Gee v. Shepherd ( 2000 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
APR 3 2000
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
TOMMY D. GEE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 99-6169
(D.C. No. 98-CV-337)
MONTE DEE SHEPHERD; UNITED (W.D. Okla.)
STATES OF AMERICA,
Defendants-Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before TACHA , ANDERSON , and LUCERO , Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). Therefore,
appellant’s request for oral argument is denied, and the case is ordered submitted
without oral argument.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
Plaintiff Tommy D. Gee appeals a jury verdict in favor of defendant
Monte D. Shepherd and the district court’s judgment following a bench trial in
favor of the defendant United States on plaintiff’s action seeking damages for
injuries he allegedly received as a result of an automobile accident. 1
Jurisdiction
over plaintiff’s case against the United States was based on the Federal Tort
Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2679 and 28 U.S.C. § 1346. The district court exercised
supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff’s action against Shepherd pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1367(a). The case was tried simultaneously to the court on plaintiff’s
claims against the United States and to the jury on plaintiff’s claims against
Shepherd. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Shepherd and the court entered
judgment in favor of the United States. Plaintiff appeals.
Plaintiff raises two questions for this court’s consideration on appeal:
(1) whether the district court erred in refusing to admit into evidence the
investigating police officer’s report and opinion; and (2) whether the jury verdict
and judgment and the district court’s decision and judgment for defendants are
1
Although the United States filed a brief in this case, it asserts that
plaintiff’s appeal only seeks relief as to the jury verdict and judgment entered in
favor of defendant Shepherd. We agree. In his brief, plaintiff requests this court
vacate the jury verdict and remand for a new trial. He does not ask this court to
disturb the district court’s entry of judgment in favor of the United States.
Therefore, we will address plaintiff’s claims of error only as they relate to the
jury verdict in favor of defendant Shepherd.
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inconsistent. Following careful review of the parties’ briefs and the record on
appeal, we discern no error and affirm.
Background
We will recite here only those facts germane to our decision in this case.
On November 7, 1997, plaintiff was a passenger in a vehicle driven by Shepherd
when Shepherd attempted to make a left turn out of a convenience store into
eastbound traffic. A government vehicle, driven by United States Army Sergeant
Don Majors, traveling westbound, struck the rear of Shepherd’s vehicle. At the
time of the accident Majors was acting within the scope of his employment. In
his negligence actions against defendants, plaintiff alleged that his knee was
seriously injured in the accident.
The trial testimony evinced a difference of opinion as to whether Majors
had a red or green light and as to whether Shepherd’s view of Majors’ automobile
was blocked by other traffic. The investigating police officer testified that he was
told by Shepherd that plaintiff was not hurt and had left the scene. See
Appellant’s App. at 325. This was supported by Majors’ testimony that he did not
see plaintiff at the accident scene. See id. at 347-48. Plaintiff’s doctor testified
that, considering the nature of the injury, “as a rule,” plaintiff would have been in
pain with a noticeable limp. Appellee’s Supp. App. at 17-18. The doctor also
testified that he did not see plaintiff for treatment of the injury until two months
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after the accident, and that he connected the injury with the accident based solely
on plaintiff’s version of the circumstances. Id. at 19. During plaintiff’s
testimony, he admitted that, in his view, Shepherd did nothing wrong at the time
of the accident. See Appellant’s App. at 297-98.
During trial, the United States offered into evidence the report of the
investigating police officer. Over the objection of Shepherd’s counsel, the court
initially held this evidence admissible. During the officer’s actual testimony as to
his opinion of fault, however, Shepherd again objected, and the court, after
reconsidering, decided that the police officer had not been qualified as an expert,
and that this testimony was not needed to assist the jury in determining the cause
of the accident. The court withdrew the accident report as an exhibit, finding that
the report also contained inadmissible statements. Plaintiff did not object to these
rulings, but moved for admission of the report with certain portions redacted. The
court overruled the motion. The police officer continued to testify as to general
law regarding entering a roadway from a private drive into oncoming traffic, and
compliance with traffic lights. Plaintiff did not cross-examine the officer.
Admission of Evidence
First, plaintiff asserts that the district court erred in excluding the opinion
and report of the investigating police officer. When we review a trial court's
decision to admit or exclude evidence, we apply an abuse of discretion standard.
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See United States v. Harmon , 918 F.2d 115, 117 (10th Cir.1990). Where a trial
court excludes evidence and the offering party properly objects at trial, we will
reverse the court’s decision only if the exclusion of the evidence constitutes an
abuse of discretion that results in “‘manifest injustice to the parties.’” Thompson
v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. , 34 F.3d 932, 939 (10th Cir. 1994) (quoting
Angelo v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 11 F.3d 957, 960 (10th Cir. 1993)); see
also United States v. Ortiz , 804 F.2d 1161, 1164 n. 2 (10th Cir. 1986) (holding
reversal for abuse of discretion appropriate only after reviewing court develops a
“definite and firm conviction [the trial court] made a clear error of judgment or
exceeded the bounds of permissible choice in the circumstances.”). “Where the
verdict more probably than not was untainted by the error, the error is harmless
and a new trial is not required.” U.S. Indus., Inc. v. Touche Ross & Co ., 854 F.2d
1223, 1252 (10th Cir. 1988) (footnotes omitted), implied overruling on other
grounds recognized by Anixter v. Home-Stake Prod . Co. , 77 F.3d 1215, 1231
(10th Cir. 1996).
Federal Rule of Evidence 704 allows the admission of expert opinion
evidence even if it “embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact.”
The rule does not, however, allow the testifying expert to tell the jury what result
they should reach. See id. Advisory Committee Note. Testimony of this type is
often excluded if it takes over the jury’s function in deciding the facts. See Frase
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v. Henry , 444 F.2d 1228, 1231 (10th Cir. 1971) (holding that an expert witness
may offer an opinion on the ultimate issue only if the opinion “aids the jury in the
interpretation of technical facts or to assist in understanding the material in
evidence”).
In arguing exclusion error, plaintiff relies on the Supreme Court’s decision
in Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey , 488 U.S. 153 (1988) (holding an aircraft
accident investigative report containing opinions and conclusions trustworthy and
admissible in a case where the cause of the accident was extremely difficult to
determine), and this court’s decision in Frase, 444 F.2d 1228 (interpreting a
Kansas rule of evidence to hold an auto accident investigating officer’s opinion
admissible because the testimony aided the jury in synthesizing the facts which
they would not have been able to synthesize themselves). Contrary to plaintiff’s
argument, these cases do not support a conclusion that an investigating officer’s
reports and opinions are either always admissible or inadmissible. Here, there
was no technical information requiring interpretation or any indication that the
jury could not make its own independent judgment of fault based on the facts and
evidence. Under these circumstances, we believe that the police officer’s
testimony would have “come[] perilously close to telling the jury,” who was at
fault. Id. at 1231. Therefore, under the facts and circumstances in this case, we
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hold that exclusion of the officer’s report and testimony was not an abuse of the
district court’s discretion.
Even if we were to conclude differently, any error in the district court’s
exclusion of the evidence would be harmless. In order to prevail against
Shepherd on his claim of negligence, under Oklahoma law, plaintiff had to prove
by a preponderance of the evidence: “(1) a duty owed by the defendant to the
plaintiff to use ordinary care, (2) a breach of that duty, and (3) an injury
proximately caused by the defendant’s breach of duty.” Brown v. Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc. , 11 F.3d 1559, 1563 (10th Cir.1993); Thompson v. Presbyterian
Hosp., Inc ., 652 P.2d 260, 263 (Okla. 1982).
When a trial court errs in the admission or exclusion of evidence, this court
will reverse the jury’s verdict “only if the error prejudicially affects a substantial
right of a party.” Sanjuan v. IBP, Inc ., 160 F.3d 1291, 1296 (10th Cir. 1998); see
also U.S. Indus., Inc. , 854 F.2d at 1252. This kind of evidentiary error is
prejudicial only if we reasonably conclude that the jury would have reached a
different result with admission of the evidence. See Sanjuan , 160 F.3d at 1296.
Following a careful review of the transcript of this trial, we cannot reasonably
conclude that the jury would have found in favor of plaintiff had it had the benefit
of the investigating officer’s report and testimony. Therefore, even if the district
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court did err in excluding the disputed evidence, that error did not sufficiently
prejudice the plaintiff to warrant vacating the jury’s verdict.
Inconsistent Verdicts
Plaintiff contends that because he was a “blame-free passenger,” the jury
verdict in favor of Shepherd and the court’s judgment in favor of the United
States were inconsistent. He asserts that the fact that no party was found to be at
fault indicates the jury’s confusion “by the parties’ testimony and the lack of
substantive testimony from the investigating officer.” Appellant’s Br. at 11.
Initially, we must determine whether we may review this issue. “A party’s
failure to object to a general jury verdict on the ground of inconsistency before
the jury is discharged constitutes waiver, unless the verdict is inconsistent on its
face such that entry of judgment upon the verdict is plain error.” Oja v.
Howmedica, Inc. 111 F.3d 782, 790 (10th Cir. 1997). Here, plaintiff has not
pointed us to any place in the record where his counsel objected on the ground of
inconsistency before the jury was discharged. We therefore must determine
whether the verdict was facially inconsistent such that entry of judgment would be
considered plain error.
Plaintiff bases his claim of inconsistency on his contention that, because he
was without fault, one of the defendants had to be found at fault. Although
plaintiff cites this court to several cases in which verdicts were found to be
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inconsistent, none of the cases provide any support for plaintiff’s contention. See
Mitchell v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. , 15 F.3d 959 (10th Cir. 1994)
(holding verdict for defendant on breach of contract claim and verdict for
plaintiffs on bad faith claim to be inconsistent); Cheney v. Moler , 285 F.2d 116(10th Cir. 1960) (holding jury verdict a nullity when jury returned a verdict for
plaintiff without damages and awarded a verdict against defendant on defendant’s
counterclaim); Hopkins v. Coen , 431 F.2d 1055 (6th Cir. 1970) (holding verdict
inconsistent when jury completed four verdict forms -- two in favor of the
plaintiffs and two in favor of the defendants).
After receiving the evidence and hearing the testimony, the jury concluded that
plaintiff had not met his burden of proof of negligence against Shepherd. Based on
the same evidence and testimony, the district court concluded that plaintiff had not
proved his case of negligence against the United States. We fail to see the
inconsistency in these decisions. Therefore, the verdict of the jury and the judgment
of the court are not facially inconsistent, and we consider plaintiff’s inconsistent
verdict claim waived. See Oja , 111 F.3d at 790.
AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Stephen H. Anderson
Circuit Judge
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