Baker v. Publishers Clearing House , 413 F. App'x 85 ( 2011 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
February 17, 2011
TENTH CIRCUIT
__________________________ Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
MARCELLUS H. BAKER, SR.,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
No. 10-3208
v. (D.Ct. No. 6:10-CV-01162-JAR-DJW)
(D. Kan.)
PUBLISHERS CLEARING HOUSE,
Defendant-Appellee.
______________________________
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before HARTZ, BRORBY, and TYMKOVICH, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to honor the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
submitted without oral argument.
Appellant Marcellus H. Baker, Sr., a pro se litigant, appeals the district
court’s dismissal of his complaint, filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Kansas
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata and collateral estoppel. It may be cited,
however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th
Cir. R. 32.1.
law, against Appellee Publishers Clearing House and all its subsidiaries for
failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted. Exercising our
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.
I. Procedural Background
On May 21, 2010, Mr. Baker filed his § 1983 complaint alleging Publishers
Clearing House and all its subsidiaries violated his civil rights under both federal
and state law when it sent him allegedly racially discriminatory e-mails associated
with a sweepstakes giveaway of prizes. The district court granted Mr. Baker’s
request to proceed without prepayment of filing fees (in forma pauperis) pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1) and, later, on June 7, 2010, issued a notice and order to
show cause to Mr. Baker, directing him to explain why his action should not be
dismissed for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted. Mr. Baker
responded by attaching the e-mails sent to him by Publishers Clearing House
which he alleged “[spoke] for themselves on this civil right’s [sic] racial issue
before the court.”
Relying on 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and the Kansas
Act Against Discrimination, K.S.A. § 44-1001, the district court sua sponte
dismissed Mr. Baker’s complaint on grounds it failed to state a claim on which
relief may be granted. With respect to the federal statutes, the district court
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determined Publishers Clearing House and its subsidiaries were not state actors
within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. It also explained the Kansas Act applied
to discrimination in employment, free and public accommodations, and housing,
and that Mr. Baker failed to allege an employment relationship with the defendant
or that the Act would otherwise apply to the e-mails on which he brought his
claim. Because the defendant was not an actor subject to liability under federal
law and Mr. Baker failed to allege a relationship with Publishers Clearing House
or its subsidiaries giving rise to a claim under Kansas law, the district court
determined he failed to state a claim on which relief may be granted and
dismissed his complaint.
II. Discussion
Mr. Baker now appeals, making the same or similar arguments raised in his
pleading dismissed by the district court. However, he fails to address the grounds
on which the district court dismissed his pleading, other than to claim it erred in
its ruling, is “out of touch” with his case, and is “just over stepping [its]
authority.” Nowhere does he provide argument as to why his instant pleading
states a cause of action on which relief may be granted under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or
Kansas law.
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“We apply the same standard of review for dismissals under
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) that we employ for Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)
motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim,” which is a de novo review. Kay v.
Bemis, 500 F.3d 1214, 1217 (10 th Cir. 2007). In reviewing § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)
dismissals “we look for plausibility in the complaint,” and “[i]n particular, we
look to the specific allegations in the complaint to determine whether they
plausibly support a legal claim for relief.” Id. at 1218 (quotation marks and
citation omitted). “Rather than adjudging whether a claim is improbable, factual
allegations in a complaint must be enough to raise a right to relief above the
speculative level.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). Under this
standard, “a plaintiff must nudge his claims across the line from conceivable to
plausible in order to survive a motion to dismiss.” Smith v. United States, 561
F.3d 1090, 1098 (10 th Cir. 2009) (quotation marks and citation omitted), cert.
denied, 130 S. Ct. 1142 (2010).
Applying this standard of review and applicable legal principles, we must
affirm the district court’s dismissal of Mr. Baker’s complaint. For substantially
the same reasons articulated by the district court, we conclude as a matter of law
that Mr. Baker’s allegations do not support a legal claim for relief. In sum, Mr.
Baker fails to make plausible allegations either identifying the Appellee and its
subsidiaries as state actors, which is a necessary element of a § 1983 claim, or
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alleging an employment or other relationship with the Appellee, as required by
Kansas law.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s dismissal of
Mr. Baker’s complaint.
Entered by the Court:
WADE BRORBY
United States Circuit Judge
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