United States v. Garner , 223 F. App'x 792 ( 2007 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS
March 30, 2007
TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
U N ITED STA TES O F A M ER ICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee, No. 06-3252
v. (D. Kansas)
THEOGEN EDW ARD GA RNER, (D.C. No. 05-CR-20094-CM )
Defendant - Appellant.
OR D ER AND JUDGM ENT *
Before H E N RY, B AL DOC K , and HA RTZ, Circuit Judges.
Theogen Garner was convicted in the United States District Court for the
District of Kansas on one count of possession with intent to distribute more than
50 grams of cocaine base within 1,000 feet of a public university. See 21 U.S.C.
§§ 841(a), 860(a). Because he had two prior convictions for felony drug offenses,
the district court sentenced him to a mandatory term of life imprisonment
followed by 10 years’ supervised release. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A).
M r. Garner appeals his conviction and sentence, arguing (1) that evidence
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited,
however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th
Cir. R. 32.1.
obtained during a traffic stop should have been suppressed because officers
unreasonably extended it in violation of the Fourth Amendment; (2) that there was
insufficient evidence to show that what he possessed was more than 50 grams of a
single substance containing cocaine base; (3) that the district court violated the
Sixth Amendment in admitting certain evidence to prove his prior convictions; (4)
that the district court violated his Sixth Amendment rights when it, rather than a
jury, found the fact of his prior convictions; and (5) that the district court
subjected him to double jeopardy when it granted a continuance during the
sentencing hearing to permit the government to seek additional evidence. W e
have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm.
I. B ACKGR OU N D
Officer Ryan Fulks w as patrolling the University of Kansas campus shortly
after 1:00 a.m. on July 21, 2005, when he noticed a slow-moving pickup truck
weaving in its lane. The truck did not have a light illuminating its license plate,
an equipment violation under Kansas law. Fulks therefore conducted a traffic
stop. He asked the driver for his license and identification. The driver, whom the
license identified as Theogen Garner, w as accompanied by a female passenger.
Fulks returned to his patrol car and ran a check on M r. Garner’s license. Dispatch
informed him that M r. Garner was on supervised release from the Kansas
Department of Corrections (D OC), so that he would need to conduct a field
interview and provide a report to the DOC.
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Officer Fulks requested backup and Officer M ark Brinkworth arrived
within 20 seconds. Fulks approached the pickup truck on the driver’s side, while
Brinkworth approached on the other. As Fulks began to explain to M r. Garner
that he was going to conduct a field interview, Brinkworth noticed an object on
M r. Garner’s right ear and asked what kind of cigarette it was. After first
responding, “oh, that’s just left over from a Black & M ild,” R. Vol. II at 11,
M r. Garner briefly paused and then stated that it was marijuana. He removed the
object from behind his ear and handed it to Fulks. The resulting investigation
eventually led to the discovery of a baggie of cocaine in M r. Garner’s pocket and
a bag of cocaine in his truck. The baggie in his pocket contained several rocks
with a total weight of 13.35 grams. The bag in his truck also contained several
rocks; their total weight exceeded 82 grams.
A grand jury indicted M r. Garner on one count of violating 21 U.S.C.
§ 860(a). Also, the government filed an information alleging that M r. Garner had
two prior convictions for felony drug offenses. The information provided notice
that the government would request an enhanced sentence based on these
convictions if M r. Garner was convicted on the indictment.
Before trial M r. Garner moved to suppress the evidence on the ground that
his detention to conduct a field interview violated the Fourth Amendment. The
district court denied the motion.
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At trial Bradley Crow, a forensic scientist, testified that the substance in
the bag in M r. Garner’s pocket weighed 13.35 grams. His random test of one of
several rocks in the bag showed that it contained cocaine base. He also tested a
random sample of the 82.31 grams of substance from the bag found in
M r. Garner’s truck and determined that it too contained cocaine base. He testified
that the methods he used to determine that the samples contained cocaine base
were scientifically accepted, and that he did not need to test each rock in each bag
because all were the same color and texture as the samples he had randomly
selected.
At the close of the government’s case, M r. Garner moved for judgment of
acquittal, arguing that the evidence was insufficient because M r. Crow had tested
only a small sample of the substances found during the arrest and not a single
rock containing cocaine was shown to weigh 50 grams. The district court denied
the motion, and the jury found M r. Garner guilty.
Before sentencing, M r. Garner responded to the government’s information
alleging two prior drug convictions. He asserted that he was not the person who
had been convicted. He pointed out that the person convicted was Theogan
Garner and that his name is Theogen Garner. He further argued that the fact of
any prior convictions must be tried to a jury. At the sentencing hearing on
M ay 30, 2006, M r. Garner unsuccessfully argued that the evidence used to prove
that he was the person convicted of the prior crimes should be limited to the
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charging documents and admissions in those cases. The government offered
fingerprint cards and a fingerprint expert to establish identity. During the
hearing, however, the government realized that one of the fingerprint cards it was
using was from an irrelevant arrest. The district court continued the hearing to
allow the government time to gather additional evidence.
At the reconvened hearing on June 23, 2006, the government offered
further fingerprint evidence and documents from the DOC website. The district
court found that the government had met its burden of showing that the Theogan
Garner convicted of the prior drug offenses was the same individual as the
Theogen Garner in the case before it. It sentenced him to life imprisonment
followed by 10 years’ supervised release.
II. D ISC USSIO N
A. M otion to Suppress
M r. Garner argues that the district court erred in denying his motion to
suppress evidence because his detention was unreasonably extended by the field
interview for the DOC. W e disagree.
“W hen reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, we view the evidence
in the light most favorable to the government, accept the district court’s findings
of fact unless clearly erroneous, and review de novo the ultimate determination of
reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment.” United States v. Apperson, 441
F.3d 1162, 1184 (10th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). A traffic
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stop is a seizure to which the protections of the Fourth Amendment apply, see
United States v. Alcaraz-Arellano, 441 F.3d 1252, 1257 (10th Cir. 2006), and is
therefore permissible only “if the officer has a reasonable articulable suspicion
that a traffic . . . violation has occurred or is occurring.” Id. at 1257–58 (internal
quotation marks omitted). “[T]he reasonableness of a traffic stop depends on
both [its] length . . . and the manner in which it is carried out.” Id. at 1258(internal quotation marks omitted). “‘A traffic stop does not become
unreasonable merely because the officer asks questions unrelated to the initial
purpose for the stop, provided that those questions do not unreasonably extend the
amount of time that the subject is delayed.’” Id. at 1259 (quoting United States v.
M artin, 422 F.3d 597, 601-02 (7th Cir. 2005)).
M r. Garner does not contend that the initial stop was invalid. His sole
argument is that conducting a DOC field interview was unrelated to the purpose
of the stop and was therefore unreasonable. But we need not decide whether it is
permissible to prolong a stop to conduct a full field interview, because the
prolongation in this case was minimal, if not nonexistent. Officer Fulks did not
ask a single question as part of such an interview. It was while he was explaining
that he would be conducting a field interview that Officer Brinkworth saw the
m arijuana cigarette and redirected the conversation. The “field interview”
certainly did not unreasonably extend the duration of the stop. Even if we assume
that Brinkworth’s presence was required only for the field interview, he arrived
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within a few seconds of Fulks’s request; so any delay caused by waiting for his
arrival did not unreasonably prolong the detention.
B. Insufficient Evidence
M r. Garner argues that the district court erred in denying his motion for
judgment of acquittal because the government failed to establish that any single
rock was a substance that weighed more than 50 grams and contained cocaine
base. W e review challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence de novo, viewing
“the evidence and the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom in the light
most favorable to the government.” United States v. Gurule, 461 F.3d 1238,
1242–43 (10th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). The evidence is
sufficient if a rational fact finder could have found the essential elements of the
crime beyond a reasonable doubt. See id.W hen proving the quantity of drugs, the government must establish that a
sampling technique used to determine the existence and quantity of drugs is
reasonably reliable. See United States v. Dent, 149 F.3d 180, 190–91 (3d Cir.
1998). A technique is reasonably reliable if “(1) a proper random selection
procedure was employed; (2) the chemical testing method conformed with an
accepted methodology; (3) the tested and untested samples were sufficiently
similar in physical appearance; and (4) the tested and untested samples were
contemporaneously seized from the same search site.” United States v. Scalia,
993 F.2d 984, 989 (1st Cir. 1993) (internal quotation marks omitted); see United
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States v. M cCutchen, 992 F.2d 22, 24–26 (3d Cir. 1993). The government
adequately established such reliability in this case. All the evidence was seized
from the same site at the same time. And M r. Crow, the forensic scientist,
testified that he had selected a random sample from each of the bags; that the
thin-layer-chromatography and infrared-spectrophotometry tests he performed
were scientifically accepted and reliable tests; and that the rocks in the bags had
“the same type of coloring [and] texture” as the tested samples and he “had no
reason to believe” that they would have a different composition. R. Vol. III at
123.
M r. Garner contends, however, that each rock was a single substance, and
that the government should have had to prove that at least one of the rocks
containing cocaine base individually weighed more than 50 grams. But this
argument fails. The general rule is that a quantity of drugs found together is
considered a single unit for purposes of prosecution. See United States v.
Johnson, 977 F.2d 1360, 1374 (10th Cir. 1992). Although “various stashes of [a]
drug are considered separate where the evidence indicates that they were intended
for different purposes or transactions,” id., M r. Garner makes no claim of such
differences, and such a claim would be absurd with respect to the individual rocks
among those in the bag with a total weight of more than 82 grams.
C. Sentencing C hallenges
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Before trial the government, in accordance with 21 U.S.C. § 851, filed an
information notifying M r. Garner that it intended to seek a sentencing
enhancement under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A). “Section 841(b)(1)(A) requires
imposition of a mandatory term of life imprisonment without release if (1) a
defendant is convicted of violating § 841(a), (2) that conviction involved a certain
requisite amount of drugs, and (3) the crime w as committed after two or more
prior convictions for a felony drug offense have become final.” United States v.
Stiger, 413 F.3d 1185, 1191 (10th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The jury found M r. Garner guilty of possessing with intent to distribute more than
50 grams of cocaine base within 1,000 feet of the University of Kansas. This
conviction satisfied the first and second requirements of § 841(b)(1)(A);
M r. Garner’s three sentencing challenges relate to the third.
1. Identity
M r. Garner challenges the evidence used to establish that he was the person
convicted of the two prior felony offenses stated in the information. He does not
argue that the evidence presented was insufficient to prove identity. Rather, he
contends that the Sixth Amendment limits the government to using only the
charging documents and admissions by the defendants in the prior cases. Because
he raised this argument at sentencing, our review is de novo. See id., 413 F.3d at
1191.
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M r. Garner contends that under Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13(2005), the government’s proof of the facts underlying the prior convictions is
limited to the charging documents, plea colloquies, and admissions in the prior
cases, and that the identity of the person convicted is a fact underlying the
conviction. But Shepard, which w as decided as a matter of statutory
interpretation and not on Sixth Amendment grounds, was concerned with
determining what prior crime the defendant had been convicted of, not whether he
is the person who had been convicted. The Supreme Court ruled that the only
proper means to determine the offense of conviction would be to examine the
charging documents, although admissions by the defendant at the prior proceeding
(such as admissions during the plea colloquy) could also be considered. Shepard
makes sense because the issue it addresses is not what the defendant did but what
he w as convicted of, and this latter issue can be resolved only on the basis of
what the jury had been asked to decide.
Here, however, the issue is whether the defendant is the same person
convicted of the prior crime. To limit evidence of identity to the documents
permitted by Shepard would be to preclude proof of identity in virtually all cases.
The factfinder would have to resolve identity based on only the name of the
defendant in the prior case. If a judge is to determine whether the defendant is
the person convicted in the prior proceedings— and Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530
U.S. 466, 490 (2000), says that this is permissible— the judge must be able to
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consider evidence beyond that allowed by Shepard. Indeed, the necessary and
appropriate evidence will be fingerprints, photographs, and other evidence from
law-enforcement and correctional-institution files, just what was used in this case.
Accordingly, we reject M r. Garner’s contention.
2. Fact-Finding by Judge
M r. Garner argues that his Sixth A mendment rights were violated because
the fact of his prior convictions was found by the judge rather than a jury. He
concedes that our current precedent is contrary to his view , and states that he is
raising the “issue to preserve it for a possible certiorari petition.” Aplt. Br. at 14.
Because it is well established that “the fact of a prior conviction may be found by
a sentencing judge,” Stiger, 413 F.3d at 1192, we reject this argument.
3. Double Jeopardy
Finally, M r. Garner argues that the district court subjected him to double
jeopardy when it continued his sentencing hearing to permit the government to
obtain more evidence establishing that he had committed prior felonies. He ties
this argument to his assertion that prior convictions must be proved to a jury,
stating, “If prior convictions must be proven to a jury beyond a reasonable
doubt . . . , then the Government should only get one chance to prove such
convictions.” Aplt. Br. at 16.
His argument fails in at least two respects: (1) as we have just stated, prior
convictions do not have to be proved to a jury, see Stiger, 413 F.3d at 1192; and
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(2) the protections against double jeopardy do not apply to noncapital sentencing
hearings, see M onge v. California, 524 U.S. 721, 728 (1998). W e therefore reject
this argument.
III. C ON CLU SIO N
M r. G arner’s conviction and sentence are AFFIRMED.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Harris L Hartz
Circuit Judge
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