Musungayi v. Whirlpool Corporation , 401 F. App'x 346 ( 2010 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
November 4, 2010
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
KAZADI BIG MUSUNGAYI,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 10-5060
(D.C. No. 4:08-CV-00427-GKF-TLW)
WHIRLPOOL CORPORATION, (N.D. Okla.)
Defendant-Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before TACHA, ANDERSON, and KELLY, Circuit Judges.
Kazadi Big Musungayi sued his former employer, Whirlpool Corporation,
alleging a hostile work environment under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17. The district court granted Whirlpool’s
motion for summary judgment, and exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291, we affirm.
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is
not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata,
and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value
consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
I
Mr. Musungayi is an African-American native of the Democratic Republic
of the Congo. He was hired by Whirlpool in July 2005 and soon complained of
coworkers exhibiting “hostile behaviors” toward him. R. Vol. 1 at 82. Whirlpool
reassigned Mr. Musungayi to a job operating a 600-ton press, which satisfied him
for a while, but ten months later he sent a letter to a member of Congress
complaining of “systematic silent oppression.” Id. at 192. According to
Mr. Musungayi, coworkers ignored him, took long breaks, and “us[ed] electronics
devices to communicate with outside people.” Id. Whirlpool investigated the
letter and learned from Mr. Musungayi that his job-partner, Don Kinsey, preferred
training Caucasians. Whirlpool could not substantiate the claim, however, and
finding no other evidence of discrimination or harassment, took no further action.
A year later, though, Mr. Musungayi filed a charge of discrimination with
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). He alleged a hostile
work environment created in part by a coworker named Keenan Berry, who was
“waging a psychological warfare.” Id. at 193. Mr. Musungayi noted that his past
complaints to Whirlpool did not deter Berry from harassing him, and he thus
suspected a “White supremacist agenda.” Id. Mr. Musungayi told Donna Griffin,
Whirlpool’s employee relations manager, that Berry “interrupt[ed] employees
working with [him] on the 600 ton press in an effort to ‘intoxicate’ others against
him.” Id. at 155. Griffin interviewed several other employees and supervisors
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but again found no evidence of discrimination or harassment. Consequently,
Whirlpool took no further action on these allegations either.
In February 2008, Mr. Musungayi pursued his discrimination charge in the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. He alleged an
equal protection violation, negligence, and “endangerment to the human factor.”
Id. at 13. More specifically, he averred that Whirlpool failed to protect him from
harassing coworkers, failed to resolve the “crisis,” overworked him, underpaid
him, and “tarnished [his] reputation.” Id. For all this, Mr. Musungayi sought
money damages totaling $250,000.00. The Michigan court eventually transferred
the case to the Northern District of Oklahoma, which dismissed all but the
Title VII claim.
In the meantime, Mr. Musungayi lodged ten more grievances with
Whirlpool, complaining that coworkers were making rowing gestures, causing
him to feel unsafe by spying on him, asking if the Congo was “Dark Africa,” and
giving him “insolent gazes.” Id. at 155-57. In addition to other complaints,
Mr. Musungayi also felt “emotionally hurt” when a coworker slammed a tote bag
and told him to fill it, id. at 117, and he reported that an employee asked why he
had been assigned “such a dumb job,” id. at 200. Whirlpool investigated each
incident but found no discrimination or harassment. The company disciplined
Mr. Musungayi, however, for later confronting and intimidating the employee
who allegedly asked why he had been given a dumb job.
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In September 2009, Mr. Musungayi was fired for insubordination. On
December 9, 2009, he responded with a second charge of discrimination, alleging
retaliatory dismissal for filing this lawsuit. After receiving his right-to-sue letter,
Mr. Musungayi moved to consolidate his retaliation claim with his pending
hostile-work-environment claim. The district court denied the motion, however,
construing it as an untimely and improper motion to amend the complaint. The
court then granted Whirlpool’s pending motion for summary judgment because
there was no evidence of discrimination or harassment on the basis of race or
national origin.
Mr. Musungayi now appeals the court’s grant of summary judgment.
II
We review the grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the same
legal standard as the district court. Jones v. Okla. City Pub. Sch., 617 F.3d 1273,
1277 (10th Cir. 2010). “Summary judgment is proper only if ‘there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact’ and ‘the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law.’” Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)). In conducting our review, we
construe the evidence and the reasonable inferences from it in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party, in this case, Mr. Musungayi. See id.To survive summary judgment on a hostile-work-environment claim, “a
plaintiff must show that a rational jury could find that the workplace is permeated
with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult, that is sufficiently severe or
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pervasive to alter the conditions of . . . employment and create an abusive
working environment.” Sandoval v. City of Boulder, Colo., 388 F.3d 1312, 1327
(10th Cir. 2004) (quotation omitted). A plaintiff must also submit evidence
allowing a jury to infer that he was harassed due to his race or national origin. Id.The district court found that Mr. Musungayi failed to demonstrate either
that any alleged harassment was sufficiently severe, pervasive, or objectively
offensive as to create an abusive working environment, or that he was harassed
because of his race or national origin. We agree with this assessment. There was
no evidence to sustain Mr. Musungayi’s belief that the difficulties he experienced
at Whirlpool resulted from a discriminatory animus based on race or national
origin. Instead, the record indicates that Mr. Musungayi’s allegations were
premised almost exclusively on his subjectively held beliefs and assumptions.
For instance, Mr. Musungayi told a coworker he was from the Congo and
was asked, “Is that what they call dark Africa?” R. Vol. 1 at 96. Mr. Musungayi
took offense and walked away. But another coworker later told Mr. Musungayi,
“If you knew the history of this country, you would understand that that part of
the world was called dark Africa.” Id. at 122. Given this context, there was
nothing severely offensive or inherently discriminatory about the question, and
we can infer nothing discriminatory from the reference.
Mr. Musungayi also alleged that Kinsey preferred to train Caucasians over
African-Americans. He explained that Kinsey was once involved in an altercation
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with another employee and afterwards said, “Well, it’s just a cultural issue and I
know at my church in the past, they used to not accept black people.” Id. at 96.
On another occasion Mr. Musungayi heard Kinsey say he taught Sunday school
students “that before loving those outside of you, you get to love first those
around you here.” Id. at 99. Based on these two statements, Mr. Musungayi
asserts that Kinsey fosters a racial bias. But these statements could not support a
factual finding that Whirlpool’s work environment was so permeated with
discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult as to render it abusive, and they
do not demonstrate that Kinsey held a discriminatory intent. Moreover, these
comments were not directed at Mr. Musungayi and did not disadvantage him.
To the contrary, Mr. Musungayi acknowledged that Kinsey trained him, and, in
fact, he actually wrote a letter to Whirlpool’s management, praising Kinsey for
training him. Perhaps Mr. Musungayi found Kinsey’s remarks offensive, but
“Title VII . . . does not set forth a general civility code.” Burlington N. & Santa
Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68 (2006) (quotation omitted).
Nor did Berry’s conduct constitute actionable harassment. See Chavez v.
New Mexico, 397 F.3d 826, 832 (10th Cir. 2005) (harassment must be racial or
stem from racial animus). According to Mr. Musungayi, Berry’s harassment
consisted of walking around Mr. Musungayi’s workspace, throwing gloves into
the press and shutting it off, spreading rumors that Mr. Musungayi was royalty,
and telling Kinsey that he–Berry–did not trust Mr. Musungayi. Berry also tried to
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avoid working with Mr. Musungayi and even reported that Mr. Musungayi was
harassing him. But none of this conduct can be attributed to a discriminatory
animus. See Bolden v. PRC Inc., 43 F.3d 545, 551 (10th Cir. 1994) (“General
harassment if not racial or sexual is not actionable.”). And apart from this alleged
conduct, Mr. Musungayi conceded that he never heard Berry make any derogatory
remarks about anyone’s race or national origin. See R. Vol. 1 at 104.
We could continue to discuss Mr. Musungayi’s allegations, but we are
satisfied that they do not point to an actionable injury. And in any event, his
appellate brief fails to articulate any reasoned argument, supported by pertinent
legal authority, suggesting that summary judgment was inappropriate. Instead,
Mr. Musungayi disputes the characterization of his problems as personality
conflicts and lobs new allegations impeaching the integrity of defense counsel.
We recognize that Mr. Musungayi is proceeding pro se, and we afford his
materials a “solicitous construction” accordingly. See Van Deelen v. Johnson,
497 F.3d 1151, 1153 n.1 (10th Cir. 2007). Nevertheless, we have “repeatedly
insisted that pro se parties follow the same rules of procedure that govern other
litigants.” Garrett v. Selby Connor Maddux & Janer, 425 F.3d 836, 840
(10th Cir. 2005) (quotation omitted). This means that “[u]nder [Federal Rule of
Appellate Procedure] 28, which applies equally to pro se litigants, a brief must
contain more than a generalized assertion of error, with citations to supporting
authority. When a pro se litigant fails to comply with that rule, we cannot fill the
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void by crafting arguments and performing the necessary legal research.” Id.
at 841 (ellipsis, citation, brackets and quotations omitted).
As a corollary, we cannot consider Mr. Musungayi’s allegations of
retaliatory discharge, as Mr. Musungayi failed to properly present that claim to
the district court. See Tele-Commc’ns, Inc. v. Comm’r, 104 F.3d 1229, 1233
(10th Cir. 1997) (“[A]n issue must be presented to, considered and decided by the
trial court before it can be raised on appeal.” (brackets and quotations omitted)).
Mr. Musungayi attempted to add a retaliatory discharge claim to his complaint by
moving to consolidate it with his hostile-work-environment claim, but the district
court denied his request as untimely and improper, see Dkt. # 87 (minute order
denying motion for consolidation), and never considered his allegations,
see R. Vol. 1 at 221 n.1. Although Mr. Musungayi criticized that ruling in his
notice of appeal, see id. at 226, we doubt his comments adequately preserved for
appeal the question of whether the court erred in denying leave to amend. Yet
even if he did wish to appeal the ruling, Mr. Musungayi failed to challenge it in
his opening brief. Instead, he simply asserted in a supplemental brief that the
district court misconstrued the motion for consolidation as seeking to amend the
complaint. Under these circumstances, we conclude that Mr. Musungayi failed to
preserve the issue for appeal. See Bronson v. Swensen, 500 F.3d 1099, 1104-05
(10th Cir. 2007) (finding forfeiture where appellant failed to adequately raise
argument in opening brief on appeal).
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III
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Paul J. Kelly, Jr.
Circuit Judge
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