United States v. Huggins , 465 F. App'x 800 ( 2012 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS March 9, 2012
TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee, No. 11-3161
(D.C. Nos. 5:11-CV-04009-RDR &
v. 5:03-CR-40010-RDR)
(D. Kansas)
MARK D. HUGGINS,
Defendant - Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before KELLY, HARTZ, and HOLMES, Circuit Judges.
Defendant Mark Huggins filed a motion for relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255in the United States District Court for the District of Kansas, claiming that his
prior conviction for attempted battery against a correctional officer did not
constitute a “violent felony” warranting a sentencing enhancement under the
Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). The court denied
the motion but granted his request for a certificate of appealability. See 28 U.S.C.
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to honor the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
precedent except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and
collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent
with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
§ 2253(c)(1)(B) (requiring COA to appeal denial of relief under § 2255). We
affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
On September 22, 2003, Defendant pleaded guilty under a plea agreement
to possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). His
sentence was enhanced under the ACCA upon a finding by the sentencing judge
that he had been convicted of three prior violent felonies as defined in 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(e)(2)(B)—namely, second-degree murder, robbery, and attempted battery
on a correctional officer. The district court imposed the mandatory minimum
sentence of 15 years’ incarceration. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1).
Defendant filed an appeal challenging his sentence but we affirmed, see
United States v. Huggins, 116 Fed. App’x 979 (10th Cir. 2004), and the Supreme
Court denied his petition for a writ of certiorari. On January 31, 2011, he filed
his present motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, contending that the recent Supreme
Court decision in Johnson v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1265 (2010), established
that his prior attempted-battery conviction was not a conviction of a violent
felony.
II. DISCUSSION
Under the ACCA a person convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) is
subject to a minimum sentence of 15 years’ imprisonment if he has three previous
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convictions of a violent felony. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). The ACCA defines
violent felony as follows:
[A]ny crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one
year, or any act of juvenile delinquency involving the use or carrying
of a firearm, knife, or destructive device that would be punishable by
imprisonment for such term if committed by an adult, that–
(I) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of
physical force against the person of another; or
(ii) is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or
otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of
physical injury to another.
Id. § 924(e)(2)(B). The issue on appeal is whether Defendant’s 1995 conviction
of attempted battery against a correctional officer is a violent felony.
“We review de novo the legal question of whether prior convictions qualify
as violent felonies under the ACCA.” United States v. Scoville, 561 F.3d 1174,
1176 (10th Cir. 2009). In doing so, “we apply a categorical approach, generally
looking only to the fact of conviction and the statutory definition of the prior
offense, and do not generally consider the particular facts disclosed by the record
of conviction.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “That is, we consider
whether the elements of the offense are of the type that would justify its inclusion
within the ACCA, without inquiring into the specific conduct of this particular
offender.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The courts apply a modified
categorical approach, however, if the “criminal statute proscribes conduct broader
than that which would satisfy the ACCA’s definition of a violent felony.” Id.(internal quotation marks omitted). In that circumstance the courts “look at the
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charging documents and documents of conviction to determine whether the
defendant in a particular case was convicted of an offense that falls within the
ACCA.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-3413 (1994) (repealed effective July 1, 2011) defined
battery against a law enforcement officer to include a battery “committed against
a correctional officer or employee by a person in custody of the secretary of
corrections, while such officer or employee is engaged in the performance of such
officer’s or employee’s duty.” Id. § 21-3413(a)(2). An attempt under Kansas law
was “any overt act toward the perpetration of a crime done by a person who
intends to commit such crime but fails in the perpetration thereof or is prevented
or intercepted in executing such crime.” Id. § 21-3301(a) (1993) (repealed
effective July 1, 2011). Under the Kansas definition of battery, a battery could be
committed in two ways—by “[i]ntentionally or recklessly causing bodily harm to
another person,” id. § 21-3412(a) (1993) (repealed effective July 1, 2011); or by
“intentionally causing physical contact with another person when done in a rude,
insulting or angry manner,” id. § 21-3412(b) (1993) (repealed effective July 1,
2011).
Defendant’s principal argument is that his prior attempted-battery offense
does not satisfy the definition of violent felony in § 924(e)(1)(B)(I) because it did
not have “as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical
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force against the person of another.” The government concedes the point because
of the Supreme Court decision in Johnson, 130 S. Ct. 1265.
Nevertheless, the government contends that the offense was still a violent
felony because it satisfied the definition in the residual clause of
§ 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) as a crime “involv[ing] conduct that presents a serious potential
risk of physical injury to another.” It relies on our decision in United States v.
Smith, 652 F.3d 1244 (2011). In Smith the defendant’s prior Oklahoma felony
conviction was for “assault, battery or assault and battery upon the person of an
Office of Juvenile Affairs employee while . . . in the performance of his or her
duties.” Id. at 1246. Assault was defined as “‘any willful and unlawful attempt
or offer with force or violence to do a corporal hurt to another,’” and battery was
defined as “‘any willful and unlawful use of force or violence upon the person of
another.’” Id. at 1246–47 (quoting Okla. Stat. tit. 21, §§ 641, 642 (2003)). The
requisite “force or violence” could be even “the slightest touching.” Id. at 1248(internal quotation marks omitted). We held that the offense came within the
ACCA’s residual clause. See id. at 1247. Following Sykes v. United States, 131
S. Ct. 2267 (2011), we said that because the Oklahoma offense was not a strict
liability, negligence, or recklessness crime, the only issue under the residual
clause was whether the offense created a risk similar to that created by the
offenses enumerated in § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii). We then held that the Oklahoma
offense created such a risk because the risk created by an assault on a peace
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officer was similar to that created by flight from police officers by the driver of a
vehicle, the offense held to come within the residual clause by Sykes itself. See
Smith, 652 F.3d at 1248–49. We explained that an assault on a police officer,
unlike an assault on an ordinary citizen (who may be able to retreat or ignore the
assault), “necessarily gives rise to [a] sort of powder keg, which may or may not
explode into violence and result in physical injury to someone at any given time,
but which always has the serious potential to do so,” because an officer “is
required or would reasonably be expected to respond with force to control the
situation.” Id. at 1249 (internal quotation marks omitted).
The government argues that the Oklahoma offense in Smith is
indistinguishable (for ACCA purposes) from the Kansas offense of attempted
battery against a correctional officer when the battery that was attempted was a
battery defined by Kan. Stat. Ann § 21-3412(b)—that is, “intentionally causing
physical contact with another person when done in a rude, insulting or angry
manner.” We agree. Although the wording of the Kansas statute does not track
the Oklahoma statute, the gist of the offense is the same, as are the expected
consequences of such contact. Although Defendant asserts that an attempt cannot
satisfy the residual clause, the Oklahoma offense considered in Smith included an
“unlawful attempt . . . to do a corporal hurt to another,” Smith, 652 F.3d at 1246,
and one would expect a law-enforcement officer to respond to an attempt in a
manner comparable to a response to a successful attack. Likewise, Defendant is
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simply incorrect when he suggests, contrary to the holdings in Sykes and Smith,
that only “physically risky crimes against property” come within the ACCA’s
residual clause. Reply Br. at 9.
The issue before us therefore comes down to whether the attempted battery
of which Defendant was convicted was based on the definition of battery in Kan.
Stat. Ann. § 21-3412(b). To resolve that issue we must apply the modified
categorical approach. Our task is made more difficult by the absence of any
document charging Defendant with the offense of attempted battery against a
correctional officer. The record is, however, adequate for our purpose. The
complaint against Defendant tracks the language of the definition of battery in
§ 21-3412(b): “Mark D. Huggins, then and there being present did unlawfully,
willfully and intentionally cause physical contact to the person of another, . . . a
uniformed and properly identified correctional officer; in a rude, insolent or angry
manner and while such officer was engaged in the performance of his duty.” R.,
Vol. 1 at 60. At Defendant’s plea hearing the charge was amended to attempted
battery against a correctional officer. As in our recent decision in United States
v. Antonio-Agusta, No. 11-1008, 2012 WL 718872 (10th Cir. March 7, 2012), we
can infer from the plea colloquy that the only amendment to the complaint was to
make the offense an attempt. There is no evidence that the amendment altered the
mens rea of the charge—namely, that the offense was committed “unlawfully,
willfully and intentionally.”
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We therefore conclude that Defendant’s attempted-battery conviction was a
conviction of a violent felony. Defendant’s vague references to the specific facts
of his offense are irrelevant under the modified categorical approach. See
Scoville, 561 F.3d at 1176.
III. CONCLUSION
We AFFIRM the district court’s order denying Mr. Huggins’s § 2255
motion.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Harris L Hartz
Circuit Judge
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