Martinez v. Northern Rio Arriba ( 1998 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FEB 5 1998
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
VERNA MARTINEZ,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 96-2254
(D.C. No. CIV-95-724-JC)
NORTHERN RIO ARRIBA (D. N.M.)
ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC.,
Defendant-Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before PORFILIO, KELLY, and HENRY, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
Verna Martinez appeals from the district court’s grant of summary
judgment to defendant on her Title VII claim. Ms. Martinez asserted that
defendant, her former employer, denied her payment for accrued sick leave time
as a benefit upon her retirement in 1994. Alleging gender discrimination in
violation of Title VII, Ms. Martinez argued that a male employee, Narciso
Rendon, had been paid for accrued sick leave time under a similar policy when he
retired in 1989. Ms. Martinez acknowledged that the policy regarding payment of
accrued sick leave had changed several times over the years. In 1979, defendant’s
policy allowed all employees to accrue sick leave time and receive payment for
that time upon retirement. In 1986, the policy was amended to limit accruals to
600 hours and required defendant to make annual payments for accrued sick leave
time. Although this was the policy in effect when Mr. Rendon retired, he was
paid for all accrued sick time, which exceeded 600 hours. The policy was
changed again in 1992, eliminating the accrual of sick leave time and expressly
providing that unused sick leave time would have no cash value upon retirement.
When Ms. Martinez retired in 1994, she sought payment for almost 3,000 hours
of accrued sick leave. Ultimately, she was paid only for those amounts which
were due her from 1986 through 1992 under the annual cash-out provision then
in effect.
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Defendant moved for summary judgment, contending that Ms. Martinez and
Mr. Rendon were not similarly situated, having retired under different managers
and different policies. Further, it contended there was no evidence that any
decision on this issue was discrimination on the basis of gender. Ms. Martinez
responded, and after a hearing the district court granted summary judgment to
defendant on her Title VII claim. 1 This appeal followed.
Our jurisdiction over this appeal arises from 28 U.S.C. § 1291. “We review
de novo the grant of summary judgment and apply the same legal standards as the
district court under Rule 56.” Aramburu v. The Boeing Co., 112 F.3d 1398, 1402
(10th Cir. 1997). Under the applicable analysis, Ms. Martinez has the initial
burden to establish a prima facie case of intentional discrimination. See Elmore
v. Capstan, Inc., 58 F.3d 525, 529 (10th Cir. 1995). She seeks to satisfy this
burden using the disparate treatment theory, see generally Drake v. City of Fort
Collins, 927 F.2d 1156, 1160 (10th Cir. 1991), alleging that she was treated
differently than Rendon.
On appeal, plaintiff essentially contends that the standards measuring when
other employees are similarly situated do not apply to her claim of disparate
treatment because the case was decided on summary judgment. This argument
1
The district court’s order also dismissed, without prejudice, various state
law claims brought in conjunction with the Title VII claim. Martinez does not
appeal that part of the court’s ruling.
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is not persuasive; we have upheld the grant of summary judgment on Title VII
claims where a district court ruled that the plaintiff failed to establish a prima
facie case in a disparate treatment claim in part because she did not demonstrate
that other employees were similarly situated. See Lowe v. Angelo’s Italian
Foods, Inc., 87 F.3d 1170, 1172, 1174-75 (10th Cir. 1996). As part of her prima
facie case under the disparate treatment theory, Ms. Martinez must show that
she was similarly situated to Mr. Rendon in all material respects. See Shumway
v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 118 F.3d 60, 64 (2d Cir. 1997); Pierce v.
Commonwealth Life Ins. Co., 40 F.3d 796, 802 (6th Cir. 1994). Relying on the
undisputed facts before the district court regarding defendant’s sick leave accrual
policies, we conclude that Mr. Rendon and Ms. Martinez were not similarly
situated because, at the times of their respective retirements, those policies
differed greatly. Further, it does not help Ms. Martinez’s prima facie case that
the policy in force when Mr. Rendon retired was not followed. Not only were
the policies markedly different, they were also administered by different general
managers. Title VII does not constrain different managers in an organization
from taking different approaches in enforcing company rules or policies.
See Elmore, 58 F.3d at 532 (noting that a new manager who applied discipline
more rigorously did not compel an inference that any disparity in treatment
amounted to discrimination). In this case, the fact that different general managers
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implemented the different sick leave accrual policies further negates any
similarity between the two employees’ situations when they retired. See
Aramburu, 112 F.3d at 1404 (similarly situated individuals must have dealt with
same supervisor and been subject to same standards); Flasher, 986 F.2d at 1320;
Mitchell v. Toledo Hosp., 964 F.2d 577, 583 (6th Cir. 1992).
Ms. Martinez contends that factual issues remain regarding defendant’s
motivation for denying payment for her accrued sick leave time. She also asserts
that defendant’s action with regard to Mr. Rendon’s retirement should be grafted
onto the 1992 policy change, and that she has demonstrated “a clear factual
dispute as to whether this benefit was due to Plaintiff.” Appellant’s Br. at 7.
We disagree. Unless she can show that Mr. Rendon was a similarly situated
employee, her claim of disparate treatment fails without consideration of whether
defendant’s proffered reasons for its action were pretextual. Because we
conclude that Ms. Martinez neither established her prima facie case nor presented
evidence which creates a genuine issue of material fact as to any element of her
prima facie case, we do not address her further arguments.
In her reply brief, Ms. Martinez appears to contend that defendant amended
the sick leave accrual policy in 1992 with discriminatory intent. This contention
was not raised to the district court, and was not raised in Martinez’s opening
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brief. Accordingly, we decline to address it. See Walker v. Mather (In re
Walker), 959 F.2d 894, 896 (10th Cir. 1992) (stating general rule that issues
not raised to district court will not be considered); State Farm Fire & Casualty
Co. v. Mhoon, 31 F.3d 979, 984 n.7 (10th Cir. 1994) (holding that issues not
raised in opening brief are waived).
The judgment of the United States District Court for the District of New
Mexico is AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Paul J. Kelly, Jr.
Circuit Judge
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