United States v. Beadles , 508 F. App'x 807 ( 2013 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
January 28, 2013
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
__________________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
No. 12-3153
v. (D.C. No. 5:10-CR-40118-JAR-1)
(D. Kan.)
TRAMAINE MONDALE BEADLES,
Defendant-Appellant.
______________________________
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before PORFILIO and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges, and BRORBY, Senior
Circuit Judge.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination
of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
A jury convicted Appellant Tramaine Mondale Beadles of one count of
bank robbery by force, violence, or intimidation in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata and collateral estoppel. It may be cited,
however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th
Cir. R. 32.1.
and 2113(a). The district court sentenced him to a term of 210 months
imprisonment, followed by three years supervised release, and ordered him to pay
victim restitution. Mr. Beadles appeals his sentence, contending the district court
committed plain error by conclusively determining his sentence prior to allowing
him his right of allocution at the sentencing hearing. We exercise jurisdiction
under 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
On December 7, 2010, a federal grand jury indicted Mr. Beadles on one
count of robbing a bank by force, violence, or intimidation in violation of 18
U.S.C. §§ 2 and 2113(a). Following the government’s presentation at trial of its
evidence again him, Mr. Beadles sought a motion for judgment of acquittal on
grounds the government failed to present sufficient evidence to support a
conviction, which the district court took under advisement. Thereafter, Mr.
Beadles set forth his defense, including his testimony asserting his accomplice
coerced him into committing the robbery by making threats against him and his
loved ones, which the jury rejected in convicting him.
Prior to sentencing, a probation officer prepared a presentence report based
on the 2011 United States Sentencing Guidelines (“Guidelines” or “U.S.S.G.”),
noting Mr. Beadles is a career criminal and calculating his total offense level at
32 and his criminal history category at VI, for a total recommended sentencing
-2-
range of 210 to 240 months imprisonment. 1 Mr. Beadles did not file any
objections to the presentence report. At the sentencing hearing, the district court
denied Mr. Beadles’s motion for acquittal as well as his motion for judgment as a
matter of law–both grounded on his assertion the government failed to provide
sufficient evidence to meet its burden for conviction based on his coercion
defense. The district court also denied Mr. Beadles’s pro se motion for a new
trial, finding, in part, he provided “no newly-discovered evidence.”
Following its rulings on these motions, the district court stated it would
announce the proposed findings of fact and also stated twice it would announce a
“tentative sentence.” It also explained it would “call for any statement or
testimony that any of the victims of this crime would like to give the Court” and
hear allocution from both Mr. Beadles’s counsel and Mr. Beadles, noting such
allocution was “his right.” It then explained the Guidelines range was 210 to 240
months imprisonment and stated:
The Court’s tentative sentence is 210 months, with no term of
probation because of the custodial sentence. Mr. Beadles would not
be eligible for probation anyway under the [G]uidelines, although the
statute allows for one to five years of probation. The statute, though,
with respect to supervised release, calls for not more than three
years. The [G]uidelines advise one to three years. The Court intends
to impose a three-year term of supervised release.
1
While the parties and district court state the recommended Guidelines
range is 210 to 240 months imprisonment, our review of the 2011 Guidelines
Sentencing Table shows the recommended range is 210 to 262 months. However,
this does not affect our disposition on appeal.
-3-
There will be no fine. The statute allows for up to $250,000.
The [G]uidelines advise [$]17,500 to $175,000.
There will be restitution imposed, an order of restitution, in the
amount of $12,815, per statute and [G]uidelines.
And also, a $100 special assessment per statute and
[G]uidelines.
The Court intends to impose each of the mandatory and special
conditions of supervision that are set forth ... in the presentence
report.
The district court then discussed the circumstances presented in conjunction
with the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors, including its belief a sentence of
210 months imprisonment was “sufficient, but not greater than necessary,” to
comply with the purposes of sentencing identified in that statute. At the
conclusion of its discussion on the proposed sentence, it allowed the government
to articulate any objections it had to the proposed sentence. In opposing the
proposed 210-month sentence and arguing for a sentence of 240 months, the
government suggested a longer sentence would better protect the public, given
Mr. Beadles had robbed several other banks prior to the instant offense. It also
provided the testimony of a bank manager on restitution and the emotional toll the
robbery caused her and other employees as well as offered the statement of
another bank employee affected by the robbery.
Following this evidence, the district court announced, as it earlier
indicated, that it would hear from counsel and then Mr. Beadles. In his argument
-4-
to the district court, Mr. Beadles’s counsel twice acknowledged a sentence of 210
months “would be an appropriate sentence,” noting such a sentence would reflect
mitigation for the coercion which caused him to commit the instant crime. Mr.
Beadles then addressed the court, stating he would “like to apologize to all” of the
bank employees and that he had not hidden anything from the agent who
interviewed him about the robbery. With regard to information he provided
authorities, he stated:
And I still have not yet received any-any officer, anybody, coming to
me and asking me am I all right. Is my family all right? I could
have been killed all because I cooperated with you guys on my last
case .... And it was just like if I didn’t have nothing, that was it. I
mean, it’s like if I don’t tell, you all don’t want to do nothing for
people. I told last time and they put me in this situation. That’s all I
have to say.
After Mr. Beadles’s allocution, the district court imposed the sentence,
explaining it had taken into account: (1) the fact Mr. Beadles is a career criminal
who robbed multiple banks; (2) the victimization of the bank employees in the
instant robbery who incurred emotional injury; (3) the fact the jury did not
believe and rejected Mr. Beadles’s coercion defense; and (4) his admission to
robbing the bank and the limited information he provided which helped in the
apprehension of his accomplice in the instant crime. After stating again that it
had taken these circumstances into consideration, it announced it was sentencing
Mr. Beadles at the low end of the Guidelines range to 210 months imprisonment
and three years supervised release and ordered him to pay restitution in the
-5-
amount of $12,815.
II. Discussion
Mr. Beadles now appeals his sentence on grounds the district court
committed plain error by effectively denying him a meaningful right of allocution
when it formally decided and announced the length of his sentence prior to
allowing him to make any statement. In making this claim, Mr. Beadles asserts
the district court decided the specific terms of his sentence and announced them
in “seemingly conclusive” terms before offering him an opportunity to address the
court, as evidenced by the fact the announcement of the sentence “interspersed a
litany of definitive and conclusive sentencing terms among the ‘tentative’ ones.”
He also argues the district court’s subsequent invitation for him to address the
sentence did not “ameliorate” the error, given a reasonable person in his situation
would have interpreted its conduct as suggesting he had no meaningful
opportunity to influence his sentence through any statements to the court. In
support, he relies on our decision in United States v. Landeros-Lopez, 615 F.3d
1260 (10th Cir. 2010), where we found the district court violated a defendant’s
right to allocution when it made a “seemingly conclusive” announcement of
sentence before offering him an opportunity to speak. In making these assertions
on his right to allocution, Mr. Beadles concedes he failed to raise them before the
district court, and therefore, our standard of review is for plain error. The
government opposes the appeal, agreeing the standard of review is for plain error
-6-
and arguing the district court’s announcement of the tentative sentence prior to
allowing Mr. Beadles his right of allocution was neither definitive nor conclusive
so as to communicate to him that he had no meaningful opportunity to influence
the sentence when addressing the court during his right of allocution. We agree.
Because Mr. Beadles failed to raise the right of allocution issue before the
district court, our standard of review is for plain error. See United States v. Frost,
684 F.3d 963, 979 (10th Cir. 2012). Plain error occurs when: (1) there is an
error; (2) which is plain; (3) affecting the defendant’s substantial rights; and (4)
seriously affecting the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial
proceeding. See United States v. Barwig, 568 F.3d 852, 855 (10th Cir. 2009).
Under a plain error review, the burden is on the appellant to establish all four
elements. See United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74, 82 (2004).
These elements are conjunctive, and only “[i]f all four prongs are satisfied, ...
may [we] then exercise our discretion to notice the forfeited error.” United States
v. Gonzalez Edeza, 359 F.3d 1246, 1250 (10th Cir. 2004) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
To establish an error as “plain,” Mr. Beadles must establish the error was
clear or obvious; to show the alleged error affected a substantial right, he must
show the error was “prejudicial,” so that the error “must have affected the
outcome of the district court proceedings.” United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725,
734 (1993). Stated another way, he must show “a reasonable probability that, but
-7-
for the error claimed, the result of the proceeding would have been different.”
Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. at 81-82 (internal quotation marks omitted). As to
the fourth prong, in order to show the error seriously affected the fairness,
integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceeding, Mr. Beadles must
demonstrate that a failure to correct the alleged error would result in a
“miscarriage of justice.” See United States v. Gonzalez-Huerta, 403 F.3d 727,
736 (10th Cir. 2005). One can establish such an error by demonstrating “a strong
possibility of receiving a significantly lower sentence” absent the error. United
States v. Meacham, 567 F.3d 1184, 1190 (10th Cir. 2009).
Having determined our standard of review, we turn to the legal principles at
issue. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32 requires, in part, that before
imposing a sentence the trial court must: (1) provide the defendant’s attorney an
opportunity to speak on the defendant’s behalf; (2) “address the defendant
personally in order to permit the defendant to speak or present any information to
mitigate the sentence”; (3) provide the government’s attorney an opportunity to
speak “equivalent to that of the defendant’s attorney”; and (4) allow victims of
the crime who are present at sentencing to be reasonably heard. See Fed. R.
Crim. P. 32(i)(4)(A)(i)-(iii) and (B). In this instance, the district court complied
with Rule 32 by allowing counsel, a victim in attendance, and Mr. Beadles to
address the court.
-8-
As to the issue of whether Mr. Beadles received a meaningful right of
allocution, we have explained that “[b]ecause allocution is vital to the sentencing
process, denial of this right requires reversal of the sentence imposed.”
Landeros-Lopez, 615 F.3d at 1264 (relying on Green v. United States, 365 U.S.
301, 304 (1961)). We have further held that:
[i]f a court “definitively” announces a defendant’s sentence before
giving him a chance to speak, the court commits reversible error
because it “effectively communicates to the defendant that his
sentence has already been determined, and that he would not have a
meaningful opportunity to influence that sentence through his
statements to the court.”
Frost, 684 F.3d at 979 (quoting Landeros-Lopez, 615 F.3d at 1268). “Such error
is generally not cured by the court’s later remark that it merely intended to
impose the sentence it announced.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
However, we have found no plain error where the trial court simply announces its
intention to sentence a defendant within the Guidelines range prior to allowing
the defendant his right to allocution. See United States v. Mendoza-Lopez, 669
F.3d 1148, 1152 (10th Cir. 2012). Moreover, even where an allocution error
occurs, we have held such an error is “not automatically subject to reversal”
under the fourth prong of the plain error analysis, because the “denial of the right
of allocution is not a fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete
miscarriage of justice, nor an omission inconsistent with the rudimentary demands
of fair procedure.” Frost, 684 F.3d at 979 (internal quotation marks omitted).
-9-
In Landeros-Lopez, on which Mr. Beadles relies, the sentencing court
definitively announced, “it is and will be the judgment of this Court that the
defendant ... is hereby committed to ... be imprisoned for a term of 115 months.
Upon release from imprisonment this defendant shall be placed on supervised
release for a term of five years ....” 615 F.3d at 1265. It then provided a
description of the conditions of confinement and supervised release, explained to
the defendant his right to appeal, and stated “[t]hat is the sentence the Court
intends to impose in this matter,” prior to asking, “[d]oes the defendant have
anything to say before the Court imposes this sentence?” Id. Under these
circumstances, we held Mr. Landeros-Lopez’s “right of allocution was violated”
because the sentencing court’s conclusive statements and definitive announcement
of the sentence to be imposed, prior to providing Mr. Landeros-Lopez an
opportunity to speak, “prematurely adjudged his sentence” and “effectively
communicated” to him “that his sentence had already been determined, and that
he would not have a meaningful opportunity to influence that sentence through his
statements to the court.” Id. at 1268.
The circumstances in Landeros-Lopez are dissimilar to those presented
here. In this case, prior to indicating what it proposed as a sentence term, the
district court twice stated it would announce a “tentative sentence” and expressly
stated it would receive evidence from the victims of the instant crime and hear
from Mr. Beadles and his counsel, thereby indicating it intended to receive this
-10-
information prior to determining a final sentence. Prior to receiving such
evidence or hearing from Mr. Beadles, it also announced its intent to sentence
him within the Guidelines range, which we have previously held does not
constitute plain error in denying a meaningful opportunity to be heard. See
Mendoza-Lopez, 669 F.3d at 1152. In addition, after announcing what it intended
to impose with regard to not only the length of imprisonment but also supervised
release, fines, restitution, and special assessment, it permitted the government to
provide any objections to them as well as to present victim evidence in support
thereof, after which it allowed Mr. Beadles’s attorney an opportunity to make
similar objections to the proposed sentence, supervised release, and restitution
amount. It then permitted Mr. Beadles an opportunity to address the court with
respect to his sentence, and only then did it announce the final sentence imposed.
These circumstances clearly illustrate the district court did not
predetermine the final sentence prior to Mr. Beadles’s allocution but, instead,
allowed the parties to object to the proposed sentence and provide argument in
support of the sentence they advocated. Indeed, after listening to the
government’s objection and argument, as well as receiving its evidence on harm
to the victims, it did not increase the sentence beyond the low end of the
Guidelines range. Furthermore, in arguing the proposed 210-month sentence was
-11-
appropriate and reflected necessary mitigation of the sentence, 2 Mr. Beadles’s
counsel clearly attempted to counter the government’s argument for a higher
sentence. In addition, the district court addressed Mr. Beadles personally,
announced he would be invited to speak to the “tentative” sentence, and allowed
him to speak on that sentence, which also demonstrates the fact that Mr. Beadles
had a meaningful opportunity to influence his sentence.
Moreover, in announcing the final sentence, it is evident the district court
considered the parties’ objections to the proposed sentence, the victims’
statements, and Mr. Beadles’s allocution, including his prior assistance to the
government, when it stated it had considered: (1) that Mr. Beadles is a career
criminal who robbed multiple banks (as argued by the government in objecting to
the proposed sentence); (2) the victims’ emotional injuries (as presented by the
victims in their statement and testimony); (3) the fact the jury rejected Mr.
Beadles’s coercion defense (as raised by Mr. Beadles’s counsel in requesting the
proposed 210-month sentence and discussed by Mr. Beadles in his allocution);
and (4) Mr. Beadles’s admission to robbing the bank and the provision of
information in the apprehension of his accomplice (as indicated in Mr. Beadles’s
2
We note Mr. Beadles’s challenge to his 210-month sentence on appeal,
after arguing for the proposed 210-month sentence at sentencing, is incredulous
and akin to the “invited error doctrine,” which precludes one from arguing the
district court erred in adopting a proposition he previously urged it to adopt. See
United States v. Quaintance, 608 F.3d 717, 721 n.2 (10th Cir. 2010); United
States v. Deberry, 430 F.3d 1294, 1302 (10th Cir. 2005).
-12-
statements during his allocution that he cooperated with authorities).
Thus, in viewing the sentencing hearing as a whole, we cannot say “a
public observer” would be left with the impression that Mr. Beadles did not have
a meaningful opportunity to influence his sentence before the district court
finalized it. See Frost, 684 F.3d at 981. As a result, no error occurred. However,
even if the circumstances presented somehow constituted an error that was clear
or obvious affecting a substantial right, Mr. Beadles has not shown the error
seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial
proceeding, as required under the fourth prong of the plain error analysis. In
other words, he has not shown a strong possibility that he would have received a
significantly lower sentence, absent the alleged error. See Meacham, 567 F.3d at
1190. This is because Mr. Beadles fails to set forth any statement or other basis
that would convince us the district court would have granted a lower sentence
than it imposed had his right to allocution not been infringed, as claimed. See
Mendoza-Lopez, 669 F.3d at 1153-54. Our conclusion is bolstered by the fact he
received the very sentence he advocated at the sentencing hearing.
-13-
III. Conclusion
For the above reasons, we AFFIRM Mr. Beadles’s sentence.
Entered by the Court:
WADE BRORBY
United States Circuit Judge
-14-