Jarrett v. Sprint/United ( 2000 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FEB 7 2000
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
THEOLA ANN JARRETT,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 99-3134
(D.C. No. 97-CV-2487)
SPRINT/UNITED MANAGEMENT (D. Kan.)
COMPANY,
Defendant-Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before BRORBY , PORFILIO , and LUCERO , Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
Plaintiff Theola Ann Jarrett, proceeding pro se on appeal, appeals the
district court’s order resolving her employment claims in favor of defendant
and its denial of her post-judgment motion. We exercise jurisdiction pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm.
Plaintiff was employed by defendant. In May of 1989, due to a mental
disability, she was unable to return to work. She received short term disability
benefits until November 17, 1989, when her long term disability benefits began.
She claims she was discharged in violation of Title VII, the Rehabilitation Act,
and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The district court entered
summary judgment on plaintiff’s claim that defendant’s failure to accommodate
her disability violated the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA, and dismissed her
remaining claims for failure to state a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
Following the entry of judgment in favor of defendant, plaintiff filed a motion
to set aside the judgment, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59, which the district
court denied.
On appeal, plaintiff asserts that the district court erred in denying her
motion to set aside the judgment, claiming her attorney’s illness had impaired his
ability to represent her, her motion to compel discovery should have been granted,
and the judgment violated her rights to due process and equal protection.
Plaintiff also challenges the summary judgment and dismissal order on the
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following grounds: (1) the district court erred in finding that plaintiff’s
employment was terminated on November 17, 1989 when her short term
disability benefits expired, (2) defendant failed to meet its burden of production
for summary judgment, (3) there exists a private right of action under the
Rehabilitation Act, (4) defendant’s contracts with the federal government
qualified as a federal subsidy under the Rehabilitation Act, (5) plaintiff’s claims
pre-dated the ADA based on a continuing violation theory, and (6) the district
court failed to address some of her claims.
We review the district court’s denial of plaintiff’s post-judgment motion
for an abuse of discretion. See Phelps v. Hamilton , 122 F.3d 1309, 1324
(10th Cir. 1997). A Rule 59(e) motion should be granted only to correct errors
of law or to consider newly discovered evidence. See id.Plaintiff has demonstrated no prejudice due to her attorney’s illness or
the denial of her motion to compel. She has not alleged how her attorney’s
representation was compromised due to his illness during the summer before
he was granted leave to withdraw on November 6, 1998. As for her motion to
compel, she sought discovery relevant to her Rehabilitation Act claim, which,
as we discuss below, she abandoned before the district court. Therefore, the
discovery she sought was irrelevant. Furthermore, plaintiff failed to file an
affidavit pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f). See United States v. Simons , 129 F.3d
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1386, 1388 (10th Cir. 1997) (“Where a movant has met the initial burden required
to support summary judgment, the non-movant then must either establish the
existence of a triable issue of fact under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) or explain why
he cannot . . . under Rule 56(f).”) (quotation omitted).
Plaintiff also claims that her due process and equal protection rights were
violated, and the only way to vindicate those rights is to set aside the judgment
and begin anew. The argument is nothing more than a request for another
opportunity to resist entry of a judgment against her, which the district court was
not obliged to entertain. See Van Skiver v. United States , 952 F.2d 1241, 1243
(10th Cir. 1991) (appeal from denial of Rule 60(b) motion). Accordingly, we
conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiff’s
post-judgment motion.
Turning to the judgment, w e review de novo the district court’s grant of
summary judgment, viewing the record in the light most favorable to the party
opposing summary judgment. See McKnight v. Kimberly Clark Corp., 149 F.3d
1125, 1128 (10th Cir. 1998). Summary judgment is appropriate if there is no
genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986);
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Similarly, our review is de novo when considering
an order dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim for relief under
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Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, using the same standard
applied by the district court. See Ordinance 59 Ass’n v. United States Dep’t of
Interior Secretary , 163 F.3d 1150, 1152 (10th Cir. 1998). “We accept as true all
well-pleaded facts, as distinguished from conclusory allegations, and view those
facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Maher v. Durango
Metals, Inc. , 144 F.3d 1302, 1304 (10th Cir. 1998). Dismissal of a complaint
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) will be upheld only if “it appears beyond doubt that the
plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of [her] claim which would entitle
[her] to relief.” Conley v. Gibson , 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957).
The judgment was based in large part on two critical circumstances:
(1) plaintiff abandoned her claims based on the Rehabilitation Act, and
(2) plaintiff failed to controvert defendant’s evidence that her employment was
terminated on November 17, 1989, the date her temporary disability benefits
ended, and before the effective date of the ADA. On the first point, in response
to defendant’s motions for summary judgment and dismissal, plaintiff
acknowledged defendant’s argument that she could not state a cause of action
under the Rehabilitation Act and stated, “[w]ithout arguing those po[i]nts,
Plaintiff contends that she brings her claims under the American[s] with
Disabilities Act of 1990.” R. vol. 2, doc. 77 at 5. The waiver of her
Rehabilitation Act claims is clear and unequivocal. Because plaintiff waived
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her claims brought pursuant to the Rehabilitation Act, we need not address her
appellate issues based on it. Cf. O’Connor v. City & County of Denver , 894 F.2d
1210, 1214 (10th Cir. 1990) (appellate court will not consider claims abandoned
in district court).
The other dispositive issue is whether plaintiff produced evidence to defeat
summary judgment on defendant’s assertion that her employment ended on
November 17, 1989. This factor is critical to plaintiff’s ADA claims because the
Act’s effective date was July 26, 1992, well after the alleged termination date of
November 17, 1989. The ADA is not effective retroactively. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 12111 note--Effective Date (ADA “shall become effective 24 months after the
date of enactment [July 26, 1990].”); Huels v. Exxon Coal USA, Inc. , 121 F.3d
1047, 1049 (7th Cir. 1997); Morrison v. Carleton Woolen Mills, Inc. , 108 F.3d
429, 443 (1st Cir. 1997); Brown v. General Tel. Co. , 108 F.3d 208, 209 (9th Cir.
1997); Gonzales v. Garner Food Servs., Inc. , 89 F.3d 1523, 1525 (11th Cir. 1996);
Buchanan v. City of San Antonio , 85 F.3d 196, 197 (5th Cir. 1996); Smith v.
United Parcel Serv. of Am., Inc. , 65 F.3d 266, 266 (2d Cir. 1995); cf. Office of
Senate Sergeant at Arms v. Office of Senate Fair Employment Practices , 95 F.3d
1102, 1107 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (“[T]he ADA, as incorporated into the [Government
Employee Rights Act], does not require a retroactive accommodation for
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a disability.”). Therefore, if defendant’s alleged violations of the ADA occurred
before July 26, 1992, defendant cannot be held accountable under the ADA.
Defendant produced the affidavit of its Benefits Services Manager to
establish plaintiff’s termination date. See R. vol. 1, doc. 66, attach. B. Plaintiff
argues that a document entitled “Individual Terminations,” explaining long term
disability coverage, refutes defendant’s evidence. See id. vol. 2, doc. 77, ex. A.
According to plaintiff, the Individual Terminations document provided that an
insured was employed by defendant as long as he or she was receiving long term
disability benefits. Plaintiff alleges she remained employed by defendant as late
as 1993 because she received benefits for a short period during that year. The
district court declined to consider the Individual Terminations document on
summary judgment because it was not properly authenticated and did not establish
that it applied during the dates in question, let alone that it proved that plaintiff
continued to be defendant’s employee as long as she received some form of long
term benefits.
We will “consider only admissible evidence in reviewing an order granting
summary judgment.” Gross v. Burggraf Constr. Co. , 53 F.3d 1531, 1541 (10th
Cir. 1995). “[T]he nonmoving party need not produce evidence ‘in a form that
would be admissible at trial,’ but the content or substance of the evidence must
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be admissible.” Thomas v. International Business Machs. , 48 F.3d 478, 485
(10th Cir. 1995) (quoting Celotex Corp. , 477 U.S. at 324).
Here, plaintiff merely attached the Individual Termination document to her
affidavit. She did not establish its authenticity or legal relevance to her claims.
Accordingly, we determine that the district court did not abuse its discretion in
refusing to consider the Individual Terminations document. See Mitchael v.
Intracorp, Inc. , 179 F.3d 847, 854 (10th Cir. 1999) (district court’s ruling to
exclude evidence at summary judgment stage reviewed for abuse of discretion).
Consequently, we hold that plaintiff failed to demonstrate a genuine issue of fact
on the question of when her employment terminated. Her employment ended
before the effective date of the ADA; therefore, the district court properly
dismissed plaintiff’s ADA claims.
Contrary to plaintiff’s argument that defendant was required to demonstrate
that its own witnesses would not help her case, we conclude that defendant met its
initial burden on summary judgment. Cf. Celotex Corp. , 477 U.S. at 323 (moving
party not required to produce materials “ negating the opponent’s claim”).
Plaintiff’s continuing violation theory is rejected because she has offered no
evidence to support it. Finally, we reject plaintiff’s argument that not all of her
claims were resolved because we determine that the district court’s
comprehensive orders resolved plaintiff’s well-pleaded claims.
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The judgment of the United States District Court for the District of Kansas
is AFFIRMED. The mandate shall issue forthwith.
Entered for the Court
Wade Brorby
Circuit Judge
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