Cook v. Champion ( 1999 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
AUG 5 1999
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
DERYL WAYNE COOK,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v. No. 98-5130
RONALD J. CHAMPION, Warden, (D.C. No. 96-CV-757)
Dick Connor Correctional Institution; (N.D. Okla.)
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE
STATE OF OKLAHOMA, sued as:
Drew Edmondson,
Respondents-Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before ANDERSON, KELLY and BRISCOE, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
Petitioner Deryl Wayne Cook appeals the district court’s denial of his 28
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
*
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
U.S.C. § 2254 petition for habeas relief and denial of his application for a
certificate of appealability. We grant in part and deny in part Cook’s request for
a certificate of appealability and affirm the ruling of the district court.
In 1991, Cook was convicted in Oklahoma of two counts of indecent
exposure after prior conviction of two or more felonies. He was sentenced to
twenty-five and thirty years’ imprisonment, to be served consecutively. The
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed his conviction on direct appeal in
a summary opinion and denied his subsequent application for post-conviction
relief.
On appeal, Cook raises two issues: (1) Introduction of hearsay testimony
violated his right to confront the witnesses against him; and (2) use of a
“presumed not guilty” rather than a “presumed innocent” jury instruction violated
his right to due process. We conclude that with respect to his Confrontation
Clause claim Cook “has made a substantial showing of the denial of a
constitutional right,” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2), and we grant a certificate of
appealability on that issue. We deny Cook’s request for a certificate of
appealability with respect to his jury instruction claim and dismiss that portion of
the appeal.
Because Cook filed his petition on August 16, 1996, our review is governed
by the provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996.
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See Lindh v. Murphy , 117 S. Ct. 2059, 2064 (1997). Under that Act, Cook is
entitled to relief only if the state court’s decision “was contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the
Supreme Court of the United States; or resulted in a decision that was based on an
unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the
State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Any factual findings made by the
state court are presumed correct and will be disturbed only if shown to be
erroneous by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e).
I. Confrontation Clause
Cook’s Confrontation Clause claim has two components. First, he asserts
his confrontation rights were violated by admission at trial of hearsay evidence
that an eyewitness reported Cook’s license plate number to police. Second, he
argues his confrontation rights were violated by a police officer’s testimony that
the victims had picked Cook from a photographic lineup.
Despite the asserted constitutional errors, much of Cook’s appellate brief is
devoted to analyzing the admissibility of the evidence under Oklahoma law. On
federal habeas review, however, our remedial powers extend to correcting
constitutional errors. On federal habeas review, we can afford no relief for
simple errors of state law. See Tyler v. Nelson , 163 F.3d 1222, 1226 (10th Cir.
1999). Therefore, we consider Cook’s contentions only to the extent they
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implicate his constitutional rights.
The charges against Cook stemmed from incidents that occurred on
September 5 and 8, 1991. On those days, as well as on September 7, a man on a
“shiny black” motorcycle rode by the home of ten-year-old Y and her parents. On
September 5 and September 7, Y was outside her house when the man rode by on
his motorcycle and, according to Y, the man exposed his genitals. Y was only
seven feet from the street when she saw the man. She did not report the
September 5 incident to her parents until the man again exposed himself on
September 7. Y described the man as an “old man, bald headed with glasses,”
riding a black motorcycle. In a subsequent conversation with police, Y stated the
motorcycle’s license plate included the number 718.
Y’s mother saw the man expose himself on September 8. The mother was
standing outside with Y’s father and a neighbor when a man rode by on a
motorcycle. As Y ran from the house, she saw the man and exclaimed, “That’s
him, that’s him.” Tr. 16, 33. The mother testified the man “had his zipper down
with his genitals out” and tried “to cover up” when he saw adults standing in the
yard. Id. at 33. Y’s father got into his car and chased the man, apparently
recording the license plate number on the motorcycle as Y9797.
The license plate number led police to Cook, who had four prior
convictions for indecent exposure. However, Y’s father, who was the only person
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who saw and recorded the Y9797 license plate number, did not testify at trial.
Instead, police officers testified over Cook’s hearsay objections that the suspect
reportedly was riding a motorcycle with license plate number Y9797. The
prosecutor referenced the license plate identification in both opening statement
and closing argument. Over Cook’s objection, one of the officers also testified
that the victims picked Cook’s photograph from a photographic lineup.
Cook argues admission of testimony regarding the license plate number and
the photographic lineup violated his rights under the Due Process and
Confrontation Clauses. In considering Cook’s claim, we need not determine if the
evidence was admissible under Oklahoma rules of evidence. Rather, we ask only
whether the admitted evidence violated Cook’s Sixth Amendment right to
confront adverse witnesses. “For the admission of hearsay evidence to comply
with the Sixth Amendment, the witness must be unavailable and the statement
must bear ‘sufficient indicia of reliability.’” Hatch v. Oklahoma , 58 F.3d 1447,
1467 (10th Cir. 1995) (quoting Ohio v. Roberts , 448 U.S. 56, 65-66 (1980)). A
statement is reliable if it “falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception” or is
accompanied by “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.” Roberts , 448 U.S.
at 66.
The hearsay evidence admitted here satisfies neither of the Roberts
requirements. There is no indication in the record that Y’s father, who recorded
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the license plate number, was unavailable to testify at trial and the state offers no
explanation for this witness’ absence. Further, the statements at issue do not fall
within a firmly rooted hearsay exception or appear to be particularly trustworthy.
The state does assert that evidence of the license plate was admissible as non-
hearsay because it was offered not for the truth of the matter asserted, but only to
explain the officers’ subsequent conduct in investigating Cook. Regardless of the
purpose for which the evidence was admitted, however, it is apparent from the
record that the prosecutor, over Cook’s objections, used the evidence in both
opening statement and closing argument for the sole purpose of proving Cook’s
guilt. Therefore, like the district court, we will assume admission of the evidence
violated Cook’s confrontation rights.
Despite this violation of Cook’s constitutional rights, he is entitled to
habeas relief only if the trial error is not harmless. See Crespin v. New Mexico ,
144 F.3d 641, 649 (10th Cir. 1998) (violation of Confrontation Clause is trial
error subject to harmless error analysis). In habeas proceedings, an error is
harmless only if it did not have “substantial and injurious effect or influence in
determining the jury’s verdict.” 1
Brecht v. Abrahamson , 507 U.S. 619, 622
1
Because the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals decided the issue in
summary fashion, it is unclear whether it applied any type of harmless error
review, or even concluded admission of the evidence violated Cook’s
confrontation rights.
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(1993) (quoting Kotteakos v. United States , 328 U.S. 750, 776 (1946)). If we are
in “grave doubt” about the harmlessness of the error, we must treat the error as
though it affected the verdict. See O’Neal v. McAninch , 513 U.S. 432, 435
(1995). “Grave doubt” exists if “the matter is so evenly balanced that . . . [we
are] in virtual equipoise as to the harmlessness of the error.” Id. In conducting a
harmless error analysis, our task is not to determine whether the evidence is
sufficient to support Cook’s convictions in the absence of the inadmissible
hearsay. See Tuttle v. Utah , 57 F.3d 879, 884 (10th Cir. 1995). Instead, “we
must determine, in light of the entire record, whether [the hearsay] evidence so
influenced the jury that we cannot conclude that it did not substantially affect the
verdict, or whether we have grave doubt as to the harmlessness of the errors
alleged.” Id.
In Delaware v. Van Arsdall , 475 U.S. 673, 684 (1986), the Supreme Court
set forth several factors that typically prove helpful in determining whether a
Confrontation Clause violation is harmless:
Whether such an error is harmless in a particular case depends upon a
host of factors, . . . includ[ing] the importance of the witness’
testimony in the prosecution’s case, whether the testimony was
cumulative, the presence or absence of evidence corroborating or
contradicting the testimony of the witness on material points, the
extent of cross-examination otherwise permitted, and, of course, the
overall strength of the prosecution’s case.
Id. Applying these factors to the instant case, we conclude any Confrontation
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Clause violations were harmless.
The license plate evidence at best linked Cook’s motorcycle with the
perpetrator. While this direct link was not unimportant, it was not critical in light
of the independent eyewitness identifications of Cook by Y and her mother. The
hearsay evidence was cumulative and unnecessary to the extent it was used to
place Cook at the crime scene. See Crespin , 144 F.3d at 650 (error harmless
where evidence not required to place defendant in store at time of robbery). At
trial, Y identified Cook as the man who drove by her house and exposed himself
on September 5 and 7. Although she was only ten years old when the incident
occurred and eleven years old at the time of trial, Y did not retreat from her
positive identification of Cook. Her mother was equally adamant in her
identification of Cook.
Some facts do weigh against a finding of harmlessness with respect to the
license plate evidence. Foremost among them is Y’s testimony that she initially
thought the license plate included the number 718. At trial, Y explained the
discrepancy by admitting her initial recollection must have been wrong. Also
weighing against a finding of harmlessness is the prosecutor’s reference to the
license plate number in opening statement and closing argument. These
references were brief, but forceful. In the prosecutor’s extremely short opening
statement, which consisted of one transcribed page in the trial record, he informed
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the jury that “[t]he big difference between the incident on the 5th and the incident
on the 8th was that somebody on the 8th got a vehicle description and a license
plate number. That information was used by police officers and detectives to find
this man, Deryl Wayne Cook.” Tr. at 5. In closing argument, the prosecutor
specifically implored the jury to “look at the license plate number.” Id. at 100.
Although troubling, these facts must be viewed in light of the strength of
the prosecution’s case. Here, that case was not based on circumstantial evidence,
see Tuttle , 57 F.3d at 892, but on two positive eyewitness identifications of Cook
as the perpetrator. Cf. Graham v. Wilson , 828 F.2d 656, 661 (10th Cir. 1987)
(numerous eyewitness identifications rendered error harmless). In light of the
significant strength of the prosecution’s case against Cook, the erroneous
admission of the license plate evidence and the resulting constitutional error did
not substantially and injuriously affect the jury’s verdict.
Admission of the officer’s testimony regarding the photographic lineup,
which Cook does not suggest was impermissibly suggestive or otherwise
improper, also was harmless. At trial, both Y and her mother identified Cook. As
such, even if improperly admitted, the evidence was relatively unimportant to the
prosecution’s case and was cumulative. Moreover, Y, her mother, and the officer
who arranged the lineup were all available at trial and subject to cross-
examination. We conclude the officer’s testimony that Y and her mother picked
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Cook’s picture from a photographic lineup did not substantially affect the jury’s
verdict.
II. Jury instruction
Cook contends he was deprived of a fair trial when the state district court
instructed the jury not that Cook was presumed innocent but that he was presumed
not guilty. Cook’s trial counsel did not object to the “presumed not guilty”
instruction at trial and appellate counsel did not raise the issue on appeal.
Instead, Cook raised the issue in his post-conviction application after the
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals issued its opinion in Flores v. State , 896
P.2d 558, 562 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995). In Flores , the court ruled use of the
“presumed not guilty” instruction constituted reversible error. In this case, the
court ruled Cook waived the issue by not presenting it on direct review.
An issue that is procedurally defaulted in state court on an adequate and
independent state law ground may not form the basis of a habeas petition unless
the petitioner establishes cause and prejudice to excuse the procedural default or
demonstrates that failure to consider the claim would constitute a fundamental
miscarriage of justice. See Coleman v. Thompson , 501 U.S. 722, 749-50 (1991);
Rogers v. Gibson , 173 F.3d 1278, 1290 (10th Cir. 1999). Cook does not dispute
that Oklahoma’s waiver rule constitutes an adequate and independent state law
ground that we must respect. Instead, he asserts ineffective assistance of counsel
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excuses his procedural default. Although ineffective assistance of counsel may
serve as “cause” sufficient to overcome a procedural bar, see Ross v. Ward , 165
F.3d 793, 798 (10th Cir. 1999), Cook simply asserts without comment that his
trial and appellate counsel were ineffective. Nowhere does he offer any
substantive explanation of how he was prejudiced by the “presumed not guilty”
instruction.
Cook cannot demonstrate deficient performance by his counsel in any
event. Flores was decided after Cook’s trial and direct appeal were complete.
Cook’s attorney did not have the benefit of Flores or any other case law casting
doubt on the propriety of the “presumed not guilty” instruction. Counsel is not
ineffective for failing to anticipate arguments on issues that had no basis in law at
the time of trial or appeal. See Sherill v. Hargett , 1999 WL 492682 (10th Cir.
1999) (rejecting same contention presented by Cook).
III. Conclusion
We GRANT Cook a certificate of appealability with respect to his
Confrontation Clause claim and AFFIRM the district court’s ruling denying Cook
habeas relief. We DENY Cook a certificate of appealability with respect to his
due process claim and DISMISS that portion of his appeal. The mandate shall
issue forthwith.
Entered for the Court
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MARY BECK BRISCOE
Circuit Judge
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