Reali v. Abbot , 90 F. App'x 319 ( 2004 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FEB 26 2004
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
JENNIFER REALI,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v. No. 03-1100
(D. Colo.)
JAMES ABBOT, Warden, Colorado (D.Ct. No. 99-MK-253)
Women’s Correctional Facility;
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE
STATE OF COLORADO,
Respondents-Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before TACHA, Chief Circuit Judge, MURPHY, Circuit Judge, and BRORBY,
Senior Circuit Judge.
Appellant Jennifer Reali appeals from the order and judgment of the district
court denying with prejudice her petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus under 28
U.S.C. § 2254. She alleges the government deprived her of effective assistance of
counsel and due process based on a breach of her attorney-client privilege, and
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of
law of the case, res judicata and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the
citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under
the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
used immunized testimony against her in violation of the Fifth Amendment. We
exercise jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm.
Background
In 1990, Ms. Reali conspired with Brian Hood to murder his wife, Diane
Hood. As the pair had planned, Ms. Reali, adorned in men’s clothing and a ski
mask, shot and killed Mrs. Hood. People v. Reali, 895 P.2d 161, 164 (Colo. App.
1994). Within days of the shooting, Ms. Reali confessed to the murder. She told
the police she had been involved in a sexual relationship with Brian Hood. She
indicated Mr. Hood convinced her to aid him in killing his wife, and provided in
detail their murder plans and the events leading up to the shooting. Consequently,
she was charged with first degree murder, conspiracy, and a crime of violence.
Ms. Reali entered a plea of not guilty by reason of impaired mental condition. 1
Thereafter, Ms. Reali agreed to cooperate in Mr. Hood’s prosecution, on
the assurance the district attorney would not seek the death penalty against her.
Pursuant to the agreement, Ms. Reali testified under a grant of use immunity at
1
After initially pleading not guilty by reason of impaired mental condition, Ms.
Reali amended her plea to not guilty by reason of insanity. However, after a sanity trial
jury found her sane, Ms. Reali returned her plea to not guilty by reason of impaired
mental condition.
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Mr. Hood’s grand jury proceedings, bond hearing, and trial. 2 Ms. Reali’s legal
counsel also provided the prosecution with select defense information to aid in
Mr. Hood’s prosecution. Reali, 895 P.2d at 164.
Prior to his trial, Mr. Hood’s attorney attempted to obtain selected materials
from Ms. Reali’s defense file to use in cross-examining her at Mr. Hood’s trial.
Claiming attorney-client privilege, Ms. Reali’s attorney filed a motion to quash
the subpoena. After an in camera review of the files, the trial judge presiding
over Mr. Hood’s case determined Ms. Reali waived privilege and ordered Ms.
Reali’s counsel to turn over certain materials. As a result, the attorney
prosecuting Mr. Hood also gained access to these files. Reali, 895 P.2d at 164.
These same attorneys later prosecuted Ms. Reali. Id.Prior to her trial, Ms. Reali filed two separate motions to dismiss the
charges against her. In the first motion, Ms. Reali claimed the release of material
for Mr. Hood’s trial violated her Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights.
In the second motion, she claimed the district attorney’s office used immunized
2
A jury subsequently found Mr. Hood guilty of conspiracy to commit first degree
murder and two counts of solicitation to commit murder. People v. Hood, 878 P.2d 89,
91 (Colo. App. 1994).
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testimony in her sanity trial, and would do the same in her pending trial on the
merits, in violation of her Fifth Amendment rights.
In considering the first motion, the state trial court ruled the turnover order
in Mr. Hood’s case was improper. However, the court determined this error did
not warrant dismissal of the charges against Ms. Reali. Instead, the court ordered
the prosecutors to refrain from using any erroneously obtained evidence.
In addressing the second motion, the court noted Ms. Reali’s confession
statements were materially the same as her immunized testimony. However, the
court prohibited the prosecution from using any immunized testimony and
announced it would consider the admission of any questionable evidence outside
the presence of the jury. At trial, Ms. Reali did not object to any evidence the
prosecution presented on immunity grounds. Reali, 950 P.2d at 648.
The jury found Ms. Reali guilty of first degree murder and conspiracy to
commit first degree murder. The Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed her
conviction, People v. Reali, 895 P.2d 161 (Colo. App. 1994), and the Colorado
Supreme Court subsequently denied her writ of certiorari. Id. Ms. Reali later
filed a collateral attack, which the Colorado courts also denied. Reali, 950 P.2d
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at 649.
Having exhausted her state court remedies, Ms. Reali then filed an
application for habeas relief in federal district court. A magistrate judge
reviewed her petition and recommended the court deny relief. The United States
District Court for the District of Colorado adopted the magistrate judge’s
recommendation and dismissed the application with prejudice. The district court
granted Ms. Reali a certificate of appealability. Ms. Reali now appeals the
district court’s dismissal of her habeas application.
On appeal, Ms. Reali makes the same three arguments she presented to the
district court. She first contends the state court order releasing attorney-client
privileged information violated her Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance
of counsel. Additionally, she contends this release of information violated her
right to due process of law under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Finally,
Ms. Reali claims the state violated her Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination when the same attorneys who prosecuted Mr. Hood prosecuted her,
used her immunized testimony to prepare for trial, and used the immunized
testimony at trial.
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Standard of Review
We review the district court’s legal determinations in denying a § 2254
petition de novo. Garcia v. Shanks, 351 F.3d 468, 471 (10th Cir. 2003). Under
the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, if a state court
adjudicates a claim on its merits, a petitioner is entitled to federal habeas relief
only if she can establish the state court decision “was contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the
Supreme Court of the United States,” or “was based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court
proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), (2). The Act also requires federal courts to
presume state court factual findings are correct, and places the burden on the
petitioner to rebut the presumption with clear and convincing evidence. Section
2254(e)(1).
1. Attorney-Client Privilege Sixth Amendment Claim
Ms. Reali first argues the state trial judge’s order requiring her attorney to
turn over defense files to her eventual prosecutors (“turnover order”) rendered her
counsel ineffective. Under such circumstances, she argues the court should
presume she suffered prejudice. In addition to her presumption argument, Ms.
Reali claims she suffered actual prejudice because these materials provided the
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prosecution with an unfair advantage in attacking her impaired mental condition
defense. From these materials, she asserts the prosecution learned (1) she
“swaggered” when she walked to disguise herself as a man when approaching
Mrs. Hood; (2) she provided her attorney with specific details of the crime she
earlier had claimed she did not remember; and (3) she had written letters to her
attorney which suggested she was alert and functioning intelligently.
Additionally, Ms. Reali asserts the turnover “chilled” her right to testify on her
own behalf. Ms. Reali’s arguments are unpersuasive.
The Sixth Amendment guarantees an accused the right to assistance of
counsel for his or her defense. United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361, 364
(1981). This right stems from the understanding fairness of the adversary
proceeding is the benchmark of the Sixth Amendment. Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S.
157, 175 (1986). To prevail on a Sixth Amendment violation claim, the
complaining party generally must demonstrate prejudice. Shillinger v. Haworth,
70 F.3d 1132, 1139-41 (10th Cir. 1995). However, in certain Sixth Amendment
contexts, courts will presume a party suffered prejudice. Id. at 1141. 3 In the
3
In Shillinger, this court detailed a number of situations where courts have
presumed prejudice. Examples of such circumstances include:
prohibiting direct examination of the defendant by his counsel, see
Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570 (1961); requiring those defendants who
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attorney-client privilege context, we presume prejudice only “when the state
becomes privy to confidential communications because of its purposeful intrusion
into the attorney-client relationship and lacks a legitimate justification for doing
so.” Id. at 1142. Ms. Reali fails to demonstrate she is entitled to a presumption
of prejudice, or that any prejudice actually resulted.
In considering Ms. Reali’s Sixth Amendment claim, the Colorado Court of
Appeals determined she failed to demonstrate any specific prejudice resulted from
the turnover order. Reali, 895 P.2d at 169-70. Assuming the turnover order was
in error, the court ruled the trial court properly remedied the error by prohibiting
the prosecution from using information it did not have prior to the turnover order.
Id. at 169. It concluded, absent some showing of specific prejudice or a violation
of the trial court’s remedial order, Ms. Reali was not entitled to relief. 4 Id. at
choose to testify to do so before any other defense witnesses, see Brooks v.
Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605 (1972); refusing to allow defense counsel closing
argument in a bench trial, see Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853 (1975);
and prohibiting any consultation between a defendant and his attorney
during an overnight recess separating the direct-examination and the cross-
examination of the defendant, see Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80(1976).
Id., 70 F.3d at 1141.
4
When addressing another portion of Ms. Reali’s direct appeal, the Colorado
Court of Appeals specifically rejected examples Ms. Reali offered to demonstrate the
prosecution violated the trial court’s remedial order. See infra Part 3.
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170.
This state appellate court decision is not contrary to, or an unreasonable
application of, federal law. Because Ms. Reali fails to show the prosecution
purposefully intruded upon her attorney-client relationship, she is not entitled to a
presumption of prejudice. See Shillinger, 70 F.3d at 1412. Nor has Ms. Reali
demonstrated she suffered any specific prejudice. She does not support her four
examples of prejudice with citations to record evidence demonstrating the
purported prejudice actually occurred. Accordingly, Ms. Reali is not entitled to
habeas relief on her Sixth Amendment claim.
2. General Due Process Violation Claim
Next, Ms. Reali claims the judge presiding over Mr. Hood’s trial deprived
her of due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments by ordering her
counsel to turn over material in her defense file. In this portion of her brief, Ms.
Reali does not articulate a specific due process violation, or cite case law in
support of her claim. She simply argues the prosecution’s possession of the
materials “is inherently detrimental, unfairly advantages the prosecution, and
threatens to subvert the adversary system of justice.” We construe her argument
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as a general fundamental unfairness claim. 5
A constitutional due process violation arises when a criminal trial lacks
fundamental fairness to the degree it is “shocking to the universal sense of
justice.” United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 432 (1973) (quotation marks and
citation omitted). See also Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236 (1941) (“As
applied to a criminal trial, denial of due process is the failure to observe that
fundamental fairness essential to the very concept of justice.”). After carefully
reviewing the record on appeal and relevant constitutional due process
requirements, we conclude the prosecution’s possession of information from Ms.
Reali’s defense file did not render her trial fundamentally unfair. Although the
fact the prosecution possessed this information is troubling, we cannot say it
warrants habeas relief in light of the trial court’s order prohibiting the prosecution
from using this information. We therefore affirm the district court’s order
denying habeas relief on this claim.
5
Although it is unclear whether Ms. Reali raised this precise claim before the
Colorado Court of Appeals, we exercise our prerogative under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2) to
deny her claim on the merits notwithstanding her failure to exhaust available state court
remedies.
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3. Fifth Amendment Improper Use of Immunized Testimony Claim
Ms. Reali lastly asserts the state violated her Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination when the attorneys who elicited her immunized
testimony against Mr. Hood later prosecuted her case. Ms. Reali contends the
prosecution’s mere exposure to the immunized testimony is unlawful and warrants
overturning her convictions. She further alleges the prosecutors used the
videotapes and transcripts of her immunized testimony to prepare their case
against her, thereby gaining an unfair advantage. Specifically, Ms. Reali contends
the prosecution gained information allowing them to (1) remark during closing
arguments on how Ms. Reali altered the ski mask worn during the shooting as
evidence of her deliberation and intent; (2) obtain a witness to testify against her
at trial; (3) counter the importance of her having poor vision and being left-
handed whereas the shooter used her right hand to wield the murder weapon; and
(4) use a witness in the sanity trial who observed her immunized testimony at Mr.
Hood’s bond hearing and whose subsequent testimony was therefore tainted.
Under the Fifth Amendment, no person “shall be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself.” U.S. Const. amend. V, Cl. 3. However, the
government may compel citizens to testify so long as it does not use the testimony
to inflict criminal penalties upon the witness. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S.
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441, 445-47 (1972). To ensure the government does not use such immunized
testimony, once a defendant establishes the government compelled her to testify
about a matter relevant to her own prosecution, the government then has the
burden of demonstrating “all of the evidence it proposes to use was derived from
legitimate independent sources.” United States v. Lacey, 86 F.3d 956, 972 (10th
Cir. 1996) (quotation marks and citations omitted).
As previously discussed, the trial court denied Ms. Reali’s pretrial motion
to dismiss for improper use of immunized testimony. The trial court determined
the immunized testimony was substantially the same as the information contained
in Ms. Reali’s confession to the police, which was not immunized. The court
concluded the prosecution satisfied its burden of proving the evidence it proposed
to use arose from an independent, lawful source.
On direct appeal, the Colorado Court of Appeals rejected Ms. Reali’s claim
the prosecutor’s mere exposure to her immunized testimony mandated the reversal
of her conviction. Reali, 895 P.2d at 167. Because Ms. Reali did not raise any
use immunity objections at trial, the court conducted a harmless error analysis as
to whether the prosecution used any immunized testimony during the trial. Id.The court noted the prosecution independently and lawfully possessed: Ms.
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Reali’s detailed, non-immunized confession describing her part in the killing;
additional non-immunized information Ms. Reali’s counsel provided; and
materials relating to her impaired mental condition defense – turned over as
required by statute. Id. With respect to three of the four instances Ms. Reali
claims the prosecution used immunized testimony, the court found the prosecution
obtained its information from lawful independent sources. Id. at 168-69. As to
Ms. Reali’s fourth claim regarding tainted witness testimony, the court found:
The record establishes that none of [Ms. Reali’s immunized]
testimony influenced this witness.... [T]he only feature that the
witness relied upon in identifying [Ms. Reali] as the purchaser of the
mask was her physical appearance and, possibly, the sound of her
voice....
[T]he privilege against self-incrimination does not extend to
non-testimonial actions.
Id. at 168. Thus, the court held no prejudicial error occurred.
Under our limited standard of review, we conclude the state court’s
determination on the issue of whether the prosecution utilized immunized
testimony is not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established
federal law. The Colorado Court of Appeals decision reasonably applies federal
law pertaining to use immunity as announced in Kastigar. Additionally, the state
court’s decision is not based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in
light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding. We affirm the
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district court’s decision Ms. Reali’s claim of improper use of immunized
testimony does not warrant habeas review.
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s denial with
prejudice Ms. Reali’s petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus.
Entered by the Court:
WADE BRORBY
United States Circuit Judge
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