Murray v. Archambo ( 1999 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
NOV 12 1999
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
CURTIS L. MURRAY, JR.,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 99-7006
(D.C. No. 96-CV-568-S)
CURT ARCHAMBO, individually; (E.D. Okla.)
CURT ARCHAMBO, as Cherokee
County Acting Sheriff; KEVIN
MCFARLAND; TERRY JOE COMBS;
CLINT JOHNSON, individually;
CLINT JOHNSON, as Deputy Sheriff
for Cherokee County, Oklahoma;
UNKNOWN SURETY COMPANIES,
which bonded the Cherokee County
Sheriff and his Deputies; CHEROKEE
NATION MARSHAL SERVICE,
Defendants-Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before EBEL , LUCERO , and MURPHY , Circuit Judges.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
Plaintiff Curtis Murray, appearing pro se, appeals the district court’s
dismissal of his civil rights action against Cherokee County, Oklahoma; the
Cherokee County Sheriff’s Department (the sheriff’s department); individual
officers and employees of the sheriff’s department (the county defendants); surety
companies bonding the sheriff’s department; and the Cherokee Nation Marshal
Service (the marshal service). We affirm.
BACKGROUND
Mr. Murray filed a complaint alleging that his civil rights were violated
during the course of two different traffic stops and a subsequent arrest. 1
The first
of these stops was allegedly conducted on October 1, 1994, by sheriff’s deputies
and a marshal service officer; the second on July 18, 1996, by sheriff’s deputies
only. The district court dismissed the case on December 2, 1996, for
Mr. Murray’s failure to appear at a status and scheduling conference, but
1
In addition to a civil rights claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Mr. Murray
alleged false arrest, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, negligence, gross
negligence, and civil conspiracy. See R., Vol. I, doc. 98 at 7-10.
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reinstated it upon a determination that the conference had been reset for a later
date.
All defendants filed motions to dismiss the complaint. The county
defendants based their motion on Mr. Murray’s failure to seek leave of court
before filing an amended complaint. The marshal service asserted that
Mr. Murray had failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, noting
the failure to name a specific officer who allegedly participated in the 1994 stop.
When Mr. Murray did not respond to the dismissal motions within the time
allocated by local rule, the court deemed them confessed and dismissed the entire
action. On appeal, this court reversed and remanded the case to the district court
for further proceedings. See Murray v. Archambo , 132 F.3d 609, 612 (10th Cir.
1998).
On remand, the district court entered scheduling orders setting deadlines
for discovery and court filings, including an amended complaint identifying the
marshal service officer who had allegedly conducted the stop. Mr. Murray filed
a First Amended Complaint asserting that two marshal service officers, whom he
“believed to be Brian Blair and Mike Dawes,” had participated in the stop.
R., Vol. I, doc. 98, at 5. He also alleged that he had “an eyewitness [who] will
testify to the fact that the allegations by plaintiff against the officers of Cherokee
National Marshall [sic] Service participated as alleged.” Id. He failed, however,
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to meet many of the court-imposed deadlines and exhibited a general lack of
cooperation with the discovery efforts of the county defendants. Specifically, he
disregarded a court order compelling production of written discovery responses.
In an order dated August 28, 1998, the court granted the county defendants’
motion for dismissal, under Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(d), for failure to cooperate in
discovery and intentional disregard of a court order. It also dismissed the
unidentified surety companies which bonded the county defendants. On
December 10, 1998, the court issued another order granting a motion for summary
judgment filed by the marshal service, based on a determination that plaintiff had
failed to come forward with any specific facts showing involvement of any
officers working for the marshal service. Mr. Murray then filed a timely notice
of appeal. 2
2
The county defendants have filed a motion to dismiss this appeal on the
grounds that Mr. Murray’s January 7, 1999 notice of appeal is untimely as to the
district court’s August 28, 1998 order granting their motion to dismiss. The
motion is not well-taken. The order dismissing the county defendants did not
adjudicate the rights and liabilities of all parties and thus was not an appealable
final order. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b).
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DISCUSSION
A. Dismissal pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(d)
Mr. Murray contends that the district court erred in dismissing his claims
against the county defendants, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(d). 3
“Determination
of the correct sanction for a discovery violation is a fact-specific inquiry that the
district court is best qualified to make.” Ehrenhaus v. Reynolds , 965 F.2d 916,
920 (10th Cir. 1992). Therefore, we review the district court’s imposition of
sanctions for abuse of discretion, accepting the supporting factual findings unless
clearly erroneous. See id. at 920, 921. The district court’s discretion is limited
by the requirement that the sanction be both “‘just’” and “‘related to the particular
3
Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(d) provides, in pertinent part:
Failure of Party to Attend at Own Deposition or Serve Answers
to Interrogatories or Respond to Request for Inspection . If a
party . . . fails . . . to serve answers or objections to interrogatories
submitted under Rule 33, after proper service of the
interrogatories, . . . the court in which the action is pending on
motion may make such orders in regard to the failure as are just, and
among others it may take any action authorized under subparagraphs
(A), (B), and (C) of subdivision (b)(2) of this rule.
The authorized actions include: (A) an order establishing designated facts
for the purpose of the action; (B) an order prohibiting a party from supporting
or opposing designated claims or defenses or introducing designated matters into
evidence; and (C) an order striking out pleadings, staying further proceedings,
dismissing the action or proceeding, or entering a default judgment. See
Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2).
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claim which was at issue.’” Id. at 920-21 (quoting Insurance Corp. of Ireland,
Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee , 456 U.S. 694, 707 (1982)).
“[D]ismissal is a severe sanction and is not ordinarily warranted if lesser
sanctions would be effective.” Jones v. Thompson , 996 F.2d 261, 265 (10th Cir.
1993). Accordingly, the district court has a duty to explain why dismissal was an
appropriate sanction. See Ehrenhaus , 965 F.2d at 921. Before entering a
dismissal, a district court must ordinarily consider, on the record, several factors
designed to caution against premature or unreflective resort to this drastic
sanction. See Mobley v. McCormick , 40 F.3d 337, 340 (10th Cir. 1994). “These
criteria include: ‘(1) the degree of actual prejudice to the defendant; (2) the
amount of interference with the judicial process; . . . (3) the culpability of the
litigant; (4) whether the court warned the party in advance that dismissal of the
action would be a likely sanction for noncompliance; and (5) the efficacy of lesser
sanctions.’” Id. (quoting Ehrenhaus , 965 F.2d at 921). 4
Here, the district court considered the appropriate criteria before entering
its order. First, the court found that Mr. Murray’s failure to comply with
discovery requests and the court’s order prejudiced the county defendants, in that
4
While we construe their pleadings liberally, pro se litigants “must follow
the same rules of procedure that govern other litigants.” Green v. Dorrell ,
969 F.2d 915, 917 (10th Cir. 1992). “[W]e have repeatedly upheld dismissals
in situations where the parties themselves neglected their cases or refused to
obey court orders.” Id. (citing cases).
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they were forced to make litigation decisions without the relevant information and
to incur additional expenses. Concerning the second factor, “the amount of
interference with the judicial process,” the court found that Mr. Murray’s
behavior stalled the litigation and thwarted defendants’ ability to be adequately
represented. As for the “culpability of the litigant,” Mr. Murray testified that he
failed to produce the discovery responses in spite of a court order simply because
he needed additional time. The court found this to be an intentional and willful
disregard of the court’s order.
The fourth factor is whether the party was notified that its failure to comply
with court orders might result in dismissal. Mr. Murray was not specifically
warned, but as the district court found, he was undoubtedly aware that the court
could utilize this sanction. Although the orders were later rescinded or reversed,
the court had previously dismissed the case twice.
Finally, the district court considered but rejected the efficacy of lesser
sanctions. Earlier, the court had extended deadlines and accepted late filings.
When it entered an order compelling production of the written responses,
Mr. Murray failed to comply. The court concluded that no lesser sanction would
serve the interest of justice. 5
5
We note that the court’s dismissal was directed only to the claims made
against the defendants affected by his lack of cooperation in discovery.
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We have reviewed the entire record on appeal. Notwithstanding
Mr. Murray’s claim that he acted in good faith, the record supports the district
court’s factual findings and its analysis of the relevant factors. Accordingly, the
district court’s order of dismissal of the county defendants did not amount to an
abuse of discretion.
B. Entry of summary judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56
Mr. Murray also asserts that the district court’s entry of summary judgment
in favor of the marshal service was improper. “We review a decision granting
summary judgment de novo, using the same legal standard applicable in the
district court.” Jantzen v. Hawkins , 188 F.3d 1247, 1251 (10th Cir. 1999).
Summary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as
a matter of law. In determining whether the evidence presents a
genuine issue of material fact, we view it in the light most favorable
to the party against whom summary judgment was entered . . . .
Id. (quotations and citations omitted). However, once the party seeking summary
judgment has supported its motion, the nonmoving party, here Mr. Murray, cannot
rest on mere allegations but must present evidence of specific facts to support his
assertions. See Muck v. United States , 3 F.3d 1378, 1380 (10th Cir. 1993).
For Mr. Murray to establish the liability of the marshal service, he must,
at a minimum, identify the specific officers of the marshal service who allegedly
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participated in the 1994 stop. Cf. Foote v. Spiegel , 118 F.3d 1416, 1423
(10th Cir. 1997) (repeating the rule that individual liability “under § 1983 must
be based on personal involvement in the alleged constitutional violation”). In
support of its motion, the marshal service submitted affidavits and documentation
indicating that officers Blair and Dawes worked on different nights and that
no other marshal service officer participated in the 1994 stop. In response,
Mr. Murray asserted that he had identified a witness “to testify to the involvement
of the named officer or officers,” and that the marshal service had “a duty to
investigate the witness and the relevant facts known.” R., Vol. I, doc. 106 at 2.
He also argued that the marshal service’s affiants were “intentionally lying under
oath.” Id. at 3.
After reviewing the entire record, we agree with the district court that
Mr. Murray failed to come forward with facts showing that an officer of the
marshal service participated in the stop. Therefore, summary judgment was the
appropriate disposition of all claims against the marshal service.
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CONCLUSION
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The judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Oklahoma is AFFIRMED. The motion to dismiss filed by the county defendants
is DENIED. The mandate shall issue forthwith.
Entered for the Court
David M. Ebel
Circuit Judge
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