United States v. Lopez-Mendoza , 332 F. App'x 498 ( 2009 )


Menu:
  •                                                                        FILED
    United States Court of Appeals
    Tenth Circuit
    June 16, 2009
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    Elisabeth A. Shumaker
    Clerk of Court
    TENTH CIRCUIT
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    v.                                                      No. 08-2116
    JOSE MANUEL LOPEZ-MENDOZA,                    (D.C. No. 2:07-CR-02055-LH-1)
    (D.N.M.)
    Defendant-Appellant.
    ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
    Before PORFILIO, ANDERSON, and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges. **
    Defendant Jose Manuel Lopez-Mendoza pleaded guilty to Reentry of a
    Removed Alien, in violation of 
    8 U.S.C. §§ 1326
    (a) and (b).          Defendant was
    sentenced to 36 months’ imprisonment followed by two years of supervised release.
    On appeal, Defendant’s counsel has filed a brief and a motion to withdraw as counsel
    pursuant to Anders v. California, 
    386 U.S. 738
    , 744 (1967). Neither Defendant nor
    the Government have filed responses to the Anders brief. Exercising jurisdiction
    *
    This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the
    doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited,
    however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th
    Cir. R. 32.1.
    **
    After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has
    determined unanimously to grant the parties' request for a decision on the briefs
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case
    is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
    under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    , we dismiss the appeal and grant counsel’s motion to
    withdraw.
    I.
    In 1990, Defendant was convicted for distribution of heroin and sentenced to
    51 months’ imprisonment. At the expiration of this sentence, immigration authorities
    deported Defendant to Mexico. Approximately one month after his deportation,
    Defendant illegally returned to the United States. In July 2007, the United States
    Border Patrol “found” Defendant at a Border Patrol checkpoint outside Alamogordo,
    New Mexico.
    Defendant pleaded guilty to Reentry of a Removed Alien, in violation of 
    8 U.S.C. §§ 1326
    (a) and (b). Based upon his prior deportation for an aggravated
    felony (heroin trafficking) and reduction for acceptance of responsibility, Defendant
    received an adjusted offense level of 21. Defendant was placed in a criminal history
    category of III for multiple prior convictions, including the aforementioned heroin
    trafficking, driving while intoxicated, and simple cocaine possession. Based on
    Defendant’s adjusted offense level and criminal history category, the presentence
    investigation report (PSR) calculated a sentencing guideline range of 46-57 months.
    Neither the Government nor Defendant objected to the PSR. At sentencing, the
    district court granted Defendant’s request for a sentence below the Guidelines range
    and sentenced Defendant to 36 months’ imprisonment and two years of supervised
    release.
    2
    II.
    Under Anders, defense counsel may “request permission to withdraw where
    counsel conscientiously examines a case and determines that any appeal would be
    wholly frivolous.” United States v. Calderon, 
    428 F.3d 928
    , 930 (10th Cir.2005).
    In such a case, “counsel must submit a brief to the client and the appellate court
    indicating any potential appealable issues based on the record.” 
    Id.
     The client may
    then choose to submit arguments to the court in response. The court must then fully
    examine the record “to determine whether defendant’s claims are wholly frivolous.”
    
    Id.
     If so, the court may dismiss the appeal.
    Here, Defendant’s counsel has identified only one potential basis for appeal:
    whether the sentence imposed was unreasonable. We examine sentencing decisions
    for both procedural and substantive reasonableness.         See United States v.
    Algarate-Valencia, 
    550 F.3d 1238
    , 1242 (10th Cir.2008). Counsel for Defendant
    admits, however, that no meritorious basis exists for concluding that Defendant’s
    sentence is either procedurally or substantively unreasonable. After independently
    reviewing the record, we agree that Defendant’s appeal is wholly frivolous.
    A.
    Because Defendant made no procedural objections to his sentence, we review
    for plain error only. United States v. Romero, 
    491 F.3d 1173
    , 1178 (10th Cir. 2007).
    Under this standard, Defendant must demonstrate that the district court committed
    (1) error, (2) that is plain, (3) which affects Defendant’s substantial rights, and
    3
    (4) seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial
    proceedings. See 
    id.
     Our review of the record confirms that the PSR correctly
    calculated Defendant’s Guidelines Range at 46-57 months.        At sentencing, the
    district court determined that, based upon the 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
     factors, this
    sentencing range was too harsh. The district court, therefore, varied downward and
    sentenced Defendant to only 36 months’ imprisonment. Thus, even if there was
    procedural error (which we do not find), Defendant’s substantial rights were not
    affected because he received a sentence 10 months below what would have been
    procedurally reasonable.
    B.
    Similarly, we hold the district court properly exercised its discretion and
    imposed a substantively reasonable sentence. We presume that sentences within the
    Guidelines range are substantively reasonable. See United States v. Kristl, 
    437 F.3d 1050
    , 1054 (10th Cir.2006).      Here, the district court went a step further for
    Defendant and actually varied downward from the applicable Guidelines range.
    Thus, giving due deference to the district court’s decision to vary downward ten
    months, we conclude that Defendant’s sentence was substantively reasonable in light
    of the factors identified in 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (a). See United States v. Muñoz-Nava,
    
    524 F.3d 1137
    , 1149 (10th Cir. 2008) (noting that we must give deference to district
    courts in determining the extent of a variance).
    III.
    4
    For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that Defendant’s appeal is frivolous
    under Anders. Accordingly, we DISMISS Defendant’s appeal and GRANT his
    counsel’s motion to withdraw from this case. See Anders, 
    386 U.S. at 744
     (holding
    that, if a defendant’s appeal is “wholly frivolous,” an appellate court “may grant
    counsel’s request to withdraw and dismiss the appeal”).
    Entered for the Court,
    Bobby R. Baldock
    United States Circuit Judge
    5
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 08-2116

Citation Numbers: 332 F. App'x 498

Judges: Anderson, Baldock, Porfilio

Filed Date: 6/16/2009

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 8/3/2023