Strepka v. Miller ( 2000 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FEB 1 2000
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
MARK ALAN STREPKA,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
GREG MILLER, So. Metro Task;
SCOTT JONES, So. Metro Task;
KELLY MARTIN, So. Metro Task; C.
KLOPPENBERG, So. Metro Task; J.
GORDANIER, So. Metro Task;
No. 99-1387
OFFICER COLLINS, So. Metro Task;
(District of Colorado)
JERRY ROSENBAUGH, C.B.I.;
(D.C. No. 99-Z-902)
RONALD BEATTY, Arap. Cty. S.O.;
J. FORSTER, Denver Dist. D.E.A.;
PATRICK J. SULLIVAN, JR., Sheriff;
DIRECTOR OF C.B.I.; DIRECTOR
DENVER DIST. D.E.A.; NAT’L
ADMIN. D.E.A.; CHRISTOPHER
CROSS, Arap. Cty. J.; GREG
NOZUM; PUBLIC SAFETY,
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF,
Defendants-Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
Before BRORBY, KELLY, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
Mark A. Strepka, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s dismissal,
pursuant to Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), of his § 1983 civil rights
complaint. In his complaint, Strepka alleged that he was being held at the
Arapahoe County, Colorado, Detention Facility, awaiting trial on pending
charges. He further asserted that he was subjected to an illegal, warrantless arrest
and that he should have been, but was not, brought before a judge or magistrate
within forty-eight hours for a probable cause hearing. In dismissing the
complaint, the district court noted that absent extraordinary circumstances, federal
courts are prohibited from interfering with ongoing state criminal proceedings.
See Younger, 401 U.S. at 45. Because Strepka had not made the requisite
showing of extraordinary circumstances, the district court concluded that it must
dismiss the action pursuant to Younger. On appeal, Strepka contends as follows:
(1) Younger does not extend to actions where the only requested remedy is
damages; and (2) even if Younger does apply to his complaint, the district court
should have stayed, rather than dismissed, his claims.
Strepka’s assertion that Younger does not apply to § 1983 complaints when
the only requested remedy is damages is foreclosed by established Tenth Circuit
precedent. See Parkhurst v. Wyoming, 641 F.2d 775, 777 (10th Cir. 1981); Pettit
v. Whetsel, No. 99-6107, 1999 WL 586998, at *2 (10th Cir. Aug. 5, 1999).
Strepka is correct, however, in his assertion that the district court erred in
dismissing, rather than staying, his complaint. See Deakins v. Monaghan, 484
U.S. 193, 202 (1988) (“[T]he District Court has no discretion to dismiss rather
than to stay claims for monetary relief that cannot be redressed in state
proceedings.”); Myers v. Garff, 876 F.2d 79, 81 (10th Cir. 1989) (citing Deakins).
Nor can the district court’s dismissal of Strepka’s complaint be salvaged by
reference to Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994). See Pettit, 1999
WL 586998, at *2 (although district court’s dismissal of § 1983 damages claim
was not proper under Younger, dismissal was proper on basis of Heck). This
court recently held “[c]laims arising out of police actions toward a criminal
suspect, such as arrest, interrogation, or search and seizure, are presumed to have
accrued when the actions actually occur.” Beck v. City of Muskogee, 195 F.3d
553, 558 (10th Cir. 1999) (quotation omitted). Furthermore, the Beck court
specifically held that “nothing in Heck changes the general rule that causes of
action relating to allegedly illegal arrest arise at the time of the arrest.” Id.Because Strepka’s § 1983 claims both relate to police actions occurring within the
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time frame of his arrest, a dismissal pursuant to Heck is not appropriate in this
particular case.
The district court’s order of dismissal is hereby REVERSED and the case
is REMANDED to the district court to reinstate the complaint. Because the
district court dismissed the complaint sua sponte before it could be served on the
defendants, the district court should order the complaint properly served. Once
the complaint has been properly served, the district court should stay all
proceedings in the case pending the outcome of the underlying state proceedings.
Strepka’s “Motion of Ambiguity Question of Judicial Procedure” is DENIED as
moot.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT:
Michael R. Murphy
Circuit Judge
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