Mann v. Boatright , 477 F.3d 1140 ( 2007 )


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  •                                                              F I L E D
    United States Court of Appeals
    Tenth Circuit
    PUBLISH               February 15, 2007
    UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS Elisabeth A. Shumaker
    Clerk of Court
    TENTH CIRCUIT
    BEVERLY M ANN, individually,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v.
    BRIAN D. BO ATR IGH T,
    individually and in his capacity as a           No. 05-1559
    Jefferson County, Colorado First
    Judicial D istrict Judge; JA M ES D.
    ZIM M ERM AN, individually and in
    his capacity as a Jefferson County,
    Colorado First Judicial District
    Judge; FREDERIC B. RODGERS, a
    Gilpin County, Colorado, County
    Judge and (by special designation of
    Colorado First Judicial District Chief
    Judge R. Brooke Jackson) Jefferson
    County, Colorado, Probate Judge, in
    his capacity as Jefferson County,
    Colorado First Judicial District
    Probate Judge; R . B RO O K E
    JACKSO N, in his capacity as Chief
    Judge of the First Judicial District,
    State of C olorado; JEFFER SO N
    COUNTY, COLORADO, a municipal
    or county corporation; TH E FIRST
    JU D IC IA L D ISTR IC T, STA TE OF
    C OLO RA D O ; TH E STA TE O F
    COLORADO; M ARY M UNG ER,
    individually and in her capacity as a
    City of Lakewood, Colorado Police
    O fficer; JA N ET Y O U N G,
    individually and in her capacity as a
    City of Lakewood, Colorado assistant
    city attorney; TH E C ITY O F
    LAKEW OOD, Colorado, a municipal
    corporation; TINA L. OLSEN, in her
    capacity as a Jefferson County,
    C olorado, C ounty Judge; TH O MAS
    E. VANCE, in his capacity as a
    Jefferson County, Colorado, County
    Judge; W ILLIA M K ILPA TR IC K,
    individually and in his capacity
    as City of Golden, Colorado Police
    C hief; M A TT JU RISC HK ,
    individually and in his capacity as a
    City of Golden, Colorado Police
    O fficer; TH E C ITY O F G O LD EN,
    Colorado, a municipal corporation;
    M ARY LOGAN, individually, as
    shareholder and as administrator of
    Grand Oaks Care Center in
    Lakew ood, C olorado; STEV E
    KUTCHER, individually and as head
    nurse of Grand Oaks Care Center in
    Lakewood, Colorado; DO NA LD
    LOGAN, individually and as assistant
    manager of Grand Oaks Care Center
    in Lakewood, Colorado;
    GERI-CARE, INC. d/b/a Grand Oaks
    Care Center, in Lakewood, Colorado;
    DAVID R. GLOSS, individually and
    as an agent of Jefferson County,
    Colorado, and as an agent of The
    State of C olorado; STEPH EN IE D.
    LORIM ER; “TH E VISITOR”,
    appointed by Judge James D .
    Zimmerman, pursuant to Colorado
    Revised Statutes 15-14-305, in his or
    her capacity as court-appointed
    “V isitor”; JO H N S. G LEA SO N ,
    individually and in his capacity as
    Colorado Supreme Court Attorney
    Regulation Counsel; LO UISE
    CULBERSON-SM ITH, individually
    -2-
    and in her capacity as a Colorado
    Supreme Court Assistant
    A ttorney Regulation C ounsel; THE
    COLORADO SUPREME COURT
    OFFICE OF ATTOR NEY
    REGULA TION CO UN SEL; CA RLA
    M ARTIN, individually and in her
    former capacity as general manager
    of Golden Pond Senior Living, LLC;
    G O LD EN PO N D SEN IO R LIV ING,
    LLC, a Colorado corporation;
    HENRY M ELTON, in his capacity as
    Executive Director of Golden Pond
    Senior Living, LLC; ENRICO
    GALIM BERTI, individually and in
    his capacity as a deputy Jefferson
    County Sheriff; DONALD TAIT, in
    his capacity as a supervising deputy
    Jefferson County Sheriff; TED
    M INK, in his capacity as Jefferson
    C ounty Sheriff; G A Y LE K IN G ;
    TR OY K ING ; JO A N SC HEU M ANN;
    ERIK SCH EUM AN N; EILEEN
    BIDW ELLL. and L. JEFFREY
    BIDW ELL,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    A PPE AL FR OM T HE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
    FOR T HE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
    (D.C. No. 05-cv-2413-REB-M JW )
    Submitted on the briefs: *
    *
    After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
    unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
    (continued...)
    -3-
    Beverly M ann, pro se.
    Elizabeth C. M oran, Alyson Ray Rutberg, Donald E. Lake, III, Pryor Johnson
    Carney Karr Nixon, P.C., Greenwood Village, Colorado for Golden Pond Senior
    Living, LLC, Henry M elton, and Carla M artin, Defendants-Appellees.
    J. Andrew Nathan, Andrew J. Fisher, N athan, Bremer, D umm & M yers, P.C.,
    Denver, Colorado for W illiam K ilpatrick, M att Jurischk and The City of Golden,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    John W . Suthers, Friedrick C. Haines, Office of the Colorado Attorney General,
    Denver, Colorado for Brian D. Boatright, James D. Zimmerman, Frederic B.
    Rodgers, R. Brooke Jackson, The First Judicial District of the State of Colorado,
    The State of C olorado, Tina L. Olsen, Thomas E. Vance, John S. Gleason, Louise
    Culberson-Smith, and The Colorado Supreme Court Office of Attorney
    Regulation Counsel, Defendants-Appellees.
    Before BARRETT, PO RFILIO, and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges.
    PO RFILIO, Circuit Judge.
    Plaintiff-Appellant Beverly M ann appeals from the district court’s sua
    sponte dismissal of her complaint for lack of jurisdiction under the
    Rooker-Feldman doctrine 1 . She also challenges its order denying her request to
    file the complaint under seal and seeks reconsideration of orders issued by this
    *
    (...continued)
    this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
    therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
    1
    Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 
    263 U.S. 413
     (1923); District of Columbia
    Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 
    460 U.S. 462
     (1983).
    -4-
    court while her appeal was pending. Exercising our jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    , we affirm the judgment of the district court. W e also decline to vacate
    any previous rulings issued by motions panels of this court during the pendency
    of this appeal.
    I.
    A. The Probate Court Orders
    At the heart of this case are two Colorado probate court orders that
    determined that Beverly’s 2 elderly father, Joseph M ann, is incapacitated and
    appointed defendant Gayle King as his guardian and conservator of his estate.
    The unfortunate circumstances surrounding the court’s issuance of these orders
    are described in detail in Beverly’s complaint. To summarize, Joseph was
    diagnosed with Alzheimer’s disease in mid-2004. In October 2004, he left his
    hometow n of Chicago, where he lived with Beverly, for what was to be a short
    trip to visit his granddaughter, King, in Golden, Colorado. W hile in Colorado,
    however, he broke his elbow and had to be hospitalized, at which point his mental
    health deteriorated rapidly. On November 4, 2004, after he was released from the
    hospital, Joseph executed a health-care power-of-attorney prepared by defendant
    attorney Stephenie Lorimer. This document, which is attached to the complaint,
    purports to revoke all prior powers-of-attorney, designates K ing as Joseph’s
    2
    To avoid confusion, we refer to M s. M ann and her father, Joseph M ann, by
    their first names.
    -5-
    attorney-in-fact, and also states that King is his preferred guardian in the event
    that he is deemed incapacitated.
    Empowered by this power-of-attorney, King placed Joseph in defendant
    Golden Pond Senior Living Center and obtained a temporary restraining order that
    prohibited Beverly from contacting him. Beverly, having traveled to Colorado,
    tried several times to visit Joseph at Golden Pond and even enlisted the help of
    the local police. Each time, however, employees of G olden Pond, on King’s
    orders and in compliance with the restraining order, refused to let Beverly see her
    father. As a result, Beverly claims that she has not seen or spoken to her father
    since November 28, 2004, when she visited him at the Grand Oaks Nursing
    Home, where he lived briefly before being moved to Golden Pond.
    On December 4, 2004, King filed a petition under the Colorado probate
    code that requested a determination that Joseph was incapacitated and sought
    appointment as his guardian. In a separate petition, she sought appointment as the
    conservator of Joseph’s estate. W ith the court’s permission, Beverly intervened
    in the action as an interested person and filed objections to the petitions on
    multiple grounds. She argued primarily that King had manipulated Joseph into
    signing the November 4, 2004, power-of-attorney at a time when he lacked
    capacity to make such decisions. She argued that the pow er-of-attorney was,
    therefore, null and void and could not operate to void any prior
    powers-of-attorney, including a 1998 power-of-attorney that Joseph had executed,
    -6-
    designating Beverly as his attorney-in-fact. Defendant state court judge Brian
    Boatright held a hearing on the petitions on April 19, 2005. He excused Joseph
    from attending the hearing based on a motion filed by Joseph’s court-appointed
    attorney, defendant David Gloss. Beverly, however, attended the hearing,
    testified, and questioned witnesses.
    On M ay 9, 2005, and M ay 11, 2005, Judge Boatright issued orders granting
    the petitions for guardianship and conservatorship, respectively. In the
    guardianship order, which is attached to the complaint, the court found by clear
    and convincing evidence that Joseph was an incapacitated person as a result of
    severe memory loss caused by Alzheimer’s disease. W ith respect to the
    appointment of King, the court stated that it “ha[d] considered the wishes of the
    respondent [Joseph] concerning the selection of the guardian as filed in the
    visitor’s report and reiterated by respondent’s Court appointed attorney.” R. doc.
    1, attach. 5 at 1.
    The guardianship order grants K ing broad control over Beverly’s access to
    Joseph. It prohibits Beverly from speaking to Joseph in person or by telephone
    without King’s consent and provides that Beverly may send letters and videotapes
    to Joseph, subject to pre-screening by King. It also states that any
    correspondence that Beverly sends “shall in no manner be disparaging towards the
    rest of the family, the W ard’s residence in Colorado or the court proceedings
    granting Guardianship and Conservatorship to M rs. King.” 
    Id.,
     attach. 5 at 2.
    -7-
    Although Beverly filed numerous motions in the probate court challenging the
    guardianship and conservatorship orders, she did not appeal the orders to the
    Colorado Court of A ppeals.
    B. The District Court Proceedings
    On November 29, 2005, Beverly filed a complaint in U.S. District Court on
    behalf of herself and Joseph against 37 defendants. Among them is every state
    judge who had any involvement in the probate court proceedings; the State of
    Colorado and its First Judicial District; Jefferson County and its sheriff’s
    department; the City of Lakewood, its City Attorney, and some of its police
    officers; the City of Golden and some of its police officers; both of the
    assisted-living centers that have housed Joseph; Joseph’s court-appointed attorney
    and the statutorily-designated “visitor”; the office of Colorado’s Attorney
    Regulation Counsel and some of its employees; King, her family, and her
    attorney; and Beverly’s sisters and their husbands. The thrust of the law suit is to
    enjoin various orders issued by the probate court, most importantly those
    appointing King as guardian and conservator. The complaint also seeks “an
    emergency writ of habeas corpus or other emergency writ,” R. doc. 1 at 11,
    requiring Joseph’s production in court so that he may be told “that he has been
    stripped of most of his legal rights and has been made the unlimited legal ward of
    King,” 
    id.
     On December 14, 2005, Beverly filed a motion for a temporary
    restraining order also seeking enjoinment of the guardianship and conservatorship
    -8-
    orders and requesting that Joseph be apprised of his legal rights. The district
    court dismissed the complaint on its own motion on December 19, 2005, holding
    that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine barred it from reviewing orders issued in the
    probate court proceedings. It also held that Rooker-Feldman barred Beverly’s
    claims against the individual defendants because their actions were based on the
    probate court’s orders. The court concluded that in the absence of subject-matter
    jurisdiction, it could not address Beverly’s request for a temporary restraining
    order and dismissed the case.
    Paralleling all of this was Beverly’s attempt to have her federal complaint
    sealed, or alternatively, the case file withheld from the court’s web-based filing
    system. The district court denied her requests, holding that Beverly failed to
    demonstrate any basis for sealing documents filed in the case. On appeal,
    Beverly argues that the district court erred in applying the Rooker-Feldman
    doctrine to her claims and abused its discretion in refusing to seal her complaint.
    II.
    A. Dismissal of the Complaint
    W e review the dismissal of a complaint for lack of subject-matter
    jurisdiction de novo. Guttman v. Khalsa, 
    446 F.3d 1027
    , 1031 (10th Cir. 2006).
    W e may affirm the dismissal on “any grounds for which there is a record
    sufficient to permit conclusions of law, even grounds not relied upon by the
    district court.” Lippoldt v. Cole, 
    468 F.3d 1204
    , 1219 (10th Cir. 2006) (quotation
    -9-
    omitted). Having carefully reviewed the record, we conclude that the district
    court lacked jurisdiction over the lion’s share of Beverly’s claims and properly
    dismissed them under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Beverly’s complaint does
    allude to some claims distinct from her challenge to the state court’s guardianship
    and conservatorship orders, which would not be barred by Rooker-Feldman. But
    as explained below, her attempt to state any such claims failed miserably, and
    thus we affirm the dismissal of the balance of her complaint for its utter disregard
    of the pleading requirements mandated by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8.
    “The Rooker-Feldman doctrine prevents the lower federal courts from
    exercising jurisdiction over cases brought by ‘state-court losers’ challenging
    ‘state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings
    comm enced.’” Lance v. Dennis, 
    126 S.Ct. 1198
    , 1199 (2006) (quoting Exxon
    M obil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 
    544 U.S. 280
    , 284 (2005)). To Beverly
    this means that having lost in probate court, she cannot file a federal complaint
    seeking review and reversal of the unfavorable judgment. Even if the probate
    court’s decision was w rong, that does not make its judgment void, but merely
    leaves it “open to reversal or modification in an appropriate and timely appellate
    proceeding.” Exxon-M obil, 
    544 U.S. at 284
    .
    The Court clarified in Exxon-M obil that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is
    confined “to cases brought after the state proceedings have ended.” Guttman,
    
    446 F.3d at 1031
     (quotation omitted). Thus, for the doctrine to apply here, the
    -10-
    state probate proceedings must have ended before Beverly filed her federal
    complaint. Beverly argues that the probate proceedings have not ended and will
    not end until either her father dies or the guardianship/conservatorship is
    terminated.
    Fortunately, the Colorado Supreme Court recently addressed the question of
    what constitutes a final judgment of the probate court. Scott v. Scott, 
    136 P.3d 892
    , 894 (Colo. 2006). Although the case involved a will probate matter, we see
    no reason why the court’s instructions should not apply equally to guardianship
    and protective proceedings. In Scott, the court held that the rules for determining
    whether a probate court order is final are the same rules that govern other kinds of
    civil cases. “[A]n order of the probate court is final if it ends the particular action
    in which it is entered and leaves nothing further for the court pronouncing it to do
    in order to completely determine the rights of the parties as to that proceeding.”
    Id. at 896. It further explained that the scope of a proceeding in a probate matter
    is governed by the petition that initiated it. Id. at 896-97. “Therefore, when the
    probate court has fully resolved the claims a proceeding presents, the probate
    court has issued a final judgment.” Id. at 896, n.7.
    Under Scott, the scope of the probate proceeding at issue in this case was
    framed by the guardianship and conservatorship petitions. Therefore, once the
    probate court issued orders fully resolving the claims raised by the petitions,
    those orders constituted final judgments. See id. On M ay 9, 2005, and M ay 11,
    -11-
    2005, the probate court issued orders granting King’s petitions for guardianship
    and conservatorship, respectively. Over Beverly’s objections, the court
    determined that Joseph was incapacitated and appointed King as his guardian and
    conservator of his estate. The order appointing a conservator did refer to on-
    going administrative filings, but nevertheless, the claims raised in K ing’s
    petitions w ere definitively decided and “there was nothing further for the probate
    court to do in order to completely determine the rights of the parties.” Id. at 898.
    Thus, we conclude that the M ay 9, 2005, and M ay 11, 2005, probate court orders
    constituted final and appealable judgments. Since Beverly did not file a timely
    appeal of those judgments, 3 the district court properly considered the probate
    proceedings final for purposes of Rooker-Feldman.
    W e must now determine whether Beverly’s federal complaint
    impermissibly seeks review and reversal of the probate court judgments. See
    Bolden v. City of Topeka, Kansas, 
    441 F.3d 1129
    , 1143 (10th Cir. 2006)
    (explaining that Rooker-Feldman precludes cases “inviting district court review
    and rejection of [state-court] judgments.”). On page 98 of her complaint, Beverly
    specifically requests a declaratory judgment nullifying various orders of the
    probate court, including the orders appointing King guardian and conservator.
    3
    Under Colorado Appellate Rule 4(a), a notice of appeal must be filed
    within 45 days of the date the of the entry of the judgment, decree, or order from
    which the party appeals.
    -12-
    She also seeks a declaratory judgment that Joseph was not mentally cognizant
    when he signed the November 4, 2004, power-of-attorney designating King as his
    attorney-in-fact. Beverly alleges that the governing document should have been
    the 1998 power-of-attorney, in w hich Joseph designated her as his
    attorney-in-fact, and the complaint requests a declaratory judgment to that effect.
    In addition, it seeks a “permanent enjoinment of [the probate court’s] orders as
    violative of the First and Fourteenth A mendments.” R. doc. 1 at 11. These are
    precisely the types of claims encompassed by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, and
    the district court properly dismissed them. See Bolden, 
    441 F.3d at 1143
    (“Appellate review – the type of judicial action barred by Rooker-Feldman –
    consists of a review of the proceedings already conducted by the ‘lower’ tribunal
    to determine whether it reached its result in accordance with law.”).
    In addition to injunctive relief, Beverly seeks monetary damages against a
    variety of government actors and private individuals for the alleged violations of
    her constitutional rights occasioned by their complicity with the probate court’s
    orders. These claims too are barred by Rooker-Feldman. “[A] district court
    [can]not entertain constitutional claims attacking a state-court judgment, even if
    the state court [did] not pass[] directly on those claims, when the constitutional
    attack [is] ‘inextricably intertwined’ with the state court’s judgment.”
    Exxon-M obil, 
    544 U.S. at 286, n.1
    . (quoting District of Columbia v. Feldman,
    
    460 U.S. 462
    , 482, n.16 (1983)). Nearly all of Beverly’s claims against the
    -13-
    individual defendants assert injuries based on the probate court judgments and,
    for her to prevail, would require the district court to review and reject those
    judgments. As such, her claims are inextricably intertwined with the probate
    court judgments and are therefore barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
    W e say “nearly” all of her claims are barred because some of the
    allegations in the complaint concern events that would seem to raise independent
    claims. Scattered throughout the complaint, for example, are vague allegations
    that arguably could give rise to state-law claims for defamation and conversion.
    Such claims, if adequately stated, would not be barred by the Rooker-Feldman
    doctrine. See Bolden, 
    441 F.3d at 1143
     (explaining that federal court retains
    jurisdiction over independent claims, even those that deny legal conclusion
    reached by state court). But if Beverly does have claims beyond the doctrine’s
    reach, we are at a loss to discern precisely what they are. Nowhere in her
    99-page, single-spaced pleading could we find “a short and plain statement of the
    claim showing that [she] is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). This alone
    would have been sufficient reason to dismiss the complaint. See United States ex
    rel. Garst v. Lockheed-M artin Corp., 
    328 F.3d 374
    , 378-79 (7th Cir. 2003)
    (affirming dismissal for plaintiff’s failure to conform complaint to pleading rules
    and collecting cases).
    -14-
    Rule 8 serves the important purpose of requiring plaintiffs to state their
    claims intelligibly so as to inform the defendants of the legal claims being
    asserted.
    Something labeled a complaint but written more as a press release,
    prolix in evidentiary detail, yet without simplicity, conciseness and
    clarity as to whom plaintiffs are suing for what wrongs, fails to
    perform the essential functions of a complaint.
    M cHenry v. Renne, 
    84 F.3d 1172
    , 1180 (9th Cir. 1996). In its sheer length,
    Beverly has made her complaint unintelligible “by scattering and concealing in a
    morass of irrelevancies the few allegations that matter.” Garst, 
    328 F.3d at 378
    .
    And prolixity is not even the main problem. Although Beverly is a licensed
    attorney in the State of Illinois, 4 she has curiously eschewed the traditional
    pleading style characterized by a short recitation of the facts followed by claims
    for relief. Instead, her first and only “Claim For Relief,” R. doc. 1 at 13, goes on
    for 463 paragraphs spanning 83 pages, and yet it neither identifies a concrete
    legal theory nor targets a particular defendant. She requests specific relief at the
    end of her pleading, but by this point not even the most attentive of readers could
    figure out who did what to whom. In short, it hardly matters whether the district
    court dismissed Beverly’s complaint because it believed all of her claims were
    4
    See R. doc. 1 at 7. W hile we generally construe pro se pleadings liberally,
    see Haines v. Kerner, 
    404 U.S. 519
    , 520-21 (1972), the same courtesy need not be
    extended to licensed attorneys. Smith v. Plati, 
    258 F.3d 1167
    , 1174 (10th Cir.
    2001).
    -15-
    barred by Rooker-Feldman or simply because it could not separate the wheat from
    the chaff. It was not the district court’s job to stitch together cognizable claims
    for relief from the wholly deficient pleading that Beverly filed. As we have
    frequently noted, we are loath to reverse a district court for refusing to do the
    litigant’s job. See, e.g., M itchell v. City of M oore, Okla., 
    218 F.3d 1190
    , 1199
    (10th Cir. 2000) (affirming grant of summary judgment where non-movant
    submitted inadequate response); SIL-FLO , Inc. v. SFHC, Inc., 
    917 F.2d 1507
    ,
    1513-14 (10th Cir. 1990) (deferring to district court’s ruling on jury instructions).
    B. Order D enying M otions to Seal Complaint
    Along with her complaint, Beverly filed two motions in the district court
    seeking to seal the complaint and other documents filed in the case or to proceed
    under a pseudonym. See R. docs. 2,3. As an alternative, she requested that
    documents filed in the case not be placed on PA CER, the court’s internet filing
    website. In support of her motion, Beverly argued that because she has been
    denied access to Joseph, she was not able to speak to him prior to filing the
    law suit. She maintained, however, that he would be “profoundly embarrassed” if
    the details related in the complaint were to become publicly available. 
    Id.
     doc. 3
    at 3. And she argued that releasing the complaint to the public w ould
    “constitute[] a profound invasion of her own privacy.” 
    Id.
     A magistrate judge
    denied both motions, holding that Beverly failed to demonstrate any basis for
    sealing documents filed in the case. Beverly appealed the decision to the district
    -16-
    court judge, who upheld it by order dated December 16, 2005, concluding that the
    m agistrate’s decision w as not contrary to law.
    W hether judicial records and other case-related information should be
    sealed or otherwise withheld from the public is a matter left to the sound
    discretion of the district court. Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 
    435 U.S. 589
    ,
    599 (1978). Accordingly, we will not disturb the district court’s decision to keep
    the case file public unless we have a “definite and firm conviction that [it] made a
    clear error of judgment or exceeded the bounds of permissible choice in the
    circumstances.” M oothart v. Bell, 
    21 F.3d 1499
    , 1504 (10th Cir. 1994) (quotation
    omitted). Beverly fails to convince us under this standard that the district court
    abused its discretion in denying the relief requested in her motions.
    Courts have long recognized a common-law right of access to judicial
    records. Nixon, 
    435 U.S. at 597
    ; Lanphere & Urbaniak v. Colorado, 
    21 F.3d 1508
    , 1511 (10th Cir. 1994). This right, however, is not absolute. The
    “presumption of access . . . can be rebutted if countervailing interests heavily
    outweigh the public interests in access.” Rushford v. New Yorker M agazine, Inc.,
    
    846 F.2d 249
    , 253 (4th Cir. 1988). “The party seeking to overcome the
    presumption bears the burden of showing some significant interest that outweighs
    the presumption.” 
    Id.
     W e agree with the district court that Beverly failed to
    demonstrate a basis for sealing the complaint or other documents in the case. The
    complaint contains a detailed history of Beverly’s on-going feud with her family
    -17-
    and discloses that Joseph has been diagnosed with Alzheimer’s disease. W e are
    not convinced, however, that Beverly’s privacy concern with respect to this
    information is sufficiently critical to outweigh the strong presumption in favor of
    public access to judicial records. Cf. James v. Jacobson, 
    6 F.3d 233
    , 239 (4th
    Cir. 1993) (holding that plaintiffs should have been permitted to use pseudonyms
    so as to prevent their children from learning the true identity of their biological
    father). We also note that much of the information contained in Beverly’s
    complaint appears to have been disclosed previously in the public probate court
    proceedings, further undermining her privacy concerns.
    C. M otions Panel Rulings
    Finally, Beverly asks us to reconsider the following two orders issued by
    motions panels of this court during the pendency of her appeal: (1) a February 6,
    2006, order holding that she is not legally authorized to act for Joseph and
    dismissing him from the appeal; and (2) a M arch 30, 2006, order imposing
    sanctions on Beverly for filing frivolous motions and unnecessarily burdening this
    court.
    M otions panel decisions are tentative and subject to reexamination by the
    merits panel. Stifel, Nicolaus & Co. v. Woolsey & Co., 
    81 F.3d 1540
    , 1544
    (10th Cir. 1996). W ith respect to the first order, Beverly argues that under
    Colorado law, she has standing to pursue claims on behalf of her father, and
    therefore, the motions panel committed error in dismissing him from the appeal.
    -18-
    In support, she cites In re Estate of M ilstein v. Ayers, 
    955 P.2d 78
    , 81 (Colo. Ct.
    App. 1998), a case in which the court permitted a son to bring claims on behalf of
    his incapacitated mother over the objections of her guardian. In Ayers, the court
    held that “[b]ecause a guardianship proceeding involves a potential deprivation of
    fundamental rights and liberties, it implicates constitutional issues.” 
    Id. at 81
    .
    Therefore, it held that the concept of third-party standing applied to guardianship
    proceedings. 
    Id.
    W e agree with Beverly that under Ayers, she has standing to pursue claims
    on behalf of her father involving alleged deprivations of his constitutional rights.
    Neither Ayers nor any other case that she cites, however, sanctions the practice of
    asserting such claims pro se. 5 As the motions panel held in its February 6, 2006,
    order, under this court’s precedent, even if Beverly were Joseph’s legal guardian,
    she would not be able to bring suit on his behalf without the assistance of
    5
    Contrary to Beverly’s argument, her case is not sufficiently analogous to
    Winkelman v. Parma City School District, No. 04-4159, currently pending in the
    Sixth Circuit, to justify her repeated attempts to set aside this court’s February 6,
    2006, order. Winkelman involves the narrow question of whether parents may
    prosecute claims pro se on behalf of their minor children under the Individuals
    with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”). The Supreme Court’s grant of a stay
    in that case pending disposition of the W inkelmans’s petition for certiorari is of
    no relevance here. Joseph is not Beverly’s minor child, she is not his legal
    guardian, and she admittedly does not know what his w ishes are with respect to
    the prosecution of this appeal. Winkelman and other IDEA cases involving pro se
    parental representation of minor children are simply inapposite.
    -19-
    counsel. See Meeker v. Kercher, 
    782 F.2d 153
    , 154 (10th Cir. 1986) (holding that
    father did not have right to represent minor daughters pro se).
    It goes without saying that it is not in the interests of minors or
    incompetents that they be represented by non-attorneys. W here they
    have claims that require adjudication, they are entitled to trained
    legal assistance so their rights may be fully protected.
    Cheung v. Youth Orchestra Found. of Buffalo, 
    906 F.2d 59
    , 61 (2d Cir. 1990). A s
    the Cheung court noted, to allow guardians to bring pro se litigation also invites
    abuse, as the present case may demonstrate. Although Beverly claims to be a
    licensed attorney, she is not licensed in the State of Colorado and she has neither
    sought nor been granted permission to practice before this court. Accordingly,
    she has no right to prosecute this appeal on Joseph’s behalf, and the motions
    panel correctly dismissed him from the appeal.
    In the M arch 30, 2006, order, the motions panel sanctioned Beverly in the
    amount of $500 for filing frivolous motions seeking unwarranted relief. See
    10th Cir. R. 46.5(B)(2). W ithin three months of her appeal being docketed,
    Beverly filed between five and seven motions, depending on how you count them,
    seeking everything from an emergency writ of mandamus on Joseph’s behalf to an
    order requiring the clerk of this court to serve her via email. A motions panel
    denied the motions and warned Beverly that repeated violations of 10th Cir.
    R. 46.5 would potentially lead to sanctions. On M arch 7, 2006, after Beverly
    twice sought reconsideration of a decided issue, she w as ordered to show cause
    -20-
    why sanctions should not be imposed. The motions panel ordered the sanctions
    upon receiving Beverly’s response.
    This court has the inherent power to impose sanctions that are necessary to
    regulate its docket, promote judicial efficiency, and deter frivolous filings.
    Christensen v. Ward, 
    916 F.2d 1462
    , 1469 (10th Cir. 1990). Beverly’s repeated
    frivolous motions have caused this court to expend valuable time and resources
    that could have been better spent addressing meritorious arguments advanced by
    rule-abiding litigants. W e therefore uphold the M arch 30, 2006, order. W e
    further O RDER that Beverly shall not be permitted to pursue additional appeals in
    this court until she provides adequate proof that she has complied with the
    sanctions imposed in this case. Christensen v. Ward, 
    916 F.2d 1485
    , 1485 (10th
    Cir. 1990)
    The judgment of the district court is A FFIRM ED. Beverly’s request to
    vacate the orders of February 6, 2006, and M arch 30, 2006, is DENIED, and all
    other pending motions are DENIED as moot.
    -21-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 19-9553

Citation Numbers: 477 F.3d 1140

Filed Date: 2/15/2007

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 1/12/2023

Authorities (23)

Bolden v. City of Topeka , 441 F.3d 1129 ( 2006 )

Nos. 89-4099, 89-4100 , 916 F.2d 1462 ( 1990 )

Mitchell v. City of Moore , 218 F.3d 1190 ( 2000 )

Lippoldt v. Cole , 468 F.3d 1204 ( 2006 )

charles-a-meeker-and-four-minor-daughters-cynthia-a-meeker-catherine-m , 782 F.2d 153 ( 1986 )

Nos. 89-4099, 89-4100 , 916 F.2d 1485 ( 1990 )

Greg Rushford, the Washington Post Company, Intervenor v. ... , 846 F.2d 249 ( 1988 )

Tse-Ming Cheung, M.D. v. Youth Orchestra Foundation of ... , 906 F.2d 59 ( 1990 )

lanphere-urbaniak-the-law-firm-of-gregory-s-lanphere-joel-e , 21 F.3d 1508 ( 1994 )

Smith v. Plati , 258 F.3d 1167 ( 2001 )

Linda K. Moothart v. A. Gary Bell, Bradley P. Pollock, Bell ... , 21 F.3d 1499 ( 1994 )

Guttman v. Khalsa , 446 F.3d 1027 ( 2006 )

sil-flo-incorporated-a-delaware-corporation-and-cross-appellee-john-j , 917 F.2d 1507 ( 1990 )

Stifel, Nicolaus & Company, Inc. v. Woolsey & Company, Inc. , 81 F.3d 1540 ( 1996 )

John James Mary James v. Cecil B. Jacobson, Jr., M.D. ... , 6 F.3d 233 ( 1993 )

Estate of Milstein v. Ayers , 955 P.2d 78 ( 1998 )

United States of America by and Through Joseph E. Garst v. ... , 328 F.3d 374 ( 2003 )

keith-mchenry-eric-warren-v-louise-renne-john-willett-charles-gallman , 84 F.3d 1172 ( 1996 )

Haines v. Kerner , 92 S. Ct. 594 ( 1972 )

Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc. , 98 S. Ct. 1306 ( 1978 )

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