Copart, INC. v. LABR , 184 F. App'x 711 ( 2006 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS
June 12, 2006
FO R TH E TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
COPART, IN C.,
Petitioner,
v. No. 05-9577
(Nos. 04-027 and 04-138)
AD M INISTRATIVE REVIEW (Petition for Review)
BO AR D, UN ITED STATES
DEPARTM ENT OF LABOR,
Respondent,
C HA RLES L. D A LTO N ,
Intervenor.
OR D ER AND JUDGM ENT *
Before PO RFILIO, B AL DOC K , and EBEL, Circuit Judges.
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and
collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and
judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and
conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
Petitioner Copart, Inc., processes and sells salvage vehicles. Intervenor
Charles Dalton, a Copart driver, w as fired after refusing to drive his truck.
M r. Dalton filed a complaint with the Department of Labor asserting that his truck
was unsafe and that his firing violated a provision of the Surface Transportation
Assistance Act of 1982 (STAA) prohibiting the termination of an employee for
refusing to operate a vehicle when he or she “has a reasonable apprehension of
serious injury to the employee or the public because of the vehicle’s unsafe
condition.” 49 U.S.C. § 31105(a)(1)(B)(ii). Following a ruling by an
administrative law judge (ALJ) reinstating M r. Dalton with back pay, the United
States Department of Labor Administrative Review Board (ARB) reversed and
dismissed M r. Dalton’s complaint. This court, in turn, reversed the A RB’s
decision, see Dalton v. United States Dep’t of Labor, 58 F. App’x 442 (10th Cir.
2003), and the ALJ’s original ruling was subsequently reinstated.
In the instant petition for review , Copart appeals the ARB’s refusal to
reopen the administrative record following remand by this court. Copart had
moved to reopen the record so that it could present evidence to show that
M r. Dalton would present a threat to its employees if reinstated. Copart argues
that the ARB’s refusal to reopen was arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of
discretion. Because we believe it was not, we exercise our jurisdiction under
49 U.S.C. § 31105(c) and deny the relief requested in Copart’s petition.
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BACKGROUND
Following the A LJ’s original order of reinstatement and back pay, Copart
appealed and moved the ARB for emergency relief arguing that M r. Dalton was a
threat to its employees. The ARB’s decision (1) found the order was not
supported by substantial evidence, (2) dismissed M r. Dalton’s complaint, and
(3) dismissed Copart’s emergency motion as moot. This court reversed the
ARB’s decision and remanded to the ARB which remanded to the ALJ.
Both parties then filed motions with the ALJ seeking to reopen the record.
In support of its motion Copart again argued that M r. Dalton would be a threat to
its employees if reinstated. Copart attached to its motion copies of petitions for
protective orders alleging that M r. Dalton had threatened and assaulted his
ex-wife and had threatened one of Copart’s managers. Copart also attached
copies of allegedly threatening letters M r. Dalton had sent Copart’s CEO. The
ALJ denied both parties’ motions to reopen, holding that Copart’s evidence was
not sufficiently probative to justify reopening. The ALJ also recommended that
the ARB adopt his findings and reinstate M r. D alton with back pay.
On appeal, the ARB held that the ALJ had not abused his discretion in
refusing to reopen the record because “he fully and fairly considered both the
arguments presented and the evidence the parties sought to introduce.” The ARB
noted that under 29 C.F.R. § 18.54(c), “‘[o]nce the record is closed, no additional
evidence shall be accepted into the record except upon a showing that new and
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material evidence has become available w hich was not readily available prior to
the closing of the record.’” 1 Supp. App. at 110 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 18.54(c)).
The ARB held (1) that the “[e]vidence about [M r.] Dalton’s violent nature and his
antipathy toward Copart employees that the ex parte protective orders purportedly
contain was . . . available earlier,” and (2) that “Dalton’s letters to [Copart’s
CEO] are not material to whether Dalton should be reinstated.” Id. at 111.
ANALYSIS
Copart argues that the ARB’s refusal to reopen was arbitrary and capricious
or an abuse of discretion because the ARB should have considered the proposed
new evidence and determined (1) whether reinstatement would endanger other
employees, (2) whether it was impossible for Copart and Dalton to having a
productive and amicable working relationship, and (3) whether Copart would have
terminated M r. Dalton for threatening one of its managers. Our review of the
ARB’s final order is under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C.
§ 701-706. Under the APA , we must “hold unlawful and set aside agency action,
findings, and conclusions” found to be, among other possible infirmities,
“arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with
law .” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A ); see BSP Trans, Inc. v. United States Dep’t of Labor,
160 F.3d 38, 46 (1st Cir. 1998) (applying § 706(2) in the context of the STAA).
1
Under 29 C.F.R. § 18.54(a), “[w]hen there is a hearing, the record shall be
closed at the conclusion of the hearing unless the administrative law judge directs
otherwise.”
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“W hen we review an agency’s decision under the arbitrary, capricious or abuse of
discretion standard, our review is narrow and deferential; we must uphold the
agency’s action if it has articulated a rational basis for the decision and has
considered relevant factors.” Slingluff v. Occupational Safety & Health Review
Comm’n, 425 F.3d 861, 866 (10th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation omitted). 2 Here,
we find the ARB’s determination that the evidence in question was either not new
or not material to be a rational basis for refusing to reopen the record.
W hile our research has revealed no case law defining “new and material
evidence” that is “not readily available prior to the closing of the record,” in the
context of the STAA, an analogy to our case law interpreting the relief from
judgment granted under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(2) for “newly discovered evidence
which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new
trial” is helpful. In that context we have held that:
A party seeking a new trial on newly discovered evidence must show
“(1) the evidence was newly discovered since the trial; (2) [the
moving party] was diligent in discovering the new evidence; (3) the
newly discovered evidence could not be merely cumulative or
impeaching; (4) the newly discovered evidence [was] material; and
2
The regulations implementing Section 405 of the STAA are found at
29 C.F.R. §§ 1978.100 through 1978.115. Under 29 C.F.R. § 1978.109(c)(3), the
ARB must consider “conclusive” all factual findings of the A LJ that are
“supported by substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole.” Further,
29 C.F.R. § 1978.100(b) states that the “rules set forth at 29 C.F.R. Part 18,”
which are the rules promulgated under the APA, also apply. In turn, 29 C.F.R.
§ 18.1 states that “[t]he Rules of Civil Procedure for the District Courts of the
United States shall be applied in any situation not provided for or controlled by
these rules, or by any statute, executive order or regulation.”
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(5) that a new trial, with the newly discovered evidence[, will]
probably produce a different result.”
Joseph v. Terminix Int’l Co., 17 F.3d 1282, 1285 (10th Cir. 1994) (quoting
Graham v. Wyeth Labs., 906 F.2d 1399, 1416 (10th Cir. 1990)) (alterations in
original).
In the administrative context, the Federal Circuit has had the opportunity,
in Wright v. USPS, 183 F.3d 1328, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 1999), to interpret 5 C.F.R.
§ 1201.115(d), a regulation that provides that a petition for review to the M erit
Systems Protection Board may be granted on the grounds that “new and material
evidence is available that, despite due diligence, was not available when the
record closed.” The Federal Circuit held that the evidence in question must be
“of sufficient weight to warrant an outcome different from that of the initial
decision” in order to be considered “material.” Wright, 183 F.3d at 1332.
Similarly, in NLRB v. Albion Corp., this court interpreted 29 U.S.C.
§ 160(e), which provides that when a petition for enforcement of a decision by the
NLRB is before the circuit court:
[i]f either party shall apply to the court for leave to adduce additional
evidence and shall show to the satisfaction of the court that such
additional evidence is material and that there were reasonable
grounds for the failure to adduce such evidence in the hearing before
the Board . . . the court may order such additional evidence to be
taken before the Board . . . and to be made a part of the record.
593 F.2d 936, 941 (10th Cir. 1979). In that case, although we determined that
remand w as required, we “attach[ed] weight to the Board’s prior determination of
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non-materiality,” and noted that “[w]e w ould not remand to the Board if there
were but a ‘remote possibility’ that the outcome w ould be affected thereby.” Id.(quoting NLRB v. Process and Pollution Control Co., 588 F.2d 786, 790
(10th Cir. 1978)). Likewise, in Process and Pollution Control Co., we held that:
[w]e should not remand if there is but a remote possibility that the
outcome w ould be affected by admitting the evidence, or if the
evidence is merely cumulative. However, remand is proper where it
would not be a useless gesture, but might produce a different result
due to consideration of material evidence previously excluded.
588 F.2d at 790-91 (quotations and citations omitted).
Here, most of the alleged threats to Copart’s manager were made before the
initial hearing. The first petition filed by M r. Dalton’s ex-wife was also filed
before the initial hearing. In denying Copart’s motion to reopen, the ALJ noted
that protective orders are issued in response to ex parte allegations. The ALJ
further noted that he had previously determined that M r. Gille had “significant
credibility problems,” Supp. App. at 103, and that it was pure speculation that ex
parte allegations made by M r. Dalton’s ex-wife showed that M r. Dalton had
continued hostility toward Copart. In its final decision, the ARB found that the
protective orders and the allegations therein could not serve as grounds for
reopening because the “[e]vidence about [M r.] Dalton’s violent nature and his
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antipathy toward Copart employees that the ex parte protective orders purportedly
contain was . . . available [prior to closing of the record].” 3 Supp. App. at 111.
Copart argues that the ARB erred in determining that the evidence
regarding the protective orders was not new evidence.
[E]ven if Copart had been aware of Dalton’s history of violence,
Dalton’s conduct, both before and after the hearing must be viewed
as a whole. Though Dalton’s violent conduct may have began before
the hearing, it continued and accumulated to such a level following
the hearing that only then was the true extent of his instability and
propensity for violence evident.
Pet’r Reply Br. at 1-2. W e disagree. Of the allegations contained in the petition
for protective order filed by the Copart manager, the only one that clearly
occurred after the initial hearing was an allegation that M r. Dalton called the
manager’s home and told his wife that he planned on making her husband’s life
miserable and that he then contacted the manager at work. Further, although
three of the four petitions for protective order filed by M r. Dalton’s ex-wife w ere
filed after the initial hearing, ex parte allegations of threats and assaults against a
party unrelated to Copart are of such limited relevance that we cannot say that the
ARB erred in finding the final three petitions merely cumulative of the first.
As to whether consideration of the allegedly threatening letters sent to
Copart’s CEO would have produced a difference result, we note the ALJ found
3
Although some of M r. Dalton’s alleged actions in regards to his ex-wife
and M r. Gille occurred after the initial hearing, the ARB evidently determining
that this evidence of was merely cumulative of the evidence regarding actions that
occurred prior to the hearing.
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that they showed at best “an individual who is frustrated after being fired” and
that “they certainly [did] not rise to the level of threats of violence.” Supp. App.
at 103. The ARB agreed, finding that they were not material to whether Dalton
should be reinstated. W e disagree with Copart’s assertion that “[a] reasonable
reader of . . . the letters . . . would conclude that the writer was hostile toward the
recipient and perhaps unstable” and would “expect the recipients of such letters to
feel disturbed and event threatened by the sentiment expressed in them.” Pet’r
Opening Br. at 12-13. A review of the letters shows that M r. Dalton felt that
Copart’s counsel orchestrated the manager’s petition for protective order in order
to avoid compliance with the reinstatement order and that the letters specifically
state that M r. Dalton did not intend for them to be threatening. Further, while
M r. Dalton’s letters include copies of biblical quotations asserting that God
protects the righteous and punishes the wicked, the letters themselves contain no
threats of physical violence, but simply assert that M r. Dalton intended to
continue to pursue his legal rights and to expose Copart’s unjust treatment of him
in the press if necessary. W e do not read the letters as threatening physical
violence and cannot say the ARB erred in finding them to not be material.
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The relief requested in Copart’s petition for review is DENIED. Intervenor
C harles Dalton’s M otion for Sur-Reply is DENIED.
Entered for the Court
David M . Ebel
Circuit Judge
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