Brady v. Bloor , 83 F. App'x 306 ( 2003 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
DEC 15 2003
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
CLARK BRADY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
No. 03-1318
(District of Colorado)
DR. ANITA BLOOR; KATHY
(D.C. No. 03-Z-558)
RITTENHOUSE, (N.P.); GARY
WATKINS, (Warden LCF),
Defendants-Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before SEYMOUR, MURPHY, and O’BRIEN, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
Clark Brady, a prisoner appearing pro se, appeals the district court’s
dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights suit. The district court dismissed
Brady’s suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) on the ground that Brady had failed
to exhaust his administrative remedies. As was true below, Brady does not
contend on appeal that he had exhausted his administrative remedies at the time
he filed his § 1983 complaint. Instead, he asserts that he need not exhaust
because (1) the administrative remedies available in Colorado are insufficient and
(2) § 1997e(a) does not apply to his claims. As noted by the district court,
Brady’s arguments are foreclosed by the Supreme Court’s opinion in Porter v.
Nussle, 534 U.S. 516 (2002). According to Porter,
Once within the discretion of the district court, exhaustion in cases
covered by § 1997e(a) is now mandatory. All “available” remedies
must now be exhausted; those remedies need not meet federal
standards, nor must they be “plain, speedy, and effective.” Even
when the prisoner seeks relief not available in grievance proceedings,
notably money damages, exhaustion is a prerequisite to suit. And
unlike the previous provision, which encompassed only § 1983 suits,
exhaustion is now required for all “action[s] . . . brought with respect
to prison conditions,” whether under § 1983 or “any other Federal
law.”
Id. at 524; see also id. at 532 (“[W]e hold that the PLRA’s exhaustion
requirement applies to all inmate suits about prison life, whether they involve
general circumstances or particular episodes, and whether they allege excessive
force or some other wrong.”).
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The district court was clearly correct in concluding that Brady could not
proceed with his § 1983 claim because he had failed to exhaust his administrative
remedies. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (“No action shall be brought with respect to
prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a
prisoner confined in any . . . correctional facility until such administrative
remedies as are available are exhausted.”). Having so concluded, however, the
district court should have dismissed without prejudice. See Yousef v. Reno, 254
F.3d 1214, 1216 & n.1, 1222-23 (10th Cir. 2001). Accordingly, the case is
REMANDED to the district court to vacate its entry of judgment in favor of the
defendants and to, instead, dismiss Brady’s claims without prejudice to allow
exhaustion of his administrative remedies. Id. Larry Gordon’s Motion
Requesting Leave of the Court to File Amicus Curiae Brief is hereby DENIED.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Michael R. Murphy
Circuit Judge
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