Cohen Ma v. Hunt , 372 F. App'x 850 ( 2010 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
April 12, 2010
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
SOLOMON BEN-TOV COHEN MA
(CANTAB),
Petitioner-Appellant,
v. No. 09-1277
(D.C. No. 1:08-CV-01844-LTB-CBS)
THERESA HUNT, Warden of GEO- (D. Colorado)
ICE Detention Facility, Aurora,
Colorado,
Respondent-Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before TACHA, BRISCOE, and TYMKOVICH, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has
determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the
determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R.
34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
The government has filed a motion to dismiss this appeal based on
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under
the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may
be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P.
32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
mootness. We dismiss in part and affirm in part.
The petitioner filed a 28 U.S.C. § 2241 petition challenging his
detention without bond by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”).
In the petition, he not only challenged his detention, but also alleged that he
was denied access to the Internet and that he was unable to practice his
religion. He sought either release or the setting of bond, injunctive and
declaratory relief regarding the conditions of confinement as well as
damages for wrongful incarceration. The district court denied the petition,
concluding that it lacked jurisdiction to review the decision of ICE to hold
the petitioner without bond. The court also determined that § 2241 was not
the proper vehicle to present the claims regarding the conditions of
confinement.
The government argues that the appeal is moot because the petitioner
is no longer in the custody of ICE, but rather now is being held in another
facility pursuant to an arrest warrant issued after he was indicted on five
counts of “refusing to apply for documents for deportation” in violation of 8
U.S.C. § 1253(a)(1)(B). The petitioner contends that the government cannot
evade jurisdiction by merely transferring him to another facility.
Under Article III of the Constitution, federal courts may only
adjudicate live controversies. Alvarez v, Smith, 130 S.Ct. 576, 580 (2009).
An “actual controversy must be extant at all stages of review, not merely at
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the time the complaint is filed.” Id. (quotation omitted). Once the
controversy ceases to exist, the action is moot and this court lacks
jurisdiction. Lane v. Simon, 495 F.3d 1182, 1186 (10th Cir. 2007) (citation
omitted).
We agree with the government that the appeal is moot as to the release
claims and those claims seeking declaratory judgment and injunctive relief
regarding the conditions of confinement. See Ferry v. Gonzales, 457 F.3d
1117, 1132 (10th Cir. 2006) (§ 2241 petition challenging alien’s detention
without bond was moot when the alien was no longer “in the custody of the
DHS to benefit from a bond determination or release.”); Wirsching v.
Colorado, 360 F.3d 1191, 1196 (10th Cir. 2004) (appeal of denial of
declaratory and injunction relief regarding conditions of confinement is
moot where the prisoner was released). The petitioner was not merely
transferred from one facility to another, but rather he was released from
ICE’s custody and is now being held, not awaiting removal, but pending the
resolution of criminal charges.
However, the petitioner’s claims for damages for wrongful
incarceration are not moot. See Lippoldt v. Cole, 468 F.3d 1204, 1217 (10th
Cir. 2006) (“[B]y definition claims for past damages cannot be deemed
moot.”) (quotation omitted); Wirsching, 360 F.3d at 1196 (release did not
moot damages claims; these claims “‘remain viable because a judgment for
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damages in [the plaintiff’s] favor would alter the defendants’ behavior by
forcing them to pay an amount of money they otherwise would not have to
pay.’”) (quotation omitted). Accordingly, we reach the merits of this part of
the appeal.
Although the district court did not specifically address the petitioner’s
claims for damages, the court correctly determined that claims regarding
conditions of confinement may not be brought in a § 2241 proceeding. See
McIntosh v. United States Parole Commission, 115 F.3d 809, 812 (10th Cir.
1997) (“Section 2241 actions are not used to challenge prison conditions
....”). See also Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749, 750 (2004) (“[R]equests
for relief turning on circumstances of confinement may be presented in a §
1983 action.”).
Accordingly, we grant the government’s motion to dismiss in part.
Because the release/bond claims and the requests for declaratory and
injunctive relief are moot, we VACATE those portions of the district
court’s order dealing with these claims and REMAND with instructions to
DISMISS those claims. See Kansas Judicial Review v. Stout, 562 F.3d 1240,
1248 (10th Cir. 2009) (“When a case becomes moot on appeal, the ordinary
course is to vacate the judgment below and remand with directions to
dismiss.”). Mootness did not occur because of some action on the part of
the petitioner, but rather occurred as a matter of happenstance. Alvarez v.
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Smith, 130 S.Ct. 576, 581-83 (2009); Arizonans for Official English v.
Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 71 (1997) (“Vacatur is in order when mootness occurs
through ... circumstances not attributable to the parties.”). We AFFIRM the
dismissal of the claims seeking damages. The motion to restore is DENIED.
The mandate shall issue forthwith.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
PER CURIAM
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