United States v. Castanada-Ulloa , 15 F. App'x 680 ( 2001 )


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  •                                                                           F I L E D
    United States Court of Appeals
    Tenth Circuit
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    JUL 19 2001
    TENTH CIRCUIT
    PATRICK FISHER
    Clerk
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff - Appellee,
    vs.                                                    No. 00-6050
    (D.C. No. 99-CR-57)
    LORENZO LUCHO CASTANEDA-                              (W.D. Okla.)
    ULLOA,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
    Before BRORBY, KELLY, and BRISCOE, Circuit Judges.
    Defendant-Appellant, Lorenzo Lucho Castaneda-Ulloa, appeals from his
    convictions and sentence for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute and
    distribution of cocaine powder, 
    21 U.S.C. §§ 841
    (a)(1), 846; interstate
    transportation in aid of racketeering, 
    18 U.S.C. §§ 2
    , 1952(a)(3); money
    laundering, 
    18 U.S.C. §§ 2
    , 1956(a)(1)(A); and use of a communication facility to
    facilitate a conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine. 
    21 U.S.C. § 843
    (b). See I R. Indict. & Doc. 59. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
    *
    This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
    doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. This court
    generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
    and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
    1291 and 
    18 U.S.C. § 3742
    (a) and we affirm.
    Background
    After a trial, a jury convicted Mr. Castaneda-Ulloa on one count of
    conspiracy to distribute cocaine (Count 1), five counts of facilitating interstate
    transportation in aid of racketeering (Counts 2, 3, 5, 6, and 8), one count of
    money laundering (Count 7), and one count of use of a communication facility to
    facilitate the conspiracy to distribute cocaine (Count 9). See I R. Indict. & Doc.
    59. The district court sentenced Mr. Castaneda-Ulloa to 292 months on Count I;
    sixty months on each of Counts 2, 3, 5, 6, and 8; 240 months on Count 7; and
    forty-eight months on Count 9, all sentences to run concurrently. I R. Doc. 59, at
    2. The district court also imposed concurrent terms of supervised release upon
    Petitioner’s release from prison, the longest term being five years on Count 1, and
    special penalty assessments of $100 per count for a total of $800. 
    Id. at 3-4
    .
    Because the parties are familiar with the facts, we will not restate them here, but
    will only refer to them as needed for our analysis.
    Discussion
    On appeal, Mr. Castaneda-Ulloa raises three issues: (1) whether the district
    court’s failure to instruct the jury on drug quantity rises to the level of reversible
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    plain error under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 
    530 U.S. 466
     (2000); (2) whether the
    jury was given proper instruction regarding accomplice testimony; and (3)
    whether a variety of evidentiary issues constitute reversible plain error. We
    address each issue in turn.
    A. The Apprendi Challenge
    Count I of the indictment charged Mr. Castaneda-Ulloa with conspiring to
    possess, with the intent to distribute, and distributing cocaine in violation of 
    21 U.S.C. §§ 841
    (a)(1), 846. In describing the overt acts that comprised the
    conspiracy, the indictment alleged that Petitioner had conspired to possess, with
    the intent to distribute, and had distributed approximately eleven kilograms of
    cocaine and “kilogram quantities” of cocaine base. I R. Indictment at 3-7. The
    quantity of cocaine distributed was not disputed at trial, but the quantity was not
    submitted to the jury as an element of the offense that the jury must find beyond a
    reasonable doubt. See I R. Doc. 38, at 37 (jury instruction stating “[t]he evidence
    in the case need not establish that the amount or quantity of controlled substance
    was as alleged in the Indictment, but only that a measurable amount of the
    controlled substance was in fact the subject of the acts charged in the
    Indictment”). Mr. Castaneda-Ulloa did not object to the jury instructions. V R. at
    499.
    The presentence report (“PSR”) indicated that Mr. Casteneda-Ulloa was
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    responsible for approximately 13.4 kilograms of cocaine powder and 25.5
    kilograms of cocaine base. VII R. at 6. Mr. Castaneda-Ulloa did not object to the
    facts in the PSR. 
    Id. at 13
    . The district court adopted the findings of the PSR, I
    R. Doc. 59, at 6, and sentenced Petitioner to 292 months’ imprisonment on the
    conspiracy charge. 
    Id. at 2
    . Because the maximum penalty available for a
    cocaine conspiracy that does not involve a specified amount of cocaine is twenty
    years (240 months), see 
    21 U.S.C. §§ 841
    (b)(1)(C), 846, Mr. Castaneda-Ulloa
    contends that his sentence of 292 months is contrary to the Supreme Court’s
    decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 
    530 U.S. 466
     (2000). We disagree.
    Because Mr. Castaneda-Ulloa did not object to the jury instructions at trial,
    we review his Apprendi challenge for plain error only. United States v. Keeling,
    
    235 F.3d 533
    , 538 (10th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, _ S. Ct._, 
    2001 WL 578795
    (June 25, 2001) (No. 00-10161). To notice plain error under Fed. R. Crim. P.
    52(b), there must be (1) an error that is (2) “plain” and (3) that “affects
    substantial rights.” United States v. Olano, 
    507 U.S. 725
    , 732 (1993). However,
    “Rule 52(b) leaves the decision to correct the forfeited error within the sound
    discretion of the court of appeals, and the court should not exercise that discretion
    unless the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of
    judicial proceedings.” 
    Id.
     (citation and internal quotations omitted).
    The Supreme Court in Apprendi held that “[o]ther than the fact of a prior
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    conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed
    statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable
    doubt.” 
    530 U.S. at 490
    . Because Apprendi states a new rule of constitutional
    criminal procedure, it must be applied retroactively to cases pending on direct
    review. United States v. Heckard, 
    238 F.3d 1222
    , 1234 (10th Cir. 2001), citing
    Griffith v. Kentucky, 
    479 U.S. 314
    , 328 (1987). Apprendi applies to § 841(b).
    Keeling, 
    235 F.3d at 538
    .
    Mr. Castaneda-Ulloa argues that because drug quantity was not submitted
    to the jury to determine beyond a reasonable doubt, he should have been
    sentenced under § 841(b)(1)(C), with a maximum sentence of twenty years. He
    contends that the district court’s failure to do so was plain error. We have already
    decided this issue in Keeling. In Keeling, we held that “[a] jury instruction which
    omitted quantity as an element in these circumstances is actual error that is now
    plain and obvious.” 
    235 F.3d at 539
    . Although we declined to determine whether
    such an error affected “substantial rights,” the third prong of the plain-error test,
    in that case, we held that “[e]ven if the first three elements of the plain error test
    are satisfied, where the evidence on a misdescribed or omitted element of the
    offense is overwhelming, the fourth element, that the error seriously affects the
    fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings, is not.” 
    Id. at 538
    (citation omitted). Therefore, even though Mr. Castaneda-Ulloa can demonstrate
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    error that is plain concerning the failure to submit drug quantity to the jury, we
    decline to notice the error for it fails to “seriously affect[] the fairness, integrity
    or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Olano, 
    507 U.S. at 732
    . Our
    review of the entire record demonstrated that there was uncontroverted,
    overwhelming testimony as to the amount of cocaine powder and cocaine base at
    issue in this case.
    B. Accomplice Testimony Jury Instruction
    Mr. Castaneda-Ulloa argues that his conviction for Count 3 of the
    indictment, facilitating interstate transportation in the aid of racketeering in July
    1998, must be reversed as the only proof on that count was accomplice testimony,
    and the district court failed to instruct the jury to weigh such testimony with great
    caution. See Aplt. Br. at 25. The government concedes that accomplice
    testimony is the only evidence supporting Appellant’s conviction on Count 3. See
    Aplee. Br. at 20. Because Mr. Castaneda-Ulloa did not object to the jury
    instructions at trial, V R. at 499, our review once again is for plain error. United
    States v. Fabiano, 
    169 F.3d 1299
    , 1302 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 
    528 U.S. 852
    (1999); see also Olano, 
    507 U.S. at 732
    .
    Appellant contends that “[a] conviction on uncorroborated accomplice
    testimony is valid only if the jury is instructed that such testimony must be
    carefully scrutinized, weighted [sic] with great care, and received with great
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    caution.” Aplt. Br. at 25 (citing United States v. Chatman, 
    994 F.2d 1510
    , 1514-
    15 (10th Cir. 1993)). We have held that when uncorroborated accomplice
    testimony is the only evidence supporting conviction that failure “to properly
    apprise the jury of the potentially unreliable nature of the accomplices’ testimony
    by means of a special cautionary instruction” is plain and reversible error. United
    States v. Hill, 
    627 F.2d 1052
    , 1055 (10th Cir. 1980) (internal quotations omitted);
    see also United States v. Owens, 
    460 F.2d 268
    , 269 (10th Cir. 1972) (holding that
    failure to instruct the jury that accomplice testimony must “be carefully
    scrutinized, weighed with great care, and received with caution” was plain and
    reversible error).
    We note, however, that “[a] defendant is not entitled to any specific
    wording of instructions.” United States v. McGuire, 
    27 F.3d 457
    , 462 (10th Cir.
    1994) (internal quotations and citation omitted). “Rather, the concern is whether
    his rights were recognized in the court’s rulings and in the court’s instructions.”
    Hill, 
    627 F.2d at 1054
     (quoting United States v. Hall, 
    536 F.2d 313
    , 328 (10th
    Cir. 1976)). On plain error review, we analyze jury instructions “as a whole to
    determine whether the jury may have been misled, upholding the judgment in the
    absence of substantial doubt that the jury was fairly guided.” Fabiano, 
    169 F.3d at 1303
     (internal quotations and citation omitted).
    In this case, the district court failed to give a “special cautionary
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    instruction” regarding accomplice testimony. Although the government argues
    that the “Accomplice-Plea Agreement” jury instruction given by the district court
    was sufficient, see Aplee. Br. at 22, we disagree. The Accomplice-Plea
    Agreement jury instruction used by the district court, in relevant part, states that
    “[a] plea bargain is one factor you should take into account in evaluating the
    testimony of a witness if a part of the bargain or a consequence of it is leniency in
    exchange for cooperation in other cases.” I R. Doc. 38, at 12. Unlike some
    pattern instructions, it does not advise that the testimony is to be received with
    caution and weighed with great care. Although a defendant is not entitled to any
    particular language in an instruction, the court’s instruction does not sufficiently
    convey the requirement that accomplice testimony must be “carefully scrutinized,
    weighed with great care, and received with caution.” The failure of the district
    court to give a separate cautionary instruction regarding accomplice testimony
    was plain error that affected substantial rights.
    We do not notice this error, however, as we do not think that the “fairness,
    integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings” was “seriously affect[ed].”
    Olano, 
    507 U.S. at 732
    . Reviewing the instructions as a whole, we believe that
    the defendant’s rights “were recognized . . . in the court’s instructions.” Hill, 
    627 F.2d at 1054
    . This is not a case where only one stock instruction on witness
    credibility was given. Cf. United States v. Gardner, 
    244 F.3d 784
    , 789-90 (10th
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    Cir. 2001) (reversing defendant’s conviction after reviewing the district court’s
    failure to give the jury a separate cautionary accomplice instruction de novo). In
    addition to a general credibility instruction, the court also gave the accomplice-
    plea agreement instruction discussed supra, a drug user instruction, and a prior
    felon instruction. See I R. Doc. 38, at 6, 9, 11. Both accomplices that testified
    against Petitioner in regards to Count 3 of the indictment were drug addicts or
    users and prior felons. We assume that the jury applies the law as given in the
    jury instructions to the facts of the case, and the jury instructions as a whole
    adequately warned the jury why the accomplices’ testimony could be particularly
    unreliable–drug use, former convictions, and the hope of gaining leniency under a
    plea agreement. In particular, the drug addict instruction specifically instructed
    the jury to consider testimony from a drug user with “great scrutiny.” Id. at 9.
    See also United States v. Smith, 
    692 F.2d 658
    , 661 (10th Cir. 1982) (holding that
    district court’s failure to give an addict instruction was not reversible error
    because “[t]he instructions to the jury on accomplice, immune informant, and
    felon testimony, along with the general credibility instruction, were sufficient to
    alert the jury to consider with special care and weigh with caution the testimony
    of [the witness]”). Though it does not figure large in our analysis, Mr.
    Casteneda-Ulloa’s counsel also reminded the jury of the importance of judging
    the credibility of the government’s witnesses. V R. at 511 (“All the non-law
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    enforcement people that have testified in this case, who are admitted conspirators
    and admitted violators of the law, have been rewarded for coming to court to
    testify. And some of them might possibly receive some additional rewards in the
    future . . . .”). We uphold Mr. Castaneda-Ulloa’s conviction on Count 3 of the
    indictment.
    C. Evidentiary Issues
    Finally, Mr. Castaneda-Ulloa raises four alleged evidentiary errors,
    claiming that the errors independently and cumulatively constitute plain error
    requiring reversal. Petitioner alleges that his conviction should be reversed
    because: (1) the prosecutor had its case agent vouch for one of its key witnesses;
    (2) the case agent provided hearsay testimony that Mr. Castaneda-Ulloa’s
    girlfriend received drug proceeds at the direction of the defendant; (3) the case
    agent indicated that Mr. Castaneda-Ulloa was involved in drug dealing beyond
    that alleged in the indictment; and (4) the prosecution introduced evidence of
    other uncharged drug offenses. Because Mr. Castaneda-Ulloa made no objections
    at trial to the admission of any of the above evidence, we review the district
    court’s evidentiary decisions for plain error. See, e.g., United States v. Molina,
    
    75 F.3d 600
    , 602 (10th Cir. 1996). We emphasize once again that “[p]lain errors
    are those which are obvious and substantial, and which when viewed in light of
    the entire record seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of
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    judicial proceedings.” United States v. Becker, 
    230 F.3d 1224
    , 1231 (10th Cir.
    2000) (internal quotations and citation omitted), cert. denied, 
    121 S. Ct. 1666
    (2001). After having reviewed the entire record, we hold that Mr. Castaneda-
    Ulloa has failed to show that the admission of any of the above evidence, either
    independently or cumulatively, was “error,” much less “plain error.”
    AFFIRMED.
    Entered for the Court
    Paul J. Kelly, Jr.
    Circuit Judge
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