United States v. Trotter (Maurice) , 379 F. App'x 735 ( 2010 )


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  •                                                                         FILED
    United States Court of Appeals
    Tenth Circuit
    May 21, 2010
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    Elisabeth A. Shumaker
    Clerk of Court
    TENTH CIRCUIT
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff - Appellee,               Nos. 09-3162 & 09-3218
    v.                                              (D. Kansas)
    MAURICE TROTTER, also known as                (D.C. No. 2:04-CR-20140-CM-1)
    Mo,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff - Appellee,               Nos. 09-3163 & 09-3219
    v.                                              (D. Kansas)
    MARDELL TROTTER, also known as                (D.C. No. 2:04-CR-20140-CM-2)
    Juice, also known as Del,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
    Before MURPHY, GORSUCH, and HOLMES, Circuit Judges.
    *
    This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the
    doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited,
    however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th
    Cir. R. 32.1.
    After examining the briefs and appellate records, this court has determined
    unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
    these appeals. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The cases are
    therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. 1
    Maurice and Mardell Trotter “were tried together and convicted of
    distribution and possession with intent to distribute significant quantities of
    cocaine powder and crack cocaine as well as conspiracy to possess with intent to
    distribute those substances.” United States v. Trotter, 
    483 F.3d 694
    , 697 (10th
    Cir. 2007). On direct appeal, this court affirmed the Trotters’ convictions and
    sentences. 
    Id. at 703
    . The Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated, and
    remanded these cases for further consideration in light of Kimbrough v. United
    States, 
    552 U.S. 85
     (2007). 2 Trotter (Maurice) v. United States, 
    552 U.S. 1090
    (2008); Trotter (Mardell) v. United States, 
    552 U.S. 1091
     (2008). This court, in
    turn, remanded the cases to the district court to clarify why it rejected the
    Trotters’ requests for variances. United States v. Trotter (Maurice), 
    518 F.3d 773
    , 774 (10th Cir. 2008); United States v. Trotter (Mardell), 267 F. App’x 267,
    267 (10th Cir. 2008). On July 11, 2008, the district court entered an order
    1
    The four separate appeals are consolidated for the purpose of this
    disposition.
    2
    In Kimbrough v. United States, the Court held district courts have
    discretion to vary from the Sentencing Guidelines on the basis “that the
    crack/powder disparity yields a sentence ‘greater than necessary’ to achieve [18
    U.S.C.] § 3553(a)’s purposes, even in a mine-run case.” 
    552 U.S. 85
    , 110 (2007).
    -2-
    clarifying it understood at the time of sentencing that it had discretion to vary
    from the Guidelines on the basis of the crack/powder cocaine disparity, and had
    refused to vary on the basis the sentences it imposed on Maurice and Mardell
    were appropriate under the facts of these particular cases. Eleven months later,
    on June 11, 2009, the Trotters filed a notice of appeal and a motion for extension
    of time to file appeal (appeal nos. 09-3162, -3163). When the district court
    denied the Trotters’ motion to extend the time to file a notice of appeal, the
    Trotters filed a second notice of appeal (appeal nos. 09-3218, -3219).
    The United States has moved to dismiss these appeals as untimely. We
    grant the government’s motion and hereby dismiss these appeals. Fed. R. App. P.
    4(b)(1)(A); United States v. Garduno, 
    506 F.3d 1287
    , 1290-91 (10th Cir. 2007)
    (holding that although Rule 4(b)(1)(A) is not jurisdictional, it is an “inflexible
    claim processing rule” “assur[ing] relief to a party properly raising” timeliness
    (quotation omitted)). In so doing, we note specifically that the district court did
    not abuse its discretion in denying the Trotters’ motion to extend the time for
    filing notices of appeal. The language of Fed. R. App. P. 4(b)(4) makes clear that
    the district court could only extend the time for filing a notice of appeal for thirty
    days beyond Rule 4(b)(1)’s deadline. Fed. R. App. P. 4(b)(4). Because the
    Trotters’ notice of appeal was filed more than ten months after the expiration of
    the time for filing a notice of appeal set out in Rule 4(b)(1), the district court
    correctly denied the Trotters’ motion to extend.
    -3-
    Because the Trotters’ notice of appeal was not timely filed, this court
    grants the government’s motion and DISMISSES these appeals. 3
    ENTERED FOR THE COURT
    Michael R. Murphy
    Circuit Judge
    3
    The Trotters assert this court should remand to the district court to
    determine whether the Trotters’ counsel was ineffective in failing to file a timely
    notice of appeal. They have not, however, cited a single case supporting such a
    course of action in the face of an untimely notice of appeal. Instead, all of the
    cases cited by the Trotters involve motions for relief from judgment pursuant to
    
    28 U.S.C. § 2255
    .
    -4-