United States v. Smith , 562 F. App'x 613 ( 2014 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
TENTH CIRCUIT April 14, 2014
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Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 13-3200
BARRY L. SMITH, (D.C. No. 2:00-CR-20150-KHV-DJW-1)
(D. Kan.)
Defendant-Appellant.
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ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
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Before TYMKOVICH, BALDOCK, and BACHARACH, Circuit Judges.**
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After giving Defendant Barry L. Smith multiple chances to clean up his act, the
district court revoked his supervised release and sentenced him to three years
imprisonment—nine months above what the Guidelines recommended. On appeal,
Defendant argues his sentence is both procedurally and substantively unreasonable.
Defendant’s procedural arguments do not rise to the level of plain error and his sentence
was not plainly unreasonable. Thus, exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and
18 U.S.C. § 3742, we affirm.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of
the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive
value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
**
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously
to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral argument. See Fed.
R. App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1. The case therefore is ordered submitted without oral
argument.
I.
In 2001, Defendant pled guilty to one count of distributing five grams or more of a
substance containing methamphetamine, a class C felony, in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(a)(1), and one count of possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking
crime, a class A felony, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A). The sentence imposed
included a term of supervised release. At the change of plea hearing, the plea petition
and the court incorrectly stated Defendant’s § 924(c) offense was a class D felony and
that if Defendant violated the terms of his supervised release, he could be subject to an
additional term of imprisonment of no more than two years. But because Defendant’s
924(c) violation was actually a class A felony, he could actually be sentenced to an
additional five years of imprisonment if his supervised release was revoked. See 18
U.S.C. § 3583(e). On November 23, 2011, Defendant was released from prison and
started his term of supervised release. On May 8, 2013, while still on supervised release,
Defendant’s probation officer filed a report alleging Defendant had violated the terms of
his supervised release by, among other things, possessing and using methamphetamine,
marijuana, and K-2,1 as well as failing multiple drug tests and lying to his probation
officer. The most serious of these violations was a grade B violation.
1
K-2, or “Spice,” “refers to a wide variety of herbal mixtures that produce experiences
similar to marijuana . . . .” DrugFacts: Spice (“Synthetic Marijuana”),
http://www.drugabuse.gov/publications/drugfacts/spice-synthetic-marijuana, (visited
April 9, 2014). “[T]he Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) has designated the five
active chemicals most frequently found in Spice as Schedule I controlled substances,
making it illegal to sell, buy, or possess them.” Id.
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At a revocation hearing on May 15, 2013, Defendant stipulated to the facts in the
violation report. Based on Defendant’s criminal history category of VI and grade B
violation, the Guidelines’ non-binding policy statements recommended a custody range
of 21 to 27 months. But the district court pointed out at this hearing that it was inclined
to impose an above-Guideline sentence and could send Defendant back to prison for up to
five years. Instead of imposing sentence, however, the court continued the matter to give
Defendant a chance to obtain drug treatment. By the next hearing, on July 15, 2013,
Defendant had started drug treatment but had again tested positive for methamphetamine.
Defendant admitted “messing up,” but stated he was “trying very hard.” The court then
gave Defendant one last chance. The court continued the hearing until July 29 and stated,
“if you miss any drug tests, if you use any drugs, if you do anything else in violation of
the terms of your supervised release, my plan is that I will send you to prison for three
years and there will be no supervised release after that.” Despite this warning, Defendant
again violated the terms of his supervised release when he failed to attend a substance
abuse treatment meeting on July 16 and was asked to leave a treatment meeting on July
23 for being argumentative.
On July 29, 2013, the district court revoked Defendant’s supervised release and
sentenced him to three years imprisonment. In doing so, the court told Defendant it felt
“at some level personally betrayed by your lack of honesty with the court and with the
probation office, and I think anyone looking at this file would come to the conclusion that
you are not a good candidate for supervision.” Defendant did not object to the sentence
below.
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II.
We review a district court’s sentence following revocation of supervised release
for procedural and substantive reasonableness. United States v. Ruby, 706 F.3d 1221,
1225 (10th Cir. 2013). Defendant challenges the procedural reasonableness of his
sentence on two grounds. He did not object on either ground below, so we review these
claims for plain error. Id. “Under plain error review, the defendant must demonstrate (1)
there is error, (2) that is plain, (3) which affects substantial rights, and (4) which seriously
affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. at 1226.
A.
Defendant first argues he was deprived of his due process right to notice and fair
warning because, at the time of the plea underlying his supervised release, the court and
defense counsel incorrectly informed him that he could face no more than two additional
years of imprisonment if his supervised release was revoked. He relies on the unreported
case of United States v. Hoff, 215 F. App’x 720, 724 (10th Cir. 2007), for the proposition
that incorrectly advising a defendant as to the terms of his supervised release meets the
first two elements of plain error. Even assuming Hoff persuaded us that Defendant meets
these first two elements of plain error, however, Hoff also reveals why Defendant’s claim
fails under plain error’s third prong. See id. That is, to show plain error, Defendant must
prove the error affected his substantial rights, and to do so, the Supreme Court has held “a
defendant is obliged to show a reasonable probability that, but for the error, he would not
have entered the plea.” United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74, 76 (2004).
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Defendant nowhere attempts to make such a showing. Instead, he appears to
argue that, had he known he could face up to a five-year revocation sentence rather than a
two-year revocation sentence, a reasonable probability exists that he would not have
violated the terms of his supervised release. Whatever the legal merit of this argument,
the record here belies it. Defendant learned on May 15, 2013, that he could be sentenced
to up to five years imprisonment upon revocation and was given not one, but two
subsequent opportunities to comply with his supervised release conditions. Despite these
multiple opportunities to avoid the penalty he by then had notice and fair warning of,
Defendant continued to violate the terms of his supervised release. We therefore need
not rely on probabilities to determine whether Defendant’s substantial rights were
affected; Defendant’s own actions show they were not.
B.
Defendant next argues his sentence is procedurally unreasonable because the court
violated his right to due process when it based the sentence, “at least in part,” on the fact
that it felt “at some level personally betrayed” by Defendant’s lack of honesty with the
court and probation office. Again, because Defendant failed to object below, we review
only for plain error. Ruby, 706 F.3d at 1225. Defendant fails to show how any error the
court may have committed in mentioning its personal sense of a betrayal of trust was
“plain—that is[] . . . ‘clear under current law.’” United States v. Cordery, 656 F.3d 1103,
1106 (10th Cir. 2011) (quoting United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734 (1993)). “An
error is clear where the Supreme Court or this court has addressed the issue or where the
district court’s interpretation was clearly erroneous.” Id. The Supreme Court has held
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“the sentencing process . . . must satisfy the requirements of the Due Process Clause.”
Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 358 (1977). Within this framework, “factors that are
constitutionally impermissible or totally irrelevant to the sentencing process[ include] the
race, religion, or political affiliation of the defendant . . . .” Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S.
862, 885 (1983).
Defendant provides no Supreme Court or Tenth Circuit authority for the
proposition that a district court may not consider a personal sense of betrayal of trust in
the context of a revocation proceeding. Instead, he argues that, under United States v.
Bakker, 925 F.2d 728 (4th Cir. 1991), an expression of personal betrayal goes beyond the
permissible scope of the breach of trust the court may consider at sentencing. Bakker
holds that a sentencing judge may not take his own religious convictions into account in
sentencing. Id. at 740. In that sense, Bakker simply extended Zant to prevent a
sentencing judge from considering either his own or the defendant’s religious convictions
at sentencing. This case has nothing to do with religious convictions; Bakker is therefore
inapposite. Conversely, Defendant recognizes that, in revoking a defendant’s supervised
release, the sentencing court not only may, but “should sanction primarily the defendant’s
breach of trust . . . .” U.S.S.G. ch. 7, pt. A, cmt. 3(b). As such, we do not see how any
error in taking the betrayal of trust personally rose to the level of plain error.
Moreover, Defendant cannot show the district court’s personal sense of betrayal
affected his substantial rights because he cannot show “a reasonable probability that, but
for the error claimed, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” See
United States v. Dazey, 403 F.3d 1147 (10th Cir. 2005). The district court warned
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Defendant on July 15 that it would impose a three-year revocation sentence if he violated
his supervised release again. The court gave this warning two weeks before commenting
on its personal sense of betrayal and imposing sentence. We have no reason to believe
that, had the court not felt personally betrayed, it would have imposed a lighter sentence
than it had already promised. Accordingly, this claim fails.
III.
Finally, Defendant argues his sentence is substantively unreasonable because the
reasons the district court cited did not justify a sentence nine months above Defendant’s
advisory range under U.S.S.G. § 7B1.4. A defendant need not object below in order to
preserve the issue of substantive reasonableness. United States v. Torres-Duenas, 461
F.3d 1178, 1183 (10th Cir. 2006). Nevertheless, our review is deferential:
[O]ur standard of review is “plainly unreasonable.” In reviewing the
sentence and the court’s explanation of it, we will not reverse if it can be
determined from the record to have been reasoned and reasonable. In
conducting this analysis, we review the district court’s findings of fact for
clear error and its legal interpretations of the Sentencing Guidelines de
novo.
United States v. Kelley, 359 F.3d 1302, 1304 (10th Cir. 2004) (internal marks and
citations omitted). “Defendant must do more than show that his preferred sentence was a
reasonable one. In virtually every case, many sentences would be reasonable. To obtain
relief, he must show that the actual sentence imposed was outside this range of
reasonableness.” United States v. McBride, 633 F.3d 1229, 1232 (10th Cir. 2011).
Defendant does not argue the district court committed clear error as to any factual
findings, nor does he argue the court erred in interpreting the Guidelines. Rather, he
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argues his sentence is unreasonable because the court “overlooked, or did not attach
sufficient weight to,” the facts that Defendant (1) did not violate his supervised release
for over a year before relapsing and (2) had improved his attitude somewhat after he
started drug treatment. This is not enough to show that a sentence nine months above
that recommended by the Guidelines was outside the range of reasonableness. The
district court gave Defendant two extra chances to clean up his act and comply with the
terms of his supervised release. Both times the court warned him of the consequences he
faced if he failed to do so. Both times Defendant disregarded the court’s warnings and
continued to violate the terms of his supervised release. In light of Defendant’s flagrant
disregard for the court’s warnings and the terms of his supervised release, we fail to see
how his revocation sentence is plainly unreasonable.
AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court,
Bobby R. Baldock
United States Circuit Judge
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