Coalition for Secular Govt v. Williams , 815 F.3d 1267 ( 2016 )


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  •                                                                                       FILED
    United States Court of Appeals
    PUBLISH                                Tenth Circuit
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                      March 2, 2016
    Elisabeth A. Shumaker
    FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                           Clerk of Court
    _________________________________
    COALITION FOR SECULAR
    GOVERNMENT, a Colorado nonprofit
    corporation,
    Plaintiff - Appellee,
    v.                                                              No. 14-1469
    WAYNE WILLIAMS, in his official
    capacity as Colorado Secretary of State,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    ------------------------
    COLORADO ETHICS WATCH;
    COLORADO COMMON CAUSE,
    Amici Curiae.
    _________________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of Colorado
    (D.C. No. 1:12-CV-01708-JLK)
    _________________________________
    Matthew D. Grove, Assistant Solicitor General (Cynthia H. Coffman, Attorney General,
    Frederick R. Yarger, Assistant Solicitor General, Sueanna P. Johnson, Assistant Attorney
    General, with him on the briefs) Office of the Attorney General for the State of Colorado,
    Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant.
    Allen Dickerson, Center for Competitive Politics, Alexandria, Virginia (Tyler Martinez,
    Center for Competitive Politics, Alexandria, Virginia, with him on the briefs), for
    Plaintiff-Appellee.
    Benjamin J. Larson, Ireland Stapleton Pryor & Pascoe, Denver, Colorado, for Colorado
    Common Cause, Amicus Curiae.
    Luis A. Toro and Margaret G. Perl, Colorado Ethics Watch, Denver, Colorado, for
    Colorado Ethics Watch, Amicus Curiae.
    _________________________________
    Before PHILLIPS, McHUGH, and MORITZ, Circuit Judges.
    _________________________________
    PHILLIPS, Circuit Judge.
    _________________________________
    Colorado Secretary of State Wayne Williams (Secretary) appeals a district
    court order enjoining him from enforcing Colorado’s issue-committee registration
    and disclosure requirements against the Coalition for Secular Government
    (Coalition), a nonprofit corporation that was planning to advocate against a statewide
    ballot initiative in the 2014 general election. Exercising jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    , we affirm.
    I.    BACKGROUND
    The Coalition is a Colorado nonprofit corporation whose mission is “to
    educate the public about the necessary secular foundation of a free society,
    particularly the principles of individual rights and separation of church and state.”
    J.A. vol. 5 at 933. In 2008, Dr. Diana Hsieh, who holds a doctorate degree in
    philosophy, founded the Coalition and is solely responsible for its operations.
    2
    In accordance with its mission, the Coalition publishes a policy paper each
    year in which a proposed “personhood” amendment appears on Colorado ballots.1
    The policy paper advocates against the personhood amendment, explains the
    Coalition’s view of the deleterious effects of passing such an amendment, and urges
    “no” votes on the ballot initiative. In 2008, 2010, and 2014, the Coalition used
    contributed funds to publish its personhood policy paper. Dr. Hsieh and a colleague
    co-authored each paper and distributed the papers publicly, first by printing and
    mailing copies and later by making the paper available online.
    Under Colorado law, the Coalition’s activities triggered various issue-
    committee registration and disclosure requirements, which we detail below.
    A.    Colorado’s Issue-Committee Regulatory Framework
    The Colorado Constitution defines “issue committee” as follows:
    [A]ny person, other than a natural person, or any group of two or
    more persons, including natural persons: (I) That has a major
    purpose of supporting or opposing any ballot issue or ballot
    question; or2 (II) That has accepted or made contributions or
    1
    For instance, in 2010, Colorado citizens voted on “[a]n amendment to the
    Colorado Constitution applying the term ‘person’ as used in those provisions of the
    Colorado Constitution relating to inalienable rights, equality of justice and due
    process of law, to every human being from the beginning of the biological
    development of that human being.” J.A. vol. 4 at 769.
    2
    The Secretary has promulgated a rule defining “issue committee” to mean “a
    person or a group of people that meets both of the conditions in [Colo. Const. art.
    XXVIII, § 2(10)(a)(I) and 2(10)(a)(II)].” Colo. Code Regs. § 1505-6:1.9 (2015)
    (emphasis added). In effect, this rule changes the “or” that exists in the Colorado
    Constitution’s definition of issue committee to “and.” Notwithstanding the
    Secretary’s interpretation of the Colorado Constitution, and especially in light of
    Gessler v. Colo. Common Cause, 
    327 P.3d 232
    , 236–38 (Colo. 2014) (declaring a
    regulation unlawful because it conflicted with a constitutional provision), we enforce
    3
    expenditures in excess of two hundred dollars to support or
    oppose any ballot issue or ballot question.
    Colo. Const. art. XXVIII, § 2(10)(a).3 Once a person or group of persons qualifies as
    an issue committee under this definition, a substantial set of registration and
    disclosure requirements apply.
    Initially, we note that the regulatory framework governing issue committees in
    Colorado derives from multiple sources: the state’s constitution, Colo. Const. art.
    XXVIII, §§ 2–3, 7, 9–10; its statutes, 
    Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 1-45-101
     to -118 (2015);
    and its regulations, Colo. Code Regs. § 1505-6 (2015). As we evaluate the claims
    now raised, we take care to note the source of each relevant registration or disclosure
    requirement. Knowing where any unconstitutional burdens lie is the key to
    Colorado’s addressing them.
    the “or” in the issue-committee definition just as it is written in the Colorado
    Constitution. Thus, we disagree with amici curiae Colorado Ethics Watch and
    Colorado Common Cause, who argue that Article XXVIII “explicitly” defines “issue
    committee” as a group (or group of persons) that spends or receives $200 and has as
    its major purpose supporting or opposing a ballot initiative. See Amici Curiae Brief at
    8.
    On appeal, the Coalition does not challenge its putative status as an issue
    committee or the Secretary’s interpretation of the Colorado Constitution. Therefore,
    we assume for this case that the Coalition—in its activities opposing the personhood-
    amendment ballot initiative—is indeed an issue committee under the Colorado
    Constitution.
    3
    Article XXVIII of the Colorado Constitution “was proposed by citizen’s
    initiative as Amendment 27 and adopted by popular vote in 2002.” Colo. Ethics
    Watch v. Senate Majority Fund, LLC, 
    269 P.3d 1248
    , 1253 (Colo. 2012).
    4
    1.     Constitutional Requirements
    Although Article XXVIII of the Colorado Constitution defines “issue
    committee,” it imposes few registration or disclosure requirements, leaving it to the
    legislative and executive branches to fill in the details. Even so, we still see six
    constitutional provisions that bear on our case.
    First, section 3(9) requires that issue committees deposit all contributions in “a
    financial institution in a separate account whose title shall include the name of the
    committee . . . .” Colo. Const. art. XXVIII, § 3(9). This subsection also imposes
    some recordkeeping responsibilities: “All records pertaining to such accounts shall be
    maintained by the committee . . . for one-hundred eighty days following any general
    election in which the committee . . . received contributions unless a complaint is
    filed, in which case they shall be maintained until final disposition of the complaint
    and any consequent litigation.” Id.
    Second, section 3(10) forbids issue committees from “accept[ing] a
    contribution, or mak[ing] an expenditure, in currency or coin exceeding one hundred
    dollars.” Id. § 3(10).
    Third, section 3(11) provides that “[n]o person shall be reimbursed for a
    contribution made to any . . . issue committee, . . . nor shall any person make such
    reimbursement . . . .” Id. § 3(11).
    Fourth, section 9(2)(a) permits any person to file a complaint against anyone
    violating the issue-committee regulatory framework. Any such person “may file a
    written complaint with the secretary of state no later than one hundred eighty days
    5
    after the date of the alleged violation.” Id. § 9(2)(a). In response to any filed
    complaint, the Colorado Constitution requires the Secretary to “refer the complaint to
    an administrative law judge [(ALJ)] within three days . . . .” Id. The ALJ then must
    “hold a hearing within fifteen days of the referral of the complaint” and “render a
    decision within fifteen days of the hearing.” Id. The Colorado Court of Appeals may
    review the ALJ’s final decision, and if the Secretary fails to enforce the ALJ’s
    decision within 30 days, the complainant may bring a private action in Colorado
    district court. Id.
    Fifth, section 10(2)(a) provides that an “appropriate officer” must impose a
    $50 penalty “per day for each day” that any violation of the issue-committee
    disclosure requirements in Colo. Const. art. XXVIII, § 7, or 
    Colo. Rev. Stat. § 1-45
    -
    108, remains uncured. Colo. Const. art. XXVIII, § 10(2)(a).
    Sixth and finally, section 7 provides that “[t]he disclosure requirements of
    section 1-45-108, C.R.S., or any successor section, shall be extended to require
    disclosure of the occupation and employer of each person who has made a
    contribution of one hundred dollars or more to a[n] . . . issue committee . . . .” Id. § 7.
    For issue committees, then, the Colorado Constitution itself simply requires the state
    legislature to extend one existing statute to include one limited disclosure.
    2.      Statutory Requirements
    Colorado statutes—specifically, Colorado’s Fair Campaign Practices Act,
    
    Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 1-45-101
     to -118 (2015)—contain the majority of the issue-
    committee registration and disclosure requirements.
    6
    First, under the Act, a person or group of persons must register as an issue
    committee with the “appropriate officer” within ten days of accepting contributions
    or making expenditures in excess of $200 to support or oppose a ballot issue. 
    Colo. Rev. Stat. § 1-45-108
    (3.3). Registration requires a statement listing certain categories
    of information: the committee’s full name; “[a] natural person authorized to act as a
    registered agent”; “[a] street address and telephone number for the principal place of
    operations”; “[a]ll affiliated candidates and committees”; and “[t]he purpose or
    nature of interest of the committee or party.” 
    Id.
     § 1-45-108(3)(a)–(e), (3.3).
    Once registered, an issue committee must “report to the appropriate officer
    [its] contributions received, including the name and address of each person who has
    contributed twenty dollars or more; expenditures made, and obligations entered into
    by the committee . . . .” Id. § 1-45-108(1)(a)(I). In accordance with the Colorado
    Constitution’s mandate, the Act also requires that an issue committee’s disclosure
    reports “include the occupation and employer of each person who has made a
    contribution of one hundred dollars or more to such committee . . . .” Id.
    § 1-45-108(1)(a)(II); see Colo. Const. art. XXVIII, § 7.
    The Act also requires an issue committee to
    file a report with the secretary of state of any contribution of one
    thousand dollars or more at any time within thirty days preceding
    the date of the primary election or general election. This report
    shall be filed with the secretary of state no later than twenty-four
    hours after receipt of said contribution.
    
    Colo. Rev. Stat. § 1-45-108
    (2.5).
    7
    Under section 1-45-108(2), every issue committee must file disclosure reports
    that include the information identified above. Subsection (2) requires multiple filings
    during election years and less frequent filings during off-election years. See 
    id.
    § 1-45-108(2)(a). In 2014, for example, an issue committee that supported or opposed
    a ballot initiative in Colorado’s general election would have had to file disclosure
    reports on May 5, May 19, June 2, June 16, July 1, August 1, September 2,
    September 15, September 29, October 14, October 27, and December 4. In addition,
    issue committees would have had to file reports within 24 hours of receiving any
    contribution of $1,000 or more. See id. § 1-45-108(2.5). If a 2014 issue committee’s
    registered agent did not file a report terminating the issue committee, the issue
    committee would have had to continue filing quarterly reports even in off-election
    years. Id. § 1-45-108(2)(a)(I)(A).
    Finally, the Act provides additional reporting requirements for certain media-
    related activity:
    An issue committee making an expenditure in excess of one
    thousand dollars on a communication that supports or opposes a
    statewide ballot issue or ballot question and that is broadcast by
    television or radio, printed in a newspaper or on a billboard,
    directly mailed or delivered by hand to personal residences, or
    otherwise distributed shall disclose, in the communication
    produced by the expenditure, the name of the issue committee
    making the expenditure.
    Id. § 1-45-108.3(1).
    8
    3.     Regulatory Requirements
    At the legislature’s direction, the Secretary has adopted several campaign-
    finance rules, many of which clarify or supplement constitutional or statutory
    requirements. For example, one rule clarifies that “[i]f a contributor gives $20 or
    more in the aggregate during the reporting period, the committee must individually
    list the contributor on the report, regardless of the amount of each contribution.”
    Colo. Code Regs. § 1505-6:10.2.1. Another rule ensures each issue committee’s filed
    registration statement is up-to-date by requiring the issue committee to “report any
    change to its committee registration statement to the appropriate filing officer within
    ten days.” Id. § 1505-6:12.1. Yet another rule requires issue committees to report any
    expenditure of $20 or more to the same payee within a single reporting period,
    including the payee’s name and address. Id. § 1505-6:10.3.
    Neither the Colorado Constitution nor the Act provides for issue-committee
    termination. But the Secretary’s rules do. An issue committee can file a termination
    report if (1) “[t]he committee no longer has a major purpose of supporting or
    opposing a ballot measure and no longer intends to accept or make contributions or
    expenditures” and (2) the committee’s reporting account “reflects no cash on hand
    and no outstanding debts, obligations, or penalties.” Id. § 1505-6:4.4.
    Thus, the Colorado Constitution, the Act, and the Secretary together regulate
    issue-committee activity.
    9
    B.    The Coalition’s Activities
    Since 2008, the Coalition has either registered or considered registering as an
    issue committee in four general elections: 2008, 2010, 2012, and 2014.4 As a result,
    the Coalition has previously disclosed certain information about its contributors and
    expenditures. We detail the Coalition’s experience as an issue committee below.
    1.     2008 Election
    In 2008, after publicly announcing her intention to publish the first policy
    paper opposing Colorado’s proposed personhood amendment, Dr. Hsieh registered
    the Coalition as an issue committee with the Secretary’s office on the advice of a
    friend who was familiar with Colorado’s issue-committee laws. In attempting to
    register the Coalition as an issue committee, Dr. Hsieh accessed the Secretary’s
    website but found it “completely impossible to figure out what . . . to do.” J.A. vol. 3
    at 597. Eventually, though, Dr. Hsieh concluded that the Coalition would probably
    spend at least $200 printing and mailing copies of the 2008 policy paper, thus
    requiring her to register the Coalition as an issue committee under Colorado law.
    Accordingly, in 2008, Dr. Hsieh completed a form registering the Coalition as
    an issue committee opposing the proposed personhood amendment. Dr. Hsieh also
    completed and filed bi-weekly reports with the Secretary’s office detailing any
    contributions received and expenditures made, each report taking about an hour to
    complete. In meeting the reporting requirements, Dr. Hsieh found it “difficult” to
    4
    Again, the Coalition does not challenge its status as an issue committee under
    the Colorado Constitution, Colorado statutes, or the Secretary’s rules.
    10
    track down the required business addresses where she had purchased items such as
    mailing envelopes, labels, and postage stamps. Id. at 600. Even when the Coalition
    did not spend any funds or receive contributions during a reporting period, Dr. Hsieh
    needed to spend about ten minutes filling out nearly blank reports.
    In November 2008, after the election, Dr. Hsieh terminated the Coalition’s
    issue-committee status, meaning the Coalition would no longer need to comply with
    Colorado’s disclosure requirements.
    2.     2010 Election
    In 2010, in response to another personhood ballot initiative, Dr. Hsieh solicited
    financial contributions to enable her and her co-author to update and expand the
    personhood policy paper. Using what Dr. Hsieh called a pledge model, she publicized
    that she and her co-author would publish an updated policy paper if they received a
    total of at least $2,000 in contributions. Putative contributors could then register their
    names, e-mail addresses, and pledge amounts with the Coalition. Dr. Hsieh told the
    putative contributors that she would not collect their pledged money if the Coalition
    did not receive at least $2,000 in pledges. Later in 2010, the Coalition raised and
    collected about $2,800 in pledges, so the Coalition completed and published its
    updated policy paper.
    Remembering her 2008 experience, Dr. Hsieh again accessed the Secretary’s
    website and registered the Coalition as an issue committee. In registering the
    Coalition again, Dr. Hsieh learned that Colorado law required issue committees to
    have separate, standalone bank accounts. In 2008, she had failed to realize (and
    11
    comply) with this requirement, but now aware of the requirement in 2010, she
    opened a new bank account “solely to comply with the State’s campaign finance
    requirements.” J.A. vol. 3 at 608. After registering the Coalition, Dr. Hsieh once
    again began filing disclosure reports.
    In meeting the reporting requirements, Dr. Hsieh had to list the addresses of all
    $20-plus contributors. For $100-plus contributors, Dr. Hsieh also had to list their
    occupations and employer information. She felt it “intrusive” to request that personal
    information from the Coalition’s contributors. Id. at 609. In fact, after Dr. Hsieh
    wrote a blog post describing the reporting requirements, putative contributors
    reacted, at least one increasing his pledge because he was “angry about the reporting
    requirements” and five reducing their contributions to avoid the reporting
    requirements. Id. at 631.
    By 2010, the Secretary had found ways to ease the reporting burden by
    implementing its online-reporting system, TRACER. Using TRACER, Dr. Hsieh was
    better able to transfer disclosure information from her software to the Secretary’s
    website. But even with this improvement, Dr. Hsieh still needed to maintain a
    spreadsheet, separate from her financial records that she maintained on accounting
    software, to organize her data so it would sync with the TRACER system. Dr. Hsieh
    spent about an hour or two completing each TRACER report.
    In 2010, Dr. Hsieh failed to file her first disclosure report on time because her
    house had flooded. Soon afterward, she received an e-mail from the Secretary’s
    office notifying her of the missed deadline and telling her that the Coalition’s issue
    12
    committee could be fined $50 per day for uncured violations of the issue-committee
    disclosure laws. To stop the fine from increasing, Dr. Hsieh immediately filed an
    incomplete report that she would later update. Even so, she soon received a notice
    that the Secretary had assessed the Coalition’s issue committee a $50 fine. In
    response, Dr. Hsieh filed a waiver request, which the Secretary’s office granted two
    weeks later.
    Despite the difficulties recounted above, Dr. Hsieh found her 2010 experience
    with Colorado’s issue-committee regulatory framework “significantly easier” than
    her experience in 2008 because of improved documentation and online resources that
    streamlined disclosure. Id. at 607. In April 2011, after the election, Dr. Hsieh filed
    the necessary papers to terminate the Coalition’s issue-committee status.
    3.       2012 Activities
    As the 2012 election neared, the Coalition filed in federal district court a
    declaratory-judgment suit against Scott Gessler, the then-Colorado Secretary of State.
    Among other relief, the Coalition requested the court to declare that the Coalition’s
    “expected activity of $3,500 does not require registration as an issue committee.”
    J.A. vol. 1 at 25. On August 13, 2012, the Coalition moved the court for a
    preliminary injunction. On October 2, 2012, after full briefing on the motion, the
    federal court certified four questions to the Colorado Supreme Court, including this
    one: “In light of Sampson v. Buescher, 
    625 F.3d 1247
     (10th Cir. 2010), what is the
    monetary trigger for Issue Committee status under Art. XXVIII § 2(10)(a)(II) of the
    Colorado Constitution?” J.A. vol. 2 at 428.
    13
    On July 2, 2014, the Colorado Supreme Court declined to answer the certified
    questions “in light of the [Colorado Supreme] Court’s decision in 12SC783, Gessler
    v. Colorado Common Cause, which was issued June 16, 2014.” Id. at 439 (emphasis
    altered). By then, the 2012 election had come and gone. Because the personhood
    amendment failed to qualify for the general-election ballot, the Coalition had neither
    registered as an issue committee nor published an updated policy paper.
    4.     2014 Election
    After the Colorado Supreme Court’s decision in Gessler v. Colorado Common
    Cause, 
    327 P.3d 232
     (Colo. 2014), the Coalition renewed its preliminary-injunction
    motion in federal district court. By then, the personhood amendment had qualified for
    the 2014 general-election ballot, and Dr. Hsieh and her co-author again wanted to
    update and expand the policy paper urging readers to vote “no” on the latest iteration
    of the personhood ballot initiative.
    The district court consolidated the hearing on the preliminary-injunction
    motion with a hearing on the merits of the case. As Dr. Hsieh testified at the hearing,
    the Coalition planned to raise about $1,500 in 2014 to fund the policy paper but still
    opposed registering as an issue committee. By October 3, 2014, the day of the
    preliminary-injunction hearing, the Coalition had already received pledges totaling
    about $2,000.
    On October 10, 2014, the district court “ORDERED and DECLARED that [the
    Coalition]’s expected activity of $3,500 does not require registration or disclosure as
    an ‘issue committee’ and the Secretary is ENJOINED from enforcing” Colorado’s
    14
    disclosure requirements against the Coalition.5 J.A. vol. 2 at 579. Specifically, the
    district court concluded that the Coalition had “established clearly and convincingly
    that it will suffer irreparable injury to its First Amendment right of free association.”
    
    Id.
    The Secretary appeals the district court’s order granting the Coalition
    declaratory and injunctive relief.
    II.    DISCUSSION
    The Secretary presents two issues on appeal. First, does Colorado’s $200
    threshold for issue-committee registration and reporting violate the First
    Amendment? And second, can Colorado require issue-committee registration and
    disclosure for a group that raises and spends $3,500 to influence an election on a
    statewide ballot initiative? Thus, the Secretary’s first issue asks us whether the
    Colorado Constitution’s monetary threshold for defining “issue committee” is
    facially valid under the First Amendment. The Secretary’s second issue asks us
    whether Colorado’s issue-committee regulatory framework is constitutional as
    applied to the Coalition. We conclude that Colorado’s issue-committee regulatory
    framework is unconstitutional as applied to the Coalition. We therefore do not
    address the facial validity of the $200 threshold.
    5
    For the 2012 and 2014 general elections, Dr. Hsieh expected to raise between
    $1,500 and $3,500 in contributions. The parties agree that the amount involved in this
    appeal is $3,500.
    15
    A.    Legal Standard
    We review de novo the district court’s “findings of constitutional fact . . . and
    conclusions of law.” Faustin v. City & Cty. of Denver, 
    423 F.3d 1192
    , 1195–96 (10th
    Cir. 2005). “Because this decision implicates First Amendment freedoms, we perform
    an independent examination of the whole record in order to ensure that the judgment
    protects the rights of free expression.” 
    Id. at 1196
    .
    The parties dispute what legal standard governs our review of the
    constitutional question. The Secretary advocates for exacting scrutiny, which this
    court has applied in a similar, controlling case. See Sampson v. Buescher, 
    625 F.3d 1247
    , 1255 (10th Cir. 2010) (discussing the exacting-scrutiny standard). Citing
    Buckley v. Valeo, 
    424 U.S. 1
     (1976), however, the Secretary argues that we should
    apply a “wholly without rationality” standard in determining whether Colorado’s
    $200 disclosure threshold may stand. Buckley, 
    424 U.S. at 83
    . To support his view,
    the Secretary argues that the Sampson court applied exacting scrutiny only because
    “the focus of those plaintiffs was on the impact of the entire disclosure scheme.”
    Appellant’s Opening Br. at 31. The Secretary argues that the Coalition’s case merits
    a less-stringent standard since it focuses “specifically on the constitutionality of
    Colorado’s disclosure threshold [of $200].” 
    Id.
     We conclude that exacting scrutiny is
    the standard that controls this case, at least in deciding the as-applied challenge.
    The plaintiffs in Sampson sought a declaration that Colorado’s “registration
    and disclosure requirements are unconstitutional, facially, and as applied.” Sampson,
    
    625 F.3d at 1253
    . We concluded that, as applied, Colorado’s issue-committee
    16
    regulatory framework failed exacting scrutiny. 
    Id. at 1261
    . Thus, Sampson forecloses
    the Secretary’s argument for a less-stringent standard.
    We face the exact as-applied question the Sampson court faced, though with a
    putative issue committee that has, at times, raised slightly more money than did the
    issue committee in Sampson. Thus, as in Sampson, we will apply exacting scrutiny to
    the as-applied challenge. See Doe v. Reed, 
    561 U.S. 186
    , 196 (2010) (“We have a
    series of precedents considering First Amendment challenges to disclosure
    requirements in the electoral context. These precedents have reviewed such
    challenges under what has been termed ‘exacting scrutiny.’” (citing, among other
    cases, Buckley, 
    424 U.S. at 64
    )).
    Exacting scrutiny “requires a ‘substantial relation’ between the disclosure
    requirement and a ‘sufficiently important’ governmental interest.” Citizens United v.
    Fed. Election Comm’n, 
    558 U.S. 310
    , 366–67 (2010) (quoting Buckley, 
    424 U.S. at 64, 66
    ). “To withstand this scrutiny, ‘the strength of the governmental interest must
    reflect the seriousness of the actual burden on First Amendment rights.’” Reed, 
    561 U.S. at 196
     (quoting Davis v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 
    554 U.S. 724
    , 744 (2008)).
    B.    Whether the Coalition Must Register and Disclose
    We conclude that the Secretary may not constitutionally require the Coalition
    to register and disclose as an issue committee under Colorado’s regulatory
    framework. The informational interest in the Coalition’s disclosures is far
    outweighed by the substantial and serious burdens of the required disclosures.
    17
    In assessing the Secretary’s arguments, we often draw comparisons to the facts
    in Sampson. We therefore begin by reviewing Sampson before proceeding to our
    exacting-scrutiny analysis of the facts in this case.
    1.     Sampson Revisited
    In Sampson, we concluded that Colorado’s issue-committee regulatory
    framework was unconstitutional as applied to a group of residents opposing
    annexation of their unincorporated neighborhood (Parker North) into a larger,
    incorporated town (Parker). See Sampson, 
    625 F.3d at 1249, 1254
    . After a Parker
    North resident submitted a petition to the Parker Town Council seeking annexation of
    Parker North into Parker, a group of residents joined in opposing the petition and
    annexation. 
    Id. at 1251
    . To convince other Parker North residents to oppose the
    petition, the anti-annexation residents “purchased and distributed No Annexation
    signs, mailed to all residents of Parker North a postcard summarizing the reasons to
    oppose annexation, continued to discuss and debate the issue on the Internet, and . . .
    submitted to the [Parker] Town Council a document opposing annexation . . . .” 
    Id.
    A pro-annexation resident, who had earlier formed an issue committee to
    support annexation, filed a complaint with the Colorado Secretary of State (then
    Bernie Buescher) alleging that the anti-annexation residents had violated the Act by
    failing (1) to register as an issue committee, (2) to comply with issue-committee
    reporting requirements, and (3) to establish a separate bank account. 
    Id.
     By that time,
    the anti-annexation residents had received $782.02 in nonmonetary contributions. 
    Id. at 1252
    . All told, the neighborhood group would ultimately receive a total of
    18
    $2,239.55 in monetary and nonmonetary contributions and spend $1,992.37 opposing
    the annexation measure and answering the complaint. See 
    id.
     at 1260 n.5.
    After retaining an attorney and responding to the complaint, the anti-
    annexation residents filed suit against Secretary Buescher in federal court alleging
    that the Colorado issue-committee requirements violated their First Amendment
    rights to free speech and association. 
    Id. at 1253
    . The federal district court upheld the
    constitutionality of Colorado’s issue-committee regulatory framework as applied to
    the anti-annexation residents, but we reversed. 
    Id.
     at 1253–54.
    In applying exacting scrutiny in Sampson, we discussed the public’s interest in
    issue-committee disclosures and the Supreme Court’s recognizing “three proper
    justifications for reporting and disclosing campaign finances.” 
    Id. at 1256
    . We
    concluded that the first two of these justifications—“facilitating the detection of
    violations of contribution limitations” and deterring quid pro quo corruption—were
    irrelevant or inapplicable to issue committees. 
    Id.
     This left the third—the public’s
    informational   interest.   
    Id.
       Issue-committee   disclosures   serve   the   public’s
    informational interest by allowing voters to “identify those who (presumably) have a
    financial interest in the outcome of the election.” 
    Id. at 1259
    . In measuring the value
    of this informational interest in the annexation debate, we focused on a balance:
    “[W]hile assuming that there is a legitimate public interest in financial disclosure
    from campaign organizations, we also recognize that this interest is significantly
    attenuated when the organization is concerned with only a single ballot issue and
    when the contributions and expenditures are slight.” 
    Id.
    19
    In balancing the public’s legitimate interest in financial disclosure with the
    anti-annexation residents’ First Amendment right of association, we concluded that
    the burden “imposed by Colorado’s registration and reporting requirements cannot be
    justified by a public interest in disclosure.” 
    Id.
     In Sampson, we characterized
    Colorado’s laws burdening issue committees as “substantial.” 
    Id.
     We noted first that
    “[t]he average citizen cannot be expected to master on his or her own the many
    campaign financial-disclosure requirements set forth” in the Colorado Constitution,
    the Act, and the Secretary’s rules. 
    Id.
     Second, we noted that hiring an attorney to help
    comply with disclosure laws and to answer any complaints would often cost more
    than the total amount of contributions of small-scale issue committees. 
    Id.
     at 1260
    (citing Citizens United, 
    558 U.S. at 324
     (“The First Amendment does not permit laws
    that force speakers to retain a campaign finance attorney, conduct demographic
    marketing research, or seek declaratory rulings before discussing the most salient
    political issues of our day.”)). Finally, we noted the residents’ burden of the “time,
    energy, and money to review the law themselves.” 
    Id.
     We concluded that “the
    financial burden of state regulation on [the anti-annexation residents’] freedom of
    association approaches or exceeds the value of their financial contributions to their
    political effort; and the governmental interest in imposing those regulations is
    minimal, if not nonexistent, in light of the small size of the contributions.” Id. at
    1261.
    Having reviewed Sampson’s exacting-scrutiny analysis, we turn now to the
    facts of this case.
    20
    2.     Framework As Applied to the Coalition
    In our view, Sampson’s holding compels us to conclude that Colorado’s issue-
    committee regulatory framework fails exacting scrutiny in this case. Simply put,
    Colorado’s issue-committee regulatory framework remains too burdensome for
    small-scale issue committees like the Coalition. We commend the Secretary for his
    progress in streamlining issue-committee disclosures and explaining complex laws to
    ordinary citizens. But the burdens remain too great in the face of the public’s
    legitimate but minimal interest in information about the Coalition’s contributors and
    expenditures.
    a.    Governmental Interest
    We begin our exacting-scrutiny analysis by noting that under Sampson’s
    reasoning we must conclude that the governmental interest in issue-committee
    disclosures remains minimal where an issue committee raises or spends $3,500. In
    Sampson, we held that the informational interest was minimal in the financial
    disclosures of an issue committee that raised and spent about $2,000. Id. at 1260.
    Again, as in Sampson, “[t]he case before us is quite unlike ones involving the
    expenditure of tens of millions of dollars on ballot issues presenting ‘complex policy
    proposals.’” Id. at 1261 (quoting Cal. Pro-Life Council, Inc. v. Getman, 
    328 F.3d 1088
    , 1105 (9th Cir. 2003)).
    The Secretary argues that the informational interest in the Coalition’s
    disclosures is “substantial.” Appellant’s Opening Br. at 32. Citing other courts’
    discussions of Sampson, the Secretary argues that “courts are virtually unanimous in
    21
    concluding that campaign disclosures are often more meaningful in the ballot
    initiative context than they are for candidate elections.” 
    Id.
     at 34 (citing, among
    others, Worley v. Fla. Sec’y of State, 
    717 F.3d 1238
    , 1248 (11th Cir. 2013) (“In the
    same way the Supreme Court in Citizens United rejected the idea that the messenger
    distorts the message, we reject the notion that knowing who the messenger is distorts
    the message.” (citation omitted))). In Sampson we explicitly “assume[d] that there is
    a legitimate public interest in financial disclosure from” issue committees. 
    625 F.3d at 1259
    . Instead of assigning that interest the same weight across all issue
    committees, however, we recognized that the strength of the informational interest in
    financial disclosure varies depending on whether an issue committee has raised and
    spent $10 million, for example, or instead $3,500. In other words, the strength of the
    public’s interest in issue-committee disclosure depends, in part, on how much money
    the issue committee has raised or spent. We continue to agree with the Ninth
    Circuit’s characterization of this sliding scale:
    As a matter of common sense, the value of this financial
    information to the voters declines drastically as the value of the
    expenditure or contribution sinks to a negligible level. As the
    monetary value of an expenditure in support of a ballot issue
    approaches zero, financial sponsorship fades into support and
    then into mere sympathy.
    Canyon Ferry Rd. Baptist Church of E. Helena, Inc. v. Unsworth, 
    556 F.3d 1021
    ,
    1033 (9th Cir. 2009) (emphasis in original); Sampson, 
    625 F.3d at
    1260–61 (same).
    We reiterate that there is an informational interest in the Coalition’s financial
    disclosures. After all, the Colorado electorate said so in passing Article XXVIII. But
    22
    at a $3,500 contribution level, we cannot under Sampson’s reasoning characterize the
    disclosure interest as substantial.
    b.     Burden
    Obviously, informational interest is just one side of the exacting-scrutiny
    balance. An issue committee raising or spending a meager $200 might still be
    required to disclose limited information without violating the First Amendment, but
    any reporting burdens must be measured against the government’s interest in that
    disclosure. See Reed, 
    561 U.S. at 196
     (“To withstand [exacting] scrutiny, ‘the
    strength of the governmental interest must reflect the seriousness of the actual burden
    on First Amendment rights.’” (quoting Davis, 
    554 U.S. at 744
    )).
    As a practical matter, the burdens here are less substantial than the burdens in
    Sampson. Today, the Secretary’s office and website have additional resources to
    assist people like Dr. Hsieh. In addition, the Secretary’s office has implemented the
    TRACER system, by which issue committees can more easily disclose contributions
    and expenditures. Dr. Hsieh’s easier experience meeting Colorado’s issue-committee
    registration and disclosure requirements is a testament to the Secretary’s good work
    in improving the process. In 2008, issue committees seeking guidance were left to
    sort through the language of the Colorado Constitution, the Act, and the Secretary’s
    regulations. Yet, apart from the easier entry of information, Colorado’s issue-
    committee regulatory framework and its associated burdens remain fully in place.
    In registering the Coalition as an issue committee and complying with
    Colorado’s reporting requirements, Dr. Hsieh still faces an overly burdensome
    23
    regulatory framework. Although the Secretary has created additional resources to
    assist issue committees in understanding and complying with registration and
    disclosure laws, meeting the requirements is no small chore. Implementing TRACER
    alleviated some technical burdens, but even with TRACER, a person registering an
    issue committee still faces over 35 online training modules on how to use TRACER.
    And although TRACER enables Dr. Hsieh to more easily transfer the Coalition’s
    financial information to the Secretary’s disclosures database, she still must provide
    detailed information about the Coalition’s most mundane, obvious, and unimportant
    expenditures (e.g., the address of the post office at which she purchased stamps).
    We also note that financial disclosure imposes a unique burden on small-scale
    issue committees. In 2010, after reaching out to putative contributors who pledged
    funds in support of the Coalition’s policy paper, some putative contributors altered
    their behavior in response to Dr. Hsieh’s request for their personal information.
    While one contributor increased his contribution in response to the disclosure
    requirements, the Coalition lost contributions it otherwise would have received. We
    would expect some prospective contributors to balk at producing their addresses or
    employment information. And with small-scale issue committees, like the
    Coalition’s, lost contributions might affect their ability to advocate. Although larger-
    dollar issue committees may not notice some lost donations, Dr. Hsieh vividly
    recalled losing even $20 contributions.
    The Secretary argues that the Coalition’s incremental burden in complying
    with Colorado’s issue-committee regulatory framework is less than the overwhelming
    24
    burden borne by the anti-annexation residents in Sampson. Specifically, the Secretary
    argues that because the Coalition is a nonprofit corporation instead of a citizen group,
    the Coalition is better prepared to comply with Colorado’s issue-committee laws.
    Although it is true that the Coalition may closely track finances and use software that
    helps in creating TRACER reports, we note that Dr. Hsieh operates the Coalition by
    herself. Dr. Hsieh spends a considerable amount of time tending to the Coalition’s
    disclosure obligations. In this way, Dr. Hsieh experienced the same substantial
    burdens as did the citizen group in Sampson.
    In sum, Colorado law imposes a wide range of burdens on issue committees,
    some of which are slight and others more substantial.
    c.     Balancing
    In balancing the informational interest in the Coalition’s disclosures and the
    burdens Colorado law imposes, we see a mismatch. In Colorado, at least in the
    Coalition’s circumstances, the minimal informational interest cannot justify the
    associated substantial burdens.
    The minimal informational interest here cannot support Colorado’s filing
    schedule that requires twelve disclosures in seven months regardless of whether an
    issue committee has received or spent any money. Further, the burden of asking for
    personal information of $20-contributors is substantial. Gaining the necessary
    information from these contributors might well result in fewer contributors willing to
    support an issue committee’s advocacy. A $20 threshold for contributor disclosure—
    25
    coupled with other registration and reporting requirements—is too burdensome when
    applied to a small-scale issue committee like the Coalition.
    In short, Colorado law—as it stands—demands too much of the Coalition
    given the public’s modest informational interest in the Coalition’s disclosures. 6
    Voters certainly have an interest in knowing who finances support or opposition to a
    given ballot initiative, but for small-scale issue committees like the Coalition,
    Colorado’s onerous reporting requirements outweigh that informational interest. At
    the same time, we recognize that Colorado’s current issue-committee regulatory
    framework is much more justifiable for large-scale, bigger-money issue committees.
    In concluding that Colorado’s issue-committee regulatory framework is
    unconstitutional as applied to the Coalition, we decline to address the facial validity
    of the Colorado Constitution’s $200 threshold for issue-committee reporting. The
    Secretary argues that if we conclude that Colorado may not require the Coalition to
    register and disclose as an issue committee, we “should [also] facially invalidate the
    $200 threshold.” Appellant’s Opening Br. at 68. The Secretary argues that facially
    invalidating the $200 threshold would “offer certainty to political speakers and
    regulators in Colorado by permitting the Colorado General Assembly to exercise its
    6
    Our exacting-scrutiny analysis does not change after this court’s recent
    decision in Independence Institute v. Williams, ___ F.3d ____, No. 14-1463, 
    2016 WL 423759
     (10th Cir. Feb. 4, 2016). In Independence Institute, we concluded that
    Colorado’s electioneering-communications disclosure framework was constitutional
    as applied to a television advertisement urging Colorado voters to support an audit of
    Colorado’s Health Benefit Exchange. 
    Id. at *1
    . Because Independence Institute
    involved a different disclosure framework, Independence Institute’s as-applied ruling
    does not impact our decision here.
    26
    political judgment to set constitutionally acceptable reporting requirements.” 
    Id. at 69
    .
    We understand the Secretary’s frustration with the present state of the law.
    Secretary Gessler tried to adjust his office’s rules after Sampson but then lost his bid
    to do so in Gessler. We sympathize with the Secretary’s suggestion that striking the
    $200 threshold as facially unconstitutional is better than leaving the threshold subject
    to piecemeal litigation on what amount of contributions and expenditures would be
    constitutional as applied.7 For instance, in Sampson we declared Colorado’s
    regulatory scheme unconstitutional for an issue committee that raised $2,239.55.
    Here we do so again for $3,500. So what about $5,000? $10,000?
    From no one’s perspective is this a satisfactory posture. But the Secretary is
    better served seeking help from the institution best equipped in our governmental
    system to solve the problem—the Colorado legislature. As noted, statutes provide
    most of the onerous reporting requirements. Even the Colorado Constitution’s setting
    a floor of $200 does not require the same full reporting as for larger-scale issue
    committees. Accordingly, we decline to address the facial validity of the $200
    threshold, and leave it to the people of Colorado themselves.
    7
    At oral argument, the court asked the Secretary’s counsel: “It sounds to me
    like what you’re really saying is if we don’t win on our first argument [as-applied
    constitutionality], then find the constitutional provision facially unconstitutional, is
    that what you’re saying?” Oral Arg. at 31:10. With a proper dose of levity but a dead-
    serious point too, the Secretary’s counsel replied, “Execute us or set us free, your
    honor.” 
    Id. at 31:22
    . Here we do neither, directing the Secretary to seek relief from
    those able to amend Colorado’s statutes to meet the Secretary’s concerns.
    27
    We thus conclude that Colorado’s issue-committee regulatory framework does
    not satisfy exacting scrutiny in this case. As applied to the Coalition, Colorado’s
    framework is unconstitutional under the First Amendment.
    III.   CONCLUSION
    As in Sampson, we conclude that Colorado’s issue-committee regulatory
    framework is unconstitutional as applied to the Coalition. The government’s modest
    informational interest in the Coalition’s disclosures is not reflected in the burdens
    Colorado law imposes on the Coalition. We therefore affirm.
    28