United States v. Ramirez-Rodriguez ( 2000 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
JUL 27 2000
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 00-1047
(D.C. No. 99-CR-60-D)
HILARIO ALFREDO RAMIREZ- (D. Colo.)
RODRIGUEZ,
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before McKAY, PORFILIO, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
Hilario Alfredo Ramirez-Rodriguez appeals from imposition of a sentence
based in part on one criminal history point imposed for a prior uncounseled
misdemeanor conviction. Our jurisdiction arises under 18 U.S.C. § 3742, and
we affirm.
In October 1999, Mr. Ramirez-Rodriguez pleaded guilty to one count of
distribution of heroin in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C) and to
one count of using or carrying a firearm during the commission of a drug
trafficking felony in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). Mr. Ramirez-Rodriguez had
a prior misdemeanor conviction for driving while ability impaired, for which he
served twenty-five days in jail in 1997 after revocation of a one-year probation
for failure to comply with the terms of the probation. The presentence report
recommended, and Mr. Ramirez-Rodriguez objected to, the addition of one
criminal history point for this conviction. After a hearing on the matter at which
Mr. Ramirez-Rodriguez testified, the district court found that, by signing
a document at the 1997 probation revocation hearing acknowledging that he had
been advised that he could request appointed counsel without cost and waiving
that right, Mr. Ramirez-Rodriguez had clearly waived his right to counsel.
See Tr. at 28-29. The court found that Mr. Ramirez-Rodriguez’s uncounseled
conviction was not unconstitutionally infirm because he had knowingly and
voluntarily waived his right to counsel. See Tr. at 27. The court added one
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criminal history point for the conviction, holding that under United States v.
Windle, 74 F.3d 997 (10th Cir. 1996), prior uncounseled misdemeanor convictions
that are not constitutionally infirm may be used to enhance punishment for
subsequent convictions.
On appeal, Mr. Ramirez-Rodriguez argues that, under Loper v. Beto,
405 U.S. 473, 481 (1972), adding the criminal history point for an uncounseled
misdemeanor conviction was erroneous. We conduct a de novo review of the
court’s interpretation and application of a sentencing guideline, disturbing the
court’s factual findings only for clear error. See Windle, 74 F.3d at 1000-01.
A defendant attacking the validity of a prior conviction for sentencing purposes
must show by a preponderance of the evidence that his prior statement was
involuntary or unknowing. See United States v. Wicks, 995 F.2d 964, 978
(10th Cir. 1993); Windle, 74 F.3d at 1001 (stating that “[o]nce the prosecution
establishes the existence of a conviction, the defendant must prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that the conviction was constitutionally infirm”).
Mr. Ramirez-Rodriguez first argues that his case is distinguishable from
Windle because the presentence investigation report in his case failed to establish
that he knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to counsel. We disagree. The
presentence investigation report contained the signed waiver, which carried
a presumption of regularity. See Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 29 (1992).
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Mr. Ramirez-Rodriguez admitted that he signed the waiver. The existence of the
admittedly signed waiver is enough to establish a knowing and voluntary waiver
of rights in the absence of any evidence to the contrary.
Mr. Ramirez-Rodriguez next argues that he proved at his sentencing
hearing that his waiver was not knowing and voluntary, citing to the “proffer”
of testimony made by his attorney at the hearing. Mr. Ramirez-Rodriguez is
mistaken about what is contained in a “proffer” of evidence. A “proffer” is the
actual documentary evidence or sworn testimony that is presented in court.
It does not include the attorney’s unsworn statement explaining to the court what
he hopes the evidence will show which prefaces the proffer. An attorney’s
unsworn statement regarding what he thinks a witness will say when he testifies is
not evidence and has no legal effect. Cf. Gomes v. Williams, 420 F.2d 1364, 1366
(10th Cir. 1970) (holding that attorney’s statement that defendant had a good
defense to allegations of fraud was “a bald allegation, without the support of facts
underlying the defense, [and] will not sustain the burden of the defaulting party
under Rule 60(b)”). Although Mr. Ramirez-Rodriguez’s counsel represented to
the court that Mr. Ramirez-Rodriguez did not read the waiver before signing it
and that neither the court nor the prosecutor verbally informed him of his right to
counsel, Mr. Ramirez-Rodriguez did not testify to these representations when
given the opportunity to do so at the hearing.
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Mr. Ramirez-Rodriguez failed to present any evidence that the waiver he
signed in 1997 was involuntary or unknowing. The district court had before it no
evidence to rebut the presumption of regularity of the signed waiver and did not
err in finding that Mr. Ramirez-Rodriguez had voluntarily and knowingly waived
his right to counsel.
The judgment of the United States District Court for the District of
Colorado is AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Stephen H. Anderson
Circuit Judge
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