United States v. Garfinkle ( 1998 )


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  •                                                                         F I L E D
    United States Court of Appeals
    Tenth Circuit
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    NOV 6 1998
    TENTH CIRCUIT
    PATRICK FISHER
    Clerk
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    v.                                       No. 98-4040
    (D.C. No. 94-CR-037-B)
    PAUL GARFINKLE,                                         (D. Utah)
    Defendant-Appellant.
    ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
    Before SEYMOUR, Chief Judge, BRORBY, and BRISCOE, Circuit Judges.
    After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
    unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
    this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. Neither party has
    requested oral argument. Therefore, the case is ordered submitted without oral
    argument.
    Paul Garfinkle appeals revocation of his probation and the district court’s
    *
    This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
    doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
    generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
    and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
    imposition of a sentence of twenty-four months’ imprisonment. We exercise
    jurisdiction pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
     and affirm.
    Garfinkle pleaded guilty in 1996 to one count of money laundering, 
    18 U.S.C. § 1956
    (a)(3), and one count of conspiracy to commit fraud, 
    18 U.S.C. § 371
    . Pursuant to the terms of a Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(e)(1)(C) plea agreement, the
    district court departed below the 78-97 month guideline range and sentenced
    Garfinkle to five years’ probation and a $50,000 fine.
    Approximately four months after sentencing, Garfinkle was charged with
    eight violations of probation conditions. He admitted to three Grade C violations:
    (1) failing to follow the instructions of the probation officer by failing to keep
    and provide copies of two checks he received; (2) failing to answer truthfully all
    inquiries by the probation officer and incurring new credit charges or opening
    additional lines of credit without approval of the probation officer; and (3)
    associating with a convicted felon without obtaining permission from the
    probation officer. A Grade C violation is “conduct constituting (A) a federal,
    state, or local offense punishable by a term of imprisonment of one year or less;
    or (B) a violation of any other condition of supervision.” U.S.S.G. § 7B1.1(a)(3).
    Garfinkle’s probation was revoked. At sentencing on March 4, 1998, the district
    court, at the urging of the government, disregarded the five-to-eleven month
    sentencing range recommended in U.S.S.G. § 7B1.4(a) and sentenced Garfinkle to
    -2-
    twenty-four months’ imprisonment and thirty-six months’ supervised release.
    Garfinkle contends the district court erred in revoking his probation and in
    imposing a sentence beyond the range suggested by the Guidelines. We review a
    decision to revoke probation for abuse of discretion.         United States v. Reber , 
    876 F.2d 81
    , 83 (10th Cir. 1989). Probation may be revoked if the court is reasonably
    satisfied a violation of probation conditions has occurred.        
    Id.
     As for the sentence
    imposed following revocation of probation, we will not reverse if it can be
    determined from the record that the sentence is “reasoned and reasonable.”
    United States v. Brooks , 
    976 F.2d 1358
    , 1361 (10th Cir. 1992);         see United States
    v. Hurst , 
    78 F.3d 482
    , 483 (10th Cir. 1996).
    Although Garfinkle purports to challenge the district court’s revocation
    decision, he offers no substantive arguments that would seriously call into
    question the court’s decision. Indeed, because it is uncontroverted that Garfinkle
    committed three Grade C violations, the court acted well within its discretion in
    choosing to revoke probation.
    As regards the sentence imposed, Garfinkle argues the district court failed
    to make adequate findings and based its decision solely on “its disbelief of
    Garfinkle and its general dislike of him.” Appellant’s br. at 5. After carefully
    reviewing the record on appeal, including the transcript of the sentencing hearing,
    we disagree. Although U.S.S.G. § 7B1.4(a) suggests a five-to-eleven month
    -3-
    sentence range, both parties urged the court to impose a sentence outside the
    range. Because Chapter 7 policy statements are not binding on sentencing courts,
    a sentence in excess of the range is not a “departure” which would necessitate the
    court making specific findings.    United States v. Burdex , 
    100 F.3d 882
    , 885 (10th
    Cir. 1996), cert. denied 
    117 S. Ct. 1283
     (1997). The government urged the court
    to impose a twenty-four month sentence because it believed the admitted
    violations were associated with a high risk of new felonious conduct.   See
    U.S.S.G. § 7B1.4, Application Note 3. In contrast, Garfinkle asked the court to
    place him back on probation, arguing the admitted violations were largely
    innocent attempts to collect money rightfully owed to him. He also argued his
    poor health justified probation.
    Although the district court did not make specific findings to support its
    ultimate sentencing decision, it is obvious from the record that the court chose to
    accept the government’s arguments. The court stated at the conclusion of the
    hearing:
    In short, Mr. Garfinkle, I don’t believe you. I think that you would
    try to sell me something on that yacht you were selling earlier if you
    had a chance. Your entire history speaks different from the way you
    presented yourself here at this hearing today. . . . Your medical
    information is not that bad. You’re out of shape and you’re
    overweight. You can take care of those. I am not suggesting you
    don’t have some medical problems, but I am suggesting that you have
    misled this Court in the past and you have misled people in the past,
    and I am not buying much of it.
    -4-
    Appellant’s App. at 49-50. The evidence before the court justified the sentence.
    In particular, the probation violations reasonably could have been interpreted by
    the court as presenting a risk of new felonious activity. We conclude the sentence
    of twenty-four months’ imprisonment was both reasoned and reasonable.
    The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
    Entered for the Court
    Mary Beck Briscoe
    Circuit Judge
    -5-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 98-4040

Filed Date: 11/6/1998

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 4/18/2021