United States v. Pena , 687 F. App'x 756 ( 2017 )


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  •                                                         FILED
    United States Court of Appeals
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS      Tenth Circuit
    FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                      May 4, 2017
    _________________________________
    Elisabeth A. Shumaker
    Clerk of Court
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff - Appellee,
    No. 16-6340
    v.                                           (D.C. Nos. 5:16-CV-00490-F
    & 5:13-CR-00189-F-1)
    JEREMY PENA,                                        (W.D. Okla.)
    Defendant - Appellant.
    _________________________________
    ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
    _________________________________
    Before HARTZ, HOLMES, and BACHARACH, Circuit Judges.
    _________________________________
    Mr. Jeremy Pena was sentenced to 125 months for distributing
    methamphetamine. In sentencing Mr. Pena, the court applied § 4B1.1 of the
    U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, characterizing a prior crime as a crime of
    violence based on § 4B1.2(a)’s residual clause. 1 Mr. Pena did not appeal,
    but he moved under 
    28 U.S.C. § 2255
     to vacate, set aside, or correct the
    *
    Because oral argument would not materially aid our decision-making,
    we are deciding the appeal based on the briefs. See Fed. R. App. P.
    34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G).
    Our order and judgment does not constitute binding precedent except
    under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel.
    But the order and judgment may be cited for its persuasive value under
    Fed. R. App. P. 32.1(a) and 10th Cir. R. 32.1(A).
    1
    This residual clause has since been deleted from the guidelines.
    sentence. The district court dismissed the motion and denied a certificate
    of appealability.
    Mr. Pena sought a certificate of appealability from our court so that
    he could appeal the district court’s decision. At the time, our precedent
    treated § 4B1.2(a)’s residual clause as unconstitutionally vague. United
    States v. Madrid, 
    805 F.3d 1204
     (10th Cir. 2015). Based on this precedent,
    a member of this panel granted a certificate of appealability. But three
    days later, the U.S. Supreme Court overruled our precedent in Beckles v.
    United States, rejecting a vagueness challenge to § 4B1.2(a)’s residual
    clause. 
    137 S. Ct. 886
    , 895 (2017). Based on Beckles, the government
    seeks revocation of the certificate of appealability and dismissal of the
    appeal.
    The Court ordered Mr. Pena to respond, and he has not complied.
    With the prior issuance of a certificate of appealability, we have
    jurisdiction to decide this appeal on the merits. See Porterfield v. Bell, 
    258 F.3d 484
    , 485 (6th Cir. 2001) (stating that the court of appeals obtains
    jurisdiction even when a certificate of appealability is improvidently
    granted). Because the underlying claim was potentially meritorious when
    the certificate of appealability was granted, we decline to revoke the
    certificate. See United States v. Marcello, 
    212 F.3d 1005
    , 1007-08 (7th Cir.
    2000) (stating that the appeals court will only rarely review the issuance of
    a certificate of appealability, rather than go straight to the merits, to avoid
    2
    unnecessary complexity in appeals involving collateral attacks).
    Nonetheless, we agree with the government that Beckles precludes relief on
    Mr. Pena’s claim under § 2255. As a result, we summarily affirm the
    sentence. 2
    Entered for the Court
    Robert E. Bacharach
    Circuit Judge
    2
    We grant Mr. Pena’s motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis.
    3
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 16-6340

Citation Numbers: 687 F. App'x 756

Filed Date: 5/4/2017

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 1/13/2023