Hatcher v. Fields ( 1997 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
AUG 1 1997
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
ROBERT L. HATCHER, JR.,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 96-7085
(D.C. No. 94-CV-226-S)
LARRY FIELDS, Director, D.O.C.; (E.D. Okla.)
MIKE PARSONS, Deputy Director,
Department of Corrections; BILL
SHORE, Coordinator, Lexington
A & R Center; STEVE HARGETT,
Warden, Joseph Harp Correctional
Center; MICHAEL CODY, Warden,
Lexington Correctional Center; RON
CHAMPION, Warden, Conner
Correctional Center; JACK COWLEY,
Warden, Oklahoma State Reformatory;
BOBBY BOONE, Warden, Mack
Alford Correctional Center; EDWARD
EVANS, Warden, James Crabtree
Correctional Center; DAN
REYNOLDS, Warden, Oklahoma State
Penitentiary; JAMES SAFFLE,
Regional Director, Department of
Corrections; MELVIN CAMPBELL,
Mail Supervisor, Oklahoma State
Penitentiary; JAMES PIERCE, Lt.,
Oklahoma State Penitentiary; PAT
HUMPHRIES, Lt., Oklahoma State
Penitentiary; EDDIE MORGAN, Unit
Manager, Oklahoma State
Penitentiary,
Defendants-Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before BRORBY, BARRETT, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument.
Plaintiff, an Oklahoma state inmate appearing pro se, appeals from the
district court’s grant of summary judgment to defendants in this civil rights suit
brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291,
and affirm.
This appeal arises from defendants’ second motion for summary judgment.
After their first motion, the district court granted judgment in favor of defendants
on all of plaintiff’s claims except an Eighth Amendment claim based on exposure
to environmental tobacco smoke (ETS). See R. doc. 33. After the district court
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of
law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the
citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under
the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
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entered its order, plaintiff filed an amended complaint on his remaining claim.
He asserted that defendants, acting with deliberate indifference, “exposed him to
levels of environmental tobacco smoke (ETS), that pose an unreasonable risk of
serious damage to his present and future health in violation of [the] Eighth
Amendment.” Id. doc. 43 at 3; see also id. doc. 49. More specifically, he alleged
that he was diagnosed by a doctor at the Oklahoma State Penitentiary (OSP) as
being “possibly” allergic to tobacco smoke, that the doctor recommended that
defendant be housed in a nonsmoker’s cell, that defendants knew about his allergy
and the doctor’s recommendation, and that they nevertheless forced plaintiff to
share cells with smokers for most of the time between October 1992 and
September 1993. Id. doc. 43 at 3. He contended his cellmates during this time
period included a chain-smoker and another smoker who blocked the ventilation
system, making the smoke problem worse. He said that he suffered headaches,
chest pain, hypertension, and difficult breathing because of his exposure to ETS,
and that he was denied medical treatment.
In their second motion for summary judgment, as in the first, defendants
asserted the defense of qualified immunity. They conceded that plaintiff was
housed with smokers during much of the time between October 1992 and
September 1993. Their evidence showed that they attempted to find him a
nonsmoking cell during this time period, however, but were temporarily unable to
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do so due to overcrowding. The evidence also showed that defendants offered to
move plaintiff in April 1993 to either of two different units so he could have a
single cell, but he declined the offer. The evidence showed, further, that since
September 1993, defendants have moved plaintiff repeatedly--to different
facilities, to single cells, or to cells in designated nonsmoking areas--in an
attempt to accommodate his alleged need to avoid smoke. The district court
recited plaintiff’s housing assignments and defendants’ responses to plaintiff’s
administrative complaints in its order. Noting defendants’ continuous efforts to
move plaintiff to a smoke-free environment, the court concluded that plaintiff had
failed to demonstrate that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether
defendants were deliberately indifferent to his smoke allergy. Accordingly, the
district court granted summary judgment to defendants.
Plaintiff contends on appeal that his need to avoid smoke and defendants’
intentional disregard of this need are genuine issues of fact to be tried. He also
claims that defendants do not enforce their nonsmoking policies, and that he is
still being exposed to unreasonably high levels of ETS.
We review the grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the same
standard as that applied by the district court. See Clemmons v. Bohannon,
956 F.2d 1523, 1525 (10th Cir. 1992). “Summary judgment is appropriate ‘if the
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
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together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law.’” Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)).
We also review defendants’ claim that they are entitled to qualified
immunity de novo. See David v. Gracey, 111 F.3d 1472, 1478 (10th Cir. 1997).
Qualified immunity is analyzed in two steps: first, we determine whether plaintiff
has alleged the violation of a constitutional right, “and then we decide whether
that right was clearly established such that a reasonable person in the defendant’s
position would have known that [his] conduct violated the right.” Id. (quoting
Garramone v. Romo, 94 F.3d 1446, 1449 (10th Cir. 1996) (citing Siegert v.
Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 231 (1991))).
To establish the Eighth Amendment violation plaintiff asserts, he must
demonstrate that defendants were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical
need to avoid smoke. See Riddle v. Mondragon, 83 F.3d 1197, 1202 (10th Cir.
1996) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)). That is, “the Eighth
Amendment’s deliberate indifference standard under Estelle has two components:
an objective component requiring that the pain or deprivation be sufficiently
serious; and a subjective component requiring that the offending officials act with
a sufficiently culpable state of mind.” Handy v. Price, 996 F.2d 1064, 1067 (10th
Cir.1993) (discussing Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991)). “A medical
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need is serious if it is one that has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating
treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize
the necessity for a doctor’s attention.” Riddle, 83 F.3d at 1202 (further quotation
omitted). As for the subjective component, the Supreme Court recently clarified
that
a prison official cannot be found liable under the Eighth Amendment
for denying an inmate humane conditions of confinement unless the
official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or
safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the
inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm
exists, and he must also draw the inference.
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994).
It is unnecessary to determine whether the right to avoid smoke allegedly
violated was clearly established in October 1992, as plaintiff’s Eighth
Amendment claim fails on its merits. The only evidence of plaintiff’s alleged
smoke allergy before 1994 is a medical report written by an OSP physician,
Dr. Marsh, on March 17, 1990. In that report, which defendants transcribed and
attached to their Martinez report, 1 Dr. Marsh recorded that plaintiff alleged
headaches and breathing problems due to smoke, that plaintiff was a nonsmoker
celled with a smoker, that he was possibly allergic, and that he would be moved to
a nonmoking cell. See R. doc. 13, attachment N at 3. Dr. Marsh’s report does not
1
See Martinez v. Aaron, 570 F.2d 317 (10th Cir.1978) (en banc).
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include a definite diagnosis of a smoke allergy or a direction that plaintiff should
avoid smoke, however, and defendants noted that there was no correspondence
advising prison security of plaintiff’s need for a nonsmoking cell in his medical
record. See id. Moreover, defendants submitted the affidavit of Dr. Shyamkant
Kulkarni, M.D., who reviewed plaintiff’s medical records from September 1992
through November 1993, and stated that he saw no documentation of a smoke
allergy or prescriptions for medication used to treat respiratory allergies. See id.doc. 51, ex. J. He also stated that plaintiff was not treated during this time period
for any serious or critical medical problems. See id. Plaintiff has not produced
any evidence that any particular defendant knew about Dr. Marsh’s report or
plaintiff’s possible allergy to smoke. 2 Moreover, plaintiff has offered no evidence
to counter defendants’ averments that they offered him a nonsmoking cell in April
1993, but he chose not to move. Considering all of this evidence, we hold that
plaintiff has not established that there is a genuine issue of material fact to be
tried as to whether any of the defendants knew that smoke constituted an
excessive risk to plaintiff’s health before September 1993, and intentionally
disregarded that risk.
2
Although plaintiff’s original, verified complaint alleged that he told
defendant James Pierce that he was allergic to smoke and had medical
documentation of his allergy, his amended, unverified complaint does not refer to
the original, and renders it of no legal effect. See King v. Dogan, 31 F.3d 344,
346 (5th Cir. 1994).
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Plaintiff’s claim that he is still being exposed to unreasonably high levels
of ETS despite defendants’ designation of nonsmoking housing units, policies of
not celling nonsmoking inmates with smokers, and repeated reassignment of
plaintiff’s housing to separate him from smokers, is basically unsupported by any
evidence. Two affidavits dated September 1994, both from inmates housed at
James Crabtree Correctional Center (JCCC), and both stating that inmates smoked
in the designated nonsmoking unit at JCCC, are too vague to establish that
plaintiff was exposed to unreasonably high levels of ETS at JCCC. See id.doc. 24, attachments “B” & “C.” Furthermore, defendants have since moved
plaintiff away from JCCC. Therefore, the district court did not err in concluding
that plaintiff failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact to be tried as to
whether defendants have been deliberately indifferent to his alleged smoke allergy
since September 1993, or in granting summary judgment to defendants.
Plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunction or, in the alternative, motion
for temporary restraining order is DENIED.
The judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Oklahoma is AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Michael R. Murphy
Circuit Judge
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