Price v. Simmons , 196 F. App'x 696 ( 2006 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS
September 20, 2006
TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
LAR RY PRICE,
Petitioner-A ppellant,
No. 06-3083
v.
(District of K ansas)
(D.C. No. 05-CV-3328-SAC)
CHARLES E. SIM M ONS, Secretary of
Corrections,
Respondent-Appellee.
ORDER
Before M U RPH Y, SE YM OU R, and M cCO NNELL, Circuit Judges.
This matter is before the court on Larry Price’s pro se request for a
certificate of appealability (“COA”). Price also requests permission to proceed
on appeal in form a pauperis. Price, a state prisoner, seeks a COA so he can
appeal the district court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2241 habeas corpus petition.
28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A ); M ontez v. M cKinna, 208 F.3d 862, 867 (10th Cir.
2000). Because Price has not “made a substantial showing of the denial of a
constitutional right,” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2), this court denies his request for a
COA and dismisses this appeal. His request to proceed on appeal in forma
pauperis is likewise denied.
Price is currently incarcerated in California state prison on a conviction of
possession of cocaine base with intent to distribute. Kansas has lodged a detainer
with California corrections officials, so that at the completion of his incarceration
in California, Price will be returned to Kansas to face parole revocation
proceedings. Price filed the instant § 2241 habeas petition in the United States
District Court for the District of Kansas challenging the detainer. 1 In his § 2241
habeas petition, Price asserted he was entitled to a final hearing before the Kansas
parole board on the validity and propriety of the revocation of his parole.
In response to Price’s § 2241 habeas petition, the district court issued an
order to show cause, directing Price to demonstrate he had exhausted his state-
court remedies. M ontez, 208 F.3d at 866 (“A habeas petitioner is generally
required to exhaust state remedies whether his action is brought under § 2241 or
§ 2254.”). Price filed a response to the order to show cause demonstrating he had
sought relief in Kansas state court. Those same filings further demonstrated,
however, that Price failed to appeal the adverse decision of the state trial court.
See O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 842 (1999) (holding that exhaustion of
1
Price properly brought his challenge to the detainer in Kansas and the
district court had jurisdiction over the petition. Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit
Court of Ky., 410 U.S. 484, 499-501 (1973); M ontez v. M cKinna, 208 F.3d 862,
867 n.6 (10th Cir. 2000).
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state remedies requires a petitioner to properly present the same claims set out in
the federal habeas petition to the highest state court on direct appeal or in a state
post-conviction proceeding). Price sought to excuse his failure to comply with
O’Sullivan by asserting he w as led astray about his state remedies by the adverse
ruling in the state trial court and by the arguments of the Kansas Assistant
Attorney General before the state trial court.
The district court began by noting Price had not properly exhausted his
state remedies because he failed to appeal the denial of his state petition for post-
conviction relief. See id. The district court concluded Price could not use his
belief that he would not prevail in the Kansas appellate courts as an excuse to
avoid exhausting his state court remedies, as such a result would render
O’Sullivan a dead letter. See Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 518 (1982) (noting
that exhaustion requirement is an essential component of the doctrine of comity
and judicial economy). The district court further concluded Price’s failure to
seek appellate review in state court constituted a procedural default of his claims.
O’Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 848; Coleman v. Thom pson, 501 U.S. 722, 731-32 (1991).
Applying Coleman’s cause-and-prejudice test for overcoming procedural default,
501 U.S. at 750, the district court concluded Price could not demonstrate cause to
overcome his procedural default because it was apparent from the record that
Price simply chose not to pursue otherw ise-available state court remedies.
Accordingly, the district court denied Price’s petition.
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To be entitled to a COA, Price must make “a substantial showing of the
denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). To make the requisite
showing, he must demonstrate “reasonable jurists could debate whether (or, for
that matter, agree that) the petition should have been resolved in a different
manner or that the issues presented were adequate to deserve encouragement to
proceed further.” M iller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336 (2003) (quotations
omitted). In evaluating whether Price has satisfied his burden, this court
undertakes “a preliminary, though not definitive, consideration of the [legal]
framework” applicable to each of his claims. Id. at 338. Although Price need not
demonstrate his appeal will succeed to be entitled to a COA, he must “prove
something more than the absence of frivolity or the existence of mere good faith.”
Id.Having undertaken a review of Price’s application for a COA and appellate
filings, the district court’s order, and the entire record before this court pursuant
to the framew ork set out by the Supreme Court in M iller-El, we conclude Price is
not entitled to a COA. The district court’s resolution of Price’s § 2241 petition is
not reasonably subject to debate and the issues he seeks to raise on appeal are not
adequate to deserve further proceedings. Accordingly, this court DENIES Price’s
request for a COA and DISM ISSES this appeal. Price’s motion to proceed in
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form a pauperis is likewise DENIED. Price is directed to remit the full amount of
the appellate filing fee w ithin twenty days.
Entered for the Court
ELISABETH A. SHUM AKER, Clerk
By
Deputy Clerk
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