Valdez v. Derrick , 681 F. App'x 700 ( 2017 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT March 13, 2017
_________________________________
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
MICHAEL VALDEZ,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v. No. 16-1038
(D.C. No. 1:15-CV-00109-RPM)
PETER DERRICK, III, in his individual (D. Colo.)
capacity; JOHN MACDONALD, in his
individual capacity; ROBERT MOTYKA,
JR., in his individual capacity; JEFF
MOTZ, in his individual capacity; KARL
ROLLER, in his individual capacity,
Defendants - Appellants,
and
CITY OF DENVER, a municipality,
Defendant.
_________________________________
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
_________________________________
Before KELLY, BALDOCK, and MORITZ, Circuit Judges.
_________________________________
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to honor the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent,
except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It
may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
Five police officers, the individual defendants in this case, appeal the district
court’s denial of their motion to dismiss, based on qualified immunity, five of the six
claims asserted against them by Michael Valdez under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, and
1986. We exercise jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and reverse.
I. Background
The following facts are alleged in the amended complaint or conceded by
Valdez. Valdez accepted a ride in a pickup truck from an acquaintance. Two other
passengers rode in the cab and another one rode in the back. Unbeknownst to
Valdez, police were searching for the truck in connection with criminal activity that
occurred earlier that day. While Valdez was riding in the truck, police began chasing
it. After the truck crashed, the driver and two of the passengers exchanged gunfire
with the officers and fled, while Valdez and the sole female passenger remained
inside the truck. Later, Valdez and the female passenger emerged from the truck
with their hands raised and lay down close to the truck. At no point did Valdez shoot
at or threaten the officers, and he did not possess a weapon. For unexplained reasons,
the officers shot Valdez in the back and finger. After he was taken to a hospital and
treated for his injuries, he was arrested and taken to jail. He was subsequently
charged with attempted murder and other charges related to his encounter with the
officers as well as charges related to the criminal activity that occurred earlier that
day. Unable to post bail, Valdez spent two months in jail before all of the charges
were dismissed and he was released.
2
Valdez sued the officers for unlawful and excessive use of force, malicious
prosecution, manufacture of inculpatory evidence, unreasonable seizure, false
imprisonment, and conspiracy to violate his civil rights.1 The gist of his argument as
it pertains to this appeal is that he “was an innocent bystander to crimes being
committed by those around him” and that the officers lacked probable cause to
believe he had committed any crime. Aplee. Br. at 8. He argues that they “actively
participated in his arrest and prosecution, and conspired with each other to perpetuate
the violation of [his] constitutional rights” by “manufacturing and withholding
evidence to cover up for the fact that they shot an innocent man.” Id. at 7, 8.
The officers sought dismissal of all but the use-of-force claim, arguing that
they were entitled to qualified immunity. The district court denied their motion,
finding that “[t]here is nothing to connect Valdez to the shooting and the [officers]
present at the scene had no basis for believing that Valdez had shot at them.”2 Aplt.
App. at 139. The court further found that “in [the] full context of what is alleged in
the amended complaint it is reasonable to believe that the [officers] were
participating in a conspiracy among the police to cover up their unlawful conduct by
pursuing criminal charges against Valdez.” Id.
1
His claims against the City and County of Denver are not part of this appeal.
2
In making its determinations, the district court relied in part on two
statements of probable cause which were attached to the officers’ motion, finding
that the statements “support the plaintiff’s case.” Aplt. App. at 139. For the purpose
of this appeal, we do not consider the statements or reach the issue of whether it was
proper for the district court to have considered them in ruling on the officers’ motion.
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The officers argue that the district court erred by concluding that the
allegations in the amended complaint were sufficient to overcome their qualified
immunity defense. We agree.
II. Analysis
We review de novo the district court’s denial of a motion to dismiss based on
qualified immunity when that ruling turns on an issue of law. Wilson v. Montano,
715 F.3d 847, 852 (10th Cir. 2013). “In reviewing a motion to dismiss, all
well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint are accepted as true and viewed in
the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Brown v. Montoya, 662 F.3d 1152,
1162 (10th Cir. 2011) (ellipsis and internal quotation marks omitted). “The
allegations must be enough that, if assumed to be true, the plaintiff plausibly (not just
speculatively) has a claim for relief.” Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1247
(10th Cir. 2008). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged.” Wilson, 715 F.3d at 852 (internal quotation marks
omitted). But “[w]here a complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with a
defendant’s liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of
entitlement to relief.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
To state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face and to overcome the
officers’ defense of qualified immunity, Valdez “must allege facts sufficient to show
(assuming they are true) that the [officers] plausibly violated [his] constitutional
rights, and that those rights were clearly established at the time.” Robbins, 519 F.3d
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at 1249. We opt to resolve this matter based on the clearly-established prong of the
qualified immunity standard. See Panagoulakos v. Yazzie, 741 F.3d 1126, 1129
(10th Cir. 2013) (“As the ‘clearly established’ prong resolves this case, we begin
with it.”). “[T]o show that a right is clearly established, the plaintiff must point to a
Supreme Court or Tenth Circuit decision on point, or the clearly established weight
of authority from other courts must have found the law to be as the plaintiff
maintains.” Callahan v. Unified Gov’t of Wyandotte Cty., 806 F.3d 1022, 1027
(10th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted). “The contours of the law must
be sufficiently drawn so that a reasonable officer knows when he is acting outside of
those lines . . . .” Id. at 1029.
Although it is clear that an officer must have probable cause to make a
warrantless arrest, Valdez has not shown that the officers’ conduct underlying the
five claims at issue in this appeal violated his clearly established rights. “To
determine whether an officer had probable cause to arrest an individual, we examine
the events leading up to the arrest, and then decide whether these historical facts,
viewed from the standpoint of an objectively reasonable police officer, amount to
probable cause.” Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371 (2003) (internal quotation
marks omitted). In Pringle, the Supreme Court concluded that an officer had
probable cause to arrest all three occupants of a vehicle after none of them would
provide any information about the cocaine and large amount of rolled-up cash the
officer found in the vehicle. Id. at 371-72. The Court reasoned that the requirement
for “individualized suspicion” was satisfied because passengers in a vehicle “will
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often be engaged in a common enterprise with the driver, and have the same interest
in concealing the fruits or the evidence of their wrongdoing.” Id. at 373 (internal
quotation marks omitted).
In Callahan, 806 F.3d at 1029, we held that the application of Pringle was
“debatable” in a case where all of the members of a specialized police unit were
arrested even though the arresting officers had probable cause to believe that only
some of them had committed thefts. We determined that no clearly established law
prohibits an officer from arresting “an entire small group when he knows some
unidentifiable members, if not all members, of that group have committed a crime.”
Id. at 1028. The arresting officers were entitled to qualified immunity because there
was no clear standard for applying Pringle beyond its specific facts and the officers
could reasonably assume that it applied in the situation at hand. Id. at 1029. “Before
we hold officers liable, we must ensure that they were fairly put on notice that their
actions were unlawful.” Id.
Here, it is beyond debate that the officers had probable cause to believe that
one or more occupants of the truck had committed crimes. Even accepting Valdez’s
assertions that he did not have a weapon or pose a threat to the officers when he
emerged from the truck, an objectively reasonable police officer in those
circumstances could have found probable cause to arrest him based on a belief that he
was engaged in a common enterprise with the other occupants of the truck.
See Pringle, 540 U.S. at 373. In light of Pringle and Callahan, the officers could not
have been on notice that arresting Valdez would be a violation of his clearly
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established rights. See Callahan, 806 F.3d at 1029. “Even law enforcement officials
who reasonably but mistakenly conclude that probable cause is present are entitled to
immunity.” Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227 (1991). Valdez’s allegations fail to
establish that the officers could not have reasonably concluded, based on the facts
and circumstances within their knowledge, that they had probable cause to arrest
Valdez. See id. at 228. And Valdez has not shown that the law was so clearly
established that an objectively reasonable officer in their position would have known
his actions were improper. See Callahan, 806 F.3d at 1027.
Valdez’s failure to plausibly allege that the officers lacked probable cause to
believe he committed a crime unravels each of his claims related to his arrest and
prosecution. To the extent he alleges the charges against him violated his rights, he
also fails to provide specific factual allegations about how the officers participated in
filing those charges or what any of them said or did that violated his rights. In
asserting a § 1983 claim, it is important “that the complaint make clear exactly who is
alleged to have done what to whom.” Robbins, 519 F.3d at 1250. Valdez’s
allegations do not meet this standard.
Valdez’s allegations are also insufficient to show that the officers were linked
in a conspiracy to deprive him of his rights. To state a claim for conspiracy, “a
plaintiff must allege specific facts showing an agreement and concerted action
amongst the defendants.” Tonkovich v. Kan. Bd. of Regents, 159 F.3d 504, 533
(10th Cir. 1998). No such facts are alleged in the amended complaint. “[W]holly
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conclusory” allegations of conspiracy cannot survive dismissal. Scott v. Hern,
216 F.3d 897, 908 (10th Cir. 2000).
III. Conclusion
We reverse the district court’s denial of qualified immunity to the officers with
respect to Valdez’s claims for malicious prosecution, manufacture of inculpatory
evidence, unreasonable seizure, false imprisonment, and conspiracy. The case is
remanded for further proceedings consistent with this order and judgment.
Entered for the Court
Bobby R. Baldock
Circuit Judge
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