Rosales v. Ortiz , 325 F. App'x 695 ( 2009 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
April 30, 2009
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
DANIEL L. ROSALES,
Plaintiff - Appellant, No. 08-1163
v. (D. Colorado)
JOE ORTIZ, Director of D.O.C.; (D.C. No. 06-cv-02438-EWN-CBS)
LARRY REID, Centennial
Correctional Facility (CCF); Case
Manager WATKINS (CCF); Case
Manager LINDSEY (CCF);
ANTHONY DECESARO, D.O.C.
Grievance Officer; Sergeant MORRIS
(CCF); Sergeant WARING (CCF);
Sergeant WILSON (CCF); C/O
CHASE (CCF); C/O PAUL (CCF);
C/O CORDOVA (CCF); C/O
LANGONI (CCF); C/O KEIL (CCF);
C/O PRICE (CCF); C/O ARGUELLO
(CCF),
Defendants - Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before KELLY, ANDERSON, and BRISCOE, Circuit Judges.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited,
however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th
Cir. R. 32.1.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination
of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
Daniel Rosales, an inmate in the custody of the Colorado Department of
Corrections (“CDOC”), appearing pro se, appeals from the dismissal, on statute of
limitations grounds, of his civil rights action 1 against various officials and staff of
the CDOC. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
On July 11, 2004, Mr. Rosales filed a civil rights action in the federal
district court, naming various officials and personnel of the CDOC (D. Colo.
No. cv-04-ES-1663, hereinafter referred to in this opinion as the 2004 complaint).
The complaint alleged numerous violations of Mr. Rosales’ constitutional rights.
As pertinent here, Mr. Rosales alleged that on November 18, 2003, and on
April 6, 2004, corrections officials entered his cell and confiscated his “adult”
magazines in violation of his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights under the
Federal Constitution. On October 29, 2004, the district court dismissed the
1
42 U.S.C. § 1983.
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complaint, without prejudice, for failure to first exhaust administrative remedies.
Mr. Rosales did not appeal that dismissal.
Subsequently, after traversing a rocky road in which CDOC personnel,
including the grievance officer, allegedly obstructed and delayed a response to his
grievances, Mr. Rosales finally completed the process of exhausting his
administrative remedies on October 6, 2005. Compl. ¶ 76; Appellant’s Op. Br. at
p. 2(a)(2) ¶ 13. Ten and a half months later, on August 21, 2006 (according to
Mr. Rosales), he commenced the process of refiling his civil rights action.
According to court records, his complaint was filed on December 5, 2006. That
complaint, as amended subsequently, is the one underlying this appeal. For
convenience, it is referred to hereafter simply as the complaint.
Thereafter, the defendants filed motions to dismiss. Following briefing by
both parties, the magistrate judge issued a report and recommendation (“R&R”)
which addressed each of the various issues raised in the complaint. Except for
the adult magazine/First Amendment issue, the R&R resolved each issue on the
merits and recommended dismissal. As for the First Amendment issue, the R&R
recommended dismissal on statute of limitations grounds, reasoning that the
complaint had been filed more than two years after the alleged confiscations on
November 18, 2003, and April 6, 2004. The district court adopted the magistrate
judge’s recommendations and dismissed all issues on the merits except for the
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adult magazine/First Amendment issue, which the court dismissed on statute of
limitations grounds.
In this appeal, it is important to note that only the adult magazine/First
Amendment issue is argued, 2 including dismissal of that issue on statute of
limitations grounds. Specifically, in the issues section of his appellate brief,
Mr. Rosales lists the following two issues:
a. First Issue: The plaintiff is not barred by the statute of
limitations, and whether Judge Nottingham reviewed the
plaintiff’s statute of limitations by not completely reviewing
the entire record.
b. Second Issue: Whether the (DOC) confiscated adult
magazines in violation of the plaintiff’s due process and equal
protection rights for freedom of speech and press.
Appellant’s Op. Br. at 3.
Accordingly, our review in this appeal is limited to those issues. The
district court’s merits disposition of the other allegations in the complaint has
become final. For purposes of our review, we construe Mr. Rosales’ pro se
complaint with the special solicitude required by the Supreme Court. See
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 127 S. Ct. 2197, 2200 (2007); Haines v. Kerner,
2
The notice of appeal identified a number of issues, but none of the issues,
except for the First Amendment issue, is pursued, developed, or argued in
Mr. Rosales’ appellate brief. Issues which are not argued or supported by
reasoning and authorities on appeal are deemed waived. See Bronson v. Swensen,
500 F.3d 1099, 1105 (10th Cir. 2007); Becker v. Kroll, 494 F.3d 904, 913 n.6
(10th Cir. 2007) (“An issue or argument insufficiently raised in the opening brief
is deemed waived.”).
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404 U.S. 519, 521 (1972); Van Deelen v. Johnson, 497 F.3d 1151, 1153 n.1 (10th
Cir. 2007).
DISCUSSION
We first address the statute of limitations issue because it is dispositive.
“Limitations periods in § 1983 suits are to be determined by reference to the
appropriate state statute of limitations and the coordinate tolling rules. . . .
Hardin v. Straub, 490 U.S. 536, 539 (1989) (further quotation omitted).
Mr. Rosales does not dispute that the limitations period applicable to this § 1983
suit is Colorado’s two-year statute of limitations which, subject to exceptions
discussed below, bars suits filed more than two years after the time the cause of
action accrued. See Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-80-102; Fogle v. Pierson, 435 F.3d
1252, 1258 (10th Cir. 2006); Blake v. Dickason, 997 F.2d 749, 750-51 (10th Cir.
1993). It is likewise undisputed that the relevant two accrual dates here are the
dates Mr. Rosales alleges his adult magazines were confiscated: November 18,
2003, and April 6, 2004. Finally, under Mr. Rosales’ version of events, the
earliest arguable “filing” date for the specific complaint under review is
August 21, 2006—approximately 33 months and 28-1/2 months, respectively,
from the accrual of Mr. Rosales’ claims. The complaint’s record filing date of
December 5, 2006, is approximately 36-1/2 months and 32 months, respectively,
from the accrual dates. On the face of it, therefore, those claims are barred by the
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two-year statute of limitations unless some exception applies to extend or
otherwise affect the running of the statute.
Mr. Rosales makes two independent arguments in that regard. First, he
contends that the 2006 complaint is simply a reinstatement or continuation of the
original, timely, but ultimately dismissed, 2004 complaint. Appellant’s Op. Br. at
2(a)(3) ¶ 19. He points to the fact that the dismissal was without prejudice. He
further directs our attention to the language of the district court, in the order
denying reconsideration pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e), stating, among other
things, that the dismissal was without prejudice: “so that Plaintiff may exhaust
his administrative remedies regarding these claims and resubmit the claims to the
Court once he has exhausted.” Order Denying Mot. To Reconsider at 3 (D. Colo.
Dec. 16, 2004) (emphasis added) (attached to Appellant’s Op. Br.).
Second, Mr. Rosales argues that the statute of limitations does not start
(due to tolling) until the exhaustion of remedies process is completed.
Appellant’s Op. Br. at 3(a). And, finally, Mr. Rosales contends that Younger v.
Chernovetz, 792 F. Supp. 173 (D. Conn. 1992), supports the proposition that an
amendment to a complaint relates back to the date the complaint was originally
filed.
These arguments are unavailing. The first argument fails simply because,
as stated above, the 2004 complaint was dismissed. As the word implies,
dismissal terminated the proceeding, leaving nothing which could be amended or
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continued. The “without prejudice” qualifier refers to the right to file a new
complaint covering the same claims without facing a defense that they had been
litigated previously and, therefore, could no longer be pursued.
Mr. Rosales’ second argument is that the two-year statute of limitations
was tolled during his diligent, but allegedly frustrated, attempt to exhaust his
administrative remedies as required by the court. He states that the exhaustion of
remedies process was completed on October 6, 2005, so the two-year statute
either commenced at that time or was extended by the time elapsed during the
exhaustion process. This contention invokes the doctrine of tolling, both legal
and equitable.
Tolling, like the statute of limitations, is governed by Colorado law. See
Hardin, 490 U.S. at 539; Fogle, 435 F.3d at 1258; Fratus v. DeLand, 49 F.3d 673,
675 (10th Cir. 1995). There are several grounds for tolling under Colorado law,
including a ninety-day extension under certain circumstances, Colo. Rev. Stat.
§ 13-80-111(1), and additional time for a person under a legal disability. Colo.
Rev. Stat. § 13-81-101(3). Neither of those exceptions are helpful to Mr. Rosales.
See Fogle, 435 F.3d at 1258; Russell-El v. United States, 198 F.3d 258, 1999 WL
987350, at **2-3 (10th Cir. Nov. 1, 1999) (unpublished) (cited for illustrative, not
controlling, authority).
Equitable tolling is also recognized by Colorado “when flexibility is
required to accomplish the goals of justice,” such as “when plaintiffs did not
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timely file their claims because of ‘extraordinary circumstances’ or because
defendants’ wrongful conduct prevented them from doing so,” despite diligent
efforts. Fogle, 435 F.3d at 1258 (quoting Morrison v. Goff, 91 P.3d 1050, 1053
(Colo. 2004) (further citation omitted)); see Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v.
Hartman, 911 P.2d 1094, 1099 (Colo. 1996).
We have declined to apply those tolling provisions in circumstances almost
identical to this case, reasoning that ample time for filing within the two-year
limitations period remained after the exhaustion of remedies, but that the plaintiff
failed to diligently pursue his opportunity to file. Russell-El, 1999 WL 987350.
We stated:
As the district court found, [plaintiff] also fails to allege any
extraordinary circumstances that prevented him from bringing his
claims despite diligent efforts. After [the original complaint] was
dismissed, [plaintiff] exhausted his administrative remedies on
October 1, 1997. On October 15, 1998, rather than filing a new
complaint he filed a motion for continuance in [the original
complaint] which was denied because that case had already been
dismissed. Although we understand that a pro se plaintiff may have
some confusion as to the procedural aspects of the law, [plaintiff]
provides no explanation for having waited an additional six months
before filing the instant action on April 16, 1998. Thus, we agree
with the district court’s determination that equitable tolling is not
appropriate in this action, “because [plaintiff’s] failure to return
promptly to federal court following exhaustion of administrative
remedies does not demonstrate diligent efforts to pursue his claims.”
Id. at *3 (further quotations omitted). We adopt and apply that reasoning and
conclusion here. Mr. Rosales asserts that his administrative remedies were
exhausted on October 6, 2005. On that date, at least six weeks and six months,
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respectively, remained of the original two-year limitations periods (beginning
November 18, 2003, and April 6, 2004). Some argument might be made about the
adequacy of the first available filing period of six weeks, although it would seem
that all Mr. Rosales had to do was mail his original complaint to the court for
filing. But Mr. Rosales’ failure to file within the next six months—waiting
instead, the better part of a year or more to file—fails equitable tolling
qualification. As we said in Russell-El, “[Plaintiff’s] failure to return promptly to
federal court following exhaustion of administrative remedies does not
demonstrate diligent efforts to pursue his claims.” Id.Finally, there remains the specific question which Mr. Rosales raises:
whether, separate from the tolling provisions discussed above, Colorado tolls
statutes of limitations during the exhaustion of administrative remedies required
by federal law. No case or statute directly supports that proposition, and we are
disinclined to carve out such an exception here. 3 As just discussed, the two-year
limitations period had not run on Mr. Rosales’ claims when they were
administratively exhausted. There is no equitable or legal reason to search for a
way to make something which was already available even more so.
3
In Russell-El, we recognized but found it unnecessary to resolve the issue.
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the district court’s dismissal of the First
Amendment/due process claim on statute of limitations grounds is AFFIRMED. 4
The plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed without prepayment of fees is
GRANTED. We remind him of his continuing obligation to make partial
payments until the filing fee is paid in full.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Stephen H. Anderson
Circuit Judge
4
Because we affirm on statute of limitations grounds, it is unnecessary to
address the merits of the adult magazine confiscation issue.
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