United States v. Santiago-Villanueva , 668 F. App'x 841 ( 2016 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT August 29, 2016
_________________________________
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v. No. 16-6126
(D.C. No. 5:15-CR-00162-F-1)
RODOLFO SANTIAGO-VILLANUEVA, (W.D. Okla.)
Defendant - Appellant.
_________________________________
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
_________________________________
Before KELLY, LUCERO, and PHILLIPS, Circuit Judges.
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Rodolfo Santiago-Villaneuva pled guilty to possession with intent to distribute
50 grams or more of methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). The
court sentenced him to 151 months in prison, which was at the bottom of the
151-to-188-month advisory range, followed by four years of supervised release.
Mr. Santiago signed a plea agreement that included a broad waiver of appellate
rights, including the right to appeal his sentence unless the court departed upwards
from the applicable sentencing guideline range. Although no such departure
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral
estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with
Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
occurred, Mr. Santiago seeks to challenge his sentence as excessive through this
appeal.
The government has moved to enforce the appeal waiver under United States
v. Hahn, 359 F.3d 1315 (10th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (per curiam). In evaluating a
motion to enforce a waiver under Hahn, we consider: “(1) whether the disputed
appeal falls within the scope of the waiver of appellate rights; (2) whether the
defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his appellate rights; and (3) whether
enforcing the waiver would result in a miscarriage of justice.” Id. at 1325. The
government’s motion addresses each of these conditions and why they are satisfied.
In his response, Mr. Santiago concedes, through his counsel, that the
government has established the first two Hahn factors. See Resp. at 1-2 (“Counsel
for Mr. Santiago recognizes this appeal appears to fall within the scope of the appeal
waiver because the term of imprisonment imposed (151 months) was within the
advisory guideline range determined applicable by the district court. Counsel further
recognizes Mr. Santiago’s waiver of appellate rights both on paper and in open court,
thoroughly described in the plaintiff-appellee’s motion, appears to satisfy this
Circuit’s standard for ‘knowing and voluntary.’” (citations omitted)).
Mr. Santiago challenges only the third factor: he asserts that enforcing the
appellate waiver will result in a miscarriage of justice. To demonstrate that is the
case, he must show one of the following: (1) the district court relied on an
impermissible factor such as race; (2) he received ineffective assistance of counsel in
connection with the negotiation of the waiver, rendering the waiver invalid; (3) the
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sentence exceeded the statutory maximum; or (4) the waiver is otherwise unlawful.
See Hahn, 359 F.3d at 1327; see also United States v. Anderson, 374 F.3d 955, 959
(10th Cir. 2004) (“The burden rests with the defendant to demonstrate that the appeal
waiver results in a miscarriage of justice.”).
Mr. Santiago states that the district court relied on an impermissible factor in
imposing his sentence—namely, race or “cultural bias.” See Resp. at 2. When
Mr. Santiago was 20 years old, he was in a relationship with a 15-year-old that
resulted in a criminal conviction in California for unlawful sexual intercourse (sex
with a minor three-plus years younger), which was listed in the Presentence
Investigation Report. The district court referenced this relationship during
sentencing and referred to the 15-year-old as a “child.” R., Vol. III at 49.
Mr. Santiago alleges that the district court’s references were inappropriate because
they evince a lack of comprehension of social dynamics in Hispanic cultures or a
personal disapproval of the same.
Taken in context, however, it is clear that the references to Mr. Santiago’s
relationship with a “child” during sentencing were part of a valid character
assessment that did not center on race or cultural bias:
I intend to impose a sentence at the bottom of the advisory guideline
range, 151 months, and here is the reason for that: The defendant’s
actions give me no basis upon which to credit his words instead of being
persuaded by his actions. I’ve got before me a defendant who a little
short of ten years ago, while illegally in this country, he made a child
pregnant. He was then removed [on four separate occasions from
December 2006 to December 2008.].
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So we’ve got an individual who was intent on violating the laws of this
country, all the while leaving behind a child he had impregnated. And
then while back in this country, for the most recent time, . . . this
defendant made himself an integral part of a group that was engaged in
distributing a substance that ruins lives and families, all of which causes
me to have none of this talk about good values and a desire to make an
honest living.
Id. Thus, Mr. Santiago has not established that the district court relied on an
impermissible factor like race such that enforcing the appeal waiver would result in a
miscarriage of justice.
For these reasons, we grant the government’s motion to enforce and dismiss
the appeal.
Entered for the Court
Per Curiam
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