United States v. De La Cruz-Ramos ( 1998 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
JAN 8 1998
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
No. 96-4142
v.
(D.C. No. 96-CR-44)
(D. Utah)
JOSE DE JESUS DE LA
CRUZ-RAMOS,
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
Before KELLY, HOLLOWAY, and HENRY, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral argument.
See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f) and 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore ordered submitted
without oral argument.
I
In this direct appeal, defendant-appellant De La Cruz-Ramos raises only the issue of
whether the district judge abused his discretion in denying defendant’s motion to withdraw
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law
of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. This court generally disfavors the citation
of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms
and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
his guilty plea. Mr. De La Cruz-Ramos was charged in a one count indictment with re-entry
by a deported alien, subsequent to conviction for an aggravated felony, in violation of
8 U.S.C. § 1326. After initially entering a plea of not guilty, the defendant entered into a plea
agreement with the government. The plea agreement called for the government to
recommend sentencing at the low end of the applicable range and for the defendant to receive
a reduction in offense level for acceptance of responsibility. A change of plea hearing was
set.
At the change of plea hearing, the district judge made the appropriate inquiries into
the defendant’s understanding of the charge against him, the maximum possible penalty, and
the fact that the actual sentence would be determined by application of the Sentencing
Guidelines. Upon inquiry from the court, Mr. De La Cruz-Ramos stated that he was satisfied
with his court appointed attorney. II R. at 9. Under oath, defendant admitted that he had
previously been convicted of possession of heroin with intent to distribute and that he had
reentered the United States after deportation without authorization. II R. at 11-13. The
district court made all other inquiries required under Fed. R. Crim. P. 11. At the conclusion
of this hearing, the court found the plea of guilty was knowingly and voluntarily entered, that
there was a factual basis for the plea, and the judge found defendant guilty on his plea of
guilty and set a date for sentencing. II R. at 14-15.
The presentence report prepared by the probation office determined that the
appropriate guidelines range was 77 to 96 months. No objection was filed before the
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scheduled sentencing hearing on July 23, 1996, but defense counsel had not received a copy
of the presentence report until five days before the scheduled hearing. At the sentencing
hearing, defense counsel told the court that he had tried to go over the presentence report
with Mr. De La Cruz-Ramos, but had not been able to arrange for an interpreter to assist him
in this until the night before the hearing. He said that he had not been able to go over the
entire report with defendant, because his client had become unhappy with his representation.
Defense counsel further told the court that defendant wanted new counsel appointed. II R.
at 3. Defendant had written a letter to the judge which he would like the judge to read. The
district judge said that counsel should finish going over the presentence report with
defendant, and continued the hearing until later that same day for that purpose. Id. at 5-6.
When the hearing resumed several hours later, Mr. De La Cruz-Ramos asked for a
week’s continuance. The judge granted an eight-day continuance. Id. at 9. When the
hearing resumed on July 31, 1996, defendant moved to withdraw his plea and asked for a
new attorney by submission of the same letter which he had offered to the court the week
before. Because this letter is brief and pertains to the only issue raised, we will quote it in
full:
Respectfully I would like to ask This Court to postpone my sentencing.
My attorney took the time to visit me in jail only one day before my sentencing
to tell me that the information he had originally given me was incorrect.
I pled guilty because of the assurance that I would receive a sentence
between 41-61 months. However it was only last night, as the court can verify,
that my attorney went to see me with the news that the appropriate guideline
was 77-96 months.
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As the court can clearly see, this is a drastic change and is not fair nor
just to receive such news the night before my sentencing.
For this reason I wish The Court to please consider assigning me a new
attorney, one who will have my best interest in mind, and not one who shows
up to lament my situation rather than presenting defense.
Thank You
Jesse De La Cruz
I R., Item 17. The district judge denied Mr. De La Cruz-Ramos’ request, stating that he saw
no basis for appointing new counsel, nor for permitting withdrawal of the guilty plea. Id. at
4-5. The court proceeded to sentence defendant to 77 months of imprisonment, the low end
of the guidelines range, three years of supervised release, and a $50 special assessment. Id.
at 8-9. Defendant has appealed.
II
We review the denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea under the abuse of
discretion standard. United States v. Carr, 80 F.3d 413, 419 (10th Cir. 1996). Withdrawal
of pleas is governed by Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(e), which states that if a motion is made before
sentencing, “the court may permit the plea to be withdrawn if the defendant shows any fair
and just reason.” Thus, we will not find an abuse of discretion unless the appellant can show
that the trial court acted unjustly or unfairly. Carr, 80 F.3d at 419. However, we have also
said that a motion to withdraw a plea before sentencing should be freely allowed and viewed
with favor. Id.Seven factors are to be considered: (1) whether the defendant has asserted his
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innocence; (2) whether withdrawal of the guilty plea would prejudice the government; (3)
the delay, if any, in filing the motion to withdraw and reasons therefor; (4) whether
withdrawing the plea would substantially inconvenience the court; (5) the assistance of
counsel; (6) whether the plea was knowing and voluntary; and (7) whether the withdrawal
would waste judicial resources. United States v. Gordon, 4 F.3d 1567, 1572 (10th Cir. 1993).
Mr. De La Cruz-Ramos asserts that there would be no prejudice to the government
in permitting withdrawal of his plea, other than the minimal amount inherent in the nature
of such things, because the trial would require only a few witnesses, probably mostly INS
employees. For the same reason he contends that there would be little inconvenience to the
court or waste of judicial resources. As to the assistance of counsel factor, defendant
complained that his counsel was not attentive, spent little time with him, and misinformed
him about the likely sentence. Defendant further contends that there was no delay in making
the motion. He had no cause to complain about his attorney’s performance before the
presentence report was belatedly received and he realized that his representation had been
inadequate. Justice would be served by allowing him to withdraw his plea, defendant finally
maintains, because the inadequacy of his attorney’s performance was combined with the
district court having made only cursory mention of the guidelines when the plea was entered,
thus leaving defendant substantially uninformed about the punishment he faced until the very
eve of sentencing.
On the other hand, the government points out that the district judge conducted an
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appropriately thorough Rule 11 hearing before accepting defendant’s plea. The district judge
found that the plea was knowingly and voluntarily entered. Notwithstanding the cases cited
by defendant for the proposition that the motion to withdraw a plea is to be treated liberally,
the government argues that it still remains the defendant’s burden to show a fair and just
reason for the withdrawal. Carr, 80 F.3d at 419. See also United States v. Hyde, 117 S. Ct.
1630, 1634 (1997) (explaining importance of addition of “fair and just reason” showing
requirement to Rule 32(e), Fed. R. Crim. P.).
The government “concedes that there would have been little prejudice to the
government if the plea had been withdrawn, other than the usual inconvenience of having to
rearrange the calendar in order to reschedule the trial and ensure the availability of
witnesses.” Answer Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee at 9, n. 1. However, the government
contends that the other six relevant factors weigh against defendant. Mr. De La Cruz-Ramos
has never asserted his innocence, as is acknowledged by Appellant’s Opening Brief at 8. The
motion to withdraw the plea was made on the brink of sentencing. The lapse of time would
have caused prejudice to the court in having to try a case months after its original trial date
had passed. In addition, all the time spent at the plea and sentencing hearings by the judge
and other court personnel would have been wasted. Trial would be a waste of judicial
resources, the government contends, because its evidence is likely to be uncontroverted, in
light of the nature of the case. As for assistance of counsel, defendant expressed no
dissatisfaction with counsel until the presentence report came out; this suggests, in the
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government’s view, that this is a case in which the defendant is unhappy with his sentence,
but “dissatisfaction with the length of a sentence is an insufficient reason to withdraw a
plea.” United States v. Gordon, 4 F.3d at 1571.
We are not persuaded by defendant’s argument that the district court abused its
discretion. On this record, we conclude that defendant was primarily motivated by his
disappointment in the sentence recommended by the presentence report. For purposes of our
analysis, we accept as true defendant’s allegation that he was led to expect a lighter sentence.
However, we have held that “[a]lthough an attorney’s unfair representation of probable
leniency may be found coercive, an erroneous estimate of sentence does not render the plea
involuntary.” United States v. Rhodes, 913 F.2d 839, 843 (10th Cir. 1990). Cf. Wellnitz v.
Page, 420 F.2d 935, 936 (10th Cir. 1970) (in a federal habeas review of a state conviction,
this court stated that a reckless promise by counsel of a specific sentence for a plea of guilty
may raise a question of coercion; however, while counsel may offer a prediction on
sentence, “[a]n erroneous sentence estimate by defense counsel does not render a plea
involuntary.”). Rule 11 requires only that the maximum punishment be explained before
accepting a plea; it does not require any estimation of the guideline range. Here there is no
indication that the attorney’s miscalculation was so egregious as to be tantamount to coercing
the plea. The sentence is still well below the maximum punishment. Mr. De La Cruz-Ramos
has not asserted his innocence, nor has he suggested that he could have developed any viable
defense to the charges had his motion been granted.
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III
In sum, defendant fails to show a fair and just reason for permitting his plea to be
withdrawn. We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying
Mr. De La Cruz-Ramos’ motion to withdraw his plea of guilty. Accordingly, the judgment
and sentence are AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
William J. Holloway, Jr.
Circuit Judge
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