United States v. Hightower , 94 F. App'x 750 ( 2004 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
APR 6 2004
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee, No. 03-1015
v. District of Colorado
JOE HIGHTOWER, (D.C. No. 02-CR-40-N)
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before EBEL , ANDERSON , and McCONNELL , Circuit Judges.
Joe Hightower was convicted by a jury and sentenced to a term of 319
months, plus 5 years’ probation. He appeals both conviction and sentence. In a
fifteen-count superseding indictment, he was charged with: 1) nine counts of
possession with intent to distribute more than five grams of cocaine base
(“crack”), in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B) and 18 U.S.C. § 2;
2) one count of possession with intent to distribute an unspecified amount of a
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of crack, in violation of 21
U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C) and 18 U.S.C. § 2; 3) two counts of possession
with intent to distribute a substance and mixture containing a detectable amount
of cocaine hydrochloride, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C) and
18 U.S.C. § 2; 4) one count of possession with intent to distribute more than 5
grams of a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of
methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B) and 18
U.S.C. § 2; 5) one count of possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug
trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A); and 6) one count of
possession of a firearm by a previously convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2).
In the proceedings below, the charge of felon in possession of a firearm
was severed from the remaining counts. Following his trial on the remaining
counts, the jury acquitted Mr. Hightower on the methamphetamine count and the
district court directed acquittal on the charge concerning using a firearm in
furtherance of drug trafficking. After the jury returned a verdict of guilty on the
remaining twelve counts, Mr. Hightower pled guilty to the count concerning
firearm possession by a felon.
On appeal, Mr. Hightower challenges his conviction and sentence on four
separate grounds: 1) that he was deprived of his due process right to a jury of his
-2-
peers because there were no African-Americans in the jury pool and the district
court did not allow additional jury voir dire to determine possible bias against
African-Americans; 2) that his due process rights were violated because he faced
a longer sentence for a crack offense, which, he argues, disparately subjects
African-Americans to harsher penalties; 3) that the district court erred in ruling
that it did not have the authority to downwardly depart based upon a Sentencing
Commission’s Report to Congress regarding the disparate effect of sentencing
guidelines for crack offenses on African-Americans; and 4) that the trial court
should have given him a downward departure for sentencing entrapment because
the agents who bought drugs from Hightower specifically asked to buy crack.
Analysis
1. Jury Voir Dire and Right to Jury of Peers
Mr. Hightower contends that he was denied a trial by a jury of his peers and
that alleged racial bias deprived him of this right. During voir dire, Mr.
Hightower’s counsel made an oral objection that there were no African-
Americans in the jury pool and later, when asked if he would like to exercise any
peremptory challenges, he objected to the panel for “lack of diversity.” App. vol.
4, at 144. He also noted that the court asked no questions regarding “ethnicity.”
Id.-3-
Mr. Hightower concedes that he has no challenge here under Batson v.
Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). Appellant’s Br. 11. Aside from his general
complaint about lack of diversity among the venire, it seems from the briefs that
Mr. Hightower wanted questioning regarding his contention that the public
connects African-Americans and crack in a discriminatory manner and that the
trial court should have asked additional questions to ferret out those with such
preconceptions. Prior to voir dire proceedings, Mr. Hightower’s counsel tendered
the following questions:
1. If you were a black man charged with federal criminal
offenses, and you saw that no other black citizens were seated
on the jury to determine your guilt or innocence, would you
feel confident that you would receive a fair trial?
2. What do you understand the term [sic] “crack” or “crack”
cocaine to mean?
3. What have you heard about “crack” or “crack cocaine”?
4. Do you have any preconceived idea of whether any particular
ethnic groups are associated with the use of “crack” or “crack
cocaine”? What is that idea based upon?
5. Do you believe that if a person charged with a crime or crimes
has been previously convicted of a criminal offense, that he or
she is more likely to have committed the more recently charged
offenses?
6. Do you believe that all of our drug laws are fairly written and
fairly enforced? If not, why not?
7. Would you assign more or less believability to a person who
has committed a crime but has received leniency from law
enforcement in exchange for their cooperation to assist in the
investigation and prosecution of others?
8. Would you assign more or less believability to a person who is
being paid to assist law enforcement in the investigation and
prosecution of others?
-4-
Doc. 97, App. vol. 1.
During voir dire, counsel for Mr. Hightower objected to the scope of
questioning, saying to the court: “I would also note for the record there have been
no questions on ethnicity.” App. vol. 4, at 144. The district court responded:
“And what question on ethnicity do you think I omitted?” Id. Counsel
responded: “I think there should be several. I think I tendered one, which was the
first question posed.” Id. From this, we gather that Mr. Hightower’s counsel was
referring to the first of his proposed voir dire questions enumerated above.
Following the exchange, the district court then asked the following question and
made the following determination:
Members of the jury panel, the defendant is an African
American. And the question is, since there are no African Americans
on the panel, do each of you, looking within yourselves, have any
doubt whatsoever that you could fairly and impartially judge the facts
in this case?
Is there anybody who has a doubt about your ability to do that?
(No response.)
All right. That’s all I’m going to ask.
Id. at 145.
“[T]he scope of voir dire examination is a matter within the sound
discretion of the trial judge and will not be disturbed on appeal absent a clear
showing of abuse of discretion.” United States v. Madrigal, 43 F.3d 1367, 1372
(10th Cir. 1994). The Supreme Court has “delineated the circumstances that
mandate an inquiry into racial prejudice during voir dire. The Court held that a
-5-
district court must make such an inquiry ‘only where the circumstances of the
case indicate that there is a reasonable possibility that racial or ethnic prejudice
might . . . influence[] the jury.’” Id. (quoting Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451
U.S. 182, 191 (1981)). The Court in Rosales-Lopez found such an inquiry might
be merited in cases involving violent crimes where the victim and defendant were
of different races. Rosales-Lopez, 451 U.S. at 191-92. Here, there is no such
showing and the district court asked a clear question regarding impartiality.
Given the fact that the district court asked a specific question regarding racial
bias, and noting an absence of evidence in the record suggesting otherwise, we
find that there was no indication that racial or ethnic prejudice influenced the jury
in any way. In fact, if the voir dire had focused on a “connection” between crack
and African-Americans, it stands to reason that the defendant could make an
argument that those very questions would have prejudiced the jury against him.
As the Fourth Circuit has observed:
to seek out generalized prejudices during the voir dire would quickly
divert the trial’s focus from the guilt or innocence of the defendant to
peripheral factors, such as the defendant’s race or religious beliefs,
which are usually irrelevant to the merits of the case. The very
process of exploring such factors would heighten their role in the
decision making process and tend to subvert the court’s express
admonition to jurors to convict or acquit only on the evidence before
them without partiality to any party.
-6-
United States v. Barber, 80 F.3d 964, 967-68 (4th Cir. 1996). With this concern
in mind, we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion by limiting voir
dire on the topic.
2. Due Process Violation Due to Higher Penalties for Crack Distribution
Although it is unclear from his brief whether Mr. Hightower is arguing that
the evidentiary basis for his conviction violated due process, that the statutory
sentencing enhancements for crack distribution violate due process, or that the
Sentencing Guidelines enhancements for crack distribution violate due process, he
advances some argument regarding each of these points. The Fifth Amendment to
the United States Constitution provides: “No person shall be . . . deprived of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law . . . .” U.S. Const. amend. V. We
review “de novo whether a violation of a defendant’s due process rights
occurred.” United States v. Walters, 269 F.3d 1207, 1215 (10th Cir. 2001).
Prior to trial, Mr. Hightower filed papers styled as a motion for a bill of
particulars seeking the weight and chemical makeup of each of the substances that
served as the basis for the cocaine charges against him, and a motion for
discovery, to dismiss (due process) or, in the alternative to sentence under the
guidelines for cocaine hydrochloride and request for an evidentiary hearing.
Appellant’s Br. 13-14. The trial court denied these various motions, but did grant
-7-
Mr. Hightower permission to have his own expert examine the drugs at court
expense.
In the proceeding below and before this Court, Mr. Hightower took
exception to his conviction and sentence because the government’s witnesses
testified that crack was present in the substances that formed the basis for his
convictions for possession with intent to distribute of crack, but did not quantify
the ratio between crack and cocaine hydrochloride. Such quantification is not
required by statute. All that the statute requires is a “detectable amount” of the
prohibited substances to be in violation, and, for the crack enhancement to apply,
all that is required is that the substance or mixture contain cocaine hydrochloride
and crack. See 21 U.S.C § 841(b)(1)(A)(ii)-(iii), and (b)(1)(B)(ii)-(iii); see also
U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c), note (A).
Prior to sentencing, Mr. Hightower filed a motion for downward departure,
on a similar due process theory, that he should not be sentenced under the
guidelines for crack offenses. See App. vol. 1, Doc. 168. Mr. Hightower argued
that a recent Sentencing Commission Report, which has not led to changes in the
sentencing guidelines for crack offenses, supports his contention that because a
substantial majority of those convicted of crack offenses are African American,
the guidelines for crack crime sentences violate due process and equal protection
principles. See id., exhibits B, C. He argues that because the sentences are
-8-
harsher for crack offenses, the disparate sentencing liability between crack and
powder cocaine offenses violates his rights to due process and equal protection.
We note that recommendations made by the Sentencing Commission to
Congress are not the law, and that Mr. Hightower was properly sentenced
according to the applicable statutory and sentencing guidelines. Mr. Hightower
makes the argument that these higher sentences for crack offenses are racially
biased and unfair, but cites to no persuasive authority to support a finding that
they violate his rights to due process or equal protection. This Court has
repeatedly held that the enhanced penalty scheme for offenses involving crack
versus powder cocaine violates neither due process nor equal protection
principles, and specifically that such possible disparate impact does not evidence
intentional discrimination. United States v. Williamson, 53 F.3d 1500, 1530 (10th
Cir. 1995). As such, the district court did not err in finding that Mr. Hightower’s
due process rights were not violated when he was convicted and sentenced for
crack distribution.
3. The District Court’s Conclusion Not to Downwardly Depart Based on
Sentencing Commission Report and Recommendation
Mr. Hightower argues that due to the existence of the Report described
above, the district court erred in finding that it did not have the authority to
consider that report as a mitigating factor justifying a downward departure for
sentencing pursuant to U.S.S.G. §5K2.0. This Court reviews de novo a district
-9-
court’s conclusion that it is without authority to grant a downward departure.
United States v. Maples, 95 F.3d 35, 37 (10th Cir. 1996). In Maples, we held that
such considerations are not proper in sentencing because such reports are not law.
Id. “In declining to depart downward based upon a proposed amendment to the
Sentencing Guidelines, the district court acted properly as it was bound by statute
to apply the existing Guidelines, policy statements and official commentary.” Id.On the specific issue of mitigating factors under the Guidelines, the Maples court
also held that “the expansive issue of appropriate sentencing levels for crack
offenses is not the sort of discrete, individual and case-specific mitigating
circumstance justifying downward departure under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b).” Id. at
37-8. The district court therefore did not err in finding that it did not have the
authority to downwardly depart based on the Sentencing Commission’s Report to
Congress.
4. Sentencing Entrapment
Mr. Hightower finally argues that the government engaged in “sentencing
entrapment” because the undercover agents who bought drugs from him asked
specifically for crack with full knowledge that he could also furnish other drugs
which carry less sentencing liability. The district court denied departure on this
ground, finding both that Mr. Hightower was predisposed to deal in crack, and
-10-
that the government’s conduct in specifying that its informants purchase crack
was not outrageous. See App. Vol. 12 at 198-99. 1
Sentencing entrapment claims are only entertained when there is the
probability that the government acted in an outrageous manner. United States v.
Lacey, 86 F.3d 956, 963 (10th Cir. 1996). Certain drug quantities may be
excluded from sentencing calculation if the defendant shows that the continuing
investigation which obtains higher and higher quantities is done in a manner that
“is so shocking, outrageous and intolerable that it offends ‘the universal sense of
justice.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 432 (1973). Putting
aside those things that might offend a “universal sense of justice,” here the
district court found that three significant purchases of crack did not amount to
outrageous conduct by government agents. We agree that, under such
circumstances, Mr. Hightower has not made a showing of sentencing entrapment
and affirm the decision of the district court not to depart downward.
1
The Government argues that because the record indicates that the district
court knew that it could have departed on a finding of sentencing entrapment, and
chose not to do so, this Court does not have the jurisdiction to review that
exercise of discretion. Ordinarily this is, indeed, the case. See, e.g., United
States v. Banta, 127 F.3d 982, 983 n.1 (10th Cir. 1997). Appellate review of a
district court’s denial of a requested departure is authorized only where the
district court rules “that it does not have any authority to depart from the
sentencing guidelines range for the entire class of circumstances proffered by the
defendant.” United States v. Castillo, 140 F.3d 874, 887 (10th Cir. 1998). Our
precedents indicate, however, that we have jurisdiction where, as here, an
appellant asserts that the government has illegally manipulated the sentencing
guidelines. See Lacey, 86 F.3d at 962 n.2.
-11-
Conclusion
For the reasons detailed above, we AFFIRM the conviction and sentence of
Mr. Hightower and DISMISS this appeal.
Entered for the Court,
Michael W. McConnell
Circuit Judge
-12-