Xiangyuan Zhu v. St. Francis Health Center , 215 F. App'x 717 ( 2007 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS
February 1, 2007
FO R TH E TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
X IA N G YUA N ZH U ,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 06-3113
(D.C. No. 05-CV-2139-KHV)
ST. FRANCIS HEALTH CENTER; (D . Kan.)
KENNEN THOM PSON, M .D.,
Defendants-Appellees.
OR D ER AND JUDGM ENT *
Before PO RFILIO, B AL DOC K , and EBEL, Circuit Judges.
Plaintiff Xiangyuan Zhu, proceeding pro se, appeals from the district
court’s dismissal of her complaint and the imposition of sanctions in the form of
attorneys’ fees and costs. M s. Zhu contends that the district court erred in
dismissing her claims on the basis of res judicata and in imposing sanctions
against her. W e lack jurisdiction to consider M s. Zhu’s challenge to the district
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is
not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata,
and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value
consistent w ith Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
court’s decision to impose sanctions because the amount has not yet been
determined. See American Soda, LLP v. U.S. Filter Wastewater Group, Inc.,
428 F.3d 921, 924 (10th Cir. 2005). This does not preclude our review of the
district court’s dismissal of M s. Zhu’s complaint. Id. at 925. W e have
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and we AFFIRM .
I
On M ay 26, 2004, M s. Zhu filed a complaint in K ansas state court against
four defendants, including St. Francis Health Center and Dr. K ennen Thompson.
The other two defendants and St. Francis moved for judgment on the pleadings.
The complaint against St. Francis was dismissed with prejudice on October 22,
2004. See Aplee. Supp. App. at 202. Dr. Thompson moved for partial judgment
on the pleadings and for a more definite statement on M s. Zhu’s medical
malpractice claim. All claims against Dr. Thompson, except for the medical
malpractice claim, were dismissed with prejudice on October 22, 2004. See id. at
203. M s. Zhu was given permission to amend her state court complaint and then
Dr. Thompson filed a renewed motion to dismiss. The state court granted the
motion on February 24, 2005, thereby dismissing all of the claims against all of
the defendants. See id. at 231.
On April 11, 2005, M s. Zhu filed a complaint in federal district court
against St. Francis and Dr. Thompson. On M ay 12, M s. Zhu filed an amended
complaint. Defendants moved to dismiss the amended complaint as barred by res
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judicata because of M s. Zhu’s prior state court action. That motion was granted
in a memorandum and order entered on February 6, 2006. This appeal followed.
II
W e review de novo the district court’s dismissal of a complaint on the basis
of res judicata. See Plotner v. AT&T Corp., 224 F.3d 1161, 1168 (10th Cir.
2000). M s. Zhu’s federal complaint asserted eight claims: one federal claim
under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C.
§ 1961 et seq., and seven state law claims. M s. Zhu’s challenge on appeal relates
solely to the dismissal of her RICO claim. 1 See Aplt. Br. at 19-28. Accordingly,
she has w aived any other issues regarding the dismissal of her seven state claims.
See State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. M hoon, 31 F.3d 979, 984 n.7 (10th Cir. 1994).
In order to determine whether the district court properly applied res
judicata to bar M s. Zhu’s RICO claim, we must first determine what preclusive
effect K ansas would give to M s. Zhu’s state court complaint. See Migra v.
Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 81 (1984) (“It is now settled
1
Although M s. Zhu argues that her “Victim and W itness Protection Act, and
18 U.S.C. §§ 24, 1341 claims w ere not barred as a matter of res judicata,” Aplt.
Br. at 28, and does not mention her RICO claim, this statement does not
accurately reflect the claims set forth in M s. Zhu’s federal complaint. These
“claims” were not alleged separately in her complaint, but instead were alleged as
predicate acts as part of her RICO claim. See Aplt. App. at 25 ¶52. Because
M s. Zhu is proceeding pro se, and we must therefore construe her filings liberally,
see Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991), we construe her
argument as a challenge to the dismissal of her RICO claim.
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that a federal court must give to a state-court judgment the same preclusive effect
as would be given that judgment under the law of the State in which the judgment
was rendered.”). U nder Kansas law, “[r]es judicata (claim preclusion) prevents
relitigation of previously litigated claims and consist[s] of the following four
elements: (1) same claim; (2) same parties; (3) claims were or could have been
raised; and (4) a final judgment on the merits.” Winston v. State Dep’t of Soc. &
Rehab. Servs., 49 P.3d 1274, 1285 (Kan. 2002). Only the third Winston factor is
at issue in this appeal. W e conclude, as discussed below, that Kansas would give
preclusive effect to M s. Zhu’s state action and therefore we must do the same.
See M igra, 465 U.S. at 81.
M s. Zhu contends that her RICO claim should not be barred by res judicata
because it is a new claim that was not raised in her state court complaint. While
we agree that M s. Zhu did not bring a RICO claim in her state court action, that is
not the dispositive consideration. “Kansas law emphasizes that the claim or cause
of action is defined in terms of the injury for which relief is demanded, that is to
say, in terms of the factual circumstances of the controversy rather than the legal
theory or remedial statute on which the suit is grounded.” Carter v. City of
Emporia, 815 F.2d 617, 620 (10th Cir. 1987) (citing Wells v. Ross, 465 P.2d 966,
968 (K an. 1970)) (emphasis added); see also Griffith v. Stout Remodeling, Inc.,
548 P.2d 1238, 1243 (Kan. 1976) (“Both actions were bottomed on the same set
of facts and if there was a final adjudication upon the merits in the first, the
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doctrine of res judicata generally would apply in the second.”). Although
M s. Zhu’s RICO claim raises a new legal theory, it is grounded in the same
factual circumstances as her state action and could have been brought as part of
that action. See Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 458 (1990) (holding that state
courts have concurrent jurisdiction over civil RICO claims).
M ost of the factual allegations in M s. Zhu’s state and federal complaints
stem from her treatment relationship with Dr. Thompson, an employee of
St. Francis. That relationship spanned from January 1998 to M arch 2003. See
Aplt. Br. at 9. In her appellate brief, M s. Zhu identifies the conduct from her
federal complaint that allegedly constituted the predicate acts necessary for her
RIC O claim against Dr. Thompson and St. Francis. See id. at 9-13. The majority
of these allegations are virtually identical to the allegations in her state complaint.
Com pare Aplt. App. at 10-18 ¶¶ 11-12, 14, 19, 24-26, 28-30, 32-37 (federal
complaint) with Aplee. Supp. App. at 22-29 ¶¶ 26-28, 31, 40-49 (state complaint).
The federal complaint contains a few new factual allegations; for example,
that St. Francis sent a fraudulent billing statement to M s. Zhu for medical services
that she did not actually receive while she was being treated by Dr. Thompson,
see Aplt. App. at 13 ¶23. Res judicata may still be a bar in this situation,
however, if the allegations arose out of the same transaction or series of
connected transactions. See Yapp v. Excel Corp., 186 F.3d 1222, 1227 (10th Cir.
1999) (describing transactional approach for res judicata purposes). Kansas
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appears to approve of this transactional approach. See Phillips USA, Inc. v.
Allflex USA, Inc., 77 F.3d 354, 360-361 (10th Cir. 1996) (discussing Kansas
cases); see also O’Keefe v. M errill Lynch & Co., 84 P.3d 613, 618-619 (Kan. Ct.
App. 2004) (applying transactional approach).
Any new allegations in M s. Zhu’s federal complaint arose out of her
treatment relationship w ith Dr. Thompson that was a focal point of her state court
complaint. As the district court explained in applying the transactional approach
to M s. Zhu’s federal claims, “plaintiff’s theories for relief all arise from
Dr. Thompson’s treatment of plaintiff, his testimony regarding that treatment, the
billing for that treatment and vague allegations of conspiracy between
Dr. Thompson, St. Francis and others.” Aplt. App. at 86. Because the relevant
facts in M s. Zhu’s federal complaint are all related in time, space and origin to
the relevant facts in her state complaint, the district court did not err in
concluding that they arose out of the same transaction or series of connected
transactions and that M s. Zhu’s RICO claim therefore was barred by res judicata.
See Yapp, 186 F.3d at 1227; O’Keefe, 84 P.3d at 618-619.
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The judgment of the district court is A FFIRM ED and the case is
REM ANDED to the district court for a final determination regarding attorneys’
fees and costs.
Entered for the Court
David M . Ebel
Circuit Judge
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