Patterson v. Williams , 500 F. App'x 792 ( 2012 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT October 31, 2012
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
JACALYN PATTERSON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 11-3357
(D.C. No. 5:10-CV-04094-CM-GLR)
BEN WILLIAMS; CHRISTOPHER (D. Kan.)
WILLIAMS; KRISTINE C. WILLIAMS,
Defendants-Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
Before GORSUCH, Circuit Judge, BRORBY, Senior Circuit Judge, and HOLMES,
Circuit Judge.
Some years ago, Kansas resident Jacalyn Patterson sued the Williams family
in Arizona state court. The problem was, the Williamses’ son Ben — who
Ms. Patterson claimed hit her with the family truck — had summer vacation plans.
The parties agreed to a continuance but it was conditioned, Ms. Patterson says, on a
guarantee that Ben would be back in time to testify. When Ben didn’t return in time
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of this
appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral
estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with
Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
and the trial continued without him, Ms. Patterson cried foul. In her mind, she and
the Williamses had a contract and by failing to produce Ben, the Williamses breached
it.
In August 2010 — almost six years after the Arizona trial — Ms. Patterson
brought this diversity suit in federal district court in Kansas. She alleged the
Williamses breached a contract, though it’s unclear whether the alleged contract was
oral or somehow reduced to writing. For its part, the district court dismissed the case
on the Williamses’ Rule 12(b)(6) motion. It explained that “regardless of whether
the contract is written or oral, plaintiff failed to file her complaint within the statute
of limitations required by Kansas for breach of contract.” Patterson v. Williams,
No. 10-CV-04094-CM-GLR, 2011 WL 5142757, at *2 (D. Kan. Oct. 28, 2011).
In this appeal, Ms. Patterson says the district court applied Kansas’s statute of
limitations in error. She argues that because the contract was made and breached in
Arizona, the district court should have applied Arizona’s six-year statute of
limitations. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-548.
Unfortunately for Ms. Patterson, Kansas’s choice-of-law rules — which the
district court must apply when sitting in diversity, see Garcia v. Int’l Elevator Co.,
358 F.3d 777, 779 (10th Cir. 2004) — are unambiguous. They require Kansas courts
to “appl[y] [their] own statutes of limitations to actions before [them].” Muzingo v.
Vaught, 859 P.2d 977, 980 (Kan. Ct. App. 1993). And under Kansas’s statutes of
limitations, actions on oral contracts must be brought within three years and actions
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on written contracts must be brought within five. See Kan. Stat. Ann. §§ 60-511,
-512. Ms. Patterson thus can’t maintain the suit she filed some six years after the
alleged breach occurred — too late under either of Kansas’s potentially controlling
statutes of limitation.
To be sure, most rules admit of exceptions, and the rule that Kansas courts
apply Kansas limitations periods is no different. But neither of the two exceptions
Ms. Patterson invokes before us actually applies.
First, Kansas courts will go ahead and apply statutes of limitations from other
states when the Kansas borrowing statute requires them to. See Kan. Stat. Ann.
§ 60-516 (“Where the cause of action has arisen in another state . . . and by the laws
of the state . . . cannot be maintained thereon by reason of lapse of time, no action
can be maintained thereon in this state except in favor of one who is a resident of this
state and who has held the cause of action from the time it accrued.”). But the
borrowing-statute exception is of use only on defense, a tool to keep nonresident,
forum-shopping plaintiffs from exploiting advantageous Kansas limitations periods.
See, e.g., Peoples Mortg. Corp. v. Kan. Bankers Sur. Trust Co., No. 01-CV-2414-
KHV, 2002 WL 68500, at *5 (D. Kan. Jan. 9, 2002) (applying shorter Colorado
limitations to bar action brought in Kansas). It won’t work “to make timely an action
barred by Kansas law,” because § 60-516 does nothing to change the fact that
“[a]nother state’s statute may not be used to extend the Kansas limitations period.”
Muzingo, 859 P.2d at 980 (emphasis added).
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Second, Kansas courts will adopt out-of-state limitations periods when
plaintiffs sue on foreign statutes that have their own limitation periods “built in.”
See id. But this exception, too, fails to help Ms. Patterson’s case. She hasn’t alleged
any violation of any statutory right, much less any corresponding “built in”
limitations period that could save her case.
Even if Kansas limitations laws do apply, Ms. Patterson insists Ben’s absence
should have tolled the clock and in this way rendered her claim timely. By her own
admission, however, Ms. Patterson knew Ben was in Australia and she has never
alleged he wasn’t subject to process. This much is fatal to her tolling claim because
Kansas law expressly states that tolling “shall not apply to extend the period of
limitation as to any defendant whose whereabouts are known and upon whom service
of summons can be effected.” Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-517.
Alternatively still, Ms. Patterson argues the Williamses should be judicially
estopped from relying on Kansas limitations laws because they once cited Arizona
limitations law in their initial brief before the district court. The difficulty is this
doctrine generally applies only when “the position to be estopped [is] one of fact
rather than of law or legal theory” so that errors of law aren’t inadvertently
ensconced in the law books. Johnson v. Lindon City Corp., 405 F.3d 1065, 1069
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(10th Cir. 2005). And here, of course, Ms. Patterson accuses the Williamses of
changing a position of law, not fact.
The judgment of the district court is affirmed.
Entered for the Court
Neil M. Gorsuch
Circuit Judge
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