Rosborough v. United States , 352 F. App'x 238 ( 2009 )


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  •                                                                           FILED
    United States Court of Appeals
    Tenth Circuit
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    September 30, 2009
    FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                 Elisabeth A. Shumaker
    Clerk of Court
    DERWLYN ROSBOROUGH,
    Petitioner-Appellant,
    No. 09-8021
    v.                                          (D.C. No. 2:08-CV-00245-ABJ)
    (D. Wyo.)
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Respondent-Appellee.
    ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY *
    Before O’BRIEN, PORFILIO, and TYMKOVICH, Circuit Judges.
    Derwlyn Rosborough is incarcerated at the Federal Correctional Institution
    in Safford, Arizona, serving a twenty year sentence imposed by the District of
    Wyoming for possession with intent to distribute cocaine, United States v.
    Rosborough, 
    366 F.3d 1145
    , 1148 (10th Cir. 2004). In 2006 the district court, in
    a thorough eighteen page order, denied Mr. Rosborough’s first motion to vacate,
    *
    After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
    unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
    this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
    therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order is not binding
    precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and
    collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent
    with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
    set aside, or correct sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Mr. Rosborough
    did not appeal that ruling. But in 2008, he filed a pleading captioned as a
    “Verified Petition Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.” R., Doc. 1. The district court
    dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction, finding that it “constitutes an
    attempt at filing a second 28 U.S.C. § 2255 petition,” Rosborough v. United
    States, No. 08-CV-245-J, at 2 (D. Wyo. Dec. 18, 2008). 1 In order to file a second
    or successive § 2255 motion, as noted by the district court, a petitioner must first
    move the court of appeals for an order authorizing the district court to hear the
    motion. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h); 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3). Because Mr. Rosborough
    had not received permission from this court to proceed, the district court faced
    two options. It could transfer the action to this court to consider whether to
    permit the second § 2255 motion, or it could dismiss the petition for lack of
    jurisdiction. In re Cline, 
    531 F.3d 1249
    , 1252 (10th Cir. 2008). The district
    court chose the latter option. Mr. Rosborough subsequently filed a motion for
    reconsideration, which the district court denied. He then filed a motion to
    proceed in forma pauperis on appeal, which the district court granted. He now
    1
    The district court also noted that it could not entertain the petition because
    Mr. Rosborough erroneously filed it in Wyoming instead of in the district where
    he is confined. See Bradshaw v. Story, 
    86 F.3d 164
    , 166 (10th Cir. 1996) (“A
    petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 . . . must be filed in the district where the
    prisoner is confined.”).
    -2-
    appeals, pro se, challenging only the district court’s dismissal of his § 2241
    petition. 2
    To appeal a district court’s dismissal of an unauthorized § 2255 motion in
    circumstances such as these, a petitioner must first obtain a certificate of
    appealability (COA). See United States v. Harper, 
    545 F.3d 1230
    , 1233
    (10th Cir. 2008). Mr. Rosborough did not seek a COA, but we will treat his
    notice of appeal as an application for a COA. See United States v. Gordon,
    
    172 F.3d 753
    , 753-54 (10th Cir. 1999); Fed. R. App. P. 22(b)(2). “In order to
    secure a COA, a petitioner must show that ‘jurists of reason would find it
    debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.’”
    
    Harper, 545 F.3d at 1233
    (quoting Slack v. McDaniel, 
    529 U.S. 473
    , 478 (2000)).
    As previously noted, the district court construed Mr. Rosborough’s § 2241
    petition as an unauthorized second § 2255 motion. 3 Thus, whether he is entitled
    to a COA depends on whether the district court’s dismissal is subject to
    reasonable debate. We conclude it is not.
    2
    We liberally construe Mr. Rosborough’s pro se filings. See Ledbetter v.
    City of Topeka, Kan., 
    318 F.3d 1183
    , 1187 (10th Cir. 2003).
    3
    Although we have instructed district courts not to recharacterize a
    prisoner’s petition for post-conviction relief as a § 2255 motion without providing
    notice to the petitioner, United States v. Kelly, 
    235 F.3d 1238
    , 1242 (10th Cir.
    2000), that instruction is inapplicable where, as here, the petitioner has previously
    filed a § 2255 motion, United States v. Torres, 
    282 F.3d 1241
    , 1246 (10th Cir.
    2002).
    -3-
    Mr. Rosborough’s petition challenges the validity of his conviction and
    sentence, taking issue with the plea agreement under which he was convicted,
    counsel’s effectiveness, and the district court’s jurisdiction. As such,
    Mr. Rosborough clearly seeks substantive § 2255 relief, and the district court’s
    decision to construe the petition as a § 2255 motion was unquestionably correct.
    See United States v. Eccleston, 
    521 F.3d 1249
    , 1253 (10th Cir.) (explaining that
    a § 2255 motion challenges the “propriety of the federal conviction or sentence”
    as imposed, whereas a § 2241 motion challenges the execution of the federal
    sentence), cert. denied, 
    129 S. Ct. 430
    (2008); see also United States v. Nelson,
    
    465 F.3d 1145
    , 1149 (10th Cir. 2006) (“It is the relief sought, not [the] pleading’s
    title, that determines whether the pleading is a § 2255 motion.”). Moreover, the
    district court properly exercised its discretion to dismiss Mr. Rosborough’s
    petition for want of jurisdiction. See In re 
    Cline, 531 F.3d at 1252
    . Hence, no
    reasonable jurist would debate the court’s decision to dismiss the petition, and
    Mr. Rosborough thus fails to satisfy the standards for issuance of a COA.
    Accordingly, we DENY a COA and DISMISS the appeal.
    Entered for the Court
    Terrence L. O’Brien
    Circuit Judge
    -4-