Stephens v. Guilfoyle ( 2007 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
February 13, 2007
UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
FO R TH E TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk of Court
RO BERT M ARK STEPH EN S,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
No. 06-6149
v. (D.C. No. 04-CV -1260-T)
(W .D. Okla.)
M ELINDA GUILFO YLE, Designee;
DIANNE KOLAR, Law Library
Supervisor; B REN T FA TK IN ,
W arden; M R. M OREY, Lieutenant;
KAREN STUCHELL, Law Library
Supervisor; BRENDA BROOKS, Unit
M anager; TERRY CODY, Lieutenant,
OSR; UNKNOW N JOHN DOES,
Defendants - Appellees.
OR D ER AND JUDGM ENT *
Before PO RFILIO, B AL DOC K , and EBEL, Circuit Judges.
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is
not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata,
and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value
consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
Plaintiff Robert M ark Stephens, an Oklahoma state inmate proceeding
pro se and in forma pauperis, appeals the district court’s order dismissing his
complaint alleging that various prison-administration personnel violated his
constitutional rights. He filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district court
determined that M r. Stephens had exhausted only one of his several claims
through the prison grievance procedure and dismissed the complaint without
prejudice. W e exercise jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm, albeit for
different reasons than those relied on by the district court due to intervening
Supreme Court precedent.
Background
M r. Stephens originally filed his lawsuit in the Northern District of
Oklahoma. After it was transferred to the W estern District, he filed an amended
complaint naming seven defendants. 1 Of those, only three were served with the
summons and complaint. Therefore, we review M r. Stephens’ claims against
those three, defendants Brooks, Cody, and Kolar.
1
The caption also named “Unknown Does,” but the amended complaint does
not allege any wrongdoing by unnamed defendants. M oreover, courts generally
permit a plaintiff to use unnamed defendants, but the plaintiff must “provide[] an
adequate description of some kind which is sufficient to identify the person
involved so process eventually can be served.” Roper v. Grayson, 81 F.3d 124,
126 (10th Cir. 1996). Given that the unnamed defendants were merely included
in the caption of the amended complaint, we do not consider them.
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As the parties recognize, the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) requires
a prisoner to exhaust all available prison remedies before filing suit under § 1983
based on prison conditions. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). The district court found that
M r. Stephens exhausted prison grievance procedures on his claims against
M s. Kolar, a prison law library supervisor, a finding appellees expressly confirm. 2
M r. Stephens does not contest this finding; rather, he contends in general terms
that his attempts to exhaust prison grievance procedures were thwarted by
prison officials seeking to prevent him from doing so. W e do not consider
M r. Stephens’ allegations against M s. Brooks due to his failure to exhaust prison
administrative remedies on those claims.
As to defendant Cody, the district court did not address whether
M r. Stephens had exhausted a grievance against him because the court determined
that the statute of limitations had expired on the claims against M r. Cody before
suit w as filed. This procedure was entirely proper. See Woodford v. Ngo,
___ U.S. ___, 126 S. Ct. 2378, 2392 (2006) (considering dismissal under
42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)(2), stating PLRA exhaustion requirement is not
jurisdictional; district court may “dismiss plainly meritless claims without first
addressing what may be a much more complex question, namely, whether the
prisoner did in fact properly exhaust available administrative remedies”). The
2
Appellees acknowledge that M r. Stephens also exhausted a grievance
pertaining to the number of hours he was allowed to be in the prison law library.
This grievance does not apply to any alleged wrongdoing by the three appellees.
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court recognized that the limitations period for M r. Stephens’ RICO claim against
M r. Cody had not expired, but held that the amended complaint failed to state a
RICO claim because M r. Stephens did not allege that he was “‘injured in his
business or property by reason of’ the alleged violation of [18 U.S.C. §] 1962.”
R. Doc. 44 at 6 n.2 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c)). On appeal, M r. Stephens
challenges only the ruling on the RICO claim.
M r. Stephens asserts that M s. Kolar violated his constitutional right of
access to the courts. He claims M s. Kolar, in her capacity as a law library
supervisor, “caused [him] to mail a legally frivolous lawsuit against [his former
employer] to the U.S. Northern District of Oklahoma Court,” claiming wrongful
discharge. R. Doc. 6 at 5. He also alleges that M s. Kolar later prepared a
fraudulent motion to dismiss the suit and a supporting affidavit. He further
alleges that she then obtained his signature on those documents by deceit and
filed them, thus causing the court to dismiss his civil suit. In addition to having
his suit dismissed against his wishes, he maintains that M s. Kolar included in the
affidavit statements that could subject him to criminal sanctions. In response to
M r. Stephens’ prison grievance, M s. Kolar stated that she watched him read and
sign the motion to dismiss, and then she mailed it to the court upon his request.
R. Doc. 6, Ex. 29 at 2.
Applying then-controlling circuit precedent, the district court held that
M r. Stephens’ failure to exhaust administratively all of his claims required
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dismissal of the entire action without prejudice. See Ross v. County of Bernalillo,
365 F.3d 1181 (10th Cir. 2004), abrogated by Jones v. Bock, ___ U.S. ___,
127 S. Ct. 910 (2007). Consequently, the court dismissed without prejudice the
claims against defendants Kolar and Brooks, and it dismissed with prejudice the
claims against defendant Cody. 3
Standards of Review
W e review de novo the district court’s dismissal under the PLRA for failure
to exhaust prison administrative remedies. Whitington v. Ortiz, 472 F.3d 804, 807
(10th Cir. 2007). W e also review de novo the district court’s order dismissing the
claims against M r. Cody on statute-of-limitations grounds. See Cory v. Aztec
Steel Bldg., Inc., 468 F.3d 1226, 1233 (10th Cir. 2006). Because M r. Stephens is
representing himself, we liberally construe his pleadings; however, we do not act
as his advocate. Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991).
Right of Access to the Court
After the district court issued its judgment in this case, the Supreme Court
announced its decision in Jones v. Bock, holding that where a prisoner’s
complaint contains claims that were exhausted administratively as well as claims
that were not, the proper procedure is to dismiss the unexhausted claims, not to
3
The district court also denied M r. Stephens’ motion for a temporary
restraining order and his motion for sanctions against defendants’ attorney.
M r. Stephens does not appeal those rulings, although he has filed a motion with
this court for injunctive relief.
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dismiss the complaint as a whole. 127 S. Ct. at 924. Consequently, although the
district court’s ruling was correct at the time it w as issued, see Ross, 365 F.3d
at 1190, under Jones it was error to dismiss the entire action. Instead, the district
court should have addressed M r. Stephens’ claims against M s. Kolar, which w ere
the only exhausted claims before it.
W e do not automatically remand for this purpose, however. Rather, we
evaluate whether the claims against M s. Kolar are frivolous and therefore subject
to dismissal. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) (stating when evaluating claims in
prisoner case filed in forma pauperis, “the court shall dismiss the case at any time
if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal is frivolous or malicious”)
(emphasis added). “Normally, a federal appellate court does not consider an issue
not passed upon below[, but] § 1915 mandates the dismissal of a claim contained
in an IFP complaint at any time a court deems the complaint to be frivolous.”
Fogle v. Pierson, 435 F.3d 1252, 1262 (10th Cir.) (citation and quotations
omitted) (remanding only those claims having arguable basis either in law or in
fact), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 675 (2006).
M r. Stephens alleges he was denied access to the courts when M s. Kolar
induced him to file a legally frivolous lawsuit and later to request that the suit be
dismissed against his wishes. In addition, he contends that M s. Kolar
fraudulently caused him to sign an affidavit that could subject him to criminal
sanctions. These claims are frivolous for at least two reasons. First,
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M r. Stephens has alleged no injury sustained by having his admittedly frivolous
suit dismissed, and therefore he does not have standing to bring this claim. “[A]n
inmate must satisfy the standing requirement of ‘actual injury’ by showing that
the denial of legal resources hindered the prisoner’s efforts to pursue a
nonfrivolous claim.” Penrod v. Zavaras, 94 F.3d 1399, 1403 (10th Cir. 1996).
Similarly, M r. Stephens does not assert that he was actually subjected to criminal
sanctions due to the allegedly fraudulent affidavit, another reason he lacks
standing to bring this claim.
Second, the constitutional right of access to the courts does not extend to a
capacity to litigate claims such as M r. Stephens’ w rongful discharge claim. See
Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 355 (1996). The Supreme Court has held that the
guarantee of access to the courts requires prisons to provide legal tools “inmates
need in order to attack their sentences, directly or collaterally, and in order to
challenge the conditions of their confinement. Impairment of any other litigating
capacity is simply one of the incidental (and perfectly constitutional)
consequences of conviction and incarceration.” Id. Accordingly, we determine
that M r. Stephens’ claims against M s. Kolar are frivolous and must be dismissed.
Remaining Claims
M r. Stephens apparently does not dispute the district court’s finding, and
appellees’ concession, that he exhausted only two grievances. He contends,
however, that he should not be required to complete the prison grievance
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procedure because some prison officials have taken actions to prevent him from
doing so and he has made his complaints known through channels other than the
grievance procedures. But a prisoner must exhaust the administrative remedies
available. See Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 (2001). M oreover, “the
PLRA’s exhaustion requirement applies to all inmate suits about prison life.”
Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002). Exhaustion is mandatory, Jernigan v.
Stuchell, 304 F.3d 1030, 1033 (10th Cir. 2002), and proper exhaustion is required,
Woodford, 126 S. Ct. at 2387.
M r. Stephens’ argument that prison officials have interfered with his
grievances in various ways, such as delay in responding, “is akin to an argument
that prison officials should be equitably estopped from relying upon the
exhaustion defense.” Jernigan, 304 F.3d at 1033. But since M r. Stephens does
not allege detrimental reliance on prison officials, we do not decide whether
equitable estoppel applies here. See id.In the alternative, M r. Stephens requests that his case be held in abeyance
to permit him to complete the grievance process for his unexhausted claims. This
procedure is foreclosed by Jones: “As a general matter, if a complaint contains
both good and bad claims, the court proceeds with the good and leaves the bad.”
127 S. Ct. at 924.
Finally, M r. Stephens contends that the district court erred in dismissing his
claims against M r. Cody on statute-of-limitations grounds. He does not challenge
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the court’s conclusion that the limitations period for filing a § 1983 claim had
expired. Rather, he maintains that the longer period for filing a RICO claim had
not run at the time he filed his amended complaint naming M r. Cody as a
defendant and that the district court erred by dismissing his RICO claim for
failure to meet a “heightened pleading standard.” See Aplt. Reply Br. at 8-9.
Contrary to M r. Stephens’ argument, however, the district court dismissed his
RICO claim against M r. Cody because he did not allege any facts to entitle him to
a civil remedy under RICO. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962, 1964(c). M r. Stephens has
identified no allegations, and our review of the record has revealed none, to
satisfy those requirements. Accordingly, the district court did not err in
dismissing M r. Stephens’ claims against M r. Cody.
Conclusion
M r. Stephens’ motion for a temporary restraining order and order to show
cause is denied. W e have construed his objections to appellees’ brief as a reply
brief. M r. Stephens’ motion to proceed without prepayment of costs and fees was
granted by the district court. He is reminded that he is obligated to continue
making partial payments until the entire fee has been paid.
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
John C. Porfilio
Circuit Judge
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