United States v. Ellis , 132 F. App'x 209 ( 2005 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
MAY 20 2005
TENTH CIRCUIT
__________________________ PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v. No. 04-6201
(W. Dist. of Oklahoma)
CHRISTOPHER LLOYD ELLIS, (D.Ct. No. 03-CV-1762-F)
Defendant - Appellant.
____________________________
ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY
AND DISMISSING APPEAL *
Before SEYMOUR, LUCERO, and O’BRIEN, Circuit Judges.
After examining appellant's brief and the appellate record, this panel
unanimously determines that oral argument would not materially assist the
determination of this appeal. See F ED . R. A PP . P. 34(a)(2) and 10th Cir. R.
34.1(G). The case is therefore submitted without oral argument.
*
This order is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of the case,
res judicata and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders
and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and
conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
I. Background
Christopher Ellis, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, 1 requests a
certificate of appealability (COA) to challenge the district court's dismissal of his
28 U.S.C. § 2255 habeas petition claiming ineffective assistance of counsel at his
plea negotiation and sentencing. Ellis was indicted on seven drug-related counts.
On October 9, 2002, he entered into a plea agreement where, inter alia, he pled
guilty to count one of a superseding information, the manufacture of
methamphetamine, in exchange for the government’s motion to dismiss the
remainder of the charges. The plea agreement also contained a waiver of his right
to appeal, both directly and collaterally, unless: 1) the district court departed
upward from the sentencing guideline range; or 2) the appeal was based on a
subsequent change in Tenth Circuit or Supreme Court case law that is “held by
the Tenth Circuit or Supreme Court to have retroactive effect.” (R. Doc. 33 at 5)
At sentencing, over the objections of Ellis’ counsel, the district court concluded
his relevant conduct warranted a corrected quantity of drugs and a six-point
enhancement based on its finding that Ellis’s offense involved substantial risk of
harm to the life of a minor. U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(5)(C)(2003). 2 The district court
1
On appeal, we liberally construe Ellis’s pleadings and submissions. Haines v.
Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972); Ledbetter v. City of Topeka, Kan., 318 F.3d 1183,
1187 (10th Cir. 2003).
2
This provision is currently found at U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(6)(C)(2004).
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sentenced Ellis to 292 months imprisonment to be followed by a five-year term of
supervised release.
Ellis did not file a direct appeal. Instead, he filed a pro se motion to
vacate, set aside or correct his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, claiming
ineffective assistance of counsel. The district court dismissed Ellis’s motion,
concluding he waived his appellate claims by accepting the plea agreement. Ellis
then filed a notice of appeal, a motion for a COA and a motion to proceed ifp.
The district court granted Ellis’ motion to proceed ifp, but denied his request for a
COA. Ellis then filed a motion for COA with this Court.
II. Discussion
When “a district court denies a habeas petition on procedural grounds,
without reaching the prisoner's underlying constitutional claim, a COA should
issue when the prisoner shows, at least, that jurists of reason would find it
debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional
right and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court
was correct in its procedural ruling.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484, 120
S. Ct. 1595 (2000).
“[I]n reviewing appeals brought after a defendant has entered into an
appeal waiver, [we] determine: (1) whether the disputed appeal falls within the
scope of the waiver of appellate rights; (2) whether the defendant knowingly and
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voluntarily waived his appellate rights; and (3) whether enforcing the waiver
would result in a miscarriage of justice . . . .” United States v. Hahn, 359 F.3d
1315, 1325 (10th Cir. 2004). Ellis contends his ineffective assistance claims were
not waived for three reasons. First, he alleges his plea was not knowing and
voluntary due to his counsel’s ineffective assistance. Second, he contends his
claim is based on retroactive changes in the law as reflected in Blakely v.
Washington, __U.S.__, 124 S. Ct. 2531, (2004), decided subsequent to his plea
and therefore not within the scope of the waiver. Finally, he argues that the
enforcement of the waiver would result in a miscarriage of justice. We address
each of these arguments in turn.
A. Validity of Plea
Collateral attacks based on ineffective assistance of counsel claims are
waived unless the petition challenges the validity or voluntariness of the plea or
waiver. United States v. Cockerham, 237 F.3d 1179, 1187 (10th Cir. 2001). In
support of his §2255 motion, Ellis argued his plea of guilty and the plea
agreement were not valid because counsel told him he could expect a sentence of
approximately 70 to 87 months and never discussed the meaning of the waiver.
(R. Doc. 62 at 6-8.) The district court rejected this argument on two bases. First,
Ellis did not allege his counsel represented an estimated sentence that was
pursuant to a promise or agreement with the prosecutor. Rather, counsel’s
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statement regarding the length of his expected sentence was merely a prediction
insufficient to render the plea involuntary. Fields v. Gibson, 277 F.3d 1203, 1214
(10th Cir. 2002) (“‘An erroneous sentence estimate by defense counsel does not
render a plea involuntary . . . . And a defendant's erroneous expectation, based on
his attorney's erroneous estimate, likewise does not render a plea involuntary.’”)
(quoting Wellnitz v. Page, 420 F.2d 935, 936-37 (10th Cir.1970)) (internal
citations omitted). Second, based on the extensive colloquy between Ellis and the
court at the time of his plea, the district court determined he could not credibly
argue he did not understand the plain terms of the agreement. Because the
remainder of Ellis’s ineffective assistance claims related to counsel’s conduct
after the plea agreement was entered, the district court determined these claims
could not affect the validity of the agreement itself.
When determining whether a waiver of appellate rights was knowing and
voluntary, we examine the specific language of the plea agreement and assess the
adequacy of the Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 colloquy. Hahn, 359 F.3d
at 1325. 3 Here, the language of the plea agreement is quite specific and the
colloquy at the plea hearing examined Ellis’ understanding of its terms in depth.
3
It appears, on appeal, Ellis has abandoned his claim regarding his counsel’s
failure to explain the meaning of a waiver, since he now claims his counsel told him “if
they added to the guideline sentencing range for more drugs or child endangerment, then
the ‘waiver’ would be void and he would beat any other enhancement on appeal.”
(Appellant’s Br. at 6.)
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For example, the agreement clearly states that “[t]he maximum penalty which
could be imposed as a result of this plea is not less than five and not more than 40
years imprisonment . . . .” (R. Doc. 33 at 2.) Further, the plea agreement
repeatedly clarifies that the district court is not obligated to confine its judgment
to the “stipulations, agreements, or recommendations” therein, but that Ellis
“understands that a sentencing guideline range for his case will be determined by
the Court under the guidelines issued by the U.S. Sentencing Commission.” (R.
Doc. 33 at 3-4.) For these reasons and those stated by the district court, we
conclude Ellis’ claim that his plea was involuntary and consequently invalidated
is without merit.
B. Change in Law
Ellis next argues that Blakely is a retroactive change in law and, therefore,
his plea agreement allows his challenge of the district court’s drug quantity
findings and the imposition of the six-point enhancement. In Blakely, after
reviewing the State of Washington’s sentencing guidelines, the Supreme Court
held the relevant statutory maximum sentence a judge may impose is one based on
"facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant," __U.S. at __,
124 S.Ct. at 2537, and not based on additional fact-finding by a judge. The
Supreme Court has recently applied its holding in Blakely to sentencing under the
federal sentencing guidelines. United States v. Booker, __U.S.__, 125 S. Ct. 738
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(2005). Ellis maintains Blakely removed the district court’s authority to increase
the amount of drugs for sentencing purposes or to apply the enhancement because
he never admitted conduct that could be construed as creating a substantial risk of
harm to the life of a minor.
Ellis is mistaken, however, in his assertion that the rule articulated in
Blakely places his appeal outside the scope of his waiver. The specific language
of the plea agreement states that Ellis’s appeal must be based on a rule that is
“held by the Tenth Circuit or Supreme Court to have retroactive effect.” In
United States v. Price, we recently held “Blakely did not announce a watershed
rule of criminal procedure that would apply retroactively to initial § 2255
motions. " 400 F.3d 844, 849 (10th Cir. 2005). Consequently, Ellis’s Blakely
claim is within the scope of the express language of his plea agreement waiver
and is therefore waived.
C. Manifest Injustice
Ellis argues that the enforcement of his waiver of appellate rights would
result in manifest injustice. This is a narrow analysis subject to factors listed in
United States v. Elliott, 264 F.3d 1171, 1174 (10th Cir.2001). Hahn, 359 F.3d at
1327. We will apply an exception to appellate waiver “[1] where the district
court relied on an impermissible factor such as race, [2] where ineffective
assistance of counsel in connection with the negotiation of the waiver renders the
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waiver invalid, [3] where the sentence exceeds the statutory maximum, or [4]
where the waiver is otherwise unlawful.” Id. (citing Elliot, 264 F.3d at 1173).
Moreover, to satisfy the fourth Elliott factor, “the error [must] seriously affect[ ]
the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings[,] as that test
was employed in United States v. Plano, 507 U.S. 725, 732, 113 S. Ct. 1770, 123
L. Ed. 2d 508 (1993).” Hahn, 359 F.3d 1327 (internal quotations omitted).
Here, Ellis does not allege that the district court relied on an impermissible
factor or that the sentence exceeded the statutory maximum. Nor does he claim
that the waiver was otherwise unlawful. As discussed above, Ellis fails to set
forth facts which would arguably demonstrate that ineffectiveness of his counsel
affected the voluntariness of his plea.
III. Conclusion
Accordingly, we conclude jurists of reason would not find it debatable
whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right, nor
would jurists of reason debate whether the district court was correct in its
procedural ruling. Therefore, we DENY Ellis’s request for a COA and DISMISS
this appeal.
Entered by the Court:
Terrence L. O’Brien
United States Circuit Judge
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