London v. Hill , 612 F. App'x 910 ( 2015 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
May 18, 2015
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK NEIL LONDON,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v. No. 13-5042
N.D. Oklahoma
JOSEPH W. BEATY, individually and (D.C. No. 4:11-CV-00028-GKF-FHM)
in his official capacity; CITY OF
TULSA, a municipal corporation,
Defendants - Appellees,
ERIC J. HILL, individually and in his
official capacity; DAVID A. FOUST,
individually and in his official
capacity,
Defendants.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before GORSUCH, MURPHY, and MORITZ, Circuit Judges.
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination
of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case was
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is
not binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata,
and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value
consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
I. Introduction
In 2011, Patrick Neil London filed a federal civil rights action against
Defendants, alleging they violated his fourth amendment right to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures. London also raised Oklahoma state tort
claims. The district court dismissed the fourth amendment claims pursuant to
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), concluding London’s complaint failed to allege facts
sufficient to state a claim for relief plausible on its face. See Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). The court also dismissed the state-law
claims.
London brought this appeal challenging the district court’s dismissal of his
complaint. Exercising jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm the
judgment.
II. Factual Background
In 2009, officers Eric Hill and David Faust 1 arrested London on outstanding
warrants after pulling him over for failing to come to a complete stop at a stop
sign. When officers searched London’s vehicle incident to the arrest, they found
illegal drugs. London was incarcerated for 435 days on drug and traffic charges
until the state district court ordered his release.
1
According to the City, Defendant Faust’s name has been repeatedly
misspelled as Foust.
-2-
After his release, London filed a complaint in federal district court naming
Officer Hill, Officer Faust, Officer Joseph Beaty, and the City of Tulsa,
Oklahoma (the “City”) as defendants. He alleged Defendants violated his fourth
and fourteenth amendment rights by illegally arresting and searching him.
Specifically, he alleged the officers acted intentionally, arbitrarily, and
maliciously by seizing him without probable cause. These claims were raised
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and were leveled against Hill, Faust, and Beaty in
their individual and official capacities. London also raised a § 1983 claim against
the City, asserting it had a policy or custom of allowing its police officers to
deprive citizens of their constitutional rights. In addition to the federal claims,
London asserted state-law negligence claims against all Defendants based, in part,
on the same set of facts underlying his § 1983 claims.
The City moved to dismiss all the claims asserted against it and all the
claims asserted against the officers in their official capacities, arguing London’s
complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The district
court granted the motion in full, dismissing all of London’s claims with the
exception of those asserted against the officers in their individual capacities.
In its ruling, the court concluded the § 1983 claims asserted against the
officers in their official capacities were duplicative of the claims asserted against
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the City and, thus, should be dismissed. 2 See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159,
165-67, 167 n.14 (1985). The court next addressed London’s § 1983 claim that
the City violated his fourth amendment rights by “establish[ing] a policy[,]
practice, pattern and/or custom of allowing its police officers to deprive citizens
of their constitutional rights.” 3 See Dodds v. Richardson, 614 F.3d 1185, 1199
(10th Cir. 2010) (“[Section] 1983 allows a plaintiff to impose liability upon a
defendant-supervisor who creates, promulgates, implements, or in some other way
possesses responsibility for the continued operation of a policy the enforcement
(by the defendant-supervisor or her subordinates) of which subjects, or causes to
be subjected that plaintiff to the deprivation of any rights secured by the
Constitution.” (quotations and alterations omitted)). The district court began its
analysis by noting that London’s only support for this claim was a reproduced list
of allegations made against several Tulsa police officers in a 2010 criminal
indictment. The court ruled those allegations wholly failed to establish the
required direct causal link between the purported unconstitutional practices and
the harm London allegedly suffered. See Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. Brown, 520
2
London has not challenged the dismissal of these claims.
3
The district court noted that London’s complaint, while purporting to also
assert claims arising under the Fourteenth Amendment, contained no factual
allegations supporting a fourteenth amendment violation. Accordingly, to the
extent such a claim was asserted, the court dismissed it. Wisely, London has not
appealed from this portion of the district court’s ruling. See Albright v. Oliver,
510 U.S. 266, 273-74 (1994) (holding the Fourth Amendment, not the Fourteenth
Amendment, governs claims arising from an arrest or seizure).
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U.S. 397, 404 (1997) (holding a § 1983 plaintiff “must show that the municipal
action was taken with the requisite degree of culpability and must demonstrate a
direct causal link between the municipal action and the deprivation of federal
rights”). Accordingly, the court concluded London’s complaint failed to meet the
Twombly pleading standard because it failed to identify the alleged “policy
makers” by name, what those individuals knew about the alleged practice of
willful blindness to officers’ violations of citizens’ constitutional rights, or how
and when the individuals learned of the alleged practice. See Twombly, 550 U.S.
at 570 (holding a plaintiff’s complaint must contain “enough facts to state a claim
to relief that is plausible on its face”).
The district court next addressed London’s state-law claims. Relying on
Oklahoma case law interpreting the Oklahoma Governmental Tort Claims Act
(“GTCA”), the court first concluded the City could not be liable for the alleged
negligent acts of the individual officers because the tortious conduct described in
London’s complaint required bad faith on the part of the officers. Fehring v.
State Ins. Fund, 19 P.3d 276, 283 (Okla. 2001) (“[W]hen, for viability, the tort
cause of action sued upon requires proof of an element that necessarily excludes
good faith conduct on the part of governmental employees, there can be no
liability against the governmental entity in a GTCA-based suit.”). London has not
appealed this portion of the district court’s ruling. He has, however, appealed the
court’s additional ruling that his state-law negligence claims against the City are
-5-
barred by the discretionary function exception set out in Okla. Stat. tit. 51, § 155.
In pertinent part, that statute provides that
[t]he state or a political subdivision shall not be liable if a loss or
claim results from:
....
4. Adoption or enforcement of or failure to adopt or enforce a law,
whether valid or invalid, including, but not limited to, any statute,
charter provisions, ordinance, resolution, rule, regulation or written
policy;
5. Performance of or the failure to exercise or perform any act or
service which is in the discretion of the state or political subdivision
or its employees . . . .
Relying on State v. Gurich, 238 P.3d 1, 4 (Okla. 2010), the district court
concluded London’s claims of negligent establishment of policy, supervision, and
training were precluded by these exemptions.
After the district court granted the City’s motion, the only remaining claims
were London’s § 1983 claims against officers Hill, Faust, and Beaty in their
individual capacities. On March 13, 2013, the claims against Officer Faust were
dismissed without prejudice for lack of service and the claims against Officer Hill
were voluntarily dismissed without prejudice on London’s oral motion. The
district court granted Officer Beaty’s motion for summary judgment as
confessed. 4 London then filed his notice of appeal.
4
London has not asserted any arguments challenging this ruling.
-6-
III. Discussion
As an initial matter, the City has challenged the jurisdiction of this court to
address London’s appeal, arguing the district court’s judgment is not final
because the individual claims against Hill and Faust were dismissed without
prejudice. See Jackson v. Volvo Trucks N. Am., Inc., 462 F.3d 1234, 1238 (10th
Cir. 2006) (“Our general rule is that a party cannot obtain appellate jurisdiction
where the district court has dismissed at least one claim without prejudice
because the case has not been fully disposed of in the lower court.”); Cook v.
Rocky Mountain Bank Note Co., 974 F.2d 147, 148 (10th Cir. 1992) (“[W]hen a
plaintiff voluntarily requests dismissal of her remaining claims without prejudice
in order to appeal from an order that dismisses another claim with prejudice, we
conclude that the order is not ‘final’ for purposes of § 1291.”). On March 21,
2014, however, a stipulated notice of dismissal was filed with the district court,
dismissing the claims against Officer Hill with prejudice. Further, because the
claims against Officer Faust were dismissed for failure to effect service, he is not
considered a party in this matter for purposes of Rule 54(b). Bristol v.
Fibreboard Corp., 789 F.2d 846, 847 (10th Cir. 1986). Accordingly, this court
has jurisdiction to consider London’s appeal.
London first challenges the district court’s dismissal of the fourth
amendment claims asserted against the City. The district court’s ruling on this
issue is reviewed de novo. Smith v. United States, 561 F.3d 1090, 1098 (10th Cir.
-7-
2009). A complaint will only survive dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) if it contains
more than a “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Twombly,
550 U.S. at 555. We can quickly reject London’s argument that the district court
applied a heightened pleading standard—under the governing standard set out in
Twombly, it is clear London has not stated a claim upon which relief may be
granted.
To make out his fourth amendment claim against the City, London must,
inter alia, show a direct causal link between the City and the constitutional
violation. Brown, 520 U.S. at 404. Here, London alleges “policy makers for the
City of Tulsa, through willful blindness, caused a policy[,] practice, pattern
and/or custom of allowing its police officers to deprive citizens of their
constitutional rights.” At a minimum, London’s complaint must identify these
policy-makers and the specific actions they took that resulted in the deprivation of
his fourth amendment rights. This he has wholly failed to do. Neither London’s
complaint nor his appellate briefing identify a single policy-maker or a specific
action allegedly taken by a policy-maker. Even if we assume the truth of the
fifty-two allegations of police misconduct set out in London’s complaint, he has
failed to allege any facts from which it could be concluded the City was aware of
those incidents of misconduct at the time of his traffic stop—thus failing to
sufficiently allege a direct causal link. Accordingly, this court has no difficulty
concluding the complaint fails to meet the Twombly standard because the
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allegations therein are wholly conclusory and the complaint contains nothing
more than a recitation of the elements of London’s cause of action. For this
reason, the dismissal of London’s fourth amendment claims against the City is
affirmed for substantially the reasons stated by the district court.
London also argues the district court erred by concluding the City was
immune from his state-law claims under the GTCA. This issue is also reviewed
de novo. Cooper v. Cent. & Sw. Servs., 271 F.3d 1247, 1251 (10th Cir. 2001). In
reaching its decision, the district court relied on a recent case in which the
Oklahoma Supreme Court held the state of Oklahoma “and its political
subdivisions enjoy immunity for the choice to adopt or enforce a law, the
formulation of law enforcement policy, and the method by which policy is
implemented.” Gurich, 238 P.3d at 4 (interpreting Okla. Stat. tit., 51 § 155).
London argues the Oklahoma Supreme Court’s statement in Gurich is dicta and
the more relevant rule can be found in a federal decision interpreting Nevada law.
See Perrin v. Gentner, 177 F. Supp. 2d 1115, 1126 (D. Nev. 2001) (ruling the
training and supervision of a police officer, unlike the initial decision to hire the
officer, were not discretionary functions).
London’s complaint set out three state-law negligence claims against the
City. He described the City’s negligent conduct as follows:
A. The negligent establishment (or, alternatively, negligent failure to
enforce) of a policy, practice, and custom within the City of Tulsa
Police Department to omit and/or failure to establish or provide
-9-
adequate training and supervision regarding the proper lawful basis
to effectuate an arrest when dealing with its citizens;
B. Negligently failed to enforce the regulations, policies, rules, and
practices of the City of Tulsa Police Department pertaining to the
proper lawful basis to effectuate an arrest;
C. The City of Tulsa, through its policy-makers, negligently failed
to instruct, supervise, control and/or discipline, on a continuing
basis, Defendants Eric J. Hill, David A. Foust [sic] and Joseph W.
Beaty in the performance of their duties to refrain from unlawfully
arresting the Plaintiff.
It is unnecessary, and impossible, to determine whether these state-law
claims are barred by the discretionary function exemption because the complaint
fails to meet the Twombly pleading standard. London asserts “policy-makers” for
the City were negligent in failing to instruct, supervise, control, and discipline the
officers involved in the traffic stop, but fails to identify any policy-maker by
name. Accordingly, it is impossible to determine from the complaint whether
these unnamed individuals even had the power to make discretionary decisions.
Similarly, London alleges the City failed to enforce regulations, policies, rules,
and practices of the City of Tulsa Police Department. He has, however, failed to
identify these regulations, policies, rules, and practices, making it impossible to
determine whether they even exist or, if they do exist, who was responsible for
enforcing them. In short, London’s state-law claims suffer from the same
infirmity as his § 1983 claims—the claims are nothing more than a “formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
-10-
In his response to the City’s motion to dismiss, London summarily argued
his complaint met the Twombly pleading standard and the state-law tort claims
should not be dismissed at the “preliminary” stage of the proceedings without
permitting him the “opportunity for discovery, amendment of the pleadings, and a
proper framing of these very complicated OGTCA claims.” 5 London
misapprehends his burden at the pleading stage. He must allege enough facts “to
raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of” negligence.
Id. at 558-60. He is not entitled to file a bare-bones complaint and fill in those
facts after discovery is complete.
IV. Conclusion
We affirm the grant of the City’s motion to dismiss. London’s complaint
fails to adequately plead either a fourth amendment claim or an Oklahoma state
negligence claim.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Michael R. Murphy
Circuit Judge
5
Neither the City’s motion to dismiss nor London’s response was included
in the appendix. The court supplements the appendix with these documents on its
own motion.
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13-5042, London v. Hill
MORITZ, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment:
I agree with my colleagues that we must affirm the district court’s dismissal of
London’s complaint, and I join those portions of the majority opinion addressing our
jurisdiction and London’s state-law claims. I write separately to express my view that we
should dismiss London’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim on a narrower ground.
The majority insists that to survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint alleging
municipal liability under § 1983 based on custom rather than policy must identify both a
specific policymaker and a specific action taken by that policymaker. Maj. Op. at 8. But
London doesn’t premise his claim on a specific policymaker’s action. Instead, he cites the
alleged failure of any policymaker to take any action. Given the nature of London’s
claim, the omissions identified by the majority should not necessarily torpedo his
complaint, particularly considering the lack of any authority or explanation to support the
majority’s conclusion. But I would not reach this question because London has failed to
allege facts sufficient to permit an inference that any of the City’s policymakers had
notice of the pattern of constitutional violations he alleges.
Municipalities are liable under § 1983 when there exists a “‘direct causal link’”
between the enforcement of the municipality’s policies and the deprivation of an
individual’s constitutional rights. Dodds v. Richardson, 614 F.3d 1185, 1202 (10th Cir.
2010) (quoting Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cnty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404
(1997)). But the existence of that direct causal link does not turn on the enactment or
adoption of an official policy. Rather, a municipality may be liable for constitutional
violations resulting from its customs, even if those customs have not received formal
approval from the municipality’s policymakers. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of
New York, 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978). A plaintiff who pursues municipal liability
based on such a custom may establish the requisite causal link between the municipality’s
actions and the constitutional violation by showing “(1) a continuing, widespread, and
persistent pattern of misconduct by the state; (2) deliberate indifference to or tacit
authorization of the conduct by policy-making officials after notice of the conduct; and
(3) a resulting injury to the plaintiff.” Rost ex rel. K.C. v. Steamboat Springs RE-2 Sch.
Dist., 511 F.3d 1114, 1125 (10th Cir. 2008).
The majority holds that London’s complaint fails to sufficiently allege a direct
causal link between the City and the alleged constitutional violation because (1) he fails
to identify any policymakers; (2) he fails to identify any specific actions taken by those
policymakers; and (3) he fails to allege any facts suggesting the City had notice of the
alleged pattern of misconduct. Maj. Op. at 8. But the majority’s reliance on the first two
omissions is at odds with this court’s express acknowledgement that a plaintiff can
employ a variety of theories to allege municipal liability under § 1983 based on a policy
or custom. See, e.g., Bryson v. City of Oklahoma City, 627 F.3d 784, 788 (10th Cir. 2010)
(explaining “municipal policy or custom may take the form of” (1) a formal regulation or
policy; (2) a practice so widespread as to amount to custom; (3) decisions of employees
with final policymaking authority; (4) ratification by policymakers of decisions made by
subordinates to whom the policymakers delegated authority; or (5) failure to adequately
train or supervise employees).
2
Liability under some of these theories may well require identification of a specific
policymaker and his or her specific actions. For instance, a plaintiff who alleges liability
based on the decision of an employee with final policymaking authority presumably must
identify both the decision and the employee. But these requirements do not necessarily
apply to London’s claim. See Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1248 (10th Cir.
2008) (explaining that “the degree of specificity necessary to establish plausibility and
fair notice, and therefore the need to include sufficient factual allegations, depends on
context”).
Unlike claims asserting liability based on the adoption of an official policy,
London’s allegations of deliberate indifference to and tacit authorization of a pattern of
officer misconduct pervasive enough to constitute a custom seem premised, by definition,
on policymakers’ inaction. See Kramer v. Wasatch Cnty. Sheriff’s Office, 743 F.3d 726,
758-59 (10th Cir. 2014) (distinguishing § 1983 liability based on official policy from
§ 1983 liability based on unwritten custom, and discussing theory of “liability by
inaction”). Similarly, London does not suggest that a specific policymaker committed a
specific act. Instead, he contends none of the City’s policymakers took action. Nor does
London assert that a specific policymaker received notice of the misconduct. Rather, he
suggests that a plaintiff can satisfy Rost’s actual notice requirement by alleging a history
of past incidents so pervasive that someone at the policymaking level was bound to have
known about them. See Owens v. Baltimore City State’s Attorneys Office, 767 F.3d 379,
402-04 (4th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, No. 14-887, 2015 WL 275612 (U.S. Apr. 27, 2015)
(reversing dismissal of complaint asserting police liability for constitutional violation
3
arising from police department’s custom when department failed to take action to correct
pattern of officer misconduct, and noting police department’s notice and indifference
could be inferred from sufficiently pervasive pattern of misconduct).
Given the various approaches to alleging liability under § 1983 and the nature of
London’s claim, I cannot agree with the majority’s one-size-fits-all approach in the
absence of any authority or explanation to support it, especially under our liberal pleading
standards. See id. at 403 (“Although prevailing on the merits of a Monell claim is
difficult, simply alleging such a claim is, by definition, easier.”). Nevertheless, I would
not reach the issue here because I agree we must affirm the district court’s dismissal of
London’s § 1983 claim based on his failure to plead sufficient facts to establish notice. I
would, however, take a slightly different tack in reaching that result.
The majority appears to accept as true all 52 of London’s allegations of police
misconduct. Maj. Op. at 8. But I would conclude that most of those allegations are mere
legal conclusions and thus are not entitled to the assumption of truth that applies to
factual allegations. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). Even assuming London is
correct that he may sufficiently plead notice by alleging a history of past incidents so
numerous and widespread as to support an inference that someone at the policymaking
level must have known about the alleged misconduct, I would find that London’s factual
allegations are insufficient, as a matter of law, to suggest a pattern extensive enough to
support such an inference. Thus, I would affirm the district court’s dismissal of London’s
complaint based on his failure to allege sufficient facts to support an inference that any
policymaker had notice of the pattern of misconduct he alleges. I would therefore reserve
4
for another day the more difficult question of whether a plaintiff like London must
identify a specific action taken by a specific policymaker to avoid dismissal under Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
5