Brown v. Butler , 30 F. App'x 870 ( 2002 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FEB 15 2002
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
JEFFREY J. BROWN and TRACY
BROWN,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v. Nos. 00-6304, 01-6170
(D.C. No. 99-CV-1343-M)
DAN E. BUTLER and KATHERINE (Western District of Oklahoma)
BUTLER,
Defendants-Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
Before BRISCOE, Circuit Judge, HOLLOWAY, Senior Circuit Judge, and
McWILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge.
These two appeals were separately briefed. No. 00-6304 was orally argued and
No. 01-6170, per agreement of counsel and the court, was submitted on the briefs. Both
appeals will be treated in this order and judgment.
No. 00-6304
The two cases have their genesis in an automobile accident on September 20,
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of
law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the
citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under
the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
1996, wherein a motor vehicle traveling pre-dawn on a country road in Oklahoma was
driven into a herd of cattle and struck a 400-pound calf. The automobile was being
driven by Jeffrey J. Brown, a resident of Kansas, and the herd of cattle was owned by Dr.
Dan E. Butler and his wife, Katherine Butler, residents of Oklahoma.
Based on that accident, Jeffrey Brown and his wife, Tracy Brown, brought an
action in the United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma against
both Dan and Katherine Butler. The matter in controversy was alleged to be in excess of
$75,000.00 and jurisdiction was based on 28 U.S.C. § 1332. The Browns alleged in their
complaint that the Butlers owned pasture land adjacent to the road where Jeffrey Brown
struck the herd of cattle which belonged to the Butlers. The complaint went on to state
that the defendants were negligent in having “failed to keep their pasture land properly
fenced, thus allowing their livestock to escape the pasture and travel into the public
roadway, specifically Purdue Road.” As the proximate result of the Butlers’ negligence,
Jeffrey Brown alleged that he had suffered permanent injuries1 and a loss of earnings, and
Tracy Brown alleged that she had suffered a loss of consortium, and the like, all in excess
of $75,000.00, and sought damages in excess of that sum, and also sought punitive
damages in excess of $75,000.00.
1
Jeffrey Brown had a container filled with carbon disulfide used in oil well
operations in his vehicle at the time of this accident. As a result of the impact with the
Butlers’ herd, the carbon disulfide was “spilled” and Brown, who was allegedly rendered
unconscious in the accident for some 23 minutes, sought damages for the injuries
resulting from his inhalation of the carbon disulfide fumes.
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By answer, the Butlers denied any negligence on their part and affirmatively
alleged that if either of them was in some degree negligent, Jeffrey Brown’s own
negligence exceeded theirs.
Prior to trial, the district court denied the Butlers’ motion for summary judgment,
concluding that there were genuine issues of material fact that required submission to a
jury. Butlers’ motion to reconsider that matter was denied. Trial by jury ensued. The
jury’s verdict was in favor of the Butlers, the jury finding that they “were not negligent.”
Judgment in favor of the Butlers was duly entered. The Browns appeal that judgment.
We affirm.
The Browns’ basic argument on appeal is that the district judge was “prejudiced”
against them, and their case, that such prejudice was demonstrated by several adverse
rulings of the district judge in connection with evidence proffered by their counsel, and
that the cumulative effect thereof was a “miscarriage of justice.”2 As a lead-in to that
argument, counsel notes that in denying the Butlers’ motion for a directed verdict at the
conclusion of the plaintiffs’ case, the district judge characterized the plaintiffs’ case as
being “arguably thin.” Such does not demonstrate judicial prejudice. In view of the
jury’s verdict, the case was “arguably thin.” In any event, so far as we can tell from the
record before us, this statement was not made by the judge in the jury’s presence.
Counsel makes no claim that the jury’s verdict is contrary to the weight of the
2
evidence or that the evidence does not support the jury’s verdict.
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As indicated, to show that the district judge was not impartial, counsel relies, in
part, on the district judge’s exclusion of certain pictures and a videotape3 of the “water
gap” in the wire fence that enclosed the Butlers’ pasture, the “water gap” being the place
where the herd apparently escaped the pasture. In this connection we note that numerous
other pictures of the “water gap” were allowed into evidence. Also, counsel asserts that
the district judge’s partiality was shown by her refusal to allow counsel to cross-examine
a state trooper, who investigated the accident and was called as a defense witness, as to
whether, in his opinion, the Butlers were guilty of gross negligence, or “unreasonable
conduct.”4 Finally, prejudice of the district judge was also demonstrated, according to
counsel, by the fact that the district judge refused to allow counsel at trial to introduce
evidence which would conceivably be probative on the issue of punitive damages. In this
regard, the issue of punitive damages was not submitted to the jury, and, of course, the
jury’s verdict was “no negligence” on the part of the Butlers.
Be that as it may, the various matters urged in support of the Browns’ basic claim
that the district judge did not act in an impartial manner, viewed singularly or collectively,
do not indicate prejudice or bias on the part of the trial judge. In her numerous
3
The videotape is narrated by a person who tells the viewer of the videotape what
he or she is seeing. From the record, we are not certain of the identity of the narrator, or
who took the video, although, in each instance, it would appear to be Jeffrey Brown.
4
It appears that the trooper testified as a lay witness, not as an expert witness. The
opinion of a lay witness is generally limited by Fed.R.Evid. 701. Counsel also notes the
district judge’s rulings limiting the cross-examination of Katherine Butler.
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evidentiary rulings, the district judge did not abuse her discretion, or otherwise indicate
personal bias or prejudice. In National Ass’n of Professional Baseball Leagues, Inc. v.
Very Minor Leagues, Inc., 223 F.3d 1143, 1152 (10th Cir. 2000), we said that an abuse of
discretion in connection with evidentiary rulings would be found only when the trial court
makes “an arbitrary, capricious, whimsical or manifestly unreasonable judgment.” In our
view, the district judge was neither “arbitrary, capricious, [or] whimsical.” Nor did she
manifest “unreasonable judgment.” Bias or prejudice has not been shown.
Counsel for the Browns also complains that the district judge acted improperly,
showing “prejudice,” when she forced counsel to proceed with closing argument on short
notice and limited counsel to only 15 minutes in his closing argument to the jury. Trial of
this case commenced on Monday, July 24, 2000, and it was the intent of all concerned
that the trial would end on the following Monday, July 31, 2000. Counsel for the Butlers
had informed opposing counsel, and the court, that they had an expert witness who would
not be available until the 31st. However, on Friday, July 28, 2000, counsel for the Butlers
advised all of a change in plans and that they no longer intended to call the witness in
question. Whereupon the district judge advised all that she proposed to conclude the trial
on that day, the 28th, and only give the instructions to the jury on Monday, the 31st.
Counsel for the Browns indicated that he was displeased with that proposed change in
schedule and preferred to argue his case to the jury on Monday morning rather than on
Friday afternoon, and that he should be allowed more than 15 minutes to argue. The
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court did not go along with that suggestion and the trial proper was concluded on Friday
afternoon, with, as stated, counsel on each side being limited to 15 minutes in closing
argument. Counsel cites no authority in support of his suggestion that we should reverse
the district judge’s judgment and remand for a “new and fairer trial,” presumably before a
different judge, because he was not allowed to argue, in closing argument, more than 15
minutes. A trial court’s control over the trial process is reviewed under an abuse of
discretion standard and “a district court has broad discretion in limiting the scope of
closing arguments.” United States v. Rogers, 960 F.2d 1501, 1513 (10th Cir. 1992). We
find no abuse of discretion. Further, as counsel’s closing arguments are not in the record
on appeal, we are unable to conclude the Browns were prejudiced as a result of their
counsel having insufficient time to prepare for closing argument. See Scott v. Hern, 216
F.3d 897, 917 (10th Cir. 2000).
Judgment affirmed.5
5
On June 11, 2001, the Browns filed a “Motion to Refile Opening Brief
Appendix.” The motion was granted on the same date. On July 2, 2001, the Butlers filed
a “Motion Requesting Permission to Respond to Contents of Appellants’ Opening Brief
Appendix and Appellees’ Request for Affirmative Relief.” In connection with this last
matter, the Butlers sought leave of court to file a supplemental response brief. On July 6,
2001, the Browns filed their objection to Butlers’ request to file an additional brief. On
December 4, 2001, the Butlers filed a letter asking for “clarification” of their motion to
file a supplemental brief. On December 27, 2001, the Butlers filed a motion requesting
“clarification” of its letter sent the court on December 4, 2001. On January 4, 2002, the
Browns filed a response to the Butlers’ motion to clarify. All of the matters, save and
except the Browns’ “Motion to Refile Opening Brief Appendix,”which had already been
granted, were referred for consideration and disposition to “the panel assigned to dispose
of the case on the merits.” This panel now denies the Butlers’ motion of July 2, 2001,
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No. 01-6170
As indicated, the jury in the underlying case returned a verdict in favor of the
defendants, and a judgment in favor of the defendants was duly entered. Thereafter
counsel for the defendants filed a bill of costs in which they sought an award of
$33,856.84. The bill was supported by a very detailed itemization as to the nature and
amount of the monies sought. The plaintiffs filed an objection to the defendants’ bill of
costs and asserted that defendants only had “recoverable costs” in the amount of
$3,077.17. The clerk of court held a hearing on the matter and then granted the costs in
the amount of $3,044.99.
Thereafter, counsel for the defendants filed with the district court a “motion for
expert witness fees and travel expenses.” That motion asked for the following: (1) expert
witness fees for Drs. Reitz and Edwards, each of whom testified at trial as defense
witnesses concerning the alleged physical injury sustained by Jeffrey Brown when he
inhaled the toxic fumes; (2) the cost of obtaining a transcript of testimony given at the
trial by Jeffrey Brown and used by counsel in the conference on jury instructions; (3)
travel expenses to Dallas, Texas, for defense counsel to attend the taking of a deposition
by Dr. Rea, plaintiffs’ expert witness; and (4) “Plaintiffs’ Portion of Examination of
William Greaves, M.D.” In connection with this last matter, counsel, in his motion,
spoke as follows:
requesting, inter alia, leave of court to file a supplemental response brief.
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The parties took the discovery deposition of Dr. Greaves in
Milwaukee, Wisconsin on June 13, 2000. According to the
billing attached to Schedule “B,” line 3, to the Bill of Costs,
Mr. Grider deposed Dr. Greaves for eight (8) hours at $340
per hour, plus a 15% Medical College administrative
assessment, for a total cost of $3,128.00. Mr. Grider agreed
that the plaintiffs are responsible for this portion of the billing
by Dr. Greaves. The defendants seek an Order to that effect
to avoid misunderstandings.
Plaintiffs thereafter filed objections to defendants’ motion for expert witness fees
and travel expenses, objecting to any additional costs being taxed. The district court
eventually ordered expert witness fees in a total amount of $4,925.00 for Drs. Reitz and
Edwards and in an amount of $3,120.00 for Dr. Greaves, the latter sum representing that
portion of Dr. Greaves’ “expert time” resulting from counsel’s eight-hour examination of
Dr. Greaves upon deposition, which amount, according to Butlers’ counsel, Browns’
counsel had agreed to pay. The other requests, i.e., reimbursement for the cost of having
Mr. Brown’s testimony transcribed and for travel costs incurred by counsel in connection
with Dr. Rea’s deposition, were denied. By his notice of appeal, counsel appeals the
district court’s award of costs to the defendants “over and above those set by the Court
Clerk of the Western District of Oklahoma.”
Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(d) reads as follows:
(d) Costs; Attorneys’ Fees
(1) Costs other than Attorneys’ Fees. Except
when express provision therefor is made either
in a statute of the United States or in these rules,
costs other than attorneys’ fees shall be allowed
as of course to the prevailing party unless the
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court otherwise directs . . . .”
In granting the Butlers’ request that the Browns pay an expert witness fee to both
Dr. Reitz and Dr. Edwards, the district court relied on United States v. City of Twin Falls,
Idaho, 806 F.2d 862, 876-9 (9th Cir. 1986)(“Twin Falls”). On appeal, opposing counsel
argues that Twin Falls is the exception to the general rule that the “prevailing party” is not
entitled to recover from the “losing party” an expert witness fee for his own expert
witnesses who testified at trial. Counsel suggests that the present case does not come
within Twin Falls since the expert witnesses’ testimony in the present case related to
Jeffrey Brown’s alleged injuries resulting from his inhalation of toxic chemicals, and the
cause thereof, and that the jury never reached that question since they found “no
negligence” on the part of the Butlers. In other words, counsel in this court concedes that
the district court in its discretion could award the Butlers’ expert witness fees for Dr.
Reitz and Dr. Edwards who testified at trial, but contends that the district court abused
such discretion because, and only because, the jury by finding “no negligence” never
reached the question of whether Jeffrey Brown sustained injuries from the collision of his
vehicle with Butler’s cow and inhaled fumes from the spilled carbon disulfide container.
This, of course, is pure hindsight. At the time Drs. Reitz and Edwards testified, it was not
known that the jury would find “no negligence,” and if the jury had found that the Butlers
were negligent, then Jeffrey Brown’s claimed injury resulting from his inhalation of toxic
substances would have been crucial, and in connection therewith the testimony of Drs.
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Reitz and Edwards would have been most germane. In this regard, the district court
found that the testimony of Drs. Reitz and Edwards was “essential in establishing the
defense against Brown’s claim that he suffered injury as a result of the September 20,
1996, incident.”
Although the argument that the district court erred in awarding the Butlers expert
witness fees for their two expert witnesses, Drs. Reitz and Edwards, solely because the
jury, by its finding of no negligence on the part of the Butlers, never reached the question
of Jeffrey Brown’s alleged physical injuries and the cause thereof, borders on the
specious, we are nonetheless concerned with the broader question, which we cannot
ignore, of whether the district court had the authority to award expert witness fees for
either Dr. Reitz or Dr. Edwards. As indicated, in making such award the district court
relied on the reasoning of the Ninth Circuit in Twin Falls. In this connection, we note
that the Ninth Circuit in Association of Flight Attendants v. Horizon Air Indus., Inc., 976
F.2d 541, 551-52 (9th Cir. 1992) (“Flight Attendants”) stated that the Supreme Court had
“effectively overruled” Twin Falls in Crawford Fitting Co. v. J. T. Gibbons, Inc., 482
U.S. 437, 442 (1987) (“Crawford”). In Flight Attendants the Ninth Circuit said that the
Supreme Court in Crawford held that “a federal court may tax expert witness fees in
excess of the [] limit set out in § 1821(b) only when the witness is court appointed.”
Flight Attendants, 976 F.2d at 552. Drs. Reitz and Edwards were not court appointed, but
retained by the Butlers and testified on their behalf at trial.
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28 U.S.C. § 1920 provides as follows:
§ 1920. Taxation of costs
A judge or clerk of any court of the United States may
tax as costs the following:
.....
(3) Fees and disbursements for printing and
witnesses.
28 U.S.C. § 1821 provides as follows:
§ 1821. Per diem and mileage generally; subsistence
(a)(1) Except as otherwise provided by
law, a witness in attendance at any court of the
United States, or before a United States
Magistrate, or before any person authorized to
take his deposition pursuant to any rule or order
of a court of the United States, shall be paid the
fees and allowances provided by this section.
...
(b) A witness shall be paid an attendance
fee of $40 per day for each day’s attendance. A
witness shall also be paid the attendance fee for
the time necessarily occupied in going to and
returning from the place of attendance at the
beginning and end of such attendance or at any
time during such attendance.
In considering the relationship between § 1920 and § 1821 and Rule 54(d), the
Supreme Court in Crawford spoke as follows:
We think that the inescapable effect of these sections in
combination is that a federal court may tax expert witness fees
in excess of the $30-per-day limit set out in § 1821(b) only
when the witness is court-appointed. The discretion granted by
Rule 54(d) is not a power to evade this specific congressional
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command. Rather, it is solely a power to decline to tax, as
costs, the items enumerated in § 1920.
Crawford, 482 U.S. at 442.
In Chaparral Resources, Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 849 F.2d 1286, 1292 (“Chaparral”)
we followed the mandate of Crawford and spoke as follows:
Because federal procedural law governs the taxation of costs,
any discretion afforded the trial court would arise under federal
law, namely Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(d), and not under state law. That
discretion is constrained by 28 U.S.C. §§ 1821 and 1920.
Crawford Fitting Co. v. J. T. Gibbons, Inc., 107 S.Ct. at 2498-
99. In the absence of an explicit statutory authorization, a trial
court has no discretion under Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(d) to tax the
actual costs of expert witness fees. Id. (Emphasis added.)
We find no “explicit statutory authorization” to the contrary, and in accord with
Crawford and Chaparral we conclude that the district court erred in awarding to the Butlers
$4,925.00 representing expert witness fees for Drs. Reitz and Edwards.
In granting the Butlers’ request that the Browns pay a portion of Dr. Greaves’ “expert
time” spent in connection with the deposition requested by the Browns’ counsel wherein the
latter examined Dr. Greaves for some eight hours, we find no abuse of discretion by the
district court. Fed.R.Civ.P 26 (b)(4)(A) provides as follows:
A party may depose any person who has been identified as an
expert whose opinions may be presented at trial. (Emphasis
added.)
In this same general connection, Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(4)(C) provides as follows:
“[U]nless manifest injustice would result, (i) the court shall
require that the party seeking discovery pay the expert a
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reasonable fee for time spent in responding to discovery under
this subdivision . . . .”
We see no “manifest injustice” in requiring the Browns to pay a portion of Dr.
Greaves’ “expert time” spent during the Browns’ extended (eight hours) interrogation of Dr.
Greaves at the deposition requested by the Browns. Counsel’s argument that since Dr.
Greaves did not actually testify at trial, such somehow excuses the Browns from payment of
at least a portion of Dr. Greaves’ “expert time,” also borders on the specious. The fact that
Dr. Greaves was not called as a witness at the trial does not change the result. Fed.R.Civ.P.
26(b)(4)(A) authorizes a deposition of “any person . . . who may be presented at trial.
(Emphasis added.) And Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(4)(C) states that “unless manifest injustice would
result . . . the court shall require that the party seeking discovery pay the expert a reasonable
fee for time spent in responding to discovery.”
The award of expert witness fees for Drs. Reitz and Edwards is reversed and that
matter is remanded to the district court with directions that it award Drs. Reitz and Edwards
witness fees in accord with 28 U.S.C. § 1821(b). The award of the expert witness fee for
Dr. Greaves is affirmed.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Robert H. McWilliams
Senior Circuit Judge
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