United States v. Mach , 477 F. App'x 481 ( 2012 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
April 17, 2012
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee, No. 11-1189
v. D. Colorado
DAKOTA MACH, (D.C. No. 1:10-CR-00195-CMA-1)
Defendant - Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before MURPHY, EBEL, and HARTZ, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination
of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
I. Introduction
Appellant Dakota Mach was charged in a two-count indictment with drug
and firearm offenses. Mach proceeded to trial and was convicted on both counts.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited,
however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th
Cir. R. 32.1.
The district court sentenced him to eighty-four and thirty-six month terms of
imprisonment, to be served concurrently. Mach appeals his sentence and
conviction, arguing the district court plainly erred by increasing his base offense
level pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(2) based on the court’s conclusion his prior
Colorado conviction for possession of a short shotgun is a crime of violence. He
also challenges the district court’s refusal to give the reasonable-doubt instruction
he proposed. Exercising jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C.
§ 3742(a), we affirm Mach’s conviction and sentence.
II. Background
After a jury trial, Mach was convicted of being a felon in possession of a
firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (“Count 1”). He was also convicted
of possessing a controlled substance, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 844(a) and 851
(“Count 2”). After the guilty verdict, a Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”)
was prepared by the United States Probation Office. After grouping the two
offenses and applying a two-level increase under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(4)(A) to
Mach’s base offense level of fourteen, the PSR arrived at a total offense level of
sixteen. Mach’s criminal history score of twenty-two placed him in Criminal
History Category VI. Based on the criminal history category and total offense
level, the PSR initially calculated an advisory guidelines range of forty-six to
fifty-seven months’ imprisonment. The PSR recommended imposing a sentence
at the top of the advisory range because of Mach’s extensive criminal history.
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After preparation of the PSR, the Government filed a motion requesting the
district court depart upward from the advisory guidelines range on the basis a
Criminal History Category VI substantially under-represented the seriousness of
Mach’s criminal history. In the alternative, the Government argued the court
should impose a ninety-two-month term of imprisonment, an upward variance of
thirty-five months from the top of the advisory guidelines range. Mach opposed
the Government’s motion, arguing the fifty-seven-month sentence recommended
in the PSR was sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with the
purposes set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). On the day before Mach’s sentencing
hearing, the Government filed an additional sentencing pleading, asserting Mach’s
base offense level was higher than initially calculated in the PSR. The
Government argued Mach’s 1994 Colorado conviction for possession of a sawed-
off shotgun qualified as a crime of violence within the meaning of U.S.S.G.
§ 2K2.1 and, thus, his base offense level should increase by six levels, from
fourteen to twenty. The district court continued the sentencing hearing to provide
Mach with an opportunity to address the Government’s assertions. Mach
thereafter filed a motion for a variant sentence and also objected to the
Government’s calculation of his offense level, arguing the Government waived
the crime-of-violence argument by not asserting it in a timely manner.
At the sentencing hearing, Mach did not contest that his 1994 Colorado
conviction is a crime of violence. The district court, after fully considering
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Mach’s waiver argument, applied the § 2K2.1 enhancement and concluded
Mach’s base offense level was twenty and his total offense level was twenty-two.
The court then considered Mach’s request for a fifty-seven month sentence on
Count 1, a variance from the advisory guidelines range of 84-105 months’
incarceration. The court denied Mach’s request for a downward variance and also
denied the Government’s request for an upward variance, sentencing Mach to
eighty-four months’ imprisonment on Count 1, the low end of the advisory
guidelines range. 1 Mach then filed this appeal.
III. Discussion
A. Crime of Violence Enhancement
Mach argues his sentence is procedurally unreasonable because the district
court incorrectly calculated his advisory guidelines range. See United States v.
Hildreth, 485 F.3d 1120, 1127 (10th Cir. 2007) (“To impose a procedurally
reasonable sentence, a district court must calculate the proper advisory Guidelines
range . . . .” (quotation omitted)). Specifically, Mach asserts the court erred by
applying a base offense level of twenty because he committed the instant firearm
offense “subsequent to sustaining one felony conviction of . . . a crime of
violence.” U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(4)(A). He argues his 1994 Colorado conviction
cannot be used to establish his base offense level because it is not a crime of
1
Mach was also sentenced to thirty-six months’ imprisonment on Count 2,
the statutory maximum sentence, to be served concurrent to his eighty-four-month
sentence.
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violence. Recognizing this argument was not raised before the district court,
Mach concedes we review only for plain error. See United States v. Steele, 603
F.3d 803, 808 (10th Cir. 2010). Under this standard of review, Mach “has the
burden of showing (1) an error, (2) that is plain, which means clear or obvious
under current law, and (3) that affects substantial rights.” United States v.
Begaye, 635 F.3d 456, 470 (10th Cir. 2011) (quotation omitted). Even if Mach
can overcome these three hurdles, this court will exercise its discretion to correct
the error only if “it seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of
judicial proceedings.” Id. (quotation omitted).
In 1994, Mach was convicted of possessing a dangerous weapon,
specifically a “short shotgun,” in violation of Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-12-102(3).
Colorado law defines a short shotgun as “a shotgun having a barrel or barrels less
than eighteen inches long or an overall length of less than twenty-six inches.”
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-12-101(1)(I). Mach’s Colorado conviction is not a crime of
violence for purposes of § 2K2.1 unless it involved a firearm described in 26
U.S.C. § 5845(a). See U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1 cmt. n.1 (defining the term “crime of
violence” as having the meaning given the term in U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)); U.S.S.G.
§ 4B1.2 cmt. n.1 (including within the term “crime of violence” the possession of
a firearm described in 26 U.S.C. § 5845(a)). In pertinent part, 26 U.S.C.
§ 5845(a) includes within the definition of a firearm “a shotgun having a barrel or
barrels of less than 18 inches in length” and “a weapon made from a shotgun if
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such weapon as modified has an overall length of less than 26 inches or a barrel
or barrels of less than 18 inches in length.”
Mach argues the federal definition of a firearm is not co-extensive with the
Colorado definition of a short shotgun because federal law applies to a shotgun
having an overall length of less than twenty-six inches only if has been modified
whereas the Colorado definition applies to all twenty-six-inch shotguns regardless
of whether they were manufactured with an overall length of less than twenty-six
inches 2 or were subsequently modified. The Government concedes the record
does not indicate whether the shotgun Mach possessed was less than twenty-six
inches in overall length or had a barrel less than eighteen inches. Because the
Government did not prove Mach possessed a shotgun with a barrel less than
eighteen inches or a modified shotgun with an overall length of less than twenty-
six inches, Mach argues the district court erred in concluding the short shotgun he
possessed was a firearm that subjected him to the heightened base offense level
set out in § 2K2.1(a)(4)(A).
2
It is unclear from the record whether any manufacturer produces a shotgun
with an overall length of less than twenty-six inches. If not, then as a matter of
fact, the federal definition is identical to the Colorado definition. The
Government, however, has not advanced this argument and has not argued Mach’s
claim cannot be reviewed for plain error because his failure to raise his argument
below prevented the district court from making necessary factual findings. See
United States v. Easter, 981 F.2d 1549, 1556 (10th Cir. 1992) (“[P]lain error
review is not appropriate when the alleged error involves the resolution of factual
disputes.”).
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Neither Mach nor the Government has identified precedent from either the
Supreme Court or this circuit addressing and definitively deciding whether a
shotgun less than twenty-six inches in length meets the § 5845(a) definition of a
firearm even if it was not modified. Mach argues the district court’s calculation
was nonetheless plainly erroneous because the statute is clear on its face. Cf.
United States v. Ruiz-Gea, 340 F.3d 1181, 1187 (10th Cir. 2003) (holding the
absence of controlling precedent does not prevent a finding of plain error if the
district court’s interpretation of a Sentencing Guideline was clearly erroneous).
He also argues he has satisfied the third prong of the plain error test by showing
his advisory guidelines range would be 46-57 months instead of 84-105 months if
the court had not applied § 2K2.1(a)(4)(A). It is unnecessary to resolve the open
question of whether federal law is co-extensive with Colorado law because even if
we assume the district court clearly or obviously erred by applying the
enhancement and also assume the court’s presumed error affected Mach’s
substantial rights, Mach has failed to satisfy the fourth prong of the plain-error
test.
In the exercise of its discretion, this court only corrects plain error that
seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial
proceedings. United States v. Eddy, 523 F.3d 1268, 1270 (10th Cir. 2008). To
meet this standard, Mach bears the burden of showing that the failure to correct
the district court’s error would result in a miscarriage of justice. Id.-7-
“[S]entencing error meets the fourth prong of plain-error review only in those rare
cases in which core notions of justice are offended.” United States v. Sierra-
Castillo, 405 F.3d 932, 941 (10th Cir. 2005) (quotation omitted). Mach has
wholly failed to meet his burden, neglecting to even mention the fourth prong of
the plain-error test in his appellate briefing.
Notwithstanding the absence of any relevant argument from Mach, we have
reviewed the record and applicable law and have no doubt the district court’s
presumed error did not result in a miscarriage of justice. Mach has never argued
he did not actually possess a short shotgun. Construing his argument in the light
most favorable to him, we will accordingly assume his Colorado conviction was
based on his possession of an unmodified shotgun with an overall length of less
than twenty-six inches. As Justice Ginsburg has indicated in a concurring
opinion, “[t]he Nation’s legislators chose to place under a registration
requirement only a very limited class of firearms, those they considered
especially dangerous.” Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 622 (1994)
(Ginsburg, J., concurring). Short shotguns are part of that “very limited class”
and we can conceive of no basis upon which to conclude that a factory
manufactured shotgun with an overall length of less than twenty-six inches is any
less dangerous than a shotgun that has been so modified. “Criminals’ use of
short-barreled or ‘sawed-off’ shotguns is particularly dangerous, and thus worthy
of enhanced punishment . . . because a shortened shotgun is easier to conceal and
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wield.” United States v. Hall, 972 F.2d 67, 70 (4th Cir. 1992). A shotgun that
was originally manufactured with an overall length of twenty-six inches is just as
easy to conceal, and thus just as dangerous, as a twenty-six-inch shotgun that has
been altered to that length. Accordingly, because Mach actually possessed an
“especially dangerous” weapon, application of the six-level enhancement did not
result in a miscarriage of justice and Mach is not entitled to a new sentencing
hearing.
B. Reasonable Doubt Instruction
Mach also challenges the district court’s refusal to give his proposed
reasonable doubt instruction. Specifically, Mach requested that the following
sentence be added to the instruction proposed by the district court: “If the jury
views the evidence in the case as reasonably permitting either of two conclusions,
one of innocence, the other of guilt, the jury must, of course, adopt the verdict of
innocence.” Mach conceded this court has previously disapproved of the
language he proposed, but he represented to the court that he would “waiv[e] any
error if that were to be the case on appeal.” United States v. Dowlin, 408 F.3d
647, 666 (10th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he two-inference language should not be used
because, standing alone, such language may mislead a jury into thinking that the
government’s burden is somehow less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt.”
(quotation omitted)).
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Mach argues his proposed instruction reflected his theory of the case. “A
defendant is entitled to an instruction on his theory of the case if the instruction is
a correct statement of the law, and if he has offered sufficient evidence for the
jury to find in his favor.” United States v. Pinson, 542 F.3d 822, 831 (10th Cir.
2008). A district court’s refusal to issue such instruction when requested by a
defendant is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Id. The Government asserts
Mach’s challenge can only be reviewed for plain error because he did not present
his “theory of the case” argument to the district court. See United States v.
Burke, 571 F.3d 1048, 1057 (10th Cir. 2009) (“[W]hen a defendant pursues a
particular theory or objection, but fails to raise another closely related argument,
he has forfeited the argument and we review only for plain error.”). Mach’s claim
fails under either standard of review.
Although this court has held that the language proposed by Mach “standing
alone . . . is imprecise and should not be used” because it may dilute the
Government’s burden of proof, it is not technically incorrect. Dowlin, 408 F.3d at666 (citing United States v. Khan, 821 F.2d 90, 93 (2d Cir. 1987) in which the
Second Circuit stated the language “is obviously correct as far as it goes”).
However, a defendant’s “theory of defense instruction is required only if, without
the instruction, the district court’s instructions were erroneous or inadequate.”
United States v. Williams, 403 F.3d 1188, 1195 (10th Cir. 2005) (quotations
omitted). Having reviewed the record, we conclude the reasonable doubt
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instruction given by the district court accurately stated the law and was neither
erroneous nor inadequate. Indeed, Mach does not argue otherwise. Thus, the
district court did not abuse its discretion or clearly err in refusing to given the
instruction proposed by Mach.
IV. Conclusion
Mach’s convictions and sentence are affirmed.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Michael R. Murphy
Circuit Judge
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