Reed, Jr. v. Michaud , 498 F. App'x 767 ( 2012 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
October 2, 2012
TENTH CIRCUIT
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
NORMAN RAY REED, JR.,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
No. 12-1292
v. (D.C. No. 1:12-CV-00068-LTB)
(D. Colo.)
DAVID MICHAUD; JOHN
SUTHERS; MICHAEL ANDERSON;
DEBORAH ALLEN; TOM WATERS;
TIM HAND; JOE THISSALWOOD;
DAVID RILEY, all in their
professional and individual capacities,
Defendants.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before BRISCOE, Chief Judge, McKAY and HOLMES, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to honor the plaintiff’s request for a decision on the briefs without
oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The defendants
in this action have never been served. The case is, therefore, submitted without
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited,
however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th
Cir. R. 32.1.
oral argument.
I.
Norman Ray Reed, Jr. (Reed), a Colorado state prisoner, appeals pro se the
district court’s order dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint and seeks leave
to appeal in forma pauperis (IFP). In his amended complaint, Reed alleges that
the Colorado Parole Board and various state officials improperly found him in
violation of parole conditions that prohibit use of alcohol or illegal drugs in
disregard of his status as a registered medical marijuana patient under Colorado
law. R. Vol. I, at 156–64; see Colo. Const. art. XVIII, § 14. Reed additionally
alleges that he was not allowed to present a defense during his parole hearing and
that he was coerced into waiving his Colorado constitutional rights. R. Vol. I, at
152, 154. Reed argues the Parole Board’s determination violated his
constitutional rights to “equal protection of the laws, [d]ue [p]rocess, [d]eliberate
[i]ndifference, and 6th amendment right to have a fair opp[o]rtunity via
court/att[orney]/[j]ury to see if any [f]ederal law actually was violated.” Id. at
153.
Noting that Reed’s claims necessarily implied the invalidity of the Parole
Board’s finding that Reed had violated his parole, the district court concluded
Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), barred Reed’s claims. R. Vol. I, at 174.
The district court additionally concluded that “it appear[ed to be] within the
authority of the parole board to impose the conditions of parole to which Mr.
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Reed objects.” Id. at 173. Accordingly, the district court sua sponte dismissed
Reed’s § 1983 claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. § 1915(e)(2) (requiring a
court to dismiss when the court determines that the action or appeal is “frivolous
or malicious” or “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted.”); R. Vol.
I, at 171–72.
In a motion seeking reconsideration of the dismissal of his § 1983 action,
Reed stated that he has fully served his sentence imposed for the parole violation
at issue here. R. Vol. I, at 177 (citing Reed’s release date as May 29, 2010, for
Reed’s parole violation). At the time the district court dismissed Reed’s claims
as barred by Heck, Reed had been instead re-incarcerated for failure to register as
a sex offender. See id. at 6, 181.
In its denial of the motion to reconsider, the district court found that
reconsideration was inappropriate because “Reed indicated [in the amended
complaint] that he was incarcerated based on his parole revocation for use of
medical marijuana.” Id. at 211. Accordingly, that claim was the focus of the
court’s dismissal under Heck. The district court went on to find that nothing in
Plaintiff’s motion warranted reconsideration of its prior order. The court noted
that Reed’s newfound argument asserting only a general challenge to the
constitutionality of state “parole procedures” and “parole suitability” would
render his prior “attack on his parole revocation for medical marijuana use moot.”
Id. at 178, 211. We exercise jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm.
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II.
We review de novo a district court’s § 1915(e)(2) dismissal of a complaint
for failure to state a claim, accepting the allegations as true and viewing them in
the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Kay v. Bemis, 500 F.3d 1214, 1217
(10th Cir. 2007). Because Reed filed his complaint pro se, we construe his
pleadings liberally. See Bear v. Patton, 451 F.3d 639, 641 (10th Cir. 2006).
In Heck, the Court held
that, in order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional
conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions
whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a
§ 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been
reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared
invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or
called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas
corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
Heck, 512 U.S. at 486–87 (footnote omitted). This court has previously held that
“when the concerns underlying Heck exist,” the principles of Heck should apply.
Beck v. City of Muskogee Police Dep’t, 195 F.3d 553, 557 (10th Cir. 1999)
(finding that such concerns include “claims that would necessarily imply the
invalidity of any conviction.”).
[W]hen a state prisoner seeks damages in a § 1983 suit, the district
court must consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff
would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence;
if it would, the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can
demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been
invalidated.
Heck, 512 U.S. at 487.
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III.
Regardless of whether the Heck bar applies, we agree with the district court
that dismissal was warranted because Reed’s amended complaint failed to state a
claim in light of the Parole Board’s authority to require parolees to abide by rules
it enumerates. R. Vol. I, at 172–73 (citing Colo. Rev. Stat. § 17-2-
201(5)(f)(I)(H)–(I) (“As a condition of every parole, the parolee shall sign a
written agreement that contains such parole conditions as deemed appropriate by
the board, which . . . include . . . [t]hat the parolee shall not abuse alcoholic
beverages or use illegal drugs while on parole.”)).
Reed does not contest that he tested positive for tetrahydrocannabinol
(THC), an ingredient in marijuana, nor does he contest the Board’s authority to
impose general drug and alcohol restrictions on parolees. Id. at 152; see United
States v. Spann, 515 F.2d 579, 582 (10th Cir. 1975). Rather, he argues that his
status as a registered medical marijuana patient under Colorado law creates a
constitutional right to use medical marijuana and a defense against imposition of
this parole restriction. R. Vol. I, at 156–57. Cf. Beinor v. Indus. Claim Appeals
Office, 262 P.3d 970, 976 (Colo. App. 2011).
Under Colorado law, “one who is on parole is granted a special privilege to
be outside the walls of the institution while serving his sentence[;] . . . such a
parolee remains in constructive custody and is subject to be returned to the
enclosure at any time.” People v. Hunter, 738 P.2d 20, 22 (Colo. App. 1986);
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Colo. Rev. Stat. § 17-2-207. The conditions of that parole are governed by
statute, including “obey[ing] all state and federal laws and municipal ordinances”
and “any other condition the board may determine to be necessary.” Colo. Rev.
Stat. § 17-2-201(5)(f)(I)(C), (I); see 21 U.S.C. § 844(a) (criminalizing possession
of a controlled substance). In light of the above, Reed has failed to sufficiently
state a claim for which relief may be granted. See People v. Watkins, 282 P.3d
500, 503–04, 506 (Colo. App. 2012) (finding that federal prohibition on the use
and possession of medical marijuana constituted an “offense” under probation
regardless of Colorado’s medical marijuana constitutional amendment).
IV.
We AFFIRM the district court’s dismissal of Reed’s claims under 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and the denial of Reed’s motion for reconsideration. We
DENY Reed’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis and remind him of his
obligation to pay the filing and docket fees in full to the clerk of the court. See
Kinnell v. Graves, 265 F.3d 1125,1129 (10th Cir. 2001).
Entered for the Court
Mary Beck Briscoe
Chief Judge
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