Ryan v. Dept. of the Air Force , 511 F. App'x 687 ( 2013 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT February 14, 2013
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
RAYMOND H. RYAN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 11-6335
(D.C. No. 5:09-CV-01374-C)
DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE, (W.D. Okla.)
Secretary, Michael B. Donley,
Defendant-Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
Before KELLY, McKAY, and O’BRIEN, Circuit Judges.
Raymond H. Ryan, formerly a civilian Air Force employee, appeals the district
court’s judgment in favor of the Secretary of the Air Force in this lawsuit concerning
the Air Force’s termination of Mr. Ryan’s employment. Exercising jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of this
appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral
estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with
Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
The Air Force first terminated Mr. Ryan’s employment in 2006. Although the
Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) rejected Mr. Ryan’s claims of disability
discrimination and retaliation for whistleblowing, in October 2007 it ordered him
reinstated due to a procedural error. But Mr. Ryan never reported to Tinker Air
Force Base in Oklahoma as ordered, and the Air Force removed him from
employment for the second time effective February 15, 2008. This time, in addition
to rejecting Mr. Ryan’s claims of disability discrimination and retaliation for
whistleblowing, the MSPB upheld the removal. The Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission concurred with the MSPB’s final decision finding no discrimination.
Mr. Ryan then filed suit in the district court. The court granted the Secretary’s
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss Mr. Ryan’s whistleblowing claims on the
ground that there is no private right of action under the Whistleblower Protection Act
of 1989 (WPA), 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8). The court denied the Secretary’s Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss Mr. Ryan’s discrimination and retaliation claims
and allowed them to go to a jury trial. After Mr. Ryan rested, the district court
granted the Secretary’s Fed. R. Civ. P. 50 motion for judgment as a matter of law
because “there simply was not evidence presented from which a reasonable jury
could determine that [the Air Force’s] actions were discriminatory or retaliatory.”
R., Vol. 1 at 406-07.
On appeal, Mr. Ryan complains that the district court: (1) dismissed his
whistleblower claims; (2) denied his motions to compel the Secretary to produce
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relevant evidence, instead allowing the Secretary to submit deficient privilege logs,
and denied his third motion to extend the discovery schedule; (3) granted the
Secretary’s motion to voluntarily dismiss a counterclaim without ruling on
Mr. Ryan’s request for sanctions; (4) quashed certain witness subpoenas and
excluded certain evidence at trial; (5) denied Mr. Ryan’s motion to recuse; and
(6) granted the Secretary’s Rule 50 motion.
1. Whistleblower Claims
We review the district court’s Rule 12(b)(1) dismissal of the whistleblowing
allegations de novo. Lucero v. Bureau of Collection Recovery, Inc., 639 F.3d 1239,
1242 (10th Cir. 2011). It appears that Mr. Ryan was trying to bring a freestanding
WPA claim. We agree with the district court, however, that there can be no such
claim, due to preemption by the Civil Service Reform Act (CSRA). See Steele v.
United States, 19 F.3d 531, 533 (10th Cir. 1994); Petrini v. Howard, 918 F.2d 1482,
1485 (10th Cir. 1990).1
To the extent that Mr. Ryan was seeking judicial review of the MSPB decision,
the district court would have had jurisdiction to consider the claim. See 5 U.S.C.
§§ 1221(h), 7703(b)(2); Steele, 19 F.3d at 532. But even assuming that Mr. Ryan
1
In Wells v. Shalala, 228 F.3d 1137, 1147 (10th Cir. 2000), this court discussed
the elements of “a prima facie case for whistleblowing under the WPA.” Steele,
however, had already held that whistleblowing allegations were preempted by the
CSRA, and “when faced with an intra-circuit conflict, a panel should follow earlier,
settled precedent over a subsequent deviation therefrom.” Haynes v. Williams,
88 F.3d 898, 900 n.4 (10th Cir. 1996).
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intended to assert a judicial-review claim rather than a freestanding WPA claim, no
remand is required. The district court could only uphold the MSPB decision, as it
was not “(1) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with law; (2) obtained without procedures required by law, rule, or
regulation having been followed; or (3) unsupported by substantial evidence.”
Daugherty v. Thompson, 322 F.3d 1249, 1254 (10th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation
marks omitted). To the contrary, the MSPB decision was unassailably correct given
the uncontroverted fact that Mr. Ryan never reported to Tinker Air Force Base.
2. Discovery Rulings
We review the district court’s discovery rulings for abuse of discretion. See
Regan-Touhy v. Walgreen Co., 526 F.3d 641, 647 (10th Cir. 2008) (denial of motion
to compel); Rogers v. Andrus Transp. Servs., 502 F.3d 1147, 1151 (10th Cir. 2007)
(denial of request for continuance). “Under this standard, we will reverse a district
court only if it exceeded the bounds of permissible choice, given the facts and
applicable law in the case at hand.” Regan-Touhy, 526 F.3d at 647 (internal
quotation marks omitted). We have recognized that:
In the discovery context, the range of permissible choices available to
the district court is notably broad. This is so because discovery
decisions necessarily involve an assessment of the anticipated burdens
and benefits of particular discovery requests in discrete factual settings,
while at the same time also requiring the trial judge to take account of
the amount in controversy, the parties’ resources, the importance of the
issues at stake in the action, and the ability of the proposed discovery to
shed light on those issues, among many other things.
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We cannot conclude that any of the discovery decisions identified by Mr. Ryan
were an abuse of the district court’s discretion. In denying the motion to compel, the
district court carefully evaluated the relevant factors, including the adequacy of the
Secretary’s privilege log, and gave supportable reasons for declining to compel
further production of evidence. As for the third motion to continue discovery, the
district court had granted two previous extensions, giving Mr. Ryan several extra
months to complete discovery, and it had warned Mr. Ryan there would be no further
extensions. Denying the motion cannot be considered an abuse.
3. Voluntary Dismissal of the Secretary’s Counterclaim
After initially bringing a counterclaim to recover severance pay that Mr. Ryan
received for the first removal, just before trial the Secretary moved under
Fed. R. Civ. P. 41 to dismiss the counterclaim with prejudice. Mr. Ryan responded,
opposing dismissal but also requesting that the court award him monetary sanctions
to compensate him for the time he had expended on the counterclaim. Although the
district court dismissed the counterclaim with prejudice, it did not rule on the request
for sanctions. On appeal, Mr. Ryan complains about the grant of the dismissal
motion and the court’s failure to rule on his sanctions request.
Our review of this issue is also for abuse of discretion. Vanguard Envtl., Inc.
v. Kerin, 528 F.3d 756, 759-60 (10th Cir. 2008). Under Rule 41(a)(2), the district
court may dismiss a claim “on terms that the court considers proper.” It was not an
abuse of discretion for the district court to accept the Secretary’s representation that
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the counterclaim was not necessary to protect the Air Force’s interests and to
determine that dropping the counterclaim would simplify the trial.
Regarding the sanctions request, it is unclear whether the district court
overlooked the request, or if it simply did not consider a monetary sanction to be a
proper condition of dismissal. We need not reverse for further consideration,
however, because under these circumstances a grant of sanctions would have been an
abuse of discretion. See Ashby v. McKenna, 331 F.3d 1148, 1151 (10th Cir. 2003)
(“[W]ith respect to a matter committed to the district court’s discretion, we cannot
invoke an alternative basis to affirm unless we can say as a matter of law that it
would have been an abuse of discretion for the trial court to rule otherwise.” (internal
quotation marks omitted)). Mr. Ryan essentially sought an award in the nature of an
attorney’s fee, without specifying any authority for compensating him for the time he
spent on the counterclaim.2 But attorney’s fee awards are not always available to
pro se plaintiffs. See Kay v. Ehrler, 499 U.S. 432, 435 (1991) (42 U.S.C. § 1988case). Moreover, the counterclaim was dismissed with prejudice. Where a claim is
dismissed with prejudice under Rule 41(a)(2), “attorneys’ fees are usually not a
proper condition of dismissal because the defendant cannot be made to defend
again.” AeroTech, Inc. v. Estes, 110 F.3d 1523, 1528 (10th Cir. 1997). Although
2
On appeal, Mr. Ryan refers to Fed. R. Civ. P. 11. However, his district-court
response did not cite Rule 11, and in any event, it does not appear that the request
met the strict requirements for Rule 11 motions. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(2)
(requiring that a Rule 11 motion be made separately and that the movant give the
other party an opportunity to withdraw the offending paper before filing the motion).
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AeroTech acknowledged that a fee award “might be appropriate” if there were
exceptional circumstances, see id., this case does not present any such exceptional
circumstances.
4. Evidentiary Rulings
“[W]e review the court’s evidentiary rulings, including the court’s decision to
exclude evidence or testimony, for abuse of discretion.” Breakthrough Mgmt. Grp.,
Inc. v. Chukchansi Gold Casino & Resort, 629 F.3d 1173, 1189 (10th Cir. 2010).
“We . . . revers[e] only if we have a firm and definite belief that the trial court made a
clear error in judgment.” Tanberg v. Sholtis, 401 F.3d 1151, 1162 (10th Cir. 2005)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
The district court granted the Air Force’s motion to quash six witness
subpoenas on the ground that the witnesses had no testimony relevant to the second
removal. Mr. Ryan argues that the witnesses falsely asserted that they had no
knowledge of the second termination, and in fact they had knowledge about
(1) Mr. Ryan’s medical condition that they conveyed to other officials before the
second removal, and (2) prior disciplinary actions that allegedly played a role in the
removal decision.
We are not convinced that the district court made a clear error in judgment in
excluding the six witnesses. And “even if we were to find an error that amounted to
an abuse of discretion, reversible error may be predicated only upon errors that affect
a party’s substantial rights.” Id.; Fed. R. Evid. 103(a). We recognize that Mr. Ryan
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believes that the witnesses were necessary for his case, but his descriptions of their
testimony do not establish that his substantial rights were affected. Questioning of
other witnesses established the Air Force’s knowledge of his medical condition and
provided information about the prior disciplinary actions. Thus, Mr. Ryan has failed
to establish that any error in quashing the subpoenas was reversible error.
As for the limitation of evidence at trial, the district court excluded all
evidence regarding employment decisions other than the second removal. On appeal
Mr. Ryan complains that he was precluded from introducing evidence (1) concerning
the period between the first and second removals, (2) regarding the Secretary’s
counterclaim for recoupment of severance pay from the first removal, and (3) the
validity of his reinstatement. We have held, however, that “a trial court has broad
discretion to determine whether evidence is relevant and to exclude irrelevant
evidence[.]” Garcia-Martinez v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 392 F.3d 1187, 1193
(10th Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, “[t]he court may
exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a
danger of . . . confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, [or] wasting
time[.]” Fed. R. Evid. 403. The first removal was not at issue in this litigation, and
the district court was well within its discretion to try to keep the parties and the jury
focused on the second removal and whether it resulted from discrimination or
retaliation.
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Mr. Ryan also asserts that his whistleblower claims were inextricably
intertwined with his discrimination and retaliation claims, so that precluding
evidence of the whistleblower claim fatally undermined his discrimination and
retaliation claims. We are not persuaded that the different claims were so
intertwined, and as discussed above, Mr. Ryan was not entitled to a trial on his
whistleblowing allegations. Accordingly, the district court’s exclusion of
whistleblowing evidence was no abuse of discretion.
5. Motion to Recuse
“We review the denial of a motion to recuse for abuse of discretion, and under
that standard we will uphold a district court’s decision unless it is an arbitrary,
capricious, whimsical, or manifestly unreasonable judgment.” Higganbotham v.
Okla. ex rel. Okla. Transp. Comm’n, 328 F.3d 638, 645 (10th Cir. 2003) (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted).
In seeking recusal, Mr. Ryan argued that the district court’s rulings against
him showed bias and that the district court had engaged in ex parte communications
with the Secretary’s counsel. But allegations regarding adverse rulings “almost never
constitute a valid basis for a bias or partiality motion. . . . Almost invariably, they are
proper grounds for appeal, not recusal.” Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555
(1994). And the allegations regarding ex parte communications rested on speculation
and suspicion, which also are insufficient to require recusal, see United States v.
Cooley, 1 F.3d 985, 993 (10th Cir. 1993); Hinman v. Rogers, 831 F.2d 937, 939
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(10th Cir. 1987) (per curiam). Therefore, the district court’s denial of the recusal
motion was not arbitrary, capricious, whimsical, or manifestly unreasonable.
6. Rule 50 Motion
Finally, we review the grant of the Secretary’s Fed. R. Civ. P. 50 motion
de novo. Owner-Operator Indep. Drivers Ass’n , Inc. v. USIS Commercial Servs.,
Inc., 537 F.3d 1184, 1190 (10th Cir. 2008). “In reviewing the grant of judgment as a
matter of law, the question is not whether there is literally no evidence supporting the
nonmoving party but whether there is evidence upon which the jury could properly
find for that party.” Id. at 1191 (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted).
Mr. Ryan argues that he presented sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to
find that the Secretary’s proffered reason for the second removal was pretext for
discrimination and retaliation. Having reviewed the transcript of the trial, however,
we agree with the district court that there was insufficient evidence for the jury
properly to find in favor of Mr. Ryan.
The judgment of the district court is affirmed.
Entered for the Court
Paul J. Kelly, Jr.
Circuit Judge
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