Horng v. Lynch , 658 F. App'x 415 ( 2016 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT September 27, 2016
_________________________________
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
ZU-CHEN HORNG,
Petitioner,
v. No. 15-9579
(Petition for Review)
LORETTA E. LYNCH, United States
Attorney General,
Respondent.
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ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
_________________________________
Before TYMKOVICH, Chief Judge, BACHARACH and MORITZ, Circuit Judges.
_________________________________
Zu-Chen Horng, a citizen of Taiwan, seeks review of the Board of Immigration
Appeals’ order affirming the Immigration Judge’s order finding him ineligible for
adjustment of status or a waiver of inadmissibility. We have jurisdiction under
8 U.S.C. § 1252 and remand to the BIA for further proceedings.
Horng was admitted to the United States in 1981 on a temporary tourist visa
but stayed beyond the authorized period. He was convicted in Utah state court of
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral
estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with
Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
shoplifting in 1990, theft in 1992, battery in 1993, and felony possession of a
controlled substance under Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2) in 1994. He was charged in
2012 with being removable as an alien convicted of two crimes involving moral
turpitude under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii), based on his shoplifting and theft
convictions, and he conceded removability.
Horng then applied for adjustment of status to become a permanent resident
under 8 U.S.C. § 1255(i). But his controlled-substance conviction rendered him
potentially ineligible under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II), which states that an alien
is inadmissible, and thus ineligible for adjustment under §1255(i), if he’s been
convicted of a “controlled substance” offense, as that term is defined in 21 U.S.C.
§ 802. Horng sought a waiver of inadmissibility under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h), which
permits a waiver if the controlled-substance conviction was for “a single offense of
simple possession of 30 grams or less of marijuana.” § 1182(h). But the record of
Horng’s controlled-substance conviction doesn’t identify the controlled substance he
was convicted of possessing.
Courts generally employ a “categorical” approach to determine if a state
controlled-substance conviction qualifies as an offense under § 802 for immigration
purposes. See Mellouli v. Lynch, 135 S. Ct. 1980, 1987 (2015). Under that approach,
we determine if the state controlled substance statute categorically fits § 802. See id.
at 1990-91. The IJ determined, and the government concedes, that a violation of
Utah § 58-37-8(2) is not categorically a controlled-substance offense under
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§ 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II) because Utah’s list of controlled substances includes
substances not listed in § 802.
Courts may use a “variant” of the categorical approach, called a “modified
categorical approach,” if the statute of conviction is “divisible”; that is, if it “sets out
one or more elements of the offense in the alternative.” Descamps v. United States,
133 S. Ct. 2276, 2281 (2013). Under this approach, we may look to certain
documents to determine which alternative formed the basis of the prior conviction.
Id. But if a statute isn’t a categorical match, and it isn’t divisible, it can’t be used as
the underlying predicate or disqualifying offense. Id. at 2285-86 (holding that an
indivisible, overbroad statute can’t serve as the basis for a predicate offense).
Utah § 58-37-8(2)(a)(1) makes it unlawful to “knowingly and intentionally . . .
possess or use a controlled substance,” referencing a list of controlled substances
written in the disjunctive in § 58-37-8(2)(b). Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2) (1994).
The IJ determined that § 58-37-8(2) was divisible and thus applied the modified
categorical approach, ultimately concluding from his review of the underlying
documents that Horng failed to show his eligibility for adjustment of status or a
waiver of inadmissibility.
Horng appealed to the BIA, arguing the Utah statute was overbroad and
indivisible. During the pendency of his BIA appeal, we decided United States v.
Trent, 767 F.3d 1046 (10th Cir. 2014), holding that a statute is divisible if it sets out
alternative ways of committing the crime, even if those means weren’t alternative
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“elements in the traditional sense.” Id. at 1060-61. Based on Trent, the BIA agreed
that § 58-37-8(2) was a divisible statute and affirmed.
Horng seeks review, arguing § 58-37-8(2) is not a “divisible” statute because it
criminalizes only the use of a controlled substance; he contends the identity of the
controlled substance isn’t an element of the crime. And since it’s undisputed the
Utah statute is overbroad—that is, it criminalizes possession of substances that aren’t
controlled substances in § 802—Horng contends the Utah conviction can’t be used to
determine he is ineligible for adjustment of status based on a controlled substance
conviction.
We generally lack jurisdiction to review the discretionary denial of relief
under § 1255(i) and § 1182(h), see § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i), but here we have jurisdiction
because Horng raises purely legal issues. See § 1252(a)(2)(D) (permitting court to
review constitutional claims and questions of law).
While Horng’s petition for review was pending in this court, the Supreme
Court decided Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016), overruling Trent and
holding that the modified categorical approach can be used only when a statute lists
alternative elements of the crime; with “elements” strictly defined as the “constituent
parts of a crime’s legal definition” that must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt or
that a defendant must necessarily admit to plead guilty. Id. at 2248, 2253 (internal
quotation marks omitted). Mathis rejected Trent’s conclusion that a statute could be
considered divisible if it lists alternative means of satisfying its elements, id. at 2248,
2253, and made clear that the modified categorical approach can’t be used “as a
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technique for discovering whether a defendant’s prior conviction, even though for a
too-broad crime, rested on facts. . . that also could have satisfied the [relevant]
elements” of the predicate or disqualifying offense, id. at 2254.
The BIA’s determination that § 58-37-8(2) is divisible relied upon Trent’s
now-overruled holding that a statute is divisible if it uses alternative statutory
phrases. Neither the IJ nor the BIA determined whether Utah treats the identity of
the specific controlled substance as an element of the § 58-37-8(2) crime that must be
proven beyond a reasonable doubt. In light of Mathis, the BIA’s divisibility analysis
is no longer valid. Accordingly, we vacate the BIA’s decision and remand this
matter to the BIA for further consideration in light of Mathis.1
Entered for the Court
Nancy L. Moritz
Circuit Judge
1
Horng also argues in his petition for review that Descamps’ categorical
analysis is a legal determination not subject to his burden of proving he is eligible for
discretionary relief. On remand, resolution of whether § 58-37-8(2) is a divisible
statute may obviate the need to address this burden-of-proof argument.
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