Smith v. Valdez ( 1997 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
MAY 21 1997
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
SAM SMITH,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v. No. 96-2232
(D.C. No. CIV 94-1295 JC/LFG)
YMELDA VALDEZ, ATTORNEY (D. N.M.)
GENERAL OF THE STATE OF NEW
MEXICO,
Respondents-Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before PORFILIO and LOGAN, Circuit Judges, and BURRAGE, District Judge. **
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
**
Honorable Michael Burrage, Chief Judge, United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Oklahoma, sitting by designation.
Petitioner Sam Smith appeals the district court’s order denying his petition
for a writ of habeas corpus filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner was
convicted by a state court jury of the crime of possession of cocaine, in violation
of the version of N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-31-23 then in effect. He claims that he
was denied his constitutional right to due process because there was insufficient
evidence to sustain his conviction. He has applied for a certificate of
appealability, as required by 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c). We deny the certificate and
dismiss the appeal.
A claim based on sufficiency of the evidence is a mixed question of fact
and law to be reviewed de novo on federal habeas. See Maes v. Thomas, 46 F.3d
979, 988 (10th Cir. 1995). Habeas relief will be granted only if a rational trier-
of-fact could not have found that each element of the crime was proved beyond a
reasonable doubt, considering all of the evidence in the light most favorable to
the prosecution. See id. (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)).
We do not reweigh conflicting evidence or make credibility determinations. See
Messer v. Roberts, 74 F.3d 1009, 1013 (10th Cir. 1996). We must “accept the
jury’s resolution of the evidence as long as it is within the bounds of reason.”
Grubbs v. Hannigan, 982 F.2d 1483, 1487 (10th Cir. 1993).
Here, the facts are not disputed. At the time he was searched during an
unrelated matter, petitioner was carrying a coin-sized plastic bag containing a
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very small amount of cocaine. The baggie did not contain an administrable
amount of cocaine, but it was clearly visible in the baggie and petitioner testified
that he saw it. According to petitioner, he had picked up the baggie from a
parking lot, intending to use it to store his spare watch pins. No watch pins were
found in the baggie. Petitioner also testified that he had used cocaine in the past,
he previously had been convicted of cocaine possession, and he no longer used
cocaine.
The parties agree that the prosecution was required to establish that
petitioner was in possession of cocaine and he knew or believed the substance
was cocaine or other contraband. Petitioner does not dispute that the amount of
cocaine in the baggie was enough to support his conviction for possession. See
State v. Wood, 875 P.2d 1113, 1116-17 (N.M. Ct. App. 1994) (“any clearly
identifiable amount of a controlled substance is sufficient evidence to support a
conviction for possession of a controlled substance;” usable or measurable
amount not required). Rather, he argues that a trace amount of cocaine cannot be
sufficient to establish his knowledge that the substance was cocaine, absent
corroborating evidence. He maintains that his prior cocaine possession conviction
cannot contribute to a finding of knowledge because it was evidence only of his
propensity to use cocaine. He maintains that the jury impermissibly convicted
him based on evidence that he had a propensity to use cocaine.
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Knowledge can be established by direct or circumstantial evidence. Cf.
Minner v. Kerby, 30 F.3d 1311, 1315 (10th Cir. 1994) (intent to distribute); see
also Wood, 875 P.2d at 1117. Although New Mexico state law generally
prohibits the introduction of evidence of a defendant’s prior bad acts to show his
propensity to commit a crime, the evidence may be admissible for another
purpose, such as showing knowledge or absence of mistake. See State v.
Woodward, 908 P.d. 231, 237 (N.M. 1995). Therefore, because the evidence of
his prior conviction related to the element of petitioner’s knowledge “in a way
that [did] not merely show his propensity” to possess cocaine, State v.
Niewiadowski, 901 P.2d 779, 782-83 (N.M. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 899 P.2d
1138 (N.M. 1995), the prior conviction properly was considered by the jury as
evidence of knowledge or absence of mistake. We hold that a rational trier of
fact could find each element of the cocaine possession charge proved beyond a
reasonable doubt. Accordingly, petitioner’s application for a certificate of
appealability is denied because he has failed to make a “substantial showing of
the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2).
APPEAL DISMISSED.
Entered for the Court
Michael Burrage
Chief District Judge
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