Milburn v. Hines , 146 F. App'x 269 ( 2005 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
August 17, 2005
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
JEFFREY LEE MILBURN,
Petitioner-Appellant, No. 05-7007
v. (E.D. of Okla.)
REGINALD HINES, (D.C. No.CV-01-659-P)
Respondent-Appellee.
ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY *
Before KELLY , O’BRIEN , and TYMKOVICH , Circuit Judges. **
Appellant Jeffrey Lee Milburn, an Oklahoma state inmate appearing pro se,
seeks a certificate of appealability (COA) allowing him to appeal the district
court’s order denying relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Milburn was sentenced
to 25 years for endeavoring to manufacture methamphetamine, two years for
possession of methamphetamine, two years for possession of a firearm while
*
This order is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of
the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the
citation of orders; nevertheless, an order may be cited under the terms and
conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
**
After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this three-judge
panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not be of material
assistance in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th
Cir. R. 34.1(G). The cause is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
committing a felony, and two years for the possession of a police scanner while
committing a felony. The sentences were to run consecutively. In his petition for
habeas corpus he raised three issues: (1) his convictions for manufacture and
possession of methamphetamine violated prohibitions against “double
punishment” and double jeopardy; (2) the evidence obtained against him was the
result of an illegal search and seizure; and (3) the sentence imposed against him
was overly excessive.
Analysis
The parties are familiar with the facts of the case and we need not repeat
them here. It is well settled that a petitioner is not entitled to receive a COA
unless he can make “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right,”
28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2), by demonstrating the issues raised are debatable among
jurists, a court could resolve the issues differently, or that the questions presented
deserve further proceedings. See Slack v. McDaniel , 529 U.S. 473, 483 (2000).
Double Jeopardy. Milburn argues the court imposed double punishment by
sentencing him twice for the same drug crime, in violation of the Double Jeopardy
Clause. Milburn was sentenced once for endeavoring to manufacture
methamphetamine and once for unlawful possession of methamphetamine. The
Double Jeopardy Clause protects defendants against (1) a second prosecution for
the same offense after acquittal; (2) a second prosecution for the same offense
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after conviction; and (3) multiple punishments for the same offense. Anderson v.
Mullin , 327 F.3d 1148, 1153-54 (10th Cir. 2003). “[W]here the same act or
transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to
be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one is whether
each provision requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not.” Id.(citing Blockburger v. United States , 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932)).
Milburn has not met this standard. The statutes under which he was
convicted have different elements and require distinct and separate proof. As
defined by the instructions put forth to the jury in this case, a conviction for
endeavoring to manufacture methamphetamine requires only that the defendant
exert physical and intellectual strength, or put forth a systematic effort, toward
the attainment of manufacture of methamphetamine. No evidence of actual
methamphetamine is necessary, and a conviction for this crime can be satisfied
without physical evidence of methamphetamine. In contrast, a conviction for
possession of methamphetamine requires actual possession of the substance and
does not require proof that the possessor put forth an effort to manufacture it.
Thus, each crime requires evidentiary proof that the other does not. Since
Milburn was not sentenced twice for the same crime, but for different crimes
altogether, resolution of this issue is not debatable under Slack and it does not
merit the grant of a COA.
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Illegal Search. Regarding Milburn’s second claim, it is well settled that
“where the State has provided an opportunity for full and fair litigation of a
Fourth Amendment Claim, a state prisoner may not be granted federal habeas
corpus relief on the ground that evidence obtained in an unconstitutional search or
seizure was introduced at his trial.” See Cannon v. Gibson , 259 F.3d 1253, 1259
(10th Cir. 2001) (citing Stone v. Powell , 428 U.S. 465, 494 (1976)). In fact,
Milburn appealed this issue to the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, which
found that he had consented to the challenged search. See Milburn v. State , No.
F-2000-100 (Okla. Crim. App., Feb. 7, 2001). Because we agree with the district
court that Milburn received a full and fair hearing on his Fourth Amendment
claim, this claim was properly denied and COA is not appropriate.
Excessive Sentence. Milburn’s final claim is that his sentence was so
excessive it violated the Constitution’s prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment. The Supreme Court has held that the Eighth Amendment prohibits a
sentence disproportionate to the severity of the crime. See Hawkins v. Hargett
200 F.3d 1279, 1281 (10th Cir. 1999) (citing Hamelin v. Michigan , 501 U.S. 957(1991)). Our case law on the subject has found a violation of the Eighth
Amendment where there was “gross disproportionality” between a defendant’s
sentence and his crime. Hawkins , 200 F.3d at 1282. In determining the existence
of “gross disproportionality,” we weigh a variety of factors, including the
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seriousness of the crime, the fit between the punishment and the crime, and the
existence of legislative determinations of an appropriate sentence range. See id.
at 1284-85.
Milburn received consecutive sentences of 25 years for his manufacturing
conviction, and 2 years each for his other crimes. We find no disproportionality
with respect to this sentence. First, Milburn’s crimes were serious, and there is
therefore a “fit between [the] punishment and [the] crime.” Id. at 1284. Second,
his sentence is fully consistent with the applicable range under Oklahoma law.
Finally, these ranges compare favorably with federal sentencing guidelines. In
light of these benchmarks, we cannot say Milburn’s punishment is grossly
disproportionate to his crimes. We therefore agree with the district court that
Milburn’s sentence does not violate the Eighth Amendment.
Accordingly, we DENY the request for COA and DISMISS the case. We
grant Milburn’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis.
Entered for the Court
Timothy M. Tymkovich
Circuit Judge
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