Doran v. Robinson , 72 F. App'x 778 ( 2003 )


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  •                                                                         F I L E D
    United States Court of Appeals
    Tenth Circuit
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    JUL 25 2003
    TENTH CIRCUIT
    PATRICK FISHER
    Clerk
    DOUGLAS TAYLOR DORAN,
    Plaintiff - Appellant,
    v.                                                     No. 03-2038
    (D.C. No. CIV-02-1403-WPJ/DJS)
    DR. PAUL ROBINSON, President of                     (D. New Mexico)
    Sandia Labs,
    Defendant - Appellee.
    ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
    Before SEYMOUR, MURPHY, and O’BRIEN, Circuit Judges.
    After examining the brief and appellate record, this panel has determined
    unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
    this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
    therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
    *
    This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the
    doctrines of law of the case, res judicata and collateral estoppel. The court
    generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
    and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
    Mr. Douglas Doran, acting pro se 1, appeals the district court’s sua sponte
    dismissal of his § 1983 in forma pauperis complaint because it was frivolous. 
    28 U.S.C. § 1915
    (e)(2)(B)(i). Exercising jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    , we
    affirm.
    Mr. Doran filed suit under 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
     against Dr. Paul Robinson,
    President of Sandia National Laboratories (Sandia). 2 He alleges Dr. Robinson,
    acting under color of state law, violated his constitutional rights by designing
    nuclear weapons at Sandia, which he terms a “crime against peace.” (ROA, Vol.
    I, Doc. 1.) In a second count, Mr. Doran characterizes the work of Sandia as a
    hostile act leading to the “crime of indiscriminate attack.” 3 (Id.) He claims
    Sandia caused him unnecessary distress, worry, and concern for his family and
    their good health. For relief, he requested personal and publicized assurances
    from Dr. Robinson that nuclear weapon design at Sandia would cease. The
    district court dismissed his complaint as frivolous, and later denied a request for
    1
    Since he acts pro se, we construe Mr. Doran’s pleadings liberally.
    Ledbetter v. City of Topeka, Kan., 
    318 F.3d 1183
    , 1187 (10th Cir. 2003).
    2
    Sandia National Laboratories is a federally owned facility managed and
    operated by private contractor Sandia Corporation. Dr. Robinson, at the time of
    suit, was president of Sandia Corporation and director of Sandia National
    Laboratories.
    3
    In support of his claims, Mr. Doran variously cites to the Charter of the
    International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg (Aug. 8, 1945); U.S. Const., art. VI,
    cl. 2; Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, art. VI (March 5, 1970); and Additional
    Protocol 1 to the 1949 Geneva Convention (Dec. 7, 1979).
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    reconsideration. 4 From these orders Mr. Doran appeals.
    A district court is required to dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint at any
    time if the court determines the action is frivolous. 
    28 U.S.C. § 1915
    (e)(2)(B)(i).
    Traditionally, we have reviewed the dismissal of a frivolous complaint for abuse
    of discretion; we discern no abuse. See Schlicher v. Thomas, 
    111 F.3d 777
    , 779
    (10th Cir. 1997). 5 “[A] district court may dismiss an in forma pauperis action as
    frivolous if the claim [is] based on an indisputably meritless legal theory or if it is
    founded on clearly baseless factual contentions.” 
    Id.
     (quotation marks and
    citation omitted) (alteration in original). Frivolous claims include those
    4
    After the district court dismissed his complaint, Mr. Doran filed a pleading
    the court correctly construed as a motion for an extension of time in which to file
    either a motion to reconsider or a motion to amend the complaint. In an Order
    Denying Request for Reconsideration, the district court denied the motion because
    there were no grounds to reconsider its ruling, and amendment of the complaint
    would have been futile. We review motions to reconsider and to amend a
    complaint for abuse of discretion. Thompson v. City of Lawrence, Kan., 
    58 F.3d 1511
    , 1514-15 (10th Cir. 1995) (motion to reconsider); Calderon v. Kan. Dep’t of
    Soc. & Rehab. Servs., 
    181 F.3d 1180
    , 1187 (10th Cir. 1999) (motion to amend
    complaint). The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Mr. Doran’s
    motion.
    5
    But see Wardell v. Dep’t of Corr., No. 03-1039, 
    2003 WL 21640973
     (10th
    Cir. July 14, 2003) (unpublished decision) (applying abuse of discretion standard
    but suggesting 1996 amendments to 
    28 U.S.C. § 1915
     may require de novo review
    of § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) dismissals); Basham v. Uphoff, No. 98-8013, 
    1998 WL 847689
    , at *4 n.2 (10th Cir. Dec. 8, 1998) (unpublished decision) (applying abuse
    of discretion standard but questioning its continued application and suggesting de
    novo review might apply in light of 1996 amendment to 
    28 U.S.C. § 1915
    , which
    removed discretion of district court to dismiss frivolous complaints and replaced
    it with requirement to do so). In this case, under either a de novo or abuse of
    discretion standard, we reach the same result.
    -3-
    “describing fantastic or delusional scenarios, claims with which federal district
    judges are all too familiar.” Denton v. Hernandez, 
    504 U.S. 25
    , 32 (1992)
    (quotation marks and citation omitted).
    Mr. Doran alleges Dr. Robinson was acting under color of state law, and
    yet identifies no state law involved in Dr. Robinson’s activities. Even liberally
    construed as a complaint against a federal official in his official capacity, Mr.
    Doran cites to no waiver of sovereign immunity that would enable the action. See
    Pleasant v. Lovell, 
    876 F.2d 787
    , 793 (10th Cir. 1989). Furthermore, Mr. Doran
    fails to allege facts establishing Dr. Robinson personally caused a constitutional
    violation. “Individual liability under § 1983 must be based on personal
    involvement in the alleged constitutional violation.” Foote v. Spiegel, 
    118 F.3d 1416
    , 1423 (10th Cir. 1997). If his claim is that Dr. Robinson supervised others
    who committed the violation(s), he has failed to allege facts establishing an
    “affirmative link exists between the constitutional deprivation and either the
    supervisor’s personal participation or his failure to supervise.” Grimsley v.
    MacKay, 
    93 F.3d 676
    , 679 (10th Cir. 1996) (quotation marks and citation
    omitted).
    Apart from the paucity of facts alleged in his complaint, Mr. Doran fails to
    state a cognizable legal theory justifying relief. The only constitutional provision
    to which he cites as a basis for relief is Article VI, Clause 2, of the United States
    -4-
    Constitution, which provides that the Constitution, laws passed in furtherance
    thereof, and treaties lawfully made “shall be the supreme Law of the Land . . . .”
    This allusion begs the question of what explicit constitutional violation Dr.
    Robinson is alleged to have committed against Mr. Doran.
    After a careful review of the record, we adopt the reasoning in the district
    court’s orders, AFFIRM the decisions of the district court, and dismiss the appeal
    as frivolous.
    Entered by the Court:
    TERRENCE L. O’BRIEN
    United States Circuit Judge
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