Daniels v. United Parcel Service, Inc. , 701 F.3d 620 ( 2012 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
December 11, 2012
PUBLISH Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
TENTH CIRCUIT
REGINA DANIELS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 11-3211
UNITED PARCEL SERVICE, INC.,
Defendant-Appellee.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS
(D.C. NO. 2:09-CV-02304-JAR)
Dennis E. Egan, Popham Law Firm, Kansas City, Missouri (with Frederick D.
Deay II, Law Office of Frederick D. Deay II, Overland Park, Kansas, with him on
the briefs) for Appellant.
Thomas B. Weaver, Armstrong Teasdale LLP, St. Louis, Missouri (Jennifer
Arendes, Armstrong Teasdale LLP, St. Louis, Missouri and Laurence R. Tucker,
Armstrong Teasdale LLP, Kansas City, Missouri, with him on the brief) for
Appellee.
Before TYMKOVICH, BALDOCK, and GORSUCH, Circuit Judges.
TYMKOVICH, Circuit Judge.
Regina Daniels, a former United Parcel Service dispatcher who worked in
UPS’s Kansas City, Kansas facility, brought suit against UPS alleging
discrimination based on her sex and age. The district court granted summary
judgment in favor of UPS, and Daniels appeals. We conclude the district court
did not err in finding (1) most of Daniels’s discrimination claims were untimely;
and (2) the claims of discrimination and retaliation that were timely failed as a
matter of law.
Accordingly, exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we AFFIRM.
I. Background
UPS is an international shipping company that maintains a nationwide
network of distribution centers in the United States, including its James Street
distribution center (James Street Station) in Kansas City, Kansas. Regina
Daniels, a woman born in 1952, began working for UPS in 1984. In 1999, she
became a full-time dispatch specialist at James Street Station. Dispatch
specialists coordinate the movement of truck drivers shipping packages between
UPS’s distribution centers. Daniels held this position until she retired in 2009, at
the age of 57.
There are three dispatch shifts—or “windows,” in UPS jargon—at the
James Street Station: day, twilight, and night. The twilight window is the busiest
and has the most functions. Dispatch specialists are normally assigned to a single
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shift, but sometimes a dispatch specialist is assigned to a “cover” position, filling
in for absences or vacancies on any shift.
Daniels was assigned to the night window from 1999 to 2004. In 2005, she
accepted a transfer to the cover position. This did not change her job
classification or pay grade. While working the cover position, Daniels primarily
worked the day and night windows. She occasionally worked on the twilight
window, but never without supervision.
UPS classifies dispatch specialists as entry-level managers, a level below
full-time supervisors. Dispatch specialists do not have formal supervisory
authority, cannot discipline or fire employees, and are not responsible for training
or evaluating employees. Despite this, Daniels says she performed some tasks
normally performed by full-time supervisors, such as giving drivers instructions,
hand-delivering certain packages, and supervising administrative assistants.
UPS has detailed salary guidelines setting pay grades and ranges for each
position. Specialists and supervisors are different grades, and specialists receive
lower pay than supervisors. Daniels’s salary was within the range established by
the UPS salary guidelines. She received a raise every year between 2006 and
2009.
Although subordinate to feeder supervisors, dispatch specialists report
directly to the James Street Station feeder manager. Three feeder managers are
relevant to this discussion. Mic Haynes held this position from 2004 to 2006, Joe
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Dooley from 2006 to 2007, Allen Kirby from 2007 to 2008, and Joe Dooley again
from 2008 onwards. The feeder manager reports to the Kansas Feeder Division
Manager.
In 2004 or 2005, Daniels began training on the twilight window. Then
Kansas Feeder Division Manager, Guy Albertson, instituted a policy that only
full-time supervisors could cover the twilight window. His stated reason for
doing so was that the twilight window was the busiest and most complex shift,
and requiring a supervisor to cover the shift would reduce the risk of service
failures. When this policy was implemented, all full-time supervisors in the
James Street Station feeder department were men. Thereafter, Daniels ceased
training on the twilight window, having completed only a week of training.
In 2005 and again in 2006, Daniels submitted letters to Human Resources
(HR) expressing interest in a promotion to a full-time supervisor position, as
required by UPS’s promotion policy. HR notified Daniels it received her letters,
and advised her that her supervisor or manager would contact her regarding
further assessments. It also informed her that her letter of interest would expire
at the end of the year, and she would need to resubmit a letter each year if she
wished to maintain her eligibility for a promotion. HR did not receive an
assessment of Daniels from her manager, at that time Mic Haynes, nor did UPS
follow up with her regarding her applications.
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Sometime in 2006, Daniels began covering the night window on a long-
term assignment. She completed this assignment in late 2006 or early 2007, but
in October 2007, after the night dispatcher was on extended leave, she was again
assigned to cover the night window until July 2008. In July 2008, Daniels’s
supervisor, Joe Dooley, permanently assigned her to the night window. At the
same time, Dooley promoted a younger male, Jason Isabell, to dispatch specialist
and assigned him to the cover position. Isabell, who had been the yard control
supervisor during the twilight window, had obtained informal dispatch training on
the twilight window and was allowed to cover that window by virtue of that
training, even though he was not a supervisor. Daniels was unaware prior to this
date that UPS was considering assigning her permanently to the night window and
assigning someone else to the cover position.
On July 31, 2008, Daniels met with UPS Kansas District Human Resources
Manager Gary Liberti to complain about her replacement by Jason Isabell and her
permanent assignment to the night shift. She also complained about the
termination of her twilight window training in 2005 and told Liberti she believed
she was transferred to the night window because she complained to HR in 2006
about an incident where Dooley came to her home to ask her to work an extra
shift.
Daniels and Liberti also discussed Daniels’s job classification and her
failure to receive a response to her 2005 and 2006 promotion applications.
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Liberti reportedly asked Daniels why she was not classified as a full-time
supervisor, given her duties. Liberti also admitted management should have
conducted a follow-up interview to her promotion applications, but failed to
comply with UPS policy. He promised to investigate her complaints and follow
up with her.
In August of 2008, Daniels filled out an Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) intake questionnaire. On November 21, 2008, having heard
nothing from Liberti, Daniels filed an EEOC complaint. Soon after, she
experienced a significant decrease in work-related communication from her
supervisor, Dooley, although she admits this did not affect her job performance.
In February 2009, Daniels met with Dooley to discuss her EEOC complaint.
At this meeting, Dooley informed Daniels there were discrepancies in her time
records, and told her to properly record her time. Approximately one month
before this meeting, UPS had audited the time records of several employees it
suspected were not properly recording their time, including Daniels. Daniels
claims she was often forced to work without taking breaks or lunch, and this
affected the time she left.
Later that month, Daniels again met with Liberti. Liberti reportedly
threatened to call the EEOC, and also warned Daniels about the discrepancies in
her time records. Despite these warnings about the time records, UPS never took
any disciplinary action against Daniels. Daniels later retired in 2009.
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In June 2009, Daniels filed a complaint against UPS in United States
District Court alleging sex and age discrimination and retaliation in violation of
Title VII, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), and Kansas law. 1
She also alleged unequal pay in violation of the Equal Pay Act (EPA) and breach
of contract pursuant to Kansas law. In December 2010, the district court granted
UPS’s motion for summary judgment, finding Daniels failed to allege sufficient
facts to support her claims.
This appeal followed.
II. Discussion
It is unlawful for employers to deprive an individual of employment
opportunities based on his or her sex. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2). It is also
unlawful for any employer to refuse to hire, fire, or otherwise discriminate in
compensation or employment terms against any individual based on age. 29
U.S.C. § 623(a)(1).
When a plaintiff asserts a sex or age discrimination claim but cannot
produce any direct evidence of discrimination, as here, the burden-shifting
framework announced in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792,
802–05 (1972), applies. Under this framework, a plaintiff must first establish a
1
We cannot discern from the record before us whether UPS requires its
employees to take employment claims to mediation or arbitration before filing
suit. The copy of UPS’s policy manual in the record does not discuss such a
practice, nor do the parties mention it in their briefs.
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prima facie case of discrimination by showing (1) membership in a protected class
and (2) an adverse employment action (3) that took place under circumstances
giving rise to an inference of discrimination. EEOC v. PVNF, L.L.C., 487 F.3d
790, 800 (10th Cir. 2007). If a plaintiff can establish a prima facie case, the
burden shifts to the employer to assert a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for
its actions. If it can do so, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to introduce
evidence that the stated nondiscriminatory reason is merely a pretext for
discriminatory intent. Simmons v. Sykes Enters., 647 F.3d 943, 947 (10th Cir.
2011).
We review the district court’s order granting summary judgment de novo.
Simms v. Okla. ex rel. Dep’t of Mental Health & Substance Abuse Servs., 165
F.3d 1321, 1326 (10th Cir. 1999). In so doing, we must view the facts in the light
most favorable to the non-moving party, drawing all reasonable inferences in his
or her favor. Id. We must not judge witness credibility or weigh evidence.
Stinnett v. Safeway, Inc., 337 F.3d 1213, 1216 (10th Cir. 2003). A grant of
summary judgment is proper only if there is no genuine dispute as to any material
fact, and the evidence is such that no reasonable jury could find in favor of the
nonmoving party. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
U.S. 242 (1986).
With these legal standards in mind, we turn to Daniels’s claims of error.
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A. Failure to Promote
Daniels’s first claim is that UPS discriminated against her on the basis of
her age and sex when it failed to promote her in 2005 and 2006, after she filed
letters with HR indicating her interest in receiving a promotion. She asserts a
cause of action accrued either at that time, or when HR manager Liberti told
Daniels in 2008 that UPS violated its promotion policy by failing to follow up on
her letters of interest.
“A charge under this section shall be filed within one hundred and eighty
days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred.” 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(e)(1); see also 29 U.S.C. § 626(d). In states with a state agency that
has authority over employment discrimination claims, including Kansas,
employees have up to 300 days to file an EEOC charge if they first file a charge
with the state agency. Id. A claim not filed within these statutory limits is time
barred. National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 109 (2002).
“Each discrete discriminatory act starts a new clock for filing charges
alleging that act.” Id. at 113. Discrete unlawful practices include termination,
failure to promote, denial of transfer, and refusal to hire. Id. at 114. The
limitations period begins on “the date the employee is notified of an adverse
employment decision by the employer.” Davidson v. Am. Online, Inc., 337 F.3d
1179, 1187 (10th Cir. 2003); see also Del. State Coll. v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250(1980). An employee need not have notice of discriminatory motivation for the
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limitations period to begin, merely notice of the adverse decision. Davidson, 337
F.3d at 1187. When a complaint alleges multiple discrete acts, the limitations
period runs separately for each act. Id. at 1185.
Daniels received a response to each of her letters of interest informing her
they would expire on December 31 of the year they were filed. Thus, Daniels was
aware no later than January 1, 2006 she had received no promotion from her first
letter, and January 1, 2007 for the second. Daniels was required to file her claims
with the EEOC within 180 days of each date, or within 300 days if she first filed
a complaint with the relevant state agency. She did not do so, but instead waited
until November, 2008, more than 660 days after her second cause of action
accrued and more than 1,000 days after her first. Her claims therefore are time
barred.
Daniels has two responses to the time bar. First, she argues her cause of
action accrued when Liberti told her in July 2008 that UPS failed to follow its
promotion policies when it did not respond to her letters of interest. She asserts
her complaint was timely if this is the relevant trigger date. But Daniels’s
conversation with Liberti did not inform her of an adverse employment action; it
only suggests her failure to receive a promotion in 2005 and 2006 might have had
a discriminatory motivation. That kind of knowledge is not required under our
case law for a cause of action to accrue, or for the statute of limitations to begin.
Id. Thus, no cause of action accrued in July 2008.
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Second, Daniels disputes that the limitations period in these statutes applies
to her failure-to-promote claim. She asserts three theories in support of this
argument: (1) she did not file any letters expressing her interest in a promotion
after 2006 because she believed doing so would be futile; (2) UPS’s failure to
promote her was a compensation decision, so a cause of action accrued with each
paycheck; and (3) Congress statutorily overruled Morgan by overturning the
Supreme Court’s decision in Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S.
618 (2007), which applied Morgan. Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub.
L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 931 (2009).
1. Futility
A plaintiff alleging discrimination need not show he applied for a job or
promotion and was rejected if doing so would have been futile. Int’l Bhd. of
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 367 (1977). This doctrine applies in
cases where the employer has a “consistently enforced discriminatory policy” that
will deter applicants who are aware of the policy from applying because they
know they face “certain rejection.” Id. at 365. To take advantage of this rule, a
nonapplicant must show he or she “would have applied but for accurate
knowledge of an employer’s discrimination and that he would have been
discriminatorily rejected had he actually applied.” Bennett v. Quark, Inc., 258
F.3d 1220, 1228) (10th Cir. 2001) (internal citation omitted), overruled on other
grounds as explained in Boyer v. Cordant Techs., Inc., 316 F.3d 1137, 1140 (10th
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Cir. 2003). “Only in the rare case where an employer has essentially foreclosed
the interactive process through its policies or explicit actions will the futile
gesture doctrine apply.” Davoll v. Webb, 194 F.3d 1116, 1133 (10th Cir. 1999)
(applying the futile gesture doctrine to Americans with Disabilities Act
violations).
Futility does not apply here. Daniels contends she was unaware of a
potential discriminatory basis for UPS’s failure to promote her until at least July
31, 2008, when Gary Liberti acknowledged UPS had not followed its stated policy
in handling her promotion requests. Thus, Daniels’s failure to apply for a
promotion in 2007 was not due to her knowledge she would be discriminatorily
rejected had she applied.
Second, Daniels does not show UPS had a “consistently enforced
discriminatory policy” or practice of discriminating against its older or female
employees in a way that demonstrated it would be futile for her to continue
seeking a promotion. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 365. UPS’s stated
promotion policy was not discriminatory; on the contrary, Liberti’s admission that
UPS did not follow its stated policy is Daniels’s principal evidence that UPS was
motivated by discriminatory bias—but only as to her.
Third, Daniels has not pointed to evidence showing UPS engaged in a
practice of discrimination against its older or female employees. While she points
out there were no female supervisors in the James Street Station feeder
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department, she admits there were female supervisors in other departments in
James Street. She nonetheless argues female supervisors at James Street Station
were far outnumbered by male supervisors. But the fact that UPS has more male
than female supervisors at a single distribution facility is not probative of whether
the company engages in a consistent practice of discrimination unless Daniels can
show this statistic “compare[s] similarly situated individuals” and accounts for
“nondiscriminatory reasons for the numerical disparities.” Doan v. Seagate
Tech., Inc., 82 F.3d 974, 979 (10th Cir. 1996). Daniels has not made the requisite
showing.
Finally, UPS submitted evidence that several women were promoted to full-
time supervisor positions in the Kansas District in 2005 and 2006. It also
submitted evidence that several Kansas District employees over age 40 were
promoted to full-time supervisor positions during those years, including at least
one woman.
Because Daniels cannot show UPS consistently discriminated against its
older or female employees or that her failure to apply for a promotion after 2006
was based on her certainty she would be discriminatorily rejected, the futile
gesture doctrine does not cure the untimeliness of Daniels’s failure-to-promote
claim.
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2. Compensation Decision
Daniels next argues UPS’s failure to promote her was a compensation
decision, and so a cause of action accrued with every paycheck she received after
she was denied promotion. See Goodwin v. General Motors Corp., 275 F.3d
1005, 1009–10 (10th Cir. 2002). The Fair Pay Act amended Title VII and the
ADEA to add the following language:
[A]n unlawful employment practice occurs, with respect to
discrimination in compensation in violation of [Title VII and the
ADEA], . . . when an individual is affected by application of a
discriminatory compensation decision or other practice, including
each time wages, benefits, or other compensation is paid, resulting in
whole or in part from such a decision or other practice.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(3)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 626(d)(3) (emphasis added). The
language creates a cause of action to challenge a “compensation decision or other
practice” after receiving any paycheck reflecting unequal pay resulting from
certain discriminatory employment decisions. In effect, the language makes it
easier for plaintiffs to file timely claims of discrimination in compensation.
Daniels argues UPS’s failure to promote her was an “other practice” subject
to the Fair Pay Act because it affected her compensation. She asserts her failure-
to-promote claim is timely because a new cause of action arose with each
paycheck she received after UPS failed to promote her.
Daniels’s reading of the statute is foreclosed by our decision in Almond v.
Unified Sch. Dist. No. 501, 665 F.3d 1174, 1181 (10th Cir. 2011), cert. denied,
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133 S. Ct. 317 (2012). Almond examined the text and history of the Fair Pay Act
and concluded that § 2000e-5(e)(3)(A) applies only to claims of “discrimination
in compensation.” Id. And while the phrase “other practice” does not expand the
scope of the Fair Pay Act, it does help define when discrimination-in-
compensation claims accrue. Id. at 1182. As the “other practice” language makes
clear, “the accrual period for covered compensation discrimination claims is
triggered not only when the pay-setting decision takes place . . . but also when
other discriminatory employment practices . . . that result in compensation
discrimination are ‘adopted.’” Id. (emphasis in original).
This would apply to Daniels’s failure-to-promote claim only if it were one
of discrimination in compensation, but it is not. 2 As we recognized in Almond,
the Fair Pay Act did not create a “limitations revolution for any claim somehow
touching on pay.” Id. Examining Justice Ginsburg’s dissent in Ledbetter, which
the court found Congress followed when drafting and passing the Fair Pay Act,
Almond concluded that “hiring, firing, promotion, demotion, and transfer
decisions, though often touching on pay, should and do accrue as soon as they are
announced.” Id. (citing 550 U.S. at 649) (emphasis added). “[T]he phrase
‘discrimination in compensation’ means paying different wages or providing
different benefits to similarly situated employees, not promoting one employee
2
Daniels brings a separate claim for discrimination in compensation,
which we address below.
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but not another to a more remunerative position.” Schuler v.
PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP, 595 F.3d 370, 374 (D.C. Cir. 2010). The
argument Daniels advances would “potentially sweep all employment decisions
under the ‘other practice’ rubric.” Noel v. Boeing Co., 622 F.3d 266, 275 (3d Cir.
2010).
In sum, because Daniels’s failure-to-promote claim is not a compensation-
related claim, the Fair Pay Act does not make it timely.
3. Applicability of Morgan
Finally, Daniels argues Morgan’s holding—that a failure to promote is a
discrete adverse employment action with a limitations period beginning on the
date the employee learns of the action—was overruled by the Fair Pay Act. But
she presents no good reason to disregard that decision. 536 U.S. at 113–14.
Our decision in Almond recognizes the continuing vitality of this holding,
as does the Third Circuit in Noel, 622 F.3d at 275, and the D.C. Circuit in
Schuler, 595 F.3d at 375. In addition to the reasons we discussed above, we note
that had Congress intended the Fair Pay Act to overturn Morgan, it would have
said so explicitly. Noel, 622 F.3d at 275 (citing Astoria Fed. Sav. and Loan Ass’n
v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 109 (1991) (observing that “legislative repeals by
implication will not be recognized, insofar as two statutes are capable of
coexistence, absent a clearly expressed congressional intention to the contrary”)).
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Daniels cannot excuse the deadlines established by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
5(e)(1) and 29 U.S.C. § 626(d)(1), which apply to her failure-to-promote claim.
Accordingly, the district court did not err in finding her claim untimely.
B. Denial of Training
Daniels’s second claim—that UPS discriminatorily denied her training on
the twilight window, which impeded her ability to receive a promotion or perform
cover dispatch duties—is untimely for similar reasons. As with her failure-to-
promote claim, the district court found Daniels’s cause of action for denial of
training accrued in 2004 or 2005, when she said UPS canceled her training on the
twilight window and instituted a policy that only full-time supervisors could
perform dispatch duties on that window. The district court concluded her claim
was untimely because she failed to file it before the statutory deadline. 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(e)(1); 29 U.S.C. § 626(d)(1).
Daniels contends the district court erred for four reasons. First, she claims
she was denied training on the twilight window not only on these occasions, but
on later occasions within the time limitation period. Second, she reprises her Fair
Pay Act argument, claiming the denial of training affected her pay and a new
cause of action accrued with each paycheck. Third, she argues the discriminatory
effect of her denial of training—her assignment to the night window—was not
apparent until 2008, and it would have been unreasonable to expect her to sue for
discrimination before it actually occurred. Fourth, she claims Jason Isabell was
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provided training on the twilight window in 2008 while she was not, citing this as
a specific denial of training giving rise to a timely cause of action.
1. Continuing Violation
Daniels first contends UPS’s denial of training was a continuing act of
discrimination. The continuing violation doctrine allows a plaintiff to recover
“for discriminatory acts that occurred prior to the statutory limitations period if
they are part of a continuing policy or practice that includes the act or acts within
the statutory period.” Davidson, 337 F.3d at 1183 (internal quotation omitted).
But the Supreme Court has rejected the continuing violation doctrine for claims
against multiple discrete acts of discrimination, limiting its application to hostile
work environment claims. See Martinez v. Potter, 347 F.3d 1208, 1211 (10th Cir.
2003) (citing Morgan, 536 U.S. at 114). Thus, when bringing a claim alleging
discrete acts of discrimination, “a claimant must file a charge . . . within the
appropriate limitations period as to each such discrete act . . . that occurred.”
Davidson, 337 F.3d at 1184.
Nonetheless, Daniels disputes that she is barred from asserting a continuing
violation claim. She claims she was continuously denied training as part of a
discriminatory pattern or practice that began after UPS imposed a policy that only
full-time supervisors—all of whom were men—could work on the twilight
window. She argues that Morgan did not abrogate the continuing violation
doctrine for pattern-or-practice claims. See 536 U.S. at 115 n.9 (“We have no
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occasion here to consider the timely filing question with respect to ‘pattern-or-
practice’ claims brought by private litigants as none are at issue here.”).
Before addressing the merits of Daniels’s arguments, we must consider
whether her pattern-or-practice claim is properly before us. Litigants who do not
raise a claim or argument before the district court cannot do so on appeal. Hicks
v. Gates Rubber Co., 928 F.2d 966, 970 (10th Cir. 1991). Daniels alleged below
that UPS had a companywide practice of discriminating against women and those
over 40 and that all her claims arose from this policy. She also argued that her
denial-of-training claim, as with her failure-to-promote claim, was part of a
continuous pattern of discrimination that occurred with each paycheck. But she
did not specifically characterize her denial-of-training claim as a pattern-or-
practice claim, or cite UPS’s policy of only allowing full-time supervisors to
work the night window as pattern-or-practice evidence. In her brief opposing
UPS’s motion for summary judgment, Daniels argued only that her denial-of-
training claim was timely because she experienced the effects of the denial—her
transfer to the night window— during the limitations period.
We doubt that was sufficient to put the district court on notice Daniels was
attempting to bring a pattern-or-practice claim. But even if this claim is properly
before us, it does not help her. A number of circuits, including ours in an
unpublished decision, have held individual plaintiffs cannot bring pattern-or-
practice claims—only the U.S. Attorney General or a certified class can do so.
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Semsroth v. City of Wichita, 304 F. App’x 707, 715–16 (10th Cir. 2008)
(Semsroth I). Semsroth I is not binding, but we are persuaded by its reasoning, as
well as the reasoning of every other circuit that has considered this question. See
Chin v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 685 F.3d 135, 149–50 (2d Cir. 2012); Davis v.
Coca-Cola Bottling Co. Consol., 516 F.3d 955, 967 n.24 (11th Cir. 2008); Bacon
v. Honda of Am. Mfg., 370 F.3d 565, 575 (6th Cir. 2004); Celestine v. Petroleos
de Venez. SA, 266 F.3d 343, 355–56 (5th Cir. 2001); Lowery v. Circuit City
Stores, Inc., 158 F.3d 742, 760–62 (4th Cir. 1998), vacated on other grounds, 527
U.S. 1031 (1999); Babrocky v. Jewel Food Co., 773 F.2d 857, 866 n.6 (7th Cir.
1985).
Pattern-or-practice claims derive from 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6(a), which
empowers the Attorney General to bring a discrimination claim against an
employer on behalf of a protected class. Semsroth I, 304 F. App’x 715. The
Supreme Court extended these types of claims to private class actions, Int’l Bhd.
of Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 357–60, but it has never extended them to cases brought
by individuals. Pattern-or-practice claims, “by their very nature, involve claims
of classwide discrimination, . . . and [Daniels], while attacking [a policy] that
would have affected all of [UPS’s] women employees as a class, [has] stated only
[her] individual claims, not a class action.” Babrocky, 773 F.2d at 866 n.6.
In addition, the method of proof for a pattern-or-practice claim differs from
that used for individual discrimination claims, which are analyzed under the
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burden-shifting McDonnell Douglas framework. Bacon, 370 F.3d at 575 (citing
McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802). The pattern-or-practice method of proof
does not address individual employment decisions, but rather seeks to prove the
existence of “a pattern of discriminatory decisionmaking.” Thiessen v. General
Electric Capital Corp., 267 F.3d 1095, 1106 (10th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation
omitted). Proving an employer had such a policy does not prove individual
employment decisions were discriminatory, although such evidence might be
relevant to individual claims under the McDonnell Douglas framework. Bacon,
370 F.3d at 575; see also Jones v. UPS, Inc., 502 F.3d 1176, 1188 (10th Cir.
2007). Like these cases, we conclude individual plaintiffs such as Daniels may
not bring pattern-or-practice claims.
Daniels argues this is inconsistent with our holding in Jones, which she
claims allows individual plaintiffs to bring pattern-or-practice claims. But in that
case, the plaintiff did not raise a pattern-or-practice claim. 502 F.3d at 1188 n.5.
Rather, he attempted to introduce evidence of an allegedly discriminatory UPS
policy to prove UPS was motivated by discrimination when it refused to allow
him to return to work after an injury. Id. at 1188. Although Jones implied in
dicta that the individual plaintiff might have been able to raise a pattern-or-
practice claim, it did not actually address this question. Id. (suggesting that had
the plaintiff raised a pattern-or-practice claim, the court might agree with the
district court that the plaintiff had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies
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for such a claim). Instead, Jones held the plaintiff could introduce the policy as
circumstantial evidence to support his claim of individualized discrimination. Id.at 1188–89. In other words, Jones supports Daniels’s right to introduce evidence
of a companywide policy against training women or older employees, but it does
not support her attempt to raise a pattern-or-practice claim arising from her denial
of training on the twilight window.
Because we hold Daniels is barred from raising a pattern-or-practice claim,
she can employ the continuing violation theory only if her denial of training was
not a discrete act. But as the district court observed, one of the claims Morgan
labeled a discrete act was a denial-of-training claim. 536 U.S. at 114–15. Thus,
Daniels cannot take advantage of the continuing violation theory to make her
claim timely.
2. Compensation Decision
Daniels’s argument that her denial of training was a compensation decision
that had continuing effect on her pay fails for the reasons we discussed above
concerning her failure-to-promote claim.
3. Present Discriminatory Effects
Daniels’s third argument is that she was not required to file a claim
challenging UPS’s decision to deny her training on the twilight window until she
experienced injury from that action. She claims this occurred in July 2008, when
UPS permanently assigned her to the night window and promoted Jason Isabell to
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cover dispatch. Daniels argues UPS promoted Isabell to this position because he
knew how to run dispatch on the twilight window and she did not, as a result of
her denied training.
Once again, a discrimination claim does not accrue when the plaintiff feels
the full effects of the discrimination, but when the discrete act occurs. Davidson,
337 F.3d at 1188; Hulsey v. Kmart, Inc., 43 F.3d 555, 559 (10th Cir. 1994).
Daniels argues Davidson is distinguishable, but other than claiming the opinion
involves a different factual scenario and is misguided, she does not explain how.
Daniels also argues the Supreme Court recently cast doubt on the rule that
the present effects of past actions cannot lead to Title VII liability. See Lewis v.
City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 2191, 2199 (2010). This is not correct. Lewis
affirmed the rule that the present effects of past actions cannot lead to Title VII
liability for claims requiring discriminatory intent, including disparate treatment
claims such as Daniels’s failure-to-train claim. Id. For these claims, a plaintiff
must still demonstrate a violation within the limitations period. Id. Lewis
abrogated this rule only for claims with no intent requirement, such as disparate
impact claims. Id.Thus, it is irrelevant that Daniels did not experience the full effects of her
denial of training until 2008. The denial occurred in 2004 or 2005, and Daniels
knew then that UPS had no female supervisors in the James Street Station feeder
division who could run the twilight window under UPS’s announced policy.
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Daniels was required to file her EEOC complaint within 300 days of the policy
change, not after she was assigned to the night window.
4. Jason Isabell’s Training
Finally, Daniels argues Jason Isabell was provided training in 2008, while
she was not, and argues her complaint was timely as to this event. UPS claims
this argument was waived because Daniels did not raise it below.
Daniels argued in her response to UPS’s summary judgment motion that
Isabell was provided training that was denied to her. But she never argued Isabell
was provided training in 2008, let alone that this was a specific instance of
training denied to her, or that her complaint was timely as to this instance.
Accordingly, this argument has been waived. Hicks, 928 F.2d at 970.
But even if this argument were properly before us, the record does not
support Daniels’s position. She cites to nothing in the record stating Isabell was
trained in 2008. 3 On the contrary, there is evidence Isabell already knew how to
perform the twilight window duties by 2006.
Daniels alleges she was denied training on the twilight window in 2004 or
2005. This was a discrete act, and she should have filed a claim challenging this
within 300 days. Daniels does not allege she requested training after that date or
3
The citation Daniels provides, to R. Vol. III at 503 ¶ 19, does not support
her claim. This paragraph merely states Isabell was the twilight window yard
control supervisor from 2003 until July 2008, and while Isabell held this position
he worked with twilight dispatchers and attempted to learn their duties.
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was specifically denied such training within the 300 days before she filed her
EEOC complaint.
For all of these reasons, the district court correctly found the denial-of-
training claim was untimely.
C. Reassignment
Daniels also contends UPS discriminated on the basis of her sex and age by
permanently assigning her to night dispatcher and assigning a younger male to the
cover dispatch position. UPS argues Daniels cannot establish a prima facie case
of discrimination arising from this event because her assignment to the night
window was not an adverse employment action.
“[R]eassignment of job duties is not automatically actionable.” Burlington
Northern and Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 71 (2006). “Whether a
particular reassignment is materially adverse depends upon the circumstances of
the particular case, and should be judged from the perspective of a reasonable
person in the plaintiff’s position, considering all the circumstances.” Id.(internal quotation omitted). An adverse employment action is a “significant
change in employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote,
reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a
significant change in benefits.” Piercy v. Maketa, 480 F.3d 1192, 1203 (10th Cir.
2007) (internal quotation omitted) (emphasis added). The question then is
whether Daniels’s reassignment was a sufficiently significant change to qualify.
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Daniels claims to have introduced evidence showing the cover position was
more prestigious, had better working conditions, and provided more advancement
opportunities. She argues it is objectively reasonable to prefer working during
the day or the evening to working at night. Further, she argues UPS has
effectively conceded the cover position was meaningfully different from the night
window because it required a full-time supervisor to work the twilight window.
The record citations Daniels provides to support her arguments are
unhelpful. She cites several pieces of evidence showing she informed her various
managers that she disliked working the night window and disliked working
holidays. She cites to a statement by a former manager who, when asked whether
Daniels was demoted by being moved to the night window, said what was done to
her “wasn’t right.” R., Vol. V, at 884. And while she points to some evidence
discussing the various duties of the different dispatch windows, all this shows is
that dispatchers working the different windows had different duties. There may
be some merit to the contention that the twilight window was more desirable in
that UPS allowed only full-time supervisors to cover that window, but Daniels
does not dispute that she could not perform all duties on the twilight window and
did not work the twilight window when she was the cover dispatcher.
We acknowledge that many employees would find working the day shift
preferable to the night shift. But this does not establish an assignment to the
night shift is sufficiently material to constitute a significant change in
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employment status or responsibilities. In McGowan v. City of Eufala, 472 F.3d
736, 742–43 (10th Cir. 2006), we discussed an employee’s claim that her
employer’s denial of a transfer to the day shift was a materially adverse
employment action. We reasoned that the shifts “offered no differences in pay
and benefits, nor was the night shift more arduous” and found the employee
desired the transfer “purely for personal reasons.” Id. at 743. We concluded the
denial was not material. Id.As in McGowan, we cannot conclude Daniels suffered an adverse
employment action when she was assigned to the night window. Daniels’s job
classification did not change when she was assigned to the night window, nor was
her salary decreased. Although she claims she did not like working the night
window, that preference is different from showing her assignment was an
objective demotion. Id. And though dispatchers working the different windows
had different duties, Daniels did not introduce any evidence showing the dispatch
duties differed significantly. In addition, the record shows Daniels spent a good
deal of her time as cover dispatcher actually working the night window, including
most of the year before her assignment to that shift was made permanent. Thus,
when Daniels was permanently assigned to the night window in July 2008, her
duties did not actually change in a material way.
Accordingly, Daniels did not suffer an adverse employment action when
she was permanently assigned to the night window.
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D. Discriminatory Job Classification
Daniels next alleges she performed the same duties as full-time supervisors,
all of whom were male and younger, but was classified as a dispatch specialist
and paid at a lower rate, in violation of Title VII, the ADEA, and the EPA. The
district court analyzed her Title VII and ADEA claims separately from her EPA
claims, but concluded that under either standard, Daniels failed to make out a
prima facie case of wage discrimination because her duties were insufficiently
similar to those performed by supervisors. 4
The McDonnell Douglas framework also applies to wage discrimination
claims under Title VII and the ADEA. Mickelson v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 460 F.3d
1304, 1311 (10th Cir. 2006). Under that framework Daniels must make out a
prima facie case of discrimination by showing (1) she is a member of a protected
class, which is not disputed, and (2) she occupied a job similar to higher paid jobs
occupied by younger or male employees. 5 Id. If she can make this showing, UPS
4
The district court concluded that because Daniels could not meet Title
VII’s requirement of showing she was paid less than males performing similar
work, she also could not meet the EPA’s stricter standard of showing she was
paid less than males performing “substantially equal work.” Mickelson v. N.Y.
Life Ins. Co., 460 F.3d 1304, 1311 (10th Cir. 2006). The parties do not dispute
that if Daniels’s Title VII discriminatory compensation claim fails for this reason,
her EPA claim will fail as well.
5
Daniels argues the district court applied the wrong standard to her claim,
holding she had to perform the same work as better-compensated younger males
to make her prima facie case, whereas Title VII requires only that she perform
similar work. County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 178–79, 181
(continued...)
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assumes the burden of articulating a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the
disparity. Id. If it can do so, Daniels assumes the burden of demonstrating UPS’s
stated reasons are pretextual. Id.Daniels argues she should be compared to full-time supervisors because she
performed the same or very similar duties. But if Daniels’s duties were not
sufficiently similar to those of full-time supervisors in her department, her
position would compare only with other dispatch specialists, and she does not
assert she was paid less than other dispatch specialists, let alone any who were
younger or male.
Were Daniels’s duties the same or similar to those of full-time supervisors?
Daniels’s counsel conceded at oral argument they were not, and the record
supports this. It is true Daniels performed some supervisory duties, including
giving drivers instructions, performing dispatch duties without a supervisor, hand-
delivering certain packages, and supervising two part-time administrative
assistants. But UPS classified dispatch specialists as entry-level managers, so it
follows that Daniels had some supervisory responsibilities. That minor overlap
does not create substantial similarity. To the contrary, no evidence suggests she
5
(...continued)
(1981). But the district court recited the correct standard, finding Daniels’s Title
VII and ADEA claims failed not because she did not perform the same work, but
because, “while she did perform some of the same responsibilities as full-time
supervisors in the feeder department, there were significant responsibilities she
did not perform.” R. Vol. IX at 1809 (emphasis added).
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performed other tasks assigned to UPS supervisors, including training and
evaluating subordinates and working the twilight window. 6
Daniels’s former manager, Mic Haynes, also said she did not perform the
same duties as a full-time supervisor. She handled a lower volume of traffic than
full-time supervisors, could not discipline subordinates, and could not handle the
twilight window by herself. While Daniels may have been able to work the
twilight window had she been trained to do so, the focus of our inquiry is the
duties Daniels actually performed, not the duties she could have performed had
she received additional training. Daniels’s counsel conceded this point at oral
argument, admitting Daniels needed additional training to work the twilight
window.
On this evidence, the work Daniels performed was not sufficiently similar
to that performed by full-time supervisors because, while she performed some of
the same duties, there were significant duties she did not perform. In Sprague v.
Thorn Ams., 129 F.3d 1355, 1363 (10th Cir. 1997), we considered a similar claim
by an employee who alleged she performed the same work as assistant managers
6
UPS also claims there is no evidence Daniels disciplined subordinates.
But William Sifuentes, a UPS driver, said in his deposition testimony that
dispatchers could discipline him. The only example he provides is that on one
occasion Jason Isabell told him not to file an injury report. He also admitted that
he did not know Isabell’s title, that Isabell never trained him or evaluated him,
and that someone else was his actual supervisor. This evidence is conflicting, but
construing it in Daniels’s favor, it shows that dispatchers at least occasionally
disciplined some subordinates.
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but was paid less. The employee in Sprague also performed tasks similar to those
performed by assistant managers, but we concluded she had much less experience
and fewer responsibilities than the assistant managers, and also did not perform
all the functions in her department the assistant managers performed in theirs. Id.We see no reason to reach a different result here.
Because Daniels cannot show she occupied a position similar to that of
higher-paid males under Title VII and the ADEA, she also cannot meet the EPA’s
stricter standard of showing she was paid less than males performing substantially
equal work. And because Daniels did not establish a prima facie case of wage
discrimination, we need not address whether UPS articulated a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for the disparity or whether Daniels introduced evidence
this reason was a pretext for discrimination.
E. Retaliation
Finally, Daniels contends that after she filed her EEOC complaint in
November, 2008, she suffered retaliation from her superiors at UPS. Specifically,
she alleges (1) UPS managers threatened her by claiming she was incorrectly
recording her time; (2) her manager significantly decreased his business
communication with her, making it difficult for her to do her job; and (3) UPS
failed to investigate her internal complaint of discrimination.
As with Daniels’s other Title VII and ADEA claims, we assess her
retaliation claims under the McDonnell Douglas framework. 411 U.S. at 802–04.
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To make out her prima facie case, Daniels must show (1) “she engaged in
protected opposition to discrimination, (2) a reasonable employee would have
considered the challenged employment action materially adverse, and (3) a causal
connection existed between the protected activity and the materially adverse
action.” Hinds v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 523 F.3d 1187, 1202 (10th Cir. 2008).
To be materially adverse, an action must be sufficient to “dissuade[] a
reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.” White,
548 U.S. at 68 (internal citation omitted). This requires injury rising to a “level
of seriousness.” Williams v. W.D. Sports, N.M., Inc., 497 F.3d 1079, 1087 (10th
Cir. 2007) (internal quotation omitted). While the employer’s conduct need not
affect the terms and conditions of employment, White, 548 U.S. at 64, the inquiry
is an objective one, and not based on a “plaintiff’s personal feelings.” Semsroth
v. City of Wichita, 555 F.3d 1182, 1184 (10th Cir. 2009) (Semsroth II).
1. Time Recording
Daniels’s first contention is that her manager, Dooley, and HR manager
Liberti falsely accused her of misrepresenting her hours in her time records. At a
meeting discussing her EEOC complaint in February 2009, Dooley told Daniels
that UPS was concerned she was not accurately recording her time. Later that
month, Liberti called her into another meeting to discuss her EEOC complaint.
During this meeting, Liberti informed her there were discrepancies in her time
records and warned Daniels to keep accurate time records. He also reportedly
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“slapped” Daniels’s EEOC intake questionnaire during the meeting and asked her,
“Well, do you want me to get the EEOC down here?” R., Vol. V, at 831–32.
The district court found Liberti’s statements were merely warnings and
would not have dissuaded a reasonable employee from pursuing a discrimination
claim. The court reasoned Liberti’s warnings had no effect on Daniels’s salary,
benefits, or working conditions and Daniels was not otherwise disciplined. See
Haynes v. Level 3 Commc’ns, LLC, 456 F.3d 1215, 1224 (10 th Cir. 2006) (holding
a written warning is not an adverse employment action if it does not cause a
significant change in employment status).
Daniels argues the district court applied the incorrect standard when it
found she needed to show evidence of a materially adverse employment action.
She points out that under White, an employer’s action need not affect the terms
and conditions of employment to be considered retaliatory, contrary to the district
court’s analysis. 548 U.S. at 64; see also Argo v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of
Kan., Inc., 452 F.3d 1193, 1202 n.2 (10th Cir. 2006) (acknowledging White does
not require an adverse employment action).
But even if the district court applied the wrong standard, we still must
analyze her claim under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework.
Under that framework, her claim fails if UPS can articulate a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory motive. Here it did so. It introduced evidence that a month
before Daniels met Dooley and Liberti, the company audited the time records of a
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number of employees suspected of keeping inaccurate time, including Daniels.
This audit was part of a wider effort to get employees to take legally required
breaks and had nothing to do with Daniels or her EEOC complaint.
Daniels admits her time records did not always reflect the time she actually
worked. And she admits she was never disciplined, demoted, or otherwise
punished for these discrepancies. But she claims her supervisors did not permit
her to take breaks because there was no one to cover for her and also forced her to
record break and meal times. She claims this led to discrepancies in her
timekeeping.
Because UPS has articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory motive for its
actions, the burden shifts back to Daniels to show this reason was a pretext for
discriminatory animus. To show pretext, Daniels must produce evidence showing
weakness, implausibility, inconsistency, incoherency, or contradiction in UPS’s
stated reasons, such that a reasonable jury could find them unconvincing. Morgan
v. Hilti, Inc., 108 F.3d 1319, 1323 (10th Cir. 1997).
Daniels claims she introduced evidence of pretext by pointing out that UPS
forced her and other employees to work through their breaks and inaccurately
record their time. She claims her situation is analogous to the facts in Trujillo v.
PacifiCorp, 524 F.3d 1149, 1158–60 (10th Cir. 2008).
Trujillo is distinguishable. In that case, we held the plaintiffs introduced
sufficient evidence that their firing for timecard violations was pretextual. Id. at
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1159. The primary evidence was that PacifiCorp had disciplined employees
accused of other serious violations, but had terminated the plaintiffs. Id. at
1158–59. The court also credited evidence that the procedure PacifiCorp used to
audit the plaintiffs’ timecards was flawed. Id. at 1159.
By contrast, Daniels was not fired or even disciplined. This is unnecessary
under White, but it distinguishes Daniels’s case from Trujillo. Daniels also
introduced no evidence UPS used a flawed method to evaluate her time records.
On the contrary, she conceded UPS’s conclusions were accurate. And here, UPS
audited a number of its employees’ time records and did not single anyone out.
Furthermore, Daniels admits UPS not only told her to record her breaks, but
also told her to actually take those breaks, telling her to get an administrative
assistant to fill in for her if necessary. This undermines her claim that she was
forced to inaccurately record her time. And many of the emails from UPS
management to Daniels and other employees discussing timekeeping were sent
before Daniels filed her EEOC complaint.
Daniels does not show she was singled out or treated differently from other
employees who were told to take breaks, and whose time records were audited.
Nor does she introduce any evidence undermining UPS’s explanation such that a
reasonable jury could find UPS’s efforts related to employee breaks and
timekeeping was a ruse to cover for its retaliation against Daniels, rather than
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what it claimed to be—an attempt to get employees to take legally required
breaks.
In sum, Daniels fails to demonstrate UPS’s legitimate explanation for its
actions is a pretext for retaliation.
2. Decrease in Communications
Daniels next claims that immediately after she filed her EEOC complaint,
she noticed a significant drop in business communications from her manager,
Dooley. She claims this amounted to retaliation because it professionally isolated
her and interfered with her ability to do her job. The district court found that
even if Dooley reduced his communications with Daniels, this amounted to a
mere snub or slight and was too minor to be actionable retaliation.
As a preliminary matter, we must address UPS’s claim that Daniels cannot
assert a retaliatory harassment claim on appeal because she did not raise this
claim before the district court. Daniels did not raise a claim of retaliatory
harassment below, merely a claim of retaliation. To the extent she attempts to
raise such a claim for the first time on appeal, she is barred from doing so. Hicks,
928 F.2d at 970.
As for Daniels’s pure retaliation claim, her arguments are without merit.
She contends that just because she was able to continue performing her duties on
the less-demanding night window, this does not show Dooley’s actions were not
isolating and coercive. But Daniels stated that Dooley’s decrease in
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communications did not affect her ability to do her job. Even though, under
White, a retaliatory action need not affect a plaintiff’s employment status, 548
U.S. at 64, whether Dooley’s decreased communications interfered with Daniels’s
ability to do her job is probative of whether the decrease was serious enough to
dissuade a reasonable worker from filing or pursuing a discrimination claim.
Williams, 497 F.3d at 1087. The fact that Daniels continued to perform her duties
satisfactorily is evidence Dooley’s decreased communications were not materially
adverse.
She also argues UPS did not provide a nondiscriminatory explanation for
Dooley’s behavior, but it was not required to do so because Daniels did not
establish a prima facie case of retaliation related to this claim. Accordingly,
Daniels did not make out a prima facie case of retaliation because she did not
establish that Dooley’s decrease in communications rose above the level of a mere
slight or snub. White, 548 U.S. at 68.
3. Failure to Investigate
Daniels’s final retaliation claim is that UPS, specifically HR manager
Liberti, did not investigate the internal discrimination complaint she filed in
August 2008. UPS denies she made such a complaint, but for purposes of this
appeal we assume she did. It is undisputed that Liberti never followed up with
Daniels after she filed this complaint. The district court found this was not
retaliatory.
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We agree that failure to investigate an internal complaint cannot be
considered retaliatory in the circumstances here. As the Second Circuit
concluded in Fincher v. Depository Trust & Clearing Corp., 604 F.3d 712 (2d
Cir. 2010), a failure to investigate a complaint, unless it leads to demonstrable
harm, leaves an employee no worse off than before the complaint was filed. Id. at
721–22. And, as the court noted, adopting a contrary rule and finding a failure to
investigate establishes a prima facie case of retaliation would open employers to
retaliation claims even where they failed to investigate because of a good faith
belief the complaint was meritless. 7 Id.Daniels complains UPS’s failure to investigate was intended to dissuade her
from pursuing the complaint. But she does not explain how this failure made it
more difficult for her to pursue her claims with the EEOC or otherwise assert her
rights. And she does not allege she suffered any other harm from Liberti’s failure
to investigate her internal complaint.
Furthermore, the cases Daniels cites do not support her argument that a
failure to investigate an internal complaint is in itself retaliatory. In an
unpublished case, McInerney v. United Air Lines, Inc., the plaintiff filed an
7
We note Fincher was careful to distinguish the claim in that case—that
failing to investigate a complaint was retaliation for filing the same complaint
—from a case where a failure to investigate a complaint is alleged to be
retaliation for a separate protected act. 604 F.3d at 722. We have no occasion
here to decide whether a failure to investigate a complaint in that context could be
considered retaliatory.
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internal discrimination complaint and was then terminated. 463 F. App’x 709,
718 (10th Cir. 2011). But in that case the plaintiff alleged her termination was
retaliatory, not that the failure to investigate was. Id. McInerney considered the
defendant’s failure to investigate only to the extent it supported the plaintiff’s
assertion that her termination was retaliatory— in other words, as pretext
evidence. Id. That is not the case here.
Based on the foregoing, we hold Daniels cannot establish a prima facie case
of retaliation for Liberti’s failure to investigate.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the order of the district court
granting summary judgment to UPS.
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