United States v. Fofana , 368 F. App'x 919 ( 2010 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS March 9, 2010
TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 09-1435
(D.C. No. 06-CR-00438-LTB)
MAMADOU FOFANA, a/k/a Mamadou (D. Colo.)
Cisse, a/k/a Amadou Cisse,
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
Before TACHA, BRISCOE, and O’BRIEN, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to honor the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is, therefore,
submitted without oral argument.
Defendant Mamadou Fofana appeals from the district court’s revocation of his
term of supervised release and the 20-month consecutive term of imprisonment imposed
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of
law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its
persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
in connection with that revocation. Exercising jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291,
we affirm.
I
In October 2006, Fofana was indicted on one count of using a false passport, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1543, and one count of using a fraudulently obtained social
security number, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 408(a)(7)(A). Fofana subsequently pled
guilty to the second count in the indictment and, on May 17, 2007, was sentenced to time
served plus a 3-year term of supervised release. The conditions of his supervised release
required him, in pertinent part, to refrain from “commit[ting] another federal, state or
local crime.” ROA, Vol. 1 at 9.
On October 17, 2008, Fofana’s probation officer filed a petition with the district
court alleging that Fofana had violated the terms of his supervised release by committing
the offense of “Assault 1 - Serious Bodily Injury with Deadly Weapon, in violation of
Colorado Statute 18-3-202(1)(a),” and by failing to report his arrest in connection with
that offense. Id. at 18. On April 20, 2009, Fofana’s probation officer filed a
supplemental petition with the district court alleging that Fofana had also violated the
terms of his supervised release by committing “the offense of Protection Order Violation
- Civil Domestic Violence, in violation of Colorado State Statute 18-6-803.5 . . . .” Id. at
22.
On June 29, 2009, Fofana was tried and convicted by a jury in Colorado state court
of second degree assault with provocation, a “Class 6 felony” under Colorado state law.
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Id. at 26. Fofana was subsequently sentenced in connection with that conviction to 30
months’ imprisonment in the custody of the Colorado Department of Corrections.
On September 23, 2009, the district court conducted a hearing on the alleged
violations of supervised release. At the conclusion of the evidence, the district court
found that Fofana “violated his conditions of supervised release by committing . . . the
felony offense of the second degree assault, injury with a deadly weapon in the heat of
passion, in violation . . . of Colorado state law . . . .” Id., Vol. 2 at 11. The district court
noted this “constitute[d] a Grade A violation,” id., that “required” the revocation of
supervised release, id. at 14. In assessing the sentence to be imposed upon Fofana, the
district court noted that one of the victims of the assault “suffer[ed] serious bodily injury
in the form of a depressed skull fracture and a small subdural hematoma, injuries
involving a substantial risk of death.” Id. at 20. The district court further noted it was not
persuaded by Fofana’s counsel that a sentence below the policy statement advisory
Guideline range of 18 to 24 months was appropriate. Id. at 21. Ultimately, the district
court sentenced Fofana to a term of imprisonment of 20 months, “consecutive to any
sentence he [was] serving with the Colorado State Department of Corrections.” Id. at 23.
II
Fofana raises two issues on appeal. First, he contends the district court erred in
concluding that his commission of a Grade A violation required the revocation of his
supervised release. Second, he contends that it was plainly unreasonable for the district
court to order the imposed term of imprisonment to run consecutively to any sentence he
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was serving with the Colorado Department of Corrections. For the reasons that follow,
we conclude that both issues lack merit.
a) Revocation of supervised release
Section 7B1.1 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines outlines “three grades of
. . . supervised release violations . . . .” U.S.S.G. § 7B1.1(a). It is undisputed that
Fofana’s commission of the felony offense of second degree assault with provocation
under Colorado state law constitutes a “Grade A” violation of his supervised release. See
U.S.S.G. § 7B1.1(a)(1) (defining Grade A violation to include a “state . . . offense
punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding one year that . . . is a crime of
violence”).
In turn, § 7B1.3 of the Sentencing Guidelines outlines the circumstances under
which the various grades of supervised release violations should, in the Sentencing
Commission’s view, result in the revocation of a defendant’s term of supervised release.
Of relevance here is subsection (a)(1), which states: “Upon a finding of a Grade A . . .
violation, the court shall revoke probation or supervised release.” U.S.S.G. § 7B1.3(a)(1).
The district court in this case was obviously referring to § 7B1.3(a)(1) when it stated:
“Well, under the policy statements of the [Sentencing] Guidelines, this being a Grade A
violation, it is required that I revoke supervised release.” ROA, Vol. 2 at 14.
Fofana argues on appeal that the district court “erred in believing revocation was
mandatory under” § 7B1.3(a)(1). Aplt. Br. at 9. In support, Fofana notes that § 7B1.3 is
merely a non-binding “policy statement” issued by the United States Sentencing
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Commission. Fofana further notes that although 18 U.S.C. § 3583(g) mandates the
revocation of supervised release in certain instances, his violation of supervised release
does not fall within any of those statutory categories.
Normally, we review a district court’s decision to revoke a term of supervised
release for abuse of discretion. United States v. Metzener, 584 F.3d 928, 932 (10th Cir.
2009). Because Fofana did not raise these arguments below, however, we review his
arguments only for plain error.1 United States v. Cordova, 461 F.3d 1184, 1186 (10th Cir.
2006). “Plain error occurs when there is (i) error, (ii) that is plain, which (iii) affects the
defendant’s substantial rights, and which (iv) seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or
public reputation of judicial proceedings.” United States v. Ruiz-Terrazas, 477 F.3d
1196, 1199 (10th Cir. 2007).
Having reviewed the record on appeal, we are not persuaded there was any error
on the part of the district court, let alone plain error. After hearing testimony from
Fofana’s probation officer and finding that Fofana had violated the terms of his
supervised release by engaging in criminal conduct in violation of Colorado state law, the
district court asked the parties for their recommended dispositions. In doing so, the
district court specifically stated that it “need[ed] some clarification as to whether the
1
As noted by the government, Fofana’s counsel conceded at the revocation
hearing that “the Court must revoke” Fofana’s supervised release. ROA, Vol. 2 at 20. In
doing so, Fofana’s counsel arguably waived the arguments now asserted by Fofana on
appeal. See United States v. Carrasco-Salazar, 494 F.3d 1270, 1272 (10th Cir. 2007)
(differentiating between waived and forfeited issues). Because Fofana cannot prevail
under any standard of review, however, we find it unnecessary to conclusively resolve
whether the arguments have been waived.
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sentence, if revocation ensues, is to be concurrent or consecutive to any sentence [Fofana
was then] serving under the state case.” ROA, Vol. 2 at 13 (emphasis added). Although
the district court later in the hearing referred to revocation of supervised release as being
“required,” id. at 14, or “mandatory,” id. at 20, for a Grade A violation, it also twice noted
that the Sentencing Guideline provisions pertaining to revocation of supervised release
were “policy statements,” id. at 14, and it noted that, in the context of a “supervised
release violation” hearing, it possessed “even more discretion than . . . in [an] original
sentencing” proceeding. Id. at 18. Considered together, these comments do not clearly
indicate that the district court believed it was bound by the Sentencing Guidelines to
revoke Fofana’s supervised release.
Even assuming, for purposes of argument, that Fofana could satisfy the first two
prongs of the plain error test, he clearly cannot establish the third prong of that test. To
meet the third prong, Fofana must demonstrate that his substantial rights were affected,
which requires a showing that the result of the revocation proceeding would have been
different but for the asserted error. See United States v. Romero, 491 F.3d 1173, 1179
(10th Cir. 2007). In other words, Fofana must demonstrate that, but for the district
court’s purported misapprehension that it was required under the Sentencing Guidelines
to revoke Fofana’s supervised release, it would not have done so and would have allowed
Fofana to remain on supervised release. Notably, Fofana does not even assert, much less
establish, that his term of supervised release would not have been revoked absent the
purported error. And, in any event, nothing in the record on appeal remotely suggests the
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district court would have, absent the purported error, refrained from revoking Fofana’s
supervised release.
b) Imposition of consecutive sentence
In his second issue on appeal, Fofana challenges the district court’s decision to run
his 20-month term of imprisonment consecutively to any sentence he was then serving
under the supervision of the Colorado Department of Corrections. Fofana, citing 18
U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3), asserts that any term of imprisonment imposed in connection with
the revocation of supervised release is not a “new term of imprisonment,” but rather is a
conversion of the original term of supervised release. Aplt. Br. at 10. In other words, he
asserts, a “defendant is just finishing out the term of imprisonment imposed upon the
original conviction.” Id. Consequently, Fofana asserts, requiring the term of
imprisonment in this context to run “consecutive to any undischarged term of
imprisonment the defendant is currently serving[] is altering the original term of
imprisonment and, as such, is plainly unreasonable.” Id.Fofana’s arguments, however, are based on a misreading of § 3583(e)(3). That
subsection authorizes a district court to
revoke a term of supervised release, and require the defendant to serve in
prison all or part of the term of supervised release authorized by statute for
the offense that resulted in such term of supervised release without credit
for time previously served on postrelease supervision . . . .
18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3). Although Fofana interprets the initial portion of this quoted
language as authorizing a district court to convert the remainder of a defendant’s original
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term of supervised release into a term of imprisonment, that interpretation ignores the
remaining portion of the statutory language. Read together, the quoted statutory language
authorizes a district court to impose a new term of imprisonment equal to “all or part of
the term of supervised release authorized by statute for the offense that resulted in” the
original term of supervised release, and that, in imposing this new term of imprisonment,
the defendant is not entitled to “credit for time previously served” on the original term of
supervised release.
In turn, as we have noted, 18 U.S.C. § 3584(a) affords discretion to a district court,
in the context of the revocation of supervised release, to order the new term of
imprisonment to run concurrently or consecutively with any other terms of imprisonment
then being served by the defendant. United States v. Rodriguez-Quintanilla, 442 F.3d
1254, 1256 (10th Cir. 2006). A district court’s discretion in this regard “is guided by the
factors delineated [in] 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), which include the characteristics of the
offense and the defendant, the need for deterrence and the protection of the public, and . .
. ‘the applicable guidelines or policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.’”
Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a); internal citation omitted). Notably, the Sentencing
Commission has issued a policy statement applicable to this situation:
Any term of imprisonment imposed upon the revocation of . . . supervised
release shall be ordered to be served consecutively to any sentence of
imprisonment that the defendant is serving, whether or not the sentence of
imprisonment being served resulted from the conduct that is the basis of the
revocation of . . . supervised release.
U.S.S.G. § 7B1.3(f).
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Thus, the district court’s order in this case requiring Fofana to serve his new 20-
month term of imprisonment consecutively to any sentence Fofana was serving in the
custody of the Colorado Department of Corrections is “in accordance with the advisory
policy statement contained in § 7B1.3(f).” Rodriguez-Quintanilla, 442 F.3d at 1256. And
it is Fofana’s “burden to demonstrate that the District Court should [have] exercise[d] its
discretion to impose concurrent sentences in spite of that [advisory policy] statement.”
Id. Because Fofana has failed to meet this burden, we conclude the district court neither
abused its discretion, nor imposed an unreasonable sentence. Id. at 1258.
We AFFIRM both the revocation of Fofana’s supervised release and the
consecutive sentence imposed.
Entered for the Court
Mary Beck Briscoe
Circuit Judge
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