United States v. Garrett, Jr. , 349 F. App'x 281 ( 2009 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
October 14, 2009
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
__________________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
No. 09-6074
v. (D.Ct. No. 5:00-CR-00025-R-10)
(W.D. Okla.)
DELMAR DELANO GARRETT, JR.,
Defendant-Appellant.
______________________________
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before BARRETT, ANDERSON, and BRORBY, Senior Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination
of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
Appellant Delmar Delano Garrett, Jr., a federal inmate, appeals the district
court’s denial of his motion brought pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) for the
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata and collateral estoppel. It may be cited,
however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th
Cir. R. 32.1.
purpose of modifying his sentence based on Amendment 706 to the United States
Sentencing Guidelines (“Guidelines” or “U.S.S.G.”). We exercise jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
On February 16, 2000, a seventy-seven-count federal indictment issued
charging thirteen defendants, including Mr. Garrett, with various drug-related
offenses, including participation in a drug conspiracy. See United States v.
Garrett, 402 F.3d 1262, 1263 (10 th Cir. 2005). Specifically, the indictment named
Mr. Garrett in four counts, including: (1) conspiracy to possess with intent to
distribute and to distribute cocaine power, cocaine base (crack cocaine), and
phencyclidine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846; (2) possession of
nine ounces of crack cocaine with intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(a)(1); (3) knowingly and intentionally using a communication facility to
facilitate the acquisition and distribution of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§ 843(b); and (4) being a felon in possession of three firearms, in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). On June 27, 2000, Mr. Garrett pled guilty to possession of
nine ounces of crack cocaine with intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(a)(1), in exchange for the government’s motion to dismiss the remaining
claims, including the conspiracy count. See Garrett, 402 F.3d at 1263. After
accepting his guilty plea, the district court dismissed the remaining counts against
-2-
him.
After Mr. Garrett pled guilty, a federal probation officer prepared a
presentence report in conjunction with the 1998 Guidelines to determine his
recommended sentence. While the offense to which he pled guilty involved the
possession of nine ounces of crack cocaine, the probation officer held Mr. Garrett
accountable for 6,677.75 grams, or 6.7 kilograms, of crack cocaine which he
purchased over a period of time from approximately March 1997 to April 1999.
Specifically, the probation officer explained this amount stemmed from crack
cocaine Mr. Garrett purchased from numerous suppliers during a common time
frame as part of two conspiracies.
Based on Mr. Garrett’s possession of over 1.5 kilograms of crack cocaine,
the probation officer determined his base offense level was 38 pursuant to
§ 2D1.1 of the 1998 Guidelines. See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)(1) (1998). The
probation officer added a two-level increase for possession of firearms in
connection with the offense and another two-level increase for obstruction of
justice for threatening and assaulting a confidential source, for a total offense
level of 42. A criminal history category of V, together with a total offense level
of 42, resulted in a Guidelines range of 360 months to life in prison. See Garrett,
402 F.3d at 1264; U.S.S.G. Ch. 5, Pt. A (1998).
-3-
Mr. Garrett initially filed objections to the presentence report, including
objections for holding him accountable for the crack cocaine he purchased from
various suppliers as well as the quantity calculated stemming from such
purchases. However, he later withdrew all objections to the presentence report.
See Garrett, 402 F.3d at 1264. At the government’s request, the district court
departed downward from the recommended sentencing range of 360 months to life
in prison and imposed a sentence of 220 months imprisonment based on Mr.
Garrett’s cooperation. See id. Mr. Garrett did not appeal his conviction or
sentence, including application of the 6.7 kilograms of relevant conduct in
assessing his base offense level. See id.Thereafter, Mr. Garrett unsuccessfully filed a § 2255 motion to vacate his
sentence and petitions for leave to file a successive § 2255 motion. See Garrett v.
United States, No. 06-6026 (10 th Cir. Feb. 13, 2006) (unpublished order) (denying
petition to file successive motion); United States v. Garrett, 402 F.3d 1262 (10 th
Cir. 2005) (vacating and remanding on issue of whether counsel was requested to
file a notice of appeal); Garrett v. United States, No. 03-6182 (10 th Cir. Aug. 19,
2003) (unpublished order) (denying petition to file successive § 2255 motion).
Following these actions, Mr. Garrett filed the instant motion pursuant to 18
U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) requesting a reduction of his sentence in conjunction with
Amendment 706, which modified the Drug Quantity Table in U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)
-4-
downward two levels for crack cocaine. 1
Thereafter, the district court appointed Mr. Garrett counsel, who then filed
a supplemental brief on March 31, 2009. Counsel argued for a sentence reduction
based on the constitutional principles recognized in United States v. Booker, 543
U.S. 220 (2005), pointing out a jury did not hear evidence on the drug quantities
used to increase Mr. Garrett’s sentence. Counsel also asserted the policy
statement promulgated by the Sentencing Commission in U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10
unconstitutionally operated as a bar to the district court’s exercise of jurisdiction
for the purpose of reducing his sentence under Booker. While recognizing this
court previously rejected this argument, counsel claimed our decisions did not
address various distinct legal issues implicated in the Sentencing Commission’s
promulgation of the policy statement nor reconciled our prior decisions in United
States v. Lee, 957 F.2d 770 (10 th Cir. 1992), and United States v. Tsosie, 376 F.3d
1210, 1218 (10 th Cir. 2004), which he stated held “policy statements did not carry
the same force and effect of laws.”
In a one-page order, the district court denied Mr. Garrett’s § 3582(c)(2)
motion on grounds he did not qualify for a sentence reduction because the 6.7
1
See U.S.S.G. Supp. to App. C, Amend. 706 (Reason for Amend.);
Amends. 712 and 713 (Mar. 3, 2008 Supp.); U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(a)(2) (2008).
-5-
kilograms of crack cocaine for which he was accountable exceeded 4.5 kilograms,
thus rendering him ineligible for relief. In addition, it held Booker had no
application to a § 3582(c)(2) sentence modification proceeding.
II. Discussion
Mr. Garrett now appeals the denial of his motion for a reduction of his
sentence, claiming the district court erred as a matter of law in summarily
denying him relief pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). In making this assertion,
Mr. Garrett raises the same arguments raised before the district court, claiming
the Sentencing Commission policy statement in § 1B1.10 cannot limit the district
court’s jurisdiction and that the principles announced in Booker should apply once
a court’s jurisdiction is invoked under § 3582(c). In so doing, he acknowledges
that in United States v. Rhodes, 549 F.3d 833, 840 (10 th Cir. 2008), cert. denied,
129 S. Ct. 2052 (2009), we held Booker does not apply to sentence modification
proceedings conducted under § 3582(c)(2) but claims this court “failed to
recognize the continuing impact of the remedial opinion in Booker” or to “address
several critical, distinct legal issues implicated in the Sentencing Commissions’s
promulgation of policy statements and the limited impact of those statements on
the jurisdiction of the court.” He also recognizes that in United States v. Dryden,
563 F.3d 1168, 1170 (10 th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, ___ S. Ct. ___, 2009 WL
2495975 (U.S. Oct. 5, 2009) (No. 09-5764), we construed the current policy
-6-
statement in § 1B1.10 as simply a restatement of Congressional direction but
claims Dryden did not address the critical distinction between a statute and a
policy statement.
In addressing Mr. Garrett’s appeal, “‘[w]e review de novo the district
court’s interpretation of a statute or the sentencing guidelines.’” United States v.
Brown, 556 F.3d 1108, 1111 (10 th Cir. 2009) (quoting United States v. Smartt, 129
F.3d 539, 540 (10 th Cir. 1997)), cert. denied, ___ S. Ct. ___, 2009 WL 1981863(U.S. Oct. 5, 2009) (No. 09-5145). “We review for an abuse of discretion a
district court’s decision to deny a reduction in sentence under 18 U.S.C.
§ 3582(c)(2).” Id. (relying on United States v. Dorrough, 84 F.3d 1309, 1311
(10 th Cir. 1996)).
Applying our standard of review, we turn to the relevant part of § 3582, on
which Mr. Garrett brought his motion for a reduction of sentence and the district
court relied in denying his motion. It states:
[I]n the case of a defendant who has been sentenced to a term of
imprisonment based on a sentencing range that has subsequently
been lowered by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
[§] 994(o), ... the court may reduce the term of imprisonment, after
considering the factors set forth in section 3553(a) to the extent that
they are applicable, if such a reduction is consistent with applicable
policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.
18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) (emphasis added). In November 2007, the Sentencing
-7-
Commission lowered crack cocaine sentences by promulgating Amendment 706 to
the Guidelines, which became retroactive in March 2008. See U.S.S.G. Supp. to
App. C, Amend. 706 (Reason for Amend.); Amends. 712 and 713 (Mar. 3, 2008
Supp.); U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(a)(2) (2008). Amendment 706 modified the drug
quantity thresholds in U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c), thereby lowering the sentencing range
so that “[c]rack cocaine offenses for quantities above and below the mandatory
minimum threshold quantities ... [were] adjusted downward by two levels.”
U.S.S.G. Supp. to App. C, Amend. 706 at 230 (Reason for Amend.). As a result,
instead of 1.5 or more kilograms of crack cocaine resulting in an offense level of
38, the revised amount requires 4.5 or more kilograms of crack cocaine for an
offense level of 38. See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)(1) (2008). Following Amendment
706, another amendment, Amendment 712, was promulgated by the Sentencing
Commission, which amended § 1B1.10 and resulted in limiting reduction of a
sentence by amendment by providing, in part: “A reduction in the defendant’s
term of imprisonment is not consistent with this policy statement and therefore is
not authorized under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) if ... an amendment listed in
subsection (c) does not have the effect of lowering the defendant’s applicable
guideline range.” See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(a)(2)(B) (2008); see also Amend. 712 at
50-51 (March 3, 2008 Supp.).
Applying these provisions to the circumstance presented, it is clear
-8-
retroactive application of a two-level reduction under Amendment 706 does not
apply here. As the district court indicated, Mr. Garrett does not qualify for a
sentence reduction because the 6.7 kilograms of crack cocaine for which he was
accountable render him ineligible for relief. Moreover, the retroactive application
of a two-level reduction to his base offense level of 38, down to a level of 36,
when combined with his four-level upward adjustment for possession of firearms
and obstruction of justice, results in a total offense level of 40, which, together
with his criminal history category of V, continues to result in a sentencing range
of 360 months to life imprisonment under the current Guidelines. See U.S.S.G.
§ 2D1.1(c)(1) (2008) and Ch. 5, Pt. A (2008). Thus, the applicable Guidelines
range would be the same as it was at the time of his sentencing. As a result, “a
reduction” in Mr. Garrett’s term of imprisonment “is not consistent with [the]
policy statement [in § 1B1.10] and therefore is not authorized under 18 U.S.C.
§ 3582(c)(2)” because a two-level reduction in the offense level under
Amendment 706, as listed in § 1B1.10(c), “does not have the effect of lowering
[his] applicable guideline range.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(a)(2)(B) (2008). As the
government points out, while Mr. Garrett is not eligible for such a reduction, he
retains the benefit of a below-Guidelines-range sentence of 220 months
imprisonment which the district court imposed at sentencing.
We next address Mr. Garrett’s argument U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10 violates the
-9-
Constitution because the Sentencing Commission cannot deny jurisdiction to
Article III courts and, therefore, the principles announced in Booker should apply
once a court’s jurisdiction is invoked under § 3582(c). To begin, as the Supreme
Court pointed out in Booker, the Sentencing Commission “is an independent
agency that exercises policymaking authority delegated to it by Congress” and
Congress’ delegation of authority to that Commission to promulgate Guidelines
does not violate the separation of powers principles or otherwise exceed
Congress’ powers. See 543 U.S. at 242-43. More specifically, after severing and
excising 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(b)(1) and 3742(e) of the Sentencing Act, the Booker
Court determined “[t]he remainder of the Act satisfies the Court’s constitutional
requirements” which it listed as being “(1) constitutionally valid ..., (2) capable of
functioning independently ..., and (3) consistent with Congress’ basic objectives
in enacting the statute ....” Id. at 258-59 (quotation marks and citations omitted).
Of course, the remainder of the Sentencing Act to which the Booker Court
referred includes § 3582(c).
In United States v. Price, we held “a district court is authorized to modify a
defendant’s sentence only in specified instances where Congress has expressly
granted the court jurisdiction to do so” and explained that by the very terms of
§ 3582(c)(2), “the court only has authority to modify a sentence when the range
has been lowered by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to 28 U.S.C. [§]
-10-
994(o).” 438 F.3d 1005, 1006-07 (10 th Cir. 2006) (quotation marks and citation
omitted). In Dryden, we rejected an argument similar to Mr. Garrett’s that the
Sentencing Commission’s policy statement in § 1B1.10(a)(2) impermissibly
limited the district court’s jurisdiction to reduce a sentence under § 3582(c)(2).
See 563 F.3d at 1170. We held the language in § 3582(c)(2), stating that a court
may reduce the term of imprisonment when “a sentencing range ... has
subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
[§] 994(o),” places a statutory limitation on resentencing and “is identical to the
requirement in U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(a)(2) that the amendment to the guidelines have
the effect of lowering the defendant’s applicable guideline range.” Id. at 1170-71
(quotation marks and citation omitted). Finally, in Rhodes, we explained the
principles announced in Booker concerning 18 U.S.C. § 3553 applied only to
original sentences, and not to proceedings under § 3582(c)(2). See 549 F.3d at
840. We find the principles in Rhodes, Dryden, and Price fully dispositive of Mr.
Garrett’s arguments and further note “we are bound by the precedent of prior
panels.” Dryden, 563 F.3d at 1171 n.1 (quotation marks and citation omitted).
Applying these principles to the case presented here, it is clear
§ 1B1.10(a)(2)(B) does not impermissibly define and limit a district court’s
authority to reduce a sentence under § 3582(c). In this case, it prohibited a
reduction in Mr. Garrett’s term of imprisonment because Amendment 706, as
-11-
listed in § 1B1.10(c), “does not have the effect of lowering [his] applicable
guideline range.” Moreover, because Booker is not applicable to § 3582(c)(2)
proceedings, it is also not applicable here. For these reasons, Mr. Garrett cannot
prevail on his constitutional and Booker arguments.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s order denying
Mr. Garrett’s motion filed pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2).
Entered by the Court:
WADE BRORBY
United States Circuit Judge
-12-