Sutphin v. Janecka ( 2009 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
February 9, 2009
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk of Court
KEVIN SUTPHIN,
Petitioner–Appellant,
No. 08-2188
v. (D.C. No. 2:07-CV-01252-RB-LCS)
(D.N.M.)
JAMES JANECKA, Warden,
Respondent–Appellee.
ORDER DENYING
CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY
Before LUCERO, ANDERSON, and TYMKOVICH, Circuit Judges.
Kevin Sutphin, a New Mexico state prisoner, appeals the district court’s
denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas application and request for a certificate of
appealability (“COA”). Because he cannot make a substantial showing of the
denial of a constitutional right, § 2253(c)(2), we deny a COA and dismiss the
appeal.
I
In 1987, Sutphin was tried before a jury in New Mexico state court on
charges of first degree murder, conspiracy to commit murder, and tampering with
evidence arising out of the killing of Charles Franklin. Sutphin did not deny
fatally beating Franklin while the two were in custody in a New Mexico state
penitentiary but testified that he believed Franklin was trying to kill him. The
court granted his request for a self-defense instruction, but its instruction did not
explicitly place upon the state the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt
that Sutphin had not acted in self defense.
Sutphin was convicted of first degree murder and tampering with evidence.
He was sentenced to life imprisonment on the murder charge and a concurrent
sentence of eighteen months’ imprisonment on the tampering charge. He
appealed, and the New Mexico Supreme Court affirmed his conviction. State v.
Sutphin, 753 P.2d 1314, 1319 (N.M. 1988).
Six years later, the New Mexico Supreme Court decided State v. Parish,
holding that when a defendant raises a reasonable doubt as to whether he acted in
self defense, the jury must be instructed that unlawfulness is a necessary element
of the crime and that the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant did not act in self-defense. 878 P.2d 988, 991-93 (N.M. 1994). The
court held that Parish’s jury instructions, which paralleled Sutphin’s, were
erroneous because they failed to instruct the jury that it could convict only if it
found beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not act in self defense.
See id.In 1997, Sutphin filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in New Mexico
state court, arguing that, under Parish, he was entitled to a new trial. In 2005, a
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state district court granted Sutphin’s habeas petition. Following the grant of
habeas relief, the state appealed to the New Mexico Supreme Court, which
reversed. The court distinguished Parish, concluding that self defense was not
properly at issue in Sutphin’s trial because the evidence of self defense was too
slight to raise a reasonable doubt. State v. Sutphin, 164 P.3d 72, 78 (N.M. 2007).
Sutphin then filed an application for a writ of habeas corpus under 28
U.S.C. § 2254 in the United States District Court for the District of New Mexico.
In his application, Sutphin argued that the state trial court violated his federal
constitutional right to proper instruction on each element of the charged crime
under Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 277-78 (1993). Adopting the
magistrate’s proposed findings and recommendations and overruling Sutphin’s
objections, the district court denied habeas relief. Sutphin sought a COA from the
district court, but the request was denied.
II
Because the district court denied his habeas application and his request for
a COA, Sutphin may not proceed on appeal absent a grant of a COA by this court.
28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A). To obtain a COA, Sutphin must make a “substantial
showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” § 2253(c)(2). This requires him
to show “that reasonable jurists could debate whether (or, for that matter, agree
that) the petition should have been resolved in a different manner or that the
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issues presented were adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.”
Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000) (quotation omitted).
Sutphin first argues that because judges in the New Mexico state courts
disagreed about whether he was entitled to the proper self-defense instruction,
“reasonable jurists could debate whether . . . the petition should have been
resolved in a different manner.” Id. However, the issue debated in the New
Mexico courts was whether the jury was properly instructed regarding New
Mexico law, see State v. Sutphin, 164 P.3d at 79-80 (Serna, J., dissenting) (citing
only New Mexico state case law), whereas a § 2554 petition may only raise
federal issues, § 2254(a) (“[A] district court shall entertain an application for a
writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of
a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the
Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” (emphasis added)). Because
errors of state law are relevant only insofar as they impact a federal right,
Sutphin’s point that judges disagreed on this issue of state law does not meet the
Slack standard.
We consider then whether the state court’s decision “involved an
unreasonable application of federal law” based on the lack of a jury instruction
placing the burden of proving self defense on the state. “To determine whether
the state trial court’s refusal to deliver a self-defense instruction violated
Petitioner’s federal constitutional right to due process, we consider [state]
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self-defense law to assess whether” he was entitled to such an instruction. Tyler
v. Nelson, 163 F.3d 1222, 1227 (10th Cir. 1999). Here, our investigation is brief
because the New Mexico Supreme Court specifically decided that “[Sutphin’s]
actions were not reasonable and did not support a self-defense instruction” under
state law. State v. Sutphin, 164 P.3d at 79. Thus, the prosecution did not need to
prove unlawfulness as an element of the murder or that Sutphin did not act in self
defense. Reasonable jurists would agree that, under the jury instructions given,
the prosecution bore the burden of proving all the elements necessary to convict
Sutphin, and therefore his federal constitutional rights were not violated. See
Sullivan, 508 U.S. at 277-78.
III
For the foregoing reasons, Sutphin’s request for a COA is DENIED and the
appeal is DISMISSED.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Carlos F. Lucero
Circuit Judge
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