United States v. Rodriguez-Hernandez , 503 F. App'x 570 ( 2012 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
November 27, 2012
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee, No. 11-4147
v. (D. Utah)
RICARDO FRANCISCO (D.C. No. 2:09-CR-00836-CW-1)
RODRIGUEZ-HERNANDEZ,
Defendant - Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before MURPHY, ANDERSON, and HARTZ, Circuit Judges.
Defendant Ricardo Francisco Rodriguez-Hernandez pleaded guilty to one
count of possession with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of a mixture or
substance containing methamphetamine. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). The United
States District Court for the District of Utah sentenced him to 96 months’
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to honor the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
precedent except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and
collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent
with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
imprisonment, followed by 60 months of supervised release. Defendant timely
appealed.
Discerning no meritorious issues for appeal, defense counsel submitted an
Anders brief and a motion for leave to withdraw. See Anders v. California, 386
U.S. 738 (1967). As required by Anders, Defendant was provided with a copy of
the brief and the clerk of this court sent him a letter informing him that he could
respond with any meritorious arguments within 30 days. See id. at 744 (defendant
must be given a copy of the Anders brief and provided time to respond).
Defendant never responded. Believing the appeal to be wholly frivolous, the
United States chose not to submit a brief. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291. After independently examining the record, we agree with defense counsel
that there are no nonfrivolous grounds for appeal. Accordingly, we grant the
motion for leave to withdraw and dismiss the appeal.
I. DISCUSSION
Defense counsel raises two issues that might arguably support an appeal.
Both are frivolous. First, because the district court provided Defendant with the
right to speak before adjudging the sentence, it did not deny him his right to
allocute. See United States v. Mendoza-Lopez, 669 F.3d 1148, 1152 (10th Cir.
2012). Second, we cannot review any ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim
because there are no special circumstances warranting departure from our general
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rule that such claims should not be considered on direct appeal. See United States
v. Galloway, 56 F.3d 1239, 1240–41 (10th Cir. 1995) (en banc).
We find no other nonfrivolous basis for appeal in the record. The district
court did not err in accepting Defendant’s guilty plea. Defendant signed a plea
agreement that informed him of the elements of his offense and the maximum
possible penalty. In it he admitted the underlying facts and stated that he entered
into the plea only “after full and careful thought; with the advice of counsel; and
with a full understanding of my rights, the facts and circumstances of the case and
the consequences of the plea.” R., Vol. 1 at 21. At the plea hearing Defendant
testified that he understood the plea agreement and the charges against him.
Before accepting the plea, the district court confirmed the factual basis of the
plea, instructed Defendant that the maximum penalty was life imprisonment, and
otherwise adequately ensured the “plea was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary,”
United States v. Gigot, 147 F.3d 1193, 1197 (10th Cir. 1998).
Also, the district court accurately calculated the Guidelines range and
imposed a reasonable sentence. Defendant admitted that he possessed 873.7
grams of actual methamphetamine, so his base offense level was 36. See USSG
§ 2D1.1(c)(2) (2010). That level was decreased by two levels because he met the
criteria in § 5C1.2(a) (which are identical to those in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(1)–(5)),
see id. § 2D1.1(b)(11), and by three additional levels because of his acceptance of
responsibility, see id. § 3E1.1, resulting in a total offense level of 31. Defendant
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requested an offense-level reduction for minor or minimal participation. See
§ 3B1.2. But the court did not clearly err in finding that he had not established
eligibility for the reduction. With a criminal-history score of zero, Defendant had
a criminal-history category of I, see id. § 5A, resulting in a Guidelines range of
108 to 135 months, see id. Although the statutory minimum sentence for
Defendant’s offense is 120 months, see 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A), the district
court was required to impose a sentence without regard to the statutory minimum
because Defendant met the criteria set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(1)–(5). See
also USSG § 5C1.2(a). Based on “the nature and circumstances of the offense”
and Defendant’s “history and characteristics,” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), the district
court varied downward from the Guidelines range, imposing a sentence of 96
months. Because the district court correctly calculated the Guidelines range and
imposed a sentence below it, Defendant’s sentence is presumptively reasonable,
see United States v. Damato, 672 F.3d 832, 848 (10th Cir. 2012), and nothing in
the record suggests that the presumption could be overcome.
II. CONCLUSION
We GRANT the motion for leave to withdraw and DISMISS the appeal.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Harris L Hartz
Circuit Judge
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